Contract Size and Small Firm Competition in Public Procurement
(English)Manuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
The European Commission encourages public authorities to split procurement contracts into multiple contracts in order to increase the competiveness of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). In this paper, I use data from Swedish public procurement auctions for internal regular cleaning service contracts to study the effect of contract size and number of contracts on SME participation and the probability of submitting the winning bid. I found that SME participation is negatively related to both contract size and the number of contracts in the procurement. A possible interpretation is that reduced contract size in order to stimulate SME participation is counteracted by reduced incentives for them to enter into procurements with multiple contracts. Medium-sized firms are also more successful when bidding for smaller contracts relative to large firms. Nevertheless, the results indicate that the SMEs’ award rate is positively correlated with the number of contracts in the procurement.
Procurement design, Split-award, Endogenous entry, Small and medium sized enterprises
Research subject Economics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-107915OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-107915DiVA: diva2:849659
Manuskriptet tidigare publicerat i serien: Umeå Economic Studies; Nr 914, Tuesday, August 25, 2015.2015-08-302015-08-302015-09-01Bibliographically approved