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Motivational Internalism
Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3112-0673
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2015 (English)Collection (editor) (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Motivational internalism—the thesis that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation—is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it has provided a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality, and versions of internalism have been seen as having implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on theories of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly relevant to wider issues in moral psychology. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism have also been seen as a problem for non-cognitivists. This volume is meant to help people appreciate the state of the art of research on internalism, to see connections between various aspects of the debate, and to deepen the discussion of a number of central aspects. The introductory chapter provides a structured overview of the debate with a focus on the last two decades or so, distinguishing several important threads and trends in recent developments. The 13 chapters of original research are divided into three parts. The essays in the first part focus on what evidence there is for or against various versions of internalism, those in the second on the relevance of versions of internalism for wider metaethical issues, and those in the third develop different ways of accommodating both internalist and externalist aspects of moral practice.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford University Press, 2015.
Keyword [en]
motivational internalism, externalism, moral psychology, objectivism, cognitivism, non-cognitivism, non-naturalism, rationalism, amoralists
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Research subject
Ethics; Practical Philosophy
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-113803DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.001.0001ISBN: 9780199367955OAI: diva2:890352
Swedish Research Council
Available from: 2016-01-03 Created: 2016-01-03 Last updated: 2016-01-11Bibliographically approved

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Björnsson, Gunnar
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Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies

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