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Diagreement, correctness, and the evidence for metaethical absolutism
Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.ORCID iD: 0000-0003-3112-0673
2015 (English)In: Oxford Studies in Metaethics / [ed] Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Metaethical absolutism is the view that moral concepts have non-relative satisfaction conditions that are constant across judges and their particular beliefs, attitudes, and cultural embedding. Two related premises underpin the argument for absolutism: (1) that moral thinking and discourse display a number of features that are characteristically found in paradigmatically absolutist domains, and only partly in uncontroversially non-absolutist domains; and (2) that the best way of making sense of these features is to assume that absolutism is correct. This chapter defends the prospect of a non-absolutist explanation of these “absolutist” features, thus calling into question the second premise. The chapter proposes independently motivated general accounts of attributions of agreement, disagreement, correctness, and incorrectness that can explain both why absolutist domains display all “absolutist” features and why these non-absolutist domains display some, and thus provides preliminary reasons to think that these features of moral discourse can be given a non-absolutist explanation.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Series
, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, 10
Keyword [en]
metaethical absolutism, moral concepts, moral discourse, agreement, disagreement
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-113804DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198738695.003.0007ISBN: 9780198738701OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-113804DiVA: diva2:890353
Funder
Swedish Research Council
Available from: 2016-01-03 Created: 2016-01-03 Last updated: 2016-01-14Bibliographically approved

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Björnsson, Gunnar
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Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies
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