Motivational Internalism: Contemporary Debates
2015 (English)In: Motivational Internalism / [ed] Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, 1-25 p.Chapter in book (Refereed)
Motivational internalism—the idea that moral judgments are intrinsically or necessarily connected to motivation—has played a central role in metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, internalism has provided a challenge for theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality, and versions of internalism have been seen as having implications for moral absolutism, realism, and rationalism. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism have also been seen as a problem for non-cognitivists. The last decades have seen a number of developments of internalist positions and arguments for and against internalism. This chapter provides a structured overview of the more important themes, including the development of new forms of conditional internalism, deferred internalism, and non-constitutional internalism, as well as the emergence of empirically-based arguments and new forms of a posteriori internalism.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. 1-25 p.
, Oxford Moral Theory
motivational internalism, amoralist, non-cognitivism, objectivism, rationalism, conditional internalism, deferred internalism, non-constitutional internalism, a posteriori internalism
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-113805DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199367955.003.0001ISBN: 9780199367955OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-113805DiVA: diva2:890377
FunderSwedish Research Council