Enoch’s Defense of Robust Meta-Ethical Realism
2016 (English)In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 13, no 1, 101-112 p.Article in journal (Other academic) Published
Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch’s book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch’s position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central passages. We focus on Enoch’s two original posi-tive arguments for non-naturalist realism, one argument building on first order moral implications of different meta-ethical positions, the other attending to the rational commitment to normative facts inherent in practical deliberation. We also pay special attention to Enoch’s handling of two types of objections to non-naturalist realism, objec-tions having to do with the possibility of moral knowledge and with moral disagreement.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. Vol. 13, no 1, 101-112 p.
non-naturalism, David Enoch, normativity, realism, moral skepticism, meta-ethics, disagreement
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-113810DOI: 10.1163/17455243-01301001OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-113810DiVA: diva2:890382
FunderSwedish Research Council