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Race to the top in traffic calming
Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Centre for Regional Science (CERUM).ORCID iD: 0000-0002-2697-1062
KU Leuven.
2015 (English)In: Papers in regional science (Print), ISSN 1056-8190, E-ISSN 1435-5957Article in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

We study the competition of two suburbs facing transit traffic flows. The suburbs are substitutes for transit traffic. In the absence of toll measures, the symmetric Nash equilibrium with two local governments leads to a race to the top in traffic calming measures that increases the cost of travel. The Nash equilibrium is compared to two types of centralized decisions: the symmetric solution and the asymmetric solution. The asymmetric solution that concentrates all transit traffic in one suburb is better but can only be realized if the authority over the local roads is transferred to the central authority.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Keyword [en]
Transport, externalities, traffic calming, multi-level government, regulation
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Research subject
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-113997DOI: 10.1111/pirs.12196OAI: diva2:892446
Available from: 2016-01-10 Created: 2016-01-10 Last updated: 2016-05-26

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Westin, Jonas
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