The Competition Effect in a Public Procurement Model: An error-in-variables approach
2016 (English)Report (Other academic)
Auction theory suggests that as the number of bidders (competition) increases, the sizes of the participants’ bids decrease. An issue in the empirical literature on auctions is which measurement(s) of competition to use. Utilizing a dataset on public procurements containing measurements on both the actual and potential number of bidders I find that a workhorse model of public procurements is best fitted to data using only actual bidders as measurement for competition. Acknowledging that all measurements of competition may be erroneous, I propose an instrumental variable estimator that (given my data) brings about a competition effect bounded by those generated from models using the actual and potential number of bidders, respectively. Also, some asymptotic results are provided for non-linear least squares estimators obtained from a dependent variable transformation model.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. , 33 p.
Umeå economic studies, ISSN 0348-1018 ; 920
dependent variable transformation model, instrumental variable, measurement error, non-linear least squares
Research subject Econometrics; Economics
IdentifiersURN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-114556OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-114556DiVA: diva2:897195