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Taking Morality Seriously
Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
2016 (English)In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 13, no 1, 101-112 p.Article, review/survey (Refereed) PublishedText
Abstract [en]

Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch's book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch's position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central passages. We focus on Enoch's two original positive arguments for non-naturalist realism, one argument building on first order moral implications of different meta-ethical positions, the other attending to the rational commitment to normative facts inherent in practical deliberation. We also pay special attention to Enoch's handling of two types of objections to non-naturalist realism, objections having to do with the possibility of moral knowledge and with moral disagreement.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2016. Vol. 13, no 1, 101-112 p.
Keyword [en]
David Enoch, non-naturalism, realism, meta-ethics, normativity, moral skepticism, disagreement
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-116095DOI: 10.1163/17455243-01301001ISI: 000368153000005OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-116095DiVA: diva2:901598
Available from: 2016-02-08 Created: 2016-02-08 Last updated: 2016-02-08Bibliographically approved

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Björnsson, Gunnar
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Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies
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