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This article examines how political factors influence anti-immigrant attitudes by focusing on political articulation performed by political parties active at the national level in 26 European countries. Multi-level analysis reveals a significant positive association between general party articulation and anti-immigrant attitudes. In particular, it seems to be when traditional right- or left-wing parties articulate that attitudes towards immigrants turn increasingly negative. Left-leaning individuals are particularly influenced when parties belonging to the political left raise these issues, which indicates that the ideological position of the individual functions as a mediating factor in this regard. The results contribute to a broader understanding of the role of political factors and underscore the importance of their inclusion in cross-national studies of anti-immigrant attitudes.

This study examines whether political frames influence anti-immigrant attitudes among native populations in 21 European countries, and if this relationship is somehow moderated by personal experiences of intergroup contact. Using data from the Comparative Manifesto Project and European Social Survey, two indicators of intergroup contact are tested: immigrant friends and immigrant colleagues, to see whether they can counter the effectof nationalistic political framing. The analysis reveals a positive relationship between nationalistic frames and anti-immigrant attitudes that is moderated by experiences of intergroup contact. In this sense, extensive contact with immigrants seems to inoculate individuals against political influences. The results contribute to a better understanding of both the role of political contexts and of the consequences of intergroup contact.

This article tests a theoretically assumed relationship between the parliamentary presence of extreme right parties (ERP) and anti-immigration attitudes over time. Data come from six rounds of the European Social Survey between 2002 and 2012 and cover the 16 European countries that participated in all rounds during this time. Using multi-level models with applications for repeated cross-sectional data, the study examines the implications of changes tied to the political advancements of the extreme right with a focus on three possible scenarios: people’s attitudes about immigration have generally become more negative, opposition towards immigration has become more dependent on immigrants’ ethnicity, and attitudes towards immigration have become more polarized. Contrary to expectations, it is found that neither the presence, the representational strength, nor the nationalistic framing of an ERP affect opposition towards immigration over time. Thus, the conclusion is that the ERPs, so far, have not driven anti-immigration attitudes in Europe. Possible explanations for these results are discussed in the concluding section.

This article approaches two shortcomings in previous research on religiosity and prejudice: (1) the lack of cross-country comparative studies; and (2) a failure to consider any moderating effects of religious contexts. We examine whether the relationship between religiosity and anti-immigration attitudes varies depending on religious contexts in Europe, and we find two things. First, strongly religious people are on average less likely to oppose immigration than non-religious people. Second, different religious contexts moderate the religiosity–attitude relationship in that religious people in Protestant countries and in countries with a low proportion of majority adherents are more tolerant than religious people in Catholic countries and in religiously homogenous countries. State policies also matter in that religious people are more negative where the government favours the majority religion. This calls into question the taken-for-granted understanding of religiosity and out-group attitudes found in the USA.