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  • 1.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Department of Economics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
    Optimal taxation, global externalities and Labor mobility2003In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 87, no 12, 2749-2764 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns transboundary environmental problems in the context of an optimal tax model. We assume that part of the labor force is mobile across countries, and that the set of tax instruments includes a nonlinear income tax and a commodity tax on the ‘dirty’ good that is causing damage to the environment. The purpose is to compare the (globally optimal) second best policy of a cooperative equilibrium with the policy implicit in a noncooperative equilibrium. We show that the commodity taxes differ between equilibria because of: (i) transboundary externalities not internalized by national governments, (ii) interaction effects between environmental and other policies, and (iii) labor mobility.

  • 2.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Cialani, Catia
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Genuine saving and the social cost of taxation2012In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 96, no 1-2, 211-217 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Following the 1987 report by The World Commission on Environment and Development, the genuine saving has come to play a key role in the context of sustainable development, and the World Bank regularly publishes numbers for genuine saving on a national basis. However, these numbers are typically calculated as if the tax system is non-distortionary. This paper presents an analogue to genuine saving in a second best economy, where the government raises revenue by means of distortionary taxation. We show how the social cost of public debt, which depends on the marginal excess burden, ought to be reflected in the genuine saving. By presenting calculations for Greece, Japan, Portugal, U.K., U.S. and OECD average, we also show that the numbers published by the World Bank are likely to be biased and may even give incorrect information as to whether the economy is locally sustainable.

  • 3.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Keeping up with the Joneses, the Smiths and the Tanakas: on international tax coordination and social comparisons2015In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 131, 71-86 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Recent evidence suggests that social comparisons between people in different countries have become more important over time due to globalization. This paper deals with optimal nonlinear income taxation in an international setting, where consumers derive utility from their relative consumption compared both with other domestic residents and people in another country. The optimal tax policy in our framework reflects both correction for positional externalities and redistributive aspects of such correction due to the incentive constraint facing each government. If the national governments behave as Nash competitors to each other, the resulting tax policy only internalizes the externalities that are due to within-country comparisons, whereas the tax policy chosen by the leader country in a Stackelberg game also to some extent reflects between-country comparisons. We also derive globally Pareto-efficient tax policies in a cooperative framework, and conclude that there are potentially large welfare gains of international tax policy coordination.

  • 4.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Göteborg, Sweden.
    When the Joneses’ consumption hurts: Optimal public good provision and nonlinear income taxation2008In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 92, no 5-6, 986-997 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper considers a model with nonlinear income taxation and public good provision when people care about their relative consumption compared to others. The standard optimality expressions are modified by terms that reflect the extent to which people care about relative consumption. The extent to which the public good provision rule should be modified is shown to depend critically on the preference elicitation format. The modified tax formulas imply substantially higher marginal income tax rates than in the conventional case, under plausible assumptions and available empirical estimates regarding comparison consumption concerns.

  • 5.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Efficient taxation, wage bargaining and policy coordination2004In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 88, no 12, 2711-2725 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper is related to the literature on optimal nonlinear taxation under right-to-manage wage formation, and we assume that the fall-back profit facing firms during wage bargaining depends on the profit they can obtain if moving production abroad. The purpose is to study how policy coordination among countries can be used to increase the welfare level in comparison with an uncoordinated equilibrium. We consider coordinated policy reforms with respect to the marginal taxation of labor income, the unemployment benefit and the provision of a public good. The results show that policy coordination that leads to fewer hours of work per employee and/or a reduction of the unemployment benefit will increase welfare compared to the uncoordinated equilibrium.

  • 6. Bingley, Paul
    et al.
    Lanot, Gauthier
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Public pension programmes and the retirement of married couples in Denmark2007In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 91, no 10, 1878-1901 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we study the economic determinants of the joint retirement process of married couples. We propose a tractable dynamic discrete choice model for retirement decisions which allows for non-trivial saving behaviour. We estimate the model on a 1% sample of Danish couples of potential retirement age drawn from a population-based administrative register. The introduction and subsequent reforms of a publicly financed early retirement programme provide us with variation in the data to insure identification of the parameters of interest: the elasticities of participation/retirement with respect to income flows. Our estimates imply a significant asymmetry in the sensitivity of retirement behaviour of men and women with respect to variation in their own, or their spouse's, income flows.

  • 7.
    Bingley, Paul
    et al.
    NCRR and Economics Department, Århus University, Århus, Denmark.
    Lanot, Gauthier
    Economics Department, Keele University, Keele, UK.
    The Incidence of Income Tax on Wages and Labour Supply2002In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 83, no 2, 173-194 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In the simple framework of a static model for equilibrium wages and labour supplies, we show that the incidence of income tax on equilibrium wages can be measured independently from the individual labour supply elasticity. This extends recent work by [Journal of Labour Economics, 15(3) (1997) S72-S101] and [Journal of Public Economics, 65 (1997) 119-145], who estimate tax incidence on earnings, and [Econometrica, 66(4) (1998) 827-861] and [NBER Working Paper 5023 (1995)], who estimate labour supply elasticities, Our measurements are based on a large multi-level longitudinal data set of Danish private sector establishments and workers. We show that, allowing for labour supply response, there is strong evidence for partial shifting of the burden of income tax from worker to employer. Higher marginal tax rates are associated with increases in gross wages and earnings

  • 8.
    Devereux, Michael
    et al.
    University of Warwick, CV4 7AL, UK and Institute for Fiscal Studies, London WC1E 7AE, UK.
    Lanot, Gauthier
    Keele University, Keele ST5 5BG, UK.
    Measuring tax incidence: an application to mortgage provision in the UK2003In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 87, no 7-8, 1747-1778 p.Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper derives measures of the average and marginal incidence of a tax or subsidy in imperfect competition, in the context of the UK housing market. We argue that one form of mortgage, common in the UK but not elsewhere (the endowment mortgage), exists primarily because of the structure of taxation in the UK. We estimate the determinants of the choice of the type of mortgage, and the size of mortgage conditional on the choice, using data from the Building Societies Association on 43 000 individual mortgages taken out between 1985 and 1989. The estimated parameters are an input to the incidence measures. Results suggest that between 70 and 80% of the additional subsidy to endowment mortgages is captured by lenders, rather than borrowers.

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