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  • 1.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Granlund, David
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Present-Biased Preferences and Publicly Provided Private Goods2014In: Finanzarchiv, ISSN 0015-2218, E-ISSN 1614-0974, Vol. 70, no 2, p. 169-199Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyzes the welfare effects of a publicly provided private good with long-term consequences for individual well-being, in an economy where consumers have present-biased preferences due to quasihyperbolic discounting. The analysis is based on a two-type model with asymmetric information between the government and the private sector, and each consumer fives for three periods. We present formal conditions under which public provision to the young and the middle-aged generation, respectively, leads to higher welfare. Our results show that quasihyperbolic discounting provides a strong incentive for public provision to the young generation - especially if the consumers are naive (as opposed to sophisticated).

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  • 2.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Markström, Mikael
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Public provision of private goods and equilibrium unemployment2005In: Finanzarchiv, ISSN 0015-2218, E-ISSN 1614-0974, Vol. 61, no 3, p. 353-367Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper deals with public provision of a private good in a two-type model with optimal nonlinear income taxation. We assume that the wage rates are determined by bargaining between unions and firms, meaning that the equilibrium is characterized by unemployment. The results show that imperfect competition in the labor market gives rise to additional policy incentives associated with the self-selection constraint, which may justify either more or less public provision than under perfect competition. The paper also addresses employment-related motives behind public provision of private goods.

  • 3.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    An optimal tax approach to alcohol policy2010In: Finanzarchiv, ISSN 0015-2218, E-ISSN 1614-0974, Vol. 66, no 2, p. 153-169Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper deals with optimal income and commodity taxation in an economy, where alcohol is an externality-generating consumption good. In our model, alcohol can be bought domestically, imported, or produced illegally. Border trade alone implies an incentive to set the domestic alcohol tax below the marginal social damage of alcohol, and to tax (subsidize) commodities that are complementary with (substitutable for) alcohol. The income tax will also be used as a corrective instrument. Furthermore, although the effects of adding illegal production are ambiguous in general, a realistic outcome is, nevertheless, that it reduces both the optimal alcohol tax and the marginal income tax rate.

1 - 3 of 3
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