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  • 1.
    Svensson, Frans
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    A Subjectivist Account of Life's Meaning2018Inngår i: De Ethica, ISSN 1854-3405, E-ISSN 2001-8819Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 2.
    Svensson, Frans
    Uppsala University.
    Does Eudaimonism Rest on a Mistake?2011Inngår i: Neither/Nor: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday / [ed] Frans Svensson and Rysiek Sliwinski, Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2011Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 3.
    Svensson, Frans
    Uppsala University.
    Does Non-Cognitivism Rest on a Mistake?2007Inngår i: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 19Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 4.
    Svensson, Frans
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Editorial IntroductionInngår i: De Ethica, ISSN 1854-3405, E-ISSN 2001-8819Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 5.
    Svensson, Frans
    Uppsala University.
    Eudaimonist Virtue Ethics and Right Action: A Reassessment2011Inngår i: Journal of Ethics, ISSN 1382-4554, E-ISSN 1572-8609, Vol. 15Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 6.
    Svensson, Frans
    Uppsala University.
    Happiness, Wellbeing, and Their Relation to Virtue in Descartes' Ethics2011Inngår i: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 77Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 7.
    Svensson, Frans
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Mill on the Meaning of Life2018Inngår i: The Meaning of Life and the Great Philosophers / [ed] S. Leach and J. Tartaglia, Routledge, 2018Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 8.
    Svensson, Frans
    Stockholm Univ, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Non-Eudaimonism, The Sufficiency of Virtue for Happiness, and Two Senses of the  Highest Good in Descartes’s Ethics2015Inngår i: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, ISSN 0960-8788, E-ISSN 1469-3526, Vol. 23, nr 2, 277-296 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    In his reflections on ethics, Descartes distances himself from the eudaimonistic tradition in moral philosophy by introducing a distinction between happiness and the highest good. While happiness, in Descartes's view, consists in an inner state of complete harmony and satisfaction, the highest good instead consists in virtue, i.e. in 'a firm and constant resolution' (e.g. CSMK: 325/AT 5: 83) to always use our free will well or correctly. In Section 1 of this paper, I pursue the Cartesian distinction between happiness and the highest good in some detail. In Section 2, I discuss the question of how the motivation to virtue should be accounted for within Descartes's ethical framework. In Section 3, I turn to Descartes's defence of the view that virtue, while fundamentally distinct from happiness, is nevertheless sufficient for obtaining it. In the final section of the paper (Section 4), my concern is instead with a second and sometimes neglected distinction that Descartes makes between two different senses of the highest good. I show that this distinction does not remove the non-eudaimonistic character of Descartes's ethics suggested in Section 1, and present two reasons for why the distinction is important for Descartes's purposes.

  • 9.
    Svensson, Frans
    Stockholm University.
    Recension av Anders Hansson, Aristoteles etik2017Inngår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 10.
    Svensson, Frans
    Stockholm University.
    Recension av Ann Heberlein, Etik: människa, moral, mening.2014Inngår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 11.
    Svensson, Frans
    Stockholm University.
    Recension av Dygdernas Renässans (red. E. Österberg, M. Lindstedt Cronberg, C.                       Stenqvist)2014Inngår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 12.
    Svensson, Frans
    Stockholm University.
    Recension av Göran Greider, Den solidariska genen2015Inngår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 13.
    Svensson, Frans
    Stockholm University.
    Recension av Johan Wennström, Dygdens Glädje2013Inngår i: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 14.
    Svensson, Frans
    Stockholm University.
    Review of Ingmar Persson, From Morality to the End of Reason2017Inngår i: Philosophical quarterly (Print), ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 15.
    Svensson, Frans
    Stockholm University.
    Review of Michael Winter, Rethinking Virtue Ethics2012Inngår i: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 16.
    Svensson, Frans
    Stockholm University.
    Review of Thaddeus Metz, Meaning in Life2014Inngår i: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 80Artikkel, omtale (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 17.
    Svensson, Frans
    Uppsala University.
    The Role of Virtue in Descartes's Ethical Theory, or: Was Descartes a Virtue Ethicist?2010Inngår i: History of Philosophy Quarterly, ISSN 0740-0675, E-ISSN 2152-1026, Vol. 27Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 18.
    Svensson, Frans
    University of the Witwatersrand.
    Virtue Ethics and Elitism2008Inngår i: Philosophical Papers, ISSN 0556-8641, E-ISSN 1996-8523, Vol. 37Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 19.
    Svensson, Frans
    Uppsala University.
    Virtue Ethics and the Search for an Account of Right Action2009Inngår i: Logic, Ethics and All That Jazz: Essays in Honour of Jordan Howard Sobel / [ed] Lars-Göran Johansson, Jan Österberg and Rysiek Sliwinski, Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2009Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 20.
    Svensson, Frans
    Univ Arizona, Dept Philosophy, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA.
    Virtue Ethics and the Search for an Account of Right Action2010Inngår i: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 13, nr 3, 255-271 s.Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Conceived of as a contender to other theories in substantive ethics, virtue ethics is often associated with, in essence, the following account or criterion of right action: VR: An action A is right for S in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous agent would characteristically do A in C. There are serious objections to VR, which take the form of counter-examples. They present us with different scenarios in which less than fully virtuous persons would be acting rightly in doing what no fully virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. In this paper, various proposals for how to revise VR in order to avoid these counter-examples are considered. I will argue that in so far as the revised accounts really do manage to steer clear of the counter-examples to VR, something which it turns out is not quite true for all of them, they instead fall prey to other damaging objections. I end by discussing the future of virtue ethics, given what has come to light in the previous sections of the paper. In particular, I sketch the outlines of a virtue ethical account of rightness that is structurally different from VR. This account also faces important problems. Still, I suggest that further scrutiny is required before we are in a position to make a definitive decision about its fate.

  • 21.
    Svensson, Frans
    et al.
    Uppsala University.
    Alanen, Lilli
    Descartes on Virtue2007Inngår i: Hommage á Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz / [ed] Toni Rönnow-Rasmussen, Björn Petersson, Jonas Josefsson, and Dan Egonsson, Department of Philosophy, Lund University: Lund University Open Access, 2007Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 22.
    Svensson, Frans
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Johansson, Jens
    Objections to Virtue Ethics2018Inngår i: Oxford Handbook of Virtue / [ed] Nancy Snow, Oxford University Press, 2018Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 23. Svensson, Frans
    et al.
    Olson, Jonas
    Uppsala University.
    A Particular Consequentialism: Why Moral Particularism and Consequentialism                        Need Not Conflict2003Inngår i: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 15Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 24.
    Svensson, Frans
    et al.
    Uppsala University.
    Olson, Jonas
    Partikularistisk konsekventialism2004Inngår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 25, nr 3Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 25.
    Svensson, Frans
    et al.
    Uppsala University.
    Olson, Jonas
    Regimenting Reasons2005Inngår i: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 71, nr 3Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 26.
    Svensson, Frans
    et al.
    Uppsala University.
    Olson, Jonas
    Sorting Out Reasons - On Stoutland’s Criticism of the Belief-Desire Model2003Inngår i: A Philosophical Smorgasbord: Essays on Action, Truth, and Other Things in Honour of Frederic Stoutland / [ed] Krister Segerberg & Rysiek Sliwinski, Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2003Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 27.
    Svensson, Frans
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Reuter, Martina
    Mind, Nature and Morality: Themes from Spinoza and Descartes2019Collection/Antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 28.
    Svensson, Frans
    et al.
    Uppsala University.
    Sliwinski, Rysiek
    Neither/Nor: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Erik Carlson on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday2011Collection/Antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
1 - 28 of 28
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