It is well known that European Union law is multilingual. Union legislation is not only published in all authentic languages but equally authoritative in each language. The European Court of Justice has discussed – and indeed made use of – this multilingual character when interpreting Community law.
However, the day-to-day application of Community law takes place not in the European Court of Justice but in the courts of the Member States. This study is concerned with the attitude towards multilingual interpretation of Community law displayed by the latter courts. It is pointed out that the European Court of Justice has created extensive obligations for national courts to conduct multilingual interpretation without offering any genuine guidance. The study draws on judgments from Danish, English and German courts and identifies a number of difficulties encountered in the interpretative process. The overall impression is that the multilingual interpretation of Community law in national courts is severely limited.
The study also examines a number of factors which can help explain the attitude of national courts. It concludes that not only practical issues but also aspects of national legal culture and fundamental notions of the law contribute to the limited impact of multilingualism. The requirements created by the European Court of Justice are, on a national level, nothing more than castles in the air.
Språkregimen i Europeiska unionen ägnas mycket uppmärksamhet, men flera perspektiv saknas i diskussionen. Diskussionen tenderar att fokusera på EU-domstolen och flerspråkigheten behandlas allt för ofta ensidigt, ofta som ett problem vilket kräver en radikal lösning. Artikeln vidgar diskussionen genom att fokusera på nationella domstolar, vilka spelar en avgörande roll för tillämpningen av unionsrätten, och genom att illustrera flerspråkighetens möjligheter. Artikeln diskuterar även en möjlig väg framåt vad gäller flerspråkighetens tillämpning, i avsaknad av politiska reformer.
The reasoning of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has been heavily criticised for its lack of transparency. This creates significant problems given the importance of CJEU case law as a source of law. The multilingual character of EU law adds to the limited transparency of CJEU judgments. The Rules of Procedure state that the judgment is binding in the language of the case. However, the working language of the Court is French and the judgment is actually drafted in French. This article demonstrates that the situation is even more complex. It discusses the limited guidance given by the Court and the multitude of approaches adopted by the Advocates General, indicating different views of the function and purpose of EU multilingualism.
The multilingual character of European Union law presents a number of legal challenges. This article examines one of these challenges, the relationship between multilingualism and legal integration in Europe. It disputes the one- dimensional view of multilingualism as solely an obstacle to legal integration and proposes a wider definition of integration – focusing not only on the hori- zontal dimension but also on the vertical dimension. The horizontal dimension concerns traditional integration, uniformity of application of Union law, from both a quantitative and qualitative perspective. The vertical dimension concerns the effectiveness of Union law, often emphasised by the Court of Justice. The chapter examines two varieties of multilingual interpretation adopted by the Court of Justice and national courts, and their relationship to legal integration. It concludes that multilingualism can be a challenge as well as an opportunity from an integration perspective.
The existence of 24 official languages in the European Union creates unique challenges, not least in situations when a divergence of wording between the language versions is discovered. One way to resolve such a divergence is to give priority to the meaning indicated by the majority of language versions, the so-called “majority meaning”. This approach is thoroughly rejected by leading scholars and Advocates General at the Court of Justice. However, other scholars demonstrate a clear tendency of the Court of Justice to favour the interpretation indicated by the majority of language versions. The author attempts to resolve this contradiction by advancing a new, pluralistic understanding of the “majority meaning”, breaking it down into different forms with examples of their application by the Court of Justice. Furthermore, the fixed expressions used by the Court of Justice in the context of multilingual interpretation are analysed to understand the underlying values supporting the use of the “majority meaning”. It is demonstrated that the need for a uniform interpretation and application of EU law, as well as the importance of legislative intent, support adopting the meaning indicated by the majority of language versions. Consequently, the “majority meaning” cannot be so easily rejected.
Boken är uppdelad i tre delar: Den första delen beskriver EU och EU-rätten, vad som kännetecknar EU:s rättsordning och hur unionsrätten förhåller sig till nationell rätt. Den andra delen förklarar målen för EU:s verksamhet och hur de ska uppnås. Den tredje delen behandlar EU-rätten från skrift till verklighet, det vill säga de rättsliga mekanismer och processer som garanterar EU-rättens genomslag.På ett tydligt och pedagogiskt sätt beskrivs EU-rättens innehåll, logik och systematik. Såväl individuella rättsregler som de institutioner som utvecklar och verkställer dessa regler behandlas.Grundläggande EU-rätt är i första hand tänkt att användas som en introduktion till EU-rätten på universitets- och högskoleutbildningar. Den vänder sig också till personer som i sitt arbete behöver grundläggande kunskaper i ämnet.
Grundläggande EU-rätt är en introduktionsbok till EU-rätten och förklarar EU:s rättsordning ur tre perspektiv: konstitutionellt, institutionellt och materielrättsligt. På ett tydligt och pedagogiskt sätt beskrivs EU-rättens innehåll, logik och systematik. Såväl individuella rättsregler som de institutioner som utvecklar och verkställer dessa regler behandlas.
Ulf Israelsson, mångårig studierektor, medarbetare och juridiska institutionens primus motor, vet vad som krävs för att bli en bra jurist. Ulf har, bland mycket annat, bidragit till juristutbildningens kvalitetsarbete genom att utföra enkäter med studenter som tagit examen. I enkäten som genomfördes 2018 kommenterade en tidigare student att "[d]et var 4,5 fantastiska år där jag lärde mig otroligt mycket". Det är naturligtvis tillfredställande för alla oss som undervisar på juristprogrammet när en student är nöjd med sin utbildning, men det viktiga är den senare delen av citatet. Att bli jurist kräver mycket arbete. Nio terminers hårt arbete kommer också att förändra de som börjar programmet. Vissa går så långt som att hävda att många juriststudenter upplever en intellektuell pånyttfödelse under första året på utbildningen. Det är inte möjligt att i detta sammanhang beskriva alla de utmaningar som studenter på juristprogrammet kommer att möta, men vi har identifierat tre centrala aspekter som alla juriststudenter måste förhålla sig till. Studenterna måste för det första lära sig att prata som en jurist, för det andra att arbeta som en jurist och för det tredje att hantera andra juriststudenter. Det kommer inte att vara enkelt, men vi lovar att det är värt det.
The 1995 Bosman case from the CJEU is one of the most famous judgments ever delivered by the Luxembourg court. It is well-known in sporting contexts, but this article takes the discussion beyond that area, demonstrating Bosman's importance in other areas of law by using network analysis. This illustrates that Bosman is an exceptional case, both in its own right and as a source of further cases, citing Bosman directly or indirectly. We also demonstrate that Bosman is primarily cited for four reasons: the jurisdiction of the CJEU in matters of preliminary rulings, the use of the fundamental freedoms against private entities, non-discriminatory obstacles on the internal market and the temporal effects of CJEU judgments. However, when analyzed further it becomes clear that the Bosman case contains few truly original contributions to EU law and largely builds on existing case law to draw important conclusions. Thus, the Court must have other reasons for citing Bosman. Given the characteristics of the case many such reasons are plausible. Bosman is well-written, well-reasoned, well-known and well-connected, making it an excellent source to use in future cases.
The case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) is one of the most important sources of European Union law. However, case law’s role in EU law is not uniform. By empirically studying how the Court uses its own case law as a source of law, we explore the correlation between, on the one hand, the characteristics of a CJEU case— type of action, actors involved, and area of law—and, on the other hand, the judgment’s “embeddedness” in previous case law and value as a precedent in subsequent cases. Using this approach, we test, confirm, and debunk existing scholarship concerning the role of CJEU case law as a source of EU law. We offer the following conclusions: that CJEU case law cannot be treated as a single entity; that only a limited number of factors reliably affect a judgment’s persuasive or precedential power; that the Court’s use of its own case law as a source of law is particularly limited in successful infringement proceedings; that case law is particularly important in preliminary references—especially those concerning fundamental freedoms and competition law; and that initiating Member State and the number of observations affects the behavior of the Court.
It is generally agreed that some judgments by the Court of Justice are more important than others, but the ability of traditional legal methods to identify such judgments is inherently limited. In this article, we apply various tools developed in network analysis to identify which judgments are the most important as legal precedents. The study reveals that certain well-known judgments, like van Gend en Loos, have limited importance as precedents, while other judgments, like Bosman, PreussenElektra and Schumacker, are likely overlooked.
An increasing number of legal scholars have been attracted to using network analysis, particularly by the possibility of conducting large-scale studies of case law. In this article, we discuss how network analysis can provide new and important information about the law governing the European Union’s internal market by making possible the study of the entire jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), including changes over time. We apply different network centrality measurements to key CJEU internal market decisions and compare how accurately they capture the precedential and persuasive power of case law. In so doing, we reach conclusions that can be used to better understand not only the law of the internal market, but also the law of any case law-driven jurisdiction such as WTO dispute settlement or investor–state arbitration.
Ett antal kommentatorer har hävdat att Högsta domstolen under senare år intagit en ny, friare roll i förhållande till lagstiftaren. Debatten har framförallt kommit att gälla ett antal enskilda och kontroversiella domar som enligt vissa debattörer kan beskrivas som ”judiciell aktivism”. Mot bakgrund av denna debatt och utifrån ett omfattande empiriskt material studerar vi hur Högsta domstolens verksamhet utvecklats över tid. Studien bekräftar att Högsta domstolen genomgått en omfattande förändring, men att det handlar om att domstolen under längre tid utvecklats till en tydligare och aktivare prejudikatinstans, snarare än ett plötsligt utslag av judiciell aktivism.
EG-domstolen avkunnade nyligen dom i Mickelsson, ett mål som gällde begränsningar av bruket av vattenskotrar i svenska vatten. Domen i Mickelsson belyser en föga diskuterad dimension av den redan komplicerade frågan om hur principen om fri rörlighet ska tillämpas och, närmare bestämt, vad som utgör en sådan åtgärd med motsvarande verkan som en kvantitativ restriktion (ÅMV) vilken är förbjuden enligt artikel 28 EG. Brukanderegler av det slag som behandlades i Mickelsson passar inte den traditionella uppdelningen i produktregler och försäljningsåtgärder som EG-domstolen etablerade i Keck. Denna artikel undersöker EG-domstolens praxis kring brukanderegler med utgångspunkt i Mickelsson och det relaterade målet mellankommissionen och Italien. Dessa domar klargör hur brukandereglers förenlighetmed artikel 28 EG ska bedömas. Genom domarna har dock EG-domstolen även tagit ett viktigt steg mot en förenklad tillämpning av artikel 28 i allmänhet.
The decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) have had an immense impact on development of European Union law, and this has raised a critical discussion about how the CJEU establishes and uses case law. Through a comparison with the United States Supreme Court (USSC) and network analysis, this article argues that much of the criticism is based on false expectations as to the nature of the CJEU. We argue that the Court of Justice must be understood as a precedent-driven constitutional court and that, if we take that as our starting point, its approach to case law is quite reasonable.
Betydelsen av HD:s avgöranden som prejudikat har rönt allt större uppmärksamhet, främst med fokus på hur HD själv ser på sin rättspraxis. Denna artikel kompletterar diskussionen genom att undersöka tingsrätternas bruk av prejudikat. Artikeln visar att endast en relativt liten andel av HD:s avgöranden används aktivt i tingsrätterna och att överlappningen mellan de avgöranden som används av tingsrätterna och de som används av HD själv är ytterst begränsad. En möjlig förklaring är att HD i hög grad prövar frågor som mycket sällan uppkommer i tingsrätterna. Detta är inte nödvändigtvis problematiskt, men motiverar en diskussion om hur HD bäst kan leda rättstillämpningen.
The paper seeks to determine to what extent lower national courts are influenced by higher national courts in their application of CJEU case law. In doing so, we study and compare references to CJEU case law in the jurisprudence of Swedish courts of first instance and courts of precedent. We find that Swedish courts of first instance generally speaking identify and apply relevant CJEU case law independent of whether this has been dealt with by Swedish CoP or not. However, when these courts find and cite a Swedish court of precedent decision concerning an issue relating to EU law, they do not consistely consider relevant CJEU case law.
In 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union celebrates sixty-five years and has thereby achieved retirement age in most EU Member States, including Luxembourg. If it were to retire, the Court would be able to look back at an exciting journey, from its relatively humble beginning on 4 December 1952 as part of the then brand-new European Coal and Steel Community to one of the most important and exciting judicial institutions in Europe, perhaps in the entire world.
The need to understand the CJEU has never been greater. This volume is dedicated to improving our understanding of the Court in relationship to other actors, including other EU institutions, the Member State, national courts, third countries, and international organizations. It is based on a conference arranged by the Swedish Network for European Legal Studies (SNELS) held at Stockholm University in December 2016, and includes contributions by both lawyers and researchers in other fields, as well as current members of the Court.
The issue of when EU law applies, its scope, is obviously important and yet it has no clear answer. Two extreme positions are that EU law has a general scope, which it does not, and that all EU law provisions have different scopes, which clarifies nothing. This article explores the middle ground by seeking to identify underlying ideas capable of explaining when different EU law provisions apply on the national level and why seemingly similar provisions differ in scope. The article studies under what conditions an individual seeking protection against discrimination can invoke EU law on the national level and concludes that EU law provisions preventing discrimination differ greatly in scope but that such differences can be explained by the fact that they are based on different ideas: the idea of the internal market, the idea of actor equivalence, or the idea of a Europe without borders.
In 2009 the CJEU delivered its judgment in the so-called Trailers case, offering a new perspective on the enigmatic ban on measures having an equivalent effect to a quantitative restrictions (MEQRs). Trailers was a positive, even necessary, development in an area fraught with complications but it left many questions as to the future direction of the CJEU. One decade on, and after several notable judgments, we are now in a position to return to those questions. This contribution explores the impact of Trailers and the relevance today of seminal MEQR decisions like Dassonville, Keck and Cassis de Dijon.
I en tid då skyddet för grundläggande rättigheter och värnet mot otillbörlig maktutövning blir allt mer aktuellt är den konstitutionella rättens betydelse för rättssystemet och rättsstaten påtaglig. De gränser som den konstitutionella rätten ställer upp för utövandet av offentlig makt ökar således i betydelse, men samtidigt blir det konstitutionellrättsliga läget allt mer komplext, inte minst på grund av europarättens inflytande.Konstitutionell rätt behandlar den konstitutionella rättens tre centrala teman:Maktdelning och andra förutsättningar för utövande av offentlig makt, skyddet för grundläggande rättigheter samt rättsligt genomdrivande av konstitutionellrättsliga normer. Utifrån dessa tre teman behandlar författarna konstitutionella bestämmelser med ursprung i svensk nationell rätt, EU-rätten och Europakonventionen om mänskliga rättigheter.Boken är anpassad för att kunna användas som lärobok på juristutbildningen, men riktar sig också till en bredare publik. Konstitutionell rätt är relevant läsning för såväl erfarna jurister som läsare som är intresserade av konstitutionella frågor mer allmänt.
I turbulenta tider, då grundläggande rättigheter och begränsningar för maktutövning utmanas, ökar betydelsen av de gränser som den konstitutionella rätten ställer upp för utövandet av offentlig makt. Samtidigt blir det konstitutionellrättsliga läget allt mer komplext, inte minst på grund av europarättens inflytande.
Konstitutionell rätt behandlar den konstitutionella rättens tre centrala teman: maktdelning och andra förutsättningar för utövande av offentlig makt, skyddet för grundläggande rättigheter samt rättsligt genomdrivande av konstitutionellrättsliga normer. Utifrån dessa tre teman behandlar författarna konstitutionella bestämmelser med ursprung i svensk nationell rätt, EU-rätten och Europakonventionen om mänskliga rättigheter.
Boken är anpassad för att kunna användas som lärobok på juristutbildningen, men riktar sig också till en bredare publik. Konstitutionell rätt är relevant läsning för såväl erfarna jurister som läsare som är intresserade av konstitutionella frågor mer allmänt. Denna andra upplaga är påtagligt omarbetad och utvidgad.
Brexit is scheduled to happen on October 31, 2019, and researchers have previously studied the impact of Brexit on relationships in the EU’s political institutions. This paper studies how Brexit might affect Member States’ interactions with the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and, more specifically, when they seek to influence the Court by submitting observations. The Untied Kingdom has consistently been a comparatively active Member State, submitting many observations. The paper introduces and employs a novel approach, studying what we call "mentions" in CJEU decisions, to measure position similarity in Member States' observations and to identify the UK's "allies" before the CJEU. The paper concludes the loss of the UK will be felt in particular in Germany, the Netherlands, Ireland and in the Nordic countries.
Recent research has demonstrated the ability of network analysis to better understand law. In this study we apply network analysis to the case law of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) in order understand its role as a source of law. In doing so, we apply network analysis tools not previously used in legal scholarship, most significantly (i) a modified version of the PageRank algorithm, (ii) the Map Equation, and (iii) resampling to infer “missing” links. In the article we demonstrate that this method can help us to understand not only the CJEU’s case law but law generally.
We argue that courts may increase their autonomy and effectiveness by persuading governmental actors, who have powers over the societal impact of judicial decisions, of the legal quality of their rulings. This view combines a strategic perspective on judicial decision making with a conception of persuasion that allows courts to widen their zone of discretion. We support our argument with data from the European Union, where we find that the Court of Justice improves its legal justifications—by embedding its decisions in case law—when it faces a more adverse political environment. Our findings suggest both that the limits of judicial independence are set largely by political preferences, and that legal rhetoric may be an opportunity for courts to extend their room for maneuver. They also indicate that political audiences may indirectly influence the development of case law, by triggering courts to engage in precedent.