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  • 1.
    Lindström, Sten
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistisk fakultet, Filosofi och lingvistik. Filosofi.
    Sundström, PärUmeå universitet, Humanistisk fakultet, Filosofi och lingvistik. Filosofi.
    Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind2002Samlingsverk (redaktörskap) (Övrig (populärvetenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 2.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    A somewhat eliminativist proposal about phenomenal consciousness2008Ingår i: Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium, The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society: Kirchberg am Wechsel , 2008, s. 340-342Konferensbidrag (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper develops a proposal about phenomenalconsciousness that is (somewhat) eliminativist in two respects. First, regarded in the light of some commonways of conceiving of consciousness, the proposal is "deflationary". Second, it opens up space for adevelopment in which what we now naturally think about as consciousness turns out to be many different things.

  • 3.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistisk fakultet, Filosofi och lingvistik.
    An argument against spectrum inversion2002Ingår i: Physicalism, Consciousness and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind, Department of Philosophy and Linguistics, Umeå , 2002, s. 65-94Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 4.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Are colours visually complex?2013Ingår i: Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday / [ed] Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng and Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2013, s. 627-639Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 5.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Are Sensory Concepts Learned by "Abstraction" from Experience?2018Ingår i: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In recent years, many philosophers and scientists have argued or accepted that it is impossible to learn primitive sensory concepts like "blue" and "red". This paper defends a more qualified picture. I try to show that some received characterisations of "learning" are nonequivalent and point towards different learning-nonlearning distinctions. And, on some ways of specifying such a distinction, it might be correct that we do not and cannot "learn" a concept of blue. But on other ways of specifying such a distinction, we can and do sometimes "learn" a concept of blue from experiences of blue. The latter part of the argument connects with some traditional "abstractionist" views, and I defend the present claims in view of some widely circulated concerns about "abstracting" concepts from experience. I close with some reflections on how one might, in view of all this, think about "the learning-nonlearning distinction".

  • 6.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistisk fakultet, Filosofi och lingvistik.
    Colour and consciousness: Untying the metaphysical knot2007Ingår i: Philosophical Studies, Vol. 136, s. 123-165Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 7.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofi och lingvistik.
    Finns blått?2005Övrigt (Övrig (populärvetenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 8.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    How physicalists can - and cannot - explain the seeming "absurdity" of physicalism2018Ingår i: Philosophy and phenomenological research, ISSN 0031-8205, E-ISSN 1933-1592, Vol. 97, nr 3, s. 681-703Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    According to a widely held physicalist view, consciousness is identical with some physical or functional phenomenon just as liquidity is identical with loose molecular connection. To many of us, this claim about consciousness seems more problematic than the claim about liquidity. To many—including many physicalists—the identification of consciousness with some physical phenomenon even seems "absurd" (Papineau 2002) or "crazy" (Perry 2001). A full defence of physicalism should explain why the allegedly correct hypothesis comes across this way. If physicalism is true and we have reason to accept it, why does it seem "absurd"? One possibility is that this is fully explained by the fact that we have an erroneous understanding of consciousness or its physical basis. This explanation is embraced by few if any physicalists. It is rejected by many, including proponents of the "phenomenal concept strategy", which lately has become the dominant strategy for defending physicalism. But the "error explanation" is clearly the most plausible explanation that is available to physicalists. So this paper argues.

  • 9.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistisk fakultet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Humes utelämnade nyans av blått2008Ingår i: Filosofisk tidskrift, nr 3, s. 18-33Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 10.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofi och lingvistik.
    Is the mystery an illusion?: Papineau on the problem of consciousness2007Ingår i: Hommage à Wlodek: philosophical papers dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz / [ed] Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Lund: Lund University , 2007Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. According to David Papineau's version of this view, the difference between our "phenomenal" and "material" concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts can't co-refer. I claim that this account is incorrect. It is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn't be. Further, and worse, the account seems to predict that an "intuition of distinctness" will arise in cases where it does not. I also make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and (physicalist) alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim (ii).

  • 11.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofi och lingvistik.
    Is the mystery an illusion?: Papineau on the problem of consciousness2008Ingår i: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 163, nr 2, s. 133-143Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts can’t co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn’t be. Further, and worse, the account predicts that an “intuition of distinctness” will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion, I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and (physicalist) alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim (ii).

  • 12.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofi och lingvistik.
    Lessons for Mary2004Ingår i: Erfahrung und Analyse : Akten des 27. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 8. bis 14. August 2004, Kirchberg am Wechsel (Österreich) = Experience and Analysis: Papers of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium / [ed] Maria E. Reicher, Johann C. Marek, Wien: The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society , 2004, s. 367-9Konferensbidrag (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 13.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    On imagism about phenomenal thought2011Ingår i: Philosophical Review, ISSN 0031-8108, E-ISSN 1558-1470, Vol. 120, nr 1, s. 43-95Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers. However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue.

  • 14.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    On representationalism, common-factorism, and whether consciousness is here and now2019Ingår i: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 176, nr 10, s. 2539-2550Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    A strong form of representationalism says that every conscious property of every mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. A weaker representationalism says that some conscious property of some mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. David Papineau has recently argued that all such theories are incorrect since (a) they construe consciousness as consisting (partly or wholly) in ‘‘relations to propositions or other abstract objects outside space and time’’, whereas (b) consciousness is ‘‘concrete’’ and ‘‘here and now’’. Papineau defends instead a kind of ‘‘qualia theory’’ according to which all conscious properties are intrinsic non-relational properties of subjects. He argues that this theory bypasses the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. Similar worries about representationalism, and similar ideas to the effect that some qualia theory, adverbial theory, or sense-datum theory fares better with respect to these worries are relatively wide-spread. I argue that Papineau’s theory does not bypass the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. In fact, Papineau’s theory arguably has no advantage at all over representationalism with regard to these issues. The features that concern Papineau about representationalist views do not derive—or do not derive solely—from the representationalism of these views. They (also) derive from a common-factorism of these views. And this common-factorism is embraced by Papineau as well as by most theories of consciousness and perception.

  • 15.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Phenomenal concepts2011Ingår i: Philosophy Compass, ISSN 1747-9991, E-ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 6, nr 4, s. 267-281Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    It’s a common idea in philosophy that we possess concepts of a peculiar kind by which we can think about our conscious states in ‘inner’ and ‘direct’ ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such. Such ‘phenomenal concepts’ figure in a variety of theoretical contexts. The bulk of this article discusses their use in a certain strategy – the phenomenal concept strategy– for defending the physicalist view that conscious states are reducible to brain states. It also considers, more briefly, how phenomenal concepts have been used to defend dualism about consciousness, and how they have been used to explain our special access to our consciousness. It concludes with a discussion about whether, and in what more precise sense of the term, we at all possess ‘phenomenal concepts’ of our conscious states.

  • 16.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Primitive Colors: A Case Study in Neo-pragmatist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Perception2018Ingår i: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617Artikel, recension (Refereegranskat)
  • 17.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofi och lingvistik.
    Psychological phenomena and first-person perspectives: critical discussions of some arguments in philosophy of mind1999Doktorsavhandling, monografi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    The topic of this thesis is how different phenomena, commonly regarded as "psychological" or "mental", are or can be apprehended in the first person. The aim is to show that a number of influential texts of contemporary philosophy display a particular type of oversight on this topic. The texts in question display, I argue, an insufficient appreciation of the case for holding that "non-qualitative" psychological phenomena are apprehended in an exclusive way in the first person.

    To make this case, I begin by isolating a limited class of phenomena. The class, which is called the class of 'occurrent psychological doings', includes performances such as searching for a flower and adding two numbers. In chapter 2, I submit a case for holding that it is logically necessary that if an agent is performing an occurrent psychological doing, then he has a certain apprehension of what he is doing. This claim is called The First-Person Thesis'.

    In chapter 3, I submit a case for holding that the type of apprehension mentioned in The First-Person Thesis is logically exclusive: it is an apprehension which an agent who is doing so-and-so can have of the fact that he is doing so-and-so but which it is logically impossible for someone else to have of this fact. This claim is called 'The Exclusiveness Thesis'.

    In chapters 4 and 5, the two theses are used in critical discussions of some influential texts of contemporary philosophy. In chapter 4,1 examine two arguments of Wittgenstein's to the effect that one may perform some selected actions without having a particular type of "experience", or "sensation". I try to show that these arguments, while valid, have rather limited implications. I use The First-Person Thesis to illustrate the limited scope of these implications. I then try to show that the limited significance of the arguments has often been obscured by commentators of Wittgenstein.

    In chapter 5, I examine a position commonly held in contemporary philosophy of mind, and often associated with Nagel. The position is that "qualitative" phenomena such as perceptual experiences and bodily sensations are, because of the appearances they present in the first person, particularly difficult to explain in physical terms. An implication of this view is the claim that other phenomena do not present appearances to subjects in the allegedly problematic way that "qualitative" phenomena do. The First-Person Thesis and The Exclusiveness Thesis are used to argue that this position, as exemplified in the writings of McGinn and Chalmers, involve controversial assumptions for which insufficient justification is provided.

  • 18.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Two types of qualia theory2014Ingår i: Harvard Review of Philosophy, ISSN 1062-6239, E-ISSN 2153-9154, Vol. 20, s. 107-131Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 19.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Filosofi och lingvistik.
    Vad gör vi när vi upplever?2007Ingår i: Västerbottens-Kuriren, ISSN 1104-0246, nr 2007-08-11Artikel i tidskrift (Övrig (populärvetenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 20.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Vad är varseblivningens genomskinlighet och vad följer av den?2015Ingår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 36, nr 3Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
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