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  • 1.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Anarchy, State, and Property2014Ingår i: Rationality, Markets and Morals, ISSN 1869-778X, E-ISSN 1869-778X, Vol. 5, s. 1-12Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The fundamental function of the state is safeguarding the safety of its citizens. Thecombination of Nozick’s invisible hand explanation with his theory of justice implies thatindividuals can have full private property rights in the state. An individual with suchproperty rights thus has the right to sell and destroy what he or she owns. This impliesthat it is perfectly fair to buy a state and dismantle it, thereby leaving citizens withoutprotection. I conclude that Nozick’s theory of the state fails since it cannot guarantee theprotection of its citizens’ safety.

  • 2.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Childhood and the metric of justice2018Ingår i: The Routledge handbook of the philosophy of childhood and children / [ed] Anca Gheaus, Gideon Calder and Jurgen De Wispelaere, Abingdon: Routledge, 2018, s. 317-327Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 3.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Combining democratic equality and luck egalitarianism2018Ingår i: Ethics, Politics & Society, Vol. 1, nr 1, s. 39-64Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The concept of responsibility plays a crucial part in the debate between proponents of democratic equality, like Rawls, and defenders of luck egalitarianism, such as Dworkin. In this paper it is argued that the two theories can be combined, and that they should be combined to achieve a theory of justice that puts personal responsibility in its proper place. The concept of justice requires two different conceptions. The two theories can be combined because they deal with different problems of justice. They ought to be combined because, first, luck egalitarianism needs a theory of background justice, and second, a theory of justice must supply an answer to the question of just individual allocations, something that is not provided by democratic equality. Democratic equality and luck egalitarianism solve each other’s problems. The combined theory will lead to allocations of goods that respect both the difference principle and the envy test.

  • 4.
    Lindblom, Lars
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Consent, Contestability and Employer Authority2009Ingår i: Revue de philosophie économique, ISSN 1376-0971, E-ISSN 2118-4852, Vol. 10, nr 2, s. 47-79Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    A common idea is that market exchange is justified by informed and free agreement between parties. This paper investigates the idea that employer authority is justified by consent. According to this view, agents in the market are informed of the consequences of their actions and are not coerced. This makes their acts voluntary. A problem in the application of this justification to the employer/employee relationship is pointed out. If the contemporary economics of the employment contracts is correct, we must, in order to explain the existence of such contracts, make the assumption that the contracting parties are attempting to deal with decision-theoretic ignorance. This is why the parties agree to an incomplete contract in which the employer has authority. However, this implies that consent to acts of authority has been given under conditions of ignorance; it follows, then, that the course of action that the employer chooses to take cannot be justified by consent because the informedness criterion of consent will not have been satisfied due to this ignorance. Another method of justification must be sought. It is suggested that in order to achieve justification of acts of authority, there should be in place a real possibility to contest employers’ decisions. This possibility is needed, rather than just more information, because if the “volenti not fit injura”-principle is not in effect, then the employee is in a coercive situation. This problem of coercion must be alleviated before justification on the basis of informed voluntariness can be achieved. Pettit’s idea of contestability will then be applied. The firm must satisfy three conditions in order to make effective contestability possible. There must be a basis and channels for contest, which means that there must be transparency as well as effective measures to make grievances heard. There must also be a forum of contest where proper hearings of contestations are guaranteed.

     

    KEYWORDS: Contestability, Consent, Ignorance, Incomplete Contracts, Employment Contracts.

  • 5.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Consent, Contestability, and Unions2018Ingår i: Business ethics quarterly, ISSN 1052-150X, E-ISSN 2153-3326Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 6.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Consent, Contestability, and Unions2019Ingår i: Business ethics quarterly, ISSN 1052-150X, E-ISSN 2153-3326, Vol. 29, nr 2, s. 189-211Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This article provides a normative justification for unions. It discusses three arguments. The argument from consent justifies unions in some circumstances, but if the employer prefers to not bargain with unions, it may provide very little justification. The argument from contestability takes as its starting point the fact that employment contracts are incomplete contracts, where authority takes the place of complete contractual terms. This theory of contracts implies that consent to authority has been given under ignorance, and, therefore, that authority cannot be justified by consent. Contestability is a mechanism that can handle this problem for consent theory. It demands transparency, channels for voice, and a forum where contestations can be evaluated. This idea can be implemented in firms in different ways, but the argument from the separation of powers implies that unions are uniquely suited to implement contestability, since they are organized outside of the employer's domain of authority.

  • 7.
    Lindblom, Lars
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Dissolving the Moral Dilemma of Whistleblowing2007Ingår i: Journal of Business Ethics, ISSN 0167-4544, E-ISSN 1573-0697, Vol. 76, nr 4, s. 413-426Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The ethical debate on whistleblowing concerns centrally the conflict between the right to political free speech and the duty of loyalty to the organization where one works. This is the moral dilemma of whistleblowing.  Political free speech is justified because it is a central part of liberal democracy, whereas loyalty can be motivated as a way of showing consideration for one’s associates. The political philosophy of John Rawls is applied to this dilemma, and it is shown that that the requirement of loyalty, in the sense that is needed to create the moral dilemma of whistleblowing, is inconsistent with that theory. In this sense, there is no moral dilemma of whistleblowing. This position has been labeled extreme in that it says that whistleblowing is always morally permitted. In a discussion and rejection of Richard De George’s criteria on permissible whistleblowing, it is pointed out that the mere rejection of loyalty will not lead to an extreme position; harms can still be taken into account. Furthermore, it is argued that the best way is, in this as in most other political circumstances, to weigh harms is provided by the free speech argument from democracy.

     

    Keywords: Free Speech, Justice as Fairness, Loyalty, Permission for Whistleblowing, Whistleblowing

  • 8.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Equality of Resources, Risk, and the Ideal Market2015Ingår i: Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, ISSN 1876-9098, E-ISSN 1876-9098, Vol. 8, nr 1, s. 1-23Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Ronald Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources makes extensive use of markets. I show that all these markets rely on one specific neoclassical conception of the ideal market in full equilibrium, as analyzed by Debreu. This market must be understood as operating under circumstances of certainty, and this is incompatible with several components of Dworkin’s account. In particular, it does not allow one to hold people responsible for their option luck, and it implies a high social safety net rather than insurance schemes for addressing brute luck. I conclude by outlining an interpretation of equality of resources that takes the ideal market seriously.

  • 9.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Equality of What for Children2016Ingår i: JUSTICE, EDUCATION AND THE POLITICS OF CHILDHOOD: CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES, Cham: Springer, 2016, Vol. 1, s. 89-100Konferensbidrag (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper revisits the equality of what-debate and asks whether previous conclusions hold if we analyze the arguments from the perspective of children. It makes three claims. First, that even if welfare cannot be justified as an equalisandum for adults, it remains a reasonable position for the case of children. This claim is argued for by showing that Dworkin's rejection of equality of welfare relies on an idea of responsible agency that is inappropriate for the case of children. Equality of welfare cannot, by this route, be rejected with regards to children. Second, we owe children welfare rather than opportunity for welfare. Here it is argued that Richard Arneson's move from equality of welfare to equality of opportunity for relies on the same kind of problematic assumption about responsible agency as Dworkin's argument for resources. However, the assumption about responsible agency still holds for adults, and for them we need an equalisandum that takes responsibility into account. Moreover, since children will grow up to be adults, they will need preparation for this stage in life. Therefore, both welfare and the appropriate responsibility-sensitive equalisandum will be relevant for children. The third claim is that a general theory of the equalisandum of justice should have a structure like Cohen's ( 99: 906-944, 1989) equality of access to advantage. Advantage is understood as consisting of both welfare and resources, and access is comprised of both actually having something that is an advantage and having the opportunity to achieve a good.

  • 10.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Goods, Principles, and Values in the Brighouse, Ladd, Loeb and Swift Framework for Educational Policy-making2018Ingår i: Studies in Philosophy and Education, ISSN 0039-3746, E-ISSN 1573-191X, Vol. 37, nr 6, s. 631-645Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This article presents the promising framework for educational decision makers developed by Brighouse, Ladd, Loeb, and Swift (BLLS). The framework consists of an account of the educational goods, distributional principles and independent values at stake in education, and a method for making policy decisions on the basis of these and solid social science. I present three criticisms of this approach. The frst says that the derivation of educational goods proceeds on the basis of a too narrow conception of values. I suggest that this foundation should consist of an overlapping consensus, rather than fourishing. The second criticism has to do with the way that the distributive principles are characterized. I argue that BLLS’s characterization of distributive principles should be complemented with accounts of what domains of social life these principles regulate and a specifcation of whether the distributive principles should be understood as applying over time or at specifc instances. The fnal criticism is that BLLS’s conception of independent values focuses solely on values that constrain the pursuit of educational goods. I claim that this part of the framework should be revised to include aspects of values that also support this pursuit. I conclude arguing that the BLLS frameworks should be further developed rather than rejected.

  • 11.
    Lindblom, Lars
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hur ska vi ha det på jobbet, egentligen2005Ingår i: Filosofins nya möten / [ed] Karin Edvardson, Sven Ove Hansson and Jessica Nihlén Fahlquist, Möklinta: Gidlunds förlag, 2005, s. 21-31Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 12.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    In defense of rawlsian fair equality of opportunity2018Ingår i: Philosophical Papers, ISSN 0556-8641, E-ISSN 1996-8523, Vol. 47, nr 2, s. 235-263Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Richard Arneson argues that Fair Equality of Opportunity (FEO) should be rejected, since it is not only too weak and too strong, but also problematically meritocratic. The paper aims to defend FEO, and argues that it is not too weak, since, pace Arneson, it does apply to the problem of stunted ambition. The argument from meritocracy is shown to be based on a conflation of different senses of meritocracy. Finally, it is shown that FEO, correctly interpreted, gives intuitive answers to the examples put forward to bolster the too strong charge. It is concluded that Arneson’s refutation of FEO fails.

  • 13.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Libertarianism, Information, and Unions2018Ingår i: Social Epistemology, ISSN 0269-1728, E-ISSN 1464-5297, Vol. 32, nr 2, s. 103-111Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This article presents a normative epistemological argument for unions, developed from libertarian premises. According to Friedman, the state should set up rules for the market, whereas managers should focus on profits. On this view, business ethics can be handled by regulations, but Hayek’s theory of the market indicates that this position is problematic, since it relies on the state being able to collect the relevant ethical information. Hayek argued that a market system is more efficient than planned economies, since it handles information more efficiently. However, there is also reason to doubt that markets can provide the needed information. The price mechanism carries information solely about preferences, but ethics also concerns rights, voluntariness and needs. Moreover, Coase showed that inside firms there are no Hayekian price mechanisms. Firms are characterized by hierarchy, which means that both employers and employees may have incentives to not be forthcoming with information relevant information. The moral epistemology of Anderson, with an important role for civil society, is used to identify solutions to these informational problems. As a part of civil society, unions complement the market as a source of ethical information, and inside the firm they balance power and provide an avenue for voice.

  • 14.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Libertarianismen, staten och demokratin2015Ingår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 3, s. 27-34Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 15.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Lyckat enligt Hattie är inte bättre för alla2016Ingår i: Pedagogiska Magasinet, ISSN 1401-3320Artikel i tidskrift (Övrig (populärvetenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 16.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Rawlsian Political Analysis: Rethinking the Microfoundations of Social Science2015Ingår i: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 12, nr 4, s. 553-556Artikel, recension (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 17.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Snåriga vägar till likvärdighet2015Ingår i: Pedagogiska Magasinet, ISSN 1401-3320Artikel i tidskrift (Övrig (populärvetenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 18.
    Lindblom, Lars
    KTH, Skolan för arkitektur och samhällsbyggnad (ABE), Filosofi.
    The Employment Contract between Ethics and Economics2009Doktorsavhandling, sammanläggning (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    This thesis investigates what work ought to be like. The answer it presents consists of an outline of a liberal theory of justice in the employment contract based on theory developed in the area of political philosophy. The thesis also examines issues of efficiency—How should measures to improve working conditions be evaluated?—and the ethical implications of the economic theory of employment contracts and the neoclassical theory of the market.

    Paper I: A theoretical framework is introduced for the evaluation of workplace inspections with respect to their effects on working conditions. The choice of a concept of efficiency is discussed, and its relation to criteria for a good working environment is clarified. It is concluded that in order to obtain reliable information on the effects of different inspection methods, it is necessary to perform controlled comparative studies in which different methods are used on different workplaces.

    Paper II: This article outlines the structure of a Rawlsian theory of justice in the employment relationship. The theory answers three questions about justice and the workplace. What is the relationship between social justice and justice at work? How should we conceive of the problem of justice within the economic sphere? And, what is justice in the workplace? Reasons for a specific construction of a local original position are given and arguments are presented in support of a principle of local justice in the form of a choice egalitarian local difference principle.

    Paper III: The political philosophy of John Rawls is applied to the moral dilemma of whistleblowing, and it is shown that that the requirement of loyalty, in the sense that is needed to create this dilemma, is inconsistent with that theory. In a discussion and rejection of Richard De George’s criteria on permissible whistleblowing, it is pointed out that the mere rejection of loyalty will not lead to an extreme position; harms can still be taken into account.

    Paper IV: The case is made that if contemporary economics of the employment contract is correct, then in order to explain the existence of employment contracts, we must make the assumption that the contracting parties are attempting to deal with decision theoretic ignorance. It follows that the course of action that the employer chooses to take when acting from authority cannot be justified by consent, since the informedness criterion of consent cannot be satisfied under ignorance. It is then suggested that in order to achieve justification of acts of authority, there must be in place a real possibility to contest employers’ decisions.

    Paper V: According to Ronald Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources, mimicking the ideal market from equal starting points is fair. According to Dworkin, the ideal market should be understood as described in Gérard Debreu’s influential work, which implies that we should conceive of trade as taking place under certainty. There are no choices under risk in such a market. Therefore, there is no such thing as option luck in the ideal market. Consequently, when mimicking this market, we cannot hold people responsible for option luck. Mimicking this market also implies that we ought to set up a social safety net, since rational individuals with perfect foresight would see to it that they always have sufficient resources at each point in life. Furthermore, the idea of insurance is incompatible with the ideal market.

  • 19.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology, Division of Philosophy, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm.
    The Structure of a Rawlsian Theory of Just Work2011Ingår i: Journal of Business Ethics, ISSN 0167-4544, E-ISSN 1573-0697, Vol. 101, nr 4, s. 577-599Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This article outlines the structure of a Rawlsian theory of justice in the employment relationship. A focus on this theory is motivated by the role it plays in debates in business ethics. The Rawlsian theory answers three central questions about justice and the workplace. What is the relationship between social justice and justice at work? How should we conceive of the problem of justice in the economic sphere? And, what is justice in the workplace? To see fully what demands justice makes on the workplace, we should first spell out the implications that domestic justice has for working conditions. When this is done, we can develop a conception of workplace justice and investigate what content such local justice should have. John Rawls’s political liberalism was constructed for the specific problem of a just basic structure; in order to apply it to another problem the key theoretical concepts must be revised. Reasons for a specific construction of a local original position are given and arguments are presented in support of a principle of local justice, which takes the form of a choice egalitarian local difference principle.

  • 20.
    Lindblom, Lars
    et al.
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Clausen, Jonas
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Edvardsson, Karin
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hayenhjelm, Madeleine
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hermansson, Hélène
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Nihlén, Jessica
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Palm, Elin
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Rudén, Christina
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Wikman, Per
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    How agencies inspect: a comparative study of inspection policies in eight Swedish government agencies2003Rapport (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 21.
    Lindblom, Lars
    et al.
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Grüne-Yanoff, Till
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    The Interactive Nature of Work Incentives2008Ingår i: Perspectives on Work: Problems, Insights, Challenges / [ed] Otto Neumaier, Gottfried Schweiger and Clemens Sedmak, London: LIT Publisher Group , 2008, s. 51-63Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
  • 22.
    Lindblom, Lars
    et al.
    Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Efficient Inspections2005Ingår i: Nordic Perspectives on Safety Management in High Reliability Organizations: Theory and Applications / [ed] Ola Svensson, Illka Salo, Pia Oedewald, Teemu Reiman and Ann Britt Skjerve, Roskilde, denmark: NKS Secretariat , 2005, s. 9-19Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    Workplace inspections are undertaken because they are believed to lead to better conditions In the workplace. It is therefore essential to know if inspections have the desired effects on working conditions. We introduce a theoretical framework for the evaluation of workplace inspections with respect to their effects on working conditions. Criteria of efficiency and priority-setting are discussed. Some empirical results concerning priority-setting in Swedish inspection agencies are presented. Further, we argue that in order to obtain reliable information about the effects of different inspection methods, it is necessary to perform controlled comparative studies in which different methods are used in different workplaces. Given the facility with which such studies can be performed, it is surprising how few such studies have been made. We conclude by surveying some empirical studies that concern the issue of efficient inspections.

  • 23.
    Lindblom, Lars
    et al.
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Evaluating Workplace Inspections2004Ingår i: Policy and Practice in Health and Safety, ISSN 1477-3996, E-ISSN 1477-4003, Vol. 2, nr 2, s. 77-91Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    A theoretical framework is introduced for the evaluation of workplace inspections with respect to their effects on working conditions. The choice of a concept of efficiency is discussed, and its relation to criteria for a good working environment is clarified. It is concluded that in order to obtain reliable information on the effects of different inspection methods, it is necessary to perform controlled comparative studies in which different methods are used on different workplaces. Given the facility with which such studies can be performed, it is surprising how few such studies have been made. The studies that are available provide sufficient evidence that inspections can increase compliance with regulations and that they can also increase workplace safety, but not much can be concluded about the relative efficiency of different inspection methods.

  • 24.
    Lindblom, Lars
    et al.
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Inspektörens dilemma2004Ingår i: Framtidens arbetsmiljö- och tillsynsarbete / [ed] Bo Johansson, Kaj Frick and Jan Johansson, Lund, Sverige: Studentlitteratur, 2004, s. 386-397Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 25.
    Lindblom, Lars
    et al.
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    The Evaluation of Inspections2003Rapport (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 26.
    Lindblom, Lars
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Wikman-Svahn, Per
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Toward a responsibility-catering prioritarian ethical theory of risk2019Ingår i: Science and Engineering Ethics, ISSN 1353-3452, E-ISSN 1471-5546, Vol. 25, nr 3, s. 655-670Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Standard tools used in societal risk management such as probabilistic risk analysis or cost–benefit analysis typically define risks in terms of only probabilities and consequences and assume a utilitarian approach to ethics that aims to maximize expected utility. The philosopher Carl F. Cranor has argued against this view by devising a list of plausible aspects of the acceptability of risks that points towards a non-consequentialist ethical theory of societal risk management. This paper revisits Cranor’s list to argue that the alternative ethical theory responsibility-catering prioritarianism can accommodate the aspects identified by Cranor and that the elements in the list can be used to inform the details of how to view risks within this theory. An approach towards operationalizing the theory is proposed based on a prioritarian social welfare function that operates on responsibility-adjusted utilities. A responsibility-catering prioritarian ethical approach towards managing risks is a promising alternative to standard tools such as cost–benefit analysis.

  • 27.
    Munter, Dan
    et al.
    KTH.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Beyond coercion: moral assessment in the labour market2017Ingår i: Journal of Business Ethics, ISSN 0167-4544, E-ISSN 1573-0697, Vol. 142, nr 1, s. 59-70Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Some libertarians argue that informed consent alone makes transactions in the labour market morally justified. In contrast, some of their critics claim that such an act of consent is no guarantee against coercion. To know whether agreements are voluntary, we need to assess the quality of the offers or the prevailing background conditions. ISCT theorists argue that it is imperative to take social norms into account when evaluating the labour market. We present a novel framework for moral assessment in the labour market, which takes consent, background conditions and norms into account, but which mainly focuses on the offers and demands made. Consent renders a transaction legitimate in the same way we regard a fair election legitimate even if we object to its outcome. For offers to be substantially justified, exploitation must be avoided and offers must give expression to the value of community. Only then they are morally justified.

  • 28.
    Wikman Svahn, Per
    et al.
    KTH.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Toward a Responsibility-catering Prioritarian Ethical Theory of Risk2012Manuskript (preprint) (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    We argue that responsibility-catering prioritarianism is well positioned to deal with the basic requirements of an ethical theory of risk. We show how responsibility-catering prioritarianism can be operationalized using a prioritarian social welfare function based on hypothetical utili-ties. For this purpose, we propose a hypothetical utility measure based on the utility that would normally be expected given circumstances outside of the control of the individual. Finally, we argue that degrees of control and knowledge of risks and consequences should influence when and how people are considered responsible in social decisions on risk.

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