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  • 1.
    Hayenhjelm, Madeleine
    Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Asymmetries in risk communication2006In: Risk Management: An International Journal, ISSN 1460-3799, E-ISSN 1743-4637, Vol. 8, no 1, p. 1-15Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The concept of risk communication has come to comprise more than conveying technical or scientific information to the public. It can also include newer forms such as public participation, joint decision-making, and two-way dialogue forums. Previous discussions on risk communication have distinguished between two different approaches, namely the democratic versus the technical one. In the present paper, it is argued that despite these recent attempts to widen the scope and objectives of risk communication, risk communication is primarily, in most cases, a relationship between unequal parties. This inequality is analysed through a threefold distinction of asymmetries in terms of communicative initiative, informational privilege, and risk influence. A preliminary model for understanding the different inequalities in the risk communication situation is developed.

  • 2.
    Hayenhjelm, Madeleine
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Book Review: Oderdiek, John. Imposing Risks: A Normative Framework.2019In: Ethics, ISSN 0014-1704, E-ISSN 1539-297X, Vol. 129, no 3Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 3.
    Hayenhjelm, Madeleine
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Compensation as Moral Repair and as Moral Justification for Risks2019In: Ethics, Politics & Society, ISSN 2184-2582Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Can compensation repair the moral harm of a previous wrongful act? On the one hand, some define the very function of compensation as one of restoring the moral balance. On the other hand, the dominant view on compensation is that it is insufficient to fully repair moral harm unless accompanied by an act of punishment or apology. In this paper, I seek to investigate the maximal potential of compensation. Central to my argument is a distinction between apologetic compensation and non-apologetic compensation. Apologetic compensation, I argue, is an act that expresses regret and apology by means of some offer ofmoney, goods, or services. Non-apologetic compensation is an act that seeks to restore loss or harm without expressing regret or apology. In the paper, I defend the view that acts of compensation can be apologetic and argue that such apologetic compensation is sufficient for moral repair.

  • 4. Hayenhjelm, Madeleine
    Four types of precaution2017In: ECPR 2017, 2017Conference paper (Refereed)
  • 5.
    Hayenhjelm, Madeleine
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Oberdiek, John. Imposing Risk: A Normative Framework.2019In: Ethics, ISSN 0014-1704, E-ISSN 1539-297X, Vol. 129, no 3, p. 492-496Article, book review (Other academic)
    The full text will be freely available from 2020-04-01 00:00
  • 6.
    Hayenhjelm, Madeleine
    Royal Institute of Technology, Teknikringen 78, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Out of the ashes: hope and vulnerability as explanatory factors in individual risk taking2006In: Journal of Risk Research, ISSN 1366-9877, E-ISSN 1466-4461, Vol. 9, no 3, p. 189-204Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    High individual risk taking, whether in terms of life-style risks or others, has often been explained in terms of acceptance of risks or misperception of the possible negative outcome. This article challenges this view, and points to a kind of risks that does not seem to fit this explanation. These risks are referred to as risks from vulnerability. They are taken because there are no positive alternatives to them, and the choice is perceived as having an element of hope. A new framework is proposed in order to expand these explanatory factors within the risk perception research. This framework analyzes individual risk taking in terms of: poor outset conditions, lack of reasonable options, hope, and liability to disinformation.

  • 7.
    Hayenhjelm, Madeleine
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Recension: Filip radovic (red.) Livets Mening, Lund: Studentlitteratur, 20122014In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, no 3, p. 33-39Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 8.
    Hayenhjelm, Madeleine
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Risk Impositions, Genuine Losses, and Reparability as a Moral Constraint2018In: Ethical Perspectives, ISSN 1370-0049, E-ISSN 1783-1431, Vol. 25, no 3, p. 419-446Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    What kind of moral principle could be sufficiently restrictive to avoid the kind of large-scale risks that have resulted in catastrophe in the past, while at the same time not be so restrictive as to halt desirable progress? Is there such a principle that is not merely a precautionary principle, but one that could be based on firm moral grounds? In this article, I set out to explore a simple idea: might it be the case that reparability could serve as a moral constraint against risky policy decisions? The idea is simple, but comes in two forms. First, that it is morally wrong to impose a risk for harm that is, in principle, irreparable, such that it would bring about a permanent loss of a kind qua kind. Second, that it is morally wrong to impose a risk for a reparable (but not compensable) harm that exceeds what realistically could be repaired. I set out here to do two things. First, I describe the moral problem to be addressed for any principle-guiding decisions about risk. A central claim in this article is that risk decisions are epistemically impaired decisions, and that we must, alongside outcome uncertainty, also take both epistemic uncertainty and moral uncertainty into account. Second, I introduce the idea of reparability as a moral constraint in the form of two versions of the Reparability Principle. Such a principle, I argue, could have some interesting advantages that seem both morally intuitive and that come with some advantages against some of the epistemic challenges posed by risk impositions.

  • 9. Hayenhjelm, Madeleine
    Trust, risk and vulnerability: towards a philosophy of risk communication2006Book (Other academic)
  • 10. Hayenhjelm, Madeleine
    Trusting and taking risks: a philosophical inquiry2007Book (Other academic)
  • 11. Hayenhjelm, Madeleine
    Vad kan riskkommunikation göra åt riskproblemen?2008In: Risk & Risici / [ed] Johannes Persson, Nils-Eric Sahlin, Bokförlaget Nya Doxa, 2008, p. 91-108Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 12.
    Hayenhjelm, Madeleine
    Philosophy Department, University College London, Gower Street, London, WC1E 6BT, UK.
    What is a fair distribution of risk?2012In: Handbook of Risk Theory: Epistemology, Decision Theory, Ethics and Social Implications of Risk / [ed] Sabine Roeser, Rafaela Hillerbrand, Per Sandin, Martin Peterson, Springer, 2012, p. 909-929Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    What is a fair distribution of risk? This chapter will look into three separate, but related, aspects of fairness in risk distributions. Firstly, I will locate the object of fairness when it comes to risk distribution. In contrast to distributions of goods, which we want to both increase and distribute fairly, risks are something we want to decrease and distribute fairly. The question of fairness in risk distributions is the question of how to combine these two partially conflicting claims; to fairness on the one hand and to risk reduction on the other. Secondly, I will take a closer look at what an equal distribution of chances for harm might be. I will point to the problem that the very idea of distributing probabilities entails. Thirdly, I address the question of when deviations from equal distributions of risks may be justified and how such inequalities can be addressed in a fair way. It will be suggested that the locus of fairness of risk should be sought in two steps: (1) the justification of particular risky activities, where the level of risk and the spread of that risk is taken into account, and (2) that any resulting higher risk for certain groups or individuals should be addressed through a combination of consent, precaution, and compensation, seeking to even out unfair exposure.

  • 13.
    Hayenhjelm, Madeleine
    et al.
    Department of Philosophy, University College London, UK.
    Wolff, Jonathan
    The moral problem of risk impositions: a survey of the literature2012In: European Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0966-8373, E-ISSN 1468-0378, Vol. 20, no S1, p. E26-E51Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper surveys the current philosophical discussion of the ethics of risk imposition, placing it in the context of relevant work in psychology, economics and social theory. The central philosophical problem starts from the observation that it is not practically possible to assign people individual rights not to be exposed to risk, as virtually all activity imposes some risk on others. This is the ‘problem of paralysis’. However, the obvious alternative theory that exposure to risk is justified when its total benefits exceed its total costs faces the standard distributional challenges of consequentialism. Forms of contractualism have been proposed as a solution, but how exactly such theories can be formulated remains problematic, especially when confronted with the difficult cases of mass, novel, risk such as climate change.

  • 14.
    Lindblom, Lars
    et al.
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Clausen, Jonas
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Edvardsson, Karin
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hayenhjelm, Madeleine
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hermansson, Hélène
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Nihlén, Jessica
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Palm, Elin
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Rudén, Christina
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Wikman, Per
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    How agencies inspect: a comparative study of inspection policies in eight Swedish government agencies2003Report (Other academic)
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