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  • 1.
    Bergman, Mats A.
    et al.
    Södertörns Högskola.
    Johansson, Per
    Uppsala University.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Spagnolo, Giancarlo
    Stockholm School of Economics.
    Privatization and quality: evidence from elderly care in Sweden2016Inngår i: Journal of Health Economics, ISSN 0167-6296, E-ISSN 1879-1646, Vol. 49, s. 109-119Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Non-contractible quality dimensions are at risk of degradation when the provision of public services is privatized. However, privatization may increase quality by fostering performance-improving innovation, particularly if combined with increased competition. We assemble a large data set on elderly care services in Sweden between 1990 and 2009 and estimate how opening to private provision affected mortality rates – an important and not easily contractible quality dimension – using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach. The results indicate that privatization and the associated increase in competition significantly improved non-contractible quality as measured by mortality rates. 

  • 2.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörns högskola.
    Indén, Tobias
    Juridisk Institut, Syddansk Universitet, Odense.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Madell, Tom
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Juridiska institutionen.
    Offentlig upphandling: på rätt sätt och till rätt pris2011Bok (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 3.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörns Högskola.
    Johansson, Per
    IFAU, Uppsala University.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Spagnolo, Giancarlo
    Stockholm School of Economics SITE.
    Privatization and Quality: Evidence from Elderly Care in Sweden2014Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Non-contractible quality dimensions are at risk of degradation when the provision of public services is privatized. However, privatization may increase quality by fostering performance-improving innovation, particularly if combined with increased competition. We assemble a large data set on elderly care services in Sweden between 1990 and 2009 and estimate how opening to private provision affected mortality rates--an important and not easily contractible quality dimension--using a difference-in-difference-in-difference approach. The results indicate that privatization and the associated increase in competition significantly improved non-contractible quality as measured by mortality rates. It also reduced the cost per resident, although left total cost unaffected.

  • 4. Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Lundberg, Johan
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Stake, Johan Y.
    Interactions Across Firms and Bid Rigging2019Inngår i: Review of Industrial Organization, ISSN 0889-938X, E-ISSN 1573-7160Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    We evaluate whether an econometric technique that is used in the spatial econometrics and network effects literature can be adopted as a test for collusive bidding in public procurement auctions. The proposed method is applied to the Swedish asphalt cartel that was discovered in 2001. Our dataset covers the period 1995–2009, which makes it possible to test for conditional independence between complementary cartel bids before and after 2001. Our estimates show a significant positive correlation between complementary cartel bids during the cartel period, whereas a non-significant correlation is shown during the later period. The variance of the parameter estimate of interest also differs between the periods, which suggests a structural change in bidding behavior among cartel members between the two periods.

  • 5.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    ECON, Centre for Economic Analysis, Stockholm.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Auctioned and re-auctioned children in 19th century Sweden2000Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    During the 19th century, poor and orphan Swedish children were boarded out. The foster-parents, compensation was determined in English auctions. Some children were re-auctioned. We use historical data from such auctions to study whether informational asymmetry and possibly adverse selection affected the outcome in the market for re-auctioned children. The empirical findings are consistent with some informational asymmetry.

  • 6.
    Bergman, Mats
    et al.
    Södertörns Högskola.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Tender evaluation and supplier selection methods in public procurement2013Inngår i: Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, ISSN 1478-4092, E-ISSN 1873-6505, Vol. 19, nr 2, s. 73-83Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The EU procurement directives stipulate that public contracts be awarded to the lowest bidder or to the bidder with the economically most advantageous tender; the latter requiring that a scoring rule be specified. We provide a simple theoretical framework, based on standard microeconomic theory, for tender evaluation (scoring and weighing) and discuss the pros and cons of methods such as highest quality (beauty contest), lowest price and price-and-quality-based evaluations. We argue that the most common method, price-to-quality scoring, is inappropriate for several reasons. It is non-transparent, making accurate representation of the procurer's preferences difficult. It is often open to strategic manipulation, due to dependence on irrelevant alternatives, and it tends to impose particular and unjustified non-linearity in bid prices. The alternative quality-to-price scoring method, where money values are assigned to different quality levels, is a better alternative. However, when the cost of quality is relatively well-known and several providers can offer optimal quality lowest price is the preferable award criteria, while beauty contests may be preferred when purchasing budgets are inflexible.

  • 7.
    Brännlund, Runar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Marklund, Per-Olov
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Assessment of green public procurement as a policy tool: Cost-efficiency and competition considerations2009Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Public procurement is officially regarded as an effective means to secure environmental improvement. Estimates by the European Commission indicate that public authorities within the European Union typically purchase goods and services corresponding to approximately 16 percent of GNP per annum. Hence, it is believed, private firms can be stimulated to invest in sustainable production technologies if the market power of public bodies is exerted through Green Public Procurement (GPP) policies. In this paper we assess whether GPP is a cost-efficient policy tool, and if so whether its implementation can, from a welfare perspective, deter or stimulate entry to procurement markets.

  • 8.
    Brännlund, Runar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Marklund, Per-Olov
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Assessment of green public procurement as a policy tool: Cost-efficiency and competition considerations2009Konferansepaper (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 9.
    Carling, Kenneth
    et al.
    Inst. Ekonomi och Samhälle, Högskolan Dalarna/Dep. of Economics, Dalarna University.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Asymmetric information and distance: An empirical assessment of geographical credit rationing2005Inngår i: Journal of Economics and Business, ISSN 0148-6195, E-ISSN 1879-1735, Vol. 57, nr 1, s. 39-59Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Does the geographical proximity between the borrowing firm and the lending bank, matter in credit risk management? If so, the bank might expose itself to a greater risk by lending to distant firms and should therefore respond by rationing them harder. In this paper, we incorporate geographical credit rationing in a simple theoretical model, and derive implications, which are empirically testable. We use data on corporate loans granted between the years of 1994 and 2000 by a leading Swedish bank, and find no evidence of geographical credit rationing.

  • 10.
    Fåhraeus, Maria
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    - Hur gick det till? En utvärdering av Sjuksköterskeprogrammet i Lycksele: "En sjuksköterskeutbildning med IT- och Glesbygdsprofil"2002Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 11.
    Grape, Ove
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Socialt arbete.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Nordström, Anna
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Kompetenspoolen, ett alternativ till att bryta långtidsarbetslöshet: en process- och samhällsekonomisk utvärdering2005Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 12.
    Hyytinen, Ari
    et al.
    School of Business and Economics, University of Jyväskylä, Finland.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Toivanen, Otto
    Helsinki Center of Economic Research (HECER), Finland.
    Politics and procurement: Evidence from cleaning contracts2008Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    We study the effects of politics on public procurement in Swedish municipalities in 199098 using data on cleaning services. No procuring municipality committed to a standard auction format or to an explicit scoring rule. Political identity of the governing party is not correlated with the decision to procure, the decision to restrict entry, or the number of invited firms. However, leftwing municipalities are more likely not to invite “inhouse firms”. In our data, the lowest bidder does not win 58% of the time, and conditional on the lowest bid not winning, the municipalities end up paying a premium of 43%. Our discrete choice analysis shows that while all municipalities are price sensitive, leftwing councils 1.5 as price sensitive as rightwing councils. Conditional on bids, leftwing councils are more likely to choose a local firm. Politics thus matter and affect procurement outcomes.

  • 13.
    Hyytinen, Ari
    et al.
    University of Jyväskylä, School of Business and Economics.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Toivonen, Otto
    Aalto University & KU Leuven, Faculty of Business and Economics (FBE); CEPR.
    Design of public procurement auctions: evidence from cleaning contracts2018Inngår i: The Rand Journal of Economics, ISSN 0741-6261, E-ISSN 1756-2171, Vol. 49, nr 2, s. 398-426Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    We analyze a regime change from beauty contests to first‐price sealed‐bid and scoring auctions, using Swedish data on public procurement of cleaning services. In beauty contests, the lowest bid often lost, leaving substantial money on the table. The procurement costs were similar before and after the regime change: (i) Entry strongly decreases the procurement cost but did not change. Entry would have decreased had the municipalities not adjusted the objects of auctions. (ii) Municipalities favored in‐house suppliers in the old regime, leading to more aggressive bidding by others. With favoritism reduced, these changes balanced each other out.

  • 14.
    Indén, Tobias
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Juridiska institutionen.
    Lindström, Hanna
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Erixon, Olof ()
    Svenskt Näringsliv.
    Frödén, Dan ()
    Tenders Sverige AB.
    Nilsson, Magnus ()
    Peak Procurement AB.
    Spånberg, Emma ()
    SNS.
    Cope, Malin ()
    Konkurrensverket.
    Wallenklint, Joakim ()
    Konkurrensverket.
    Överprövningar av offentliga upphandlingar: En intervjustudie om skillnader mellan LOU och LUF2014Rapport (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
    Abstract [sv]

    Syftet med denna studie är att analysera möjliga förklaringar till att upphandlingarsom görs enligt Lagen (2007:1092) om offentlig upphandling inom områdenavatten, energi, transporter och posttjänster (LUF) tycks föranleda en mindre andelöverprövningar än upphandlingar som görs enligt Lagen (2007:1091) om offentligupphandling (LOU). Den senare lagstiftningen är tillämplig på offentliga upphandlingarav tjänster, varor och byggentreprenader som inte faller under de områdensom anges i LUF (se ovan).Tillgänglig statistik visar att överprövning är mer vanligt förekommande blandupphandlingar som regleras av LOU. Detta förhållande kvarstår med hänsyn tagentill att det är mer vanligt att upphandla enligt LOU än LUF. För att belysa möjligaförklaringar till detta har 28 intervjuer genomförts med beställare/upphandlare frånstatliga och kommunala organ samt med företrädare för leverantörer från olikabranscher.Utgångspunkterna för intervjuerna har varit frågor relaterade till upphandlingssituationen(t.ex. organisation och kompetens), juridiska faktorer (t.ex. förhandlingsmöjligheter)samt leverantörernas syn på upphandling (t.ex. överprövningsom affärsstrategi).Intervjuerna ger vid handen att en avgörande anledning till att upphandlingarenligt LUF överprövas i mindre utsträckning än upphandlingar enligt LOU är detmer omfattande förhandlingsutrymme som till skillnad från LOU finns i LUF. Frånupphandlarsidan menar de intervjuade att förhandling förebygger och ger möjlighetatt hantera missförstånd och felaktigheter under upphandlingens gång. Dettaanses minska risken för att en leverantör upplever sig felbehandlad eller upphandlingensom illa genomförd. En annan intressant iakttagelse är att de intervjuadeupphandlarna beskriver att de branscher som upphandlas enligt LOU i högreutsträckning präglas av en ”överprövningskultur”. Av de intervjuade nämner fleraatt LUF-upphandlingar ofta är mer komplexa och att myndigheter som upphandlarunder LUF därför håller sig med upphandlare med hög marknadsspecifikkompetens. En sådan lösning är något som skulle vara mer resurskrävande förkommunala organ, då de ofta förfogar över en i högre grad diversifieradupphandlingsportfölj.

  • 15.
    Lundberg, Johan
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Distributional Effects of Lower Food Prices in a Rich Country2012Inngår i: Journal of Consumer Policy, ISSN 0168-7034, E-ISSN 1573-0700, Vol. 35, nr 2, s. 373-391Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Controlling for differences in taxes and transportation costs, the Nordic Competition Authorities claims, in a report from 2005, that food prices are 11% higher in Sweden compared to the EU-15 countries. One explanation for this put forward in the report is the limited competition on this market which suggests there to be a potential for lower food prices. This paper focuses on distributional effects of a price decrease on food. Based on a simple model of household utility, the households demand for food is derived and estimated. Price and income elasticities for different income groups are then calculated based on these parameter estimates. Our results suggest that food is a normal good with an average income elasticity of approximately 0.18 and a price elasticity of 0.45. In addition, and of importance from a policy perspective, the results indicate the income elasticity to differ across income groups while price elasticities are constant.

  • 16.
    Lundberg, Johan
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM). Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Nationalekonomi.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Nationalekonomi.
    Distributional Effects of Lower Food Prices in a Rich Country: Calculations Based on Estimates of Household Demand for Food2008Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 17.
    Lundberg, Johan
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM). Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Nationalekonomi.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Nationalekonomi.
    Join the Club?  On the Attractiveness of Golf Club Membership2008Inngår i: The Empirical Economics Letters, ISSN 1681-8997, Vol. 7, nr 11, s. 1125-1132Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 18.
    Lundberg, Johan
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Join the Club: On the Attractiveness of Golf Club Membership2005Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of this paper is to analyze determinants of the attractiveness of membership in Swedish golfclubs. This is modeled as a utility maximization problem and is estimated using a unique data set that includes 99 percent of all golf clubs in Sweden. We find that the annual membership fees and the member profile have a significant impact on the club´s attractiveness as well as a number of other important characteristics of the club and the municipality in which the club is located. The latter result indicates that not only the characteristics of the club itself but also its location matter for its attractiveness.

  • 19.
    Lundberg, Johan
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Westin, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Hushållens efterfrågan på dagligvaror och val av dagligvarubutik i Umeå kommun.2004Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [sv]

    Syftet med föreliggande rapport är att analysera vilka faktorer som påverkar hushållens efterfrågan på dagligvaror samt vilka faktorer som styr hushållens val av dagligvarubutik. Den ekonometriska analysen bygger på ett datamaterial bestående av totalt 116 enkätsvar från hushåll i Umeå kommun. Enkäten omfattar information om hushållens sammansättning, inkomstnivå, bostadsområde, val av dagligvarubutik för olika typer av inköp (stora inköp (veckohandel), medelstora inköp samt mindre inköp (kompletteringshandel)), hushållets utgifter för dagligvaror per månad, hushållets storlek etc.

    Det begränsade empiriska materialet gör det inte möjligt att utifrån de resultat som presenteras dra några statistiskt säkerställda slutsatser. Däremot ger den ekonometriska analysen möjlighet att formulera hypoteser som kan studeras ytterligare i en mer omfattande studie. Därmed skall denna rapport ses som en förstudie till en mer omfattande studie baserad på ett utskick om cirka 3 000 enkäter. Ett mer sådant empiriskt underlag skulle även göra det möjligt att använda mer sofistikerade ekonometriska metoder.

  • 20.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    An empirical analysis of regional differences in municipal competitive procurement in Sweden2001Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper studies regional differences in price and competition in municipal competitive procurement in Sweden. The bidding process is a first-price, sealed bid auction. The piecewise pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator presented in Donald and Paarsch (1993) is applied to data on cleaning service contracts. The results show higher estimated costs for completing the contract, but lower estimated bids in the major city area of Stockholm compared with the rest of the country. This is explained by lower profit margins and higher operational costs. An analysis is also carried out of why the lowest bidder is not always the contracted bidder in all auctions.

  • 21.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Auction Formats and Award Rules in Swedish Procurement Auctions2007Inngår i: The Economics of Public Procurement, Palgrave Macmillan , 2007Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 22.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Auction Formats and Award Rules in Swedish Procurement Auctions2005Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper provides an empirical analysis of outcomes from Swedish procurement auctions given award criterion and auction format. The auctions are single unit first-price sealed bid auctions or its simultaneous counterpart, and contracts can be awarded to lowest bidder or in accordance with qualitative criteria. The empirical results provide no evidence of differences in winning bids depending on the auction format. The award rule on the other hand matters, a horizontal comparison show higher winning bids on contracts awarded to some other but the lowest bidder. The effect of bidder interaction and bidder identity is also considered.

  • 23.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Auction Formats and Award Rules in Swedish Procurement Auctions2006Inngår i: Rivista di Politica Economica, ISSN 0035-6468, Vol. 96, nr 1-2, s. 91-116Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 24.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Bidder Behaviour in Swedish Simultaneous Procurement Auctions2005Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Given no capacity constraints and the same set of competitors one would expect the same identity of the bidder having the lowest cost to complete all contracts simultaneously auctioned. Results based on bid level data from Swedish procurement auctions of internal cleaning service contracts suggests otherwise. The same bidder is found on simultaneous auctioned contracts although this bidder has not submitted the lowest bid on all contracts. A possible explanation is that bidders submit aggressive bids on some contracts in order to be given other contracts with less aggressive bids and thereby maximizing the total profit.

  • 25.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Nationalekonomi.
    Child Auctions in Nineteenth Century Sweden: An Analysis of Price Differences2000Inngår i: The Journal of human resources, ISSN 0022-166X, E-ISSN 1548-8004, Vol. 35, nr 2, s. 279-298Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 26.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Going once, going twice, SOLD!: the economics of past and present public procurement in Sweden2001Doktoravhandling, med artikler (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This thesis is about the economic aspects of public procurement of services through auctionsin Sweden. It focuses on two different institutions, auctions used to find foste r-parents forboarded out children in the 19th century, and auctions of cleaning service contracts in the 20 thcentury. I n both cases, the contracting entity is the municipality or its representative, thelowest bidder wins the auction, and is paid in accordance with his/her bid.In the child auctions, c hildren were allotted to foster-parents by means of an open biddingprocess, the descending English auction, where the bids were given continuously to theauctioneer. In modern public procurement sealed bids ar e used in accordance with the firstprice,sealed bid auction. The first part of this thesis is about price formation in the childauctions and a study is made of the children who were auctioned several times, indicatingasymmetric information among bidders or adverse selection in this market. These subjects arestudied using field data on 601 child auctions held in Northern Sweden during the period 1863to 1889. The empirical findings in the first paper suggest that the foster-parents had a cleareconomic motive in these auctions. The child characteristics significantly affect the amount ofcompensation paid to the foster-parent. There is also evidence that farmers preferred older,more productive children. The second paper studies whether a re-auctioned child commandeda higher or lower price than a child that was not re-auctioned. The results indicate some formof asymmetric information because foster-parents demanded a higher level of compensationfor a re-auctioned child. The results also suggest that the probability that a child was reauctionedincreased if he/she was not healthy.The third paper in the thesis discusses a kind of "paradox". Although there is a competitiveeffect on the bids in the auction of cleaning service contracts, the contracting entity has anoption, given by law, to restrict the number of bidders. In th is paper, an implementation costis introduced fo r the contracting entity to justify such a restriction. The results, based onSwedish municipality data, indicate that contract and municipality characteristics, assumed toaffect the implementation cost, affect the volume of the procurement, and the number ofbidders, but not necessarily the choice of allocation mechanism. The final paper studiesregional differences in bids, costs, and competition in municipal procurement using the samedata as in paper [3]. The results show higher estimated costs for completing the contract, butlower estimated mean bids in the major city area of Stockholm compared with the res t of thecountry. This is explained by lower profit margins and higher operational costs in the majorcity area. An analysis is also carried out of why the lowest bidder is not always the contractedbidder.

  • 27.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Klara, färdiga, vårda!: En utvärdering av det nätbaserade sjuksköterskeprogrammet i Lycksele2005Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 28.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    On financial Incentives in child auctions in 19th century Sweden2009Inngår i: The world of Child Labor: An Historical and regional Survey / [ed] Hugh D Hindman, Sharpe Me Inc , 2009, 1, s. 597-600Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 29.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Restrictions on competition in municipal competitive procurement in Sweden2001Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    The bidding process in public procurement in Sweden is a first-price, sealed bid auction. Although there is a competitive effect on the bids in this type of auction, the contracting entity can through the choice of allocation mechanism, restrict the number of bidders. This paper studies this choice and imposes an implementation cost on the contracting entity to motivate such a restriction. The results, based on data for Swedish municipalities, suggest that contract specifications and municipality characteristics (that are assumed to influence the implementation cost), affect the volume of the procurement and the number of bidders, but not necessarily the choice of allocation mechanism.

  • 30.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Restrictions on Competition in Municipal Competitive Procurement in Sweden2005Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    The bidding process in public procurement in Sweden is a first-price sealed bid auction. Although there is a competitive effect on the bids in this type of auction, the contracting entity can through the choice of procurement procedure, restrict the number of bidders. This paper studies this choice and imposes an implementation cost on the contracting entity to motivate such a restriction. The results, based on data for Swedish municipalities, suggest that contract specifications and municipality characteristics (that are assumed to influence the implementation cost); affect the volume of the procurement and the number of bidders, but not necessarily the choice of procurement procedure.

  • 31.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Restrictions on Competition in Municipal Competitive Procurement in Sweden2005Inngår i: International Advances in Economic Research, ISSN 1083-0898, E-ISSN 1573-966X, Vol. 11, nr 3, s. 329-342Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The bidding process in public procurement in Sweden is a first-price sealed bid auction. Although there is a competitive effect on the bids in this type of auction, the contracting entity can, through the choice of procurement procedure, restrict the number of bidders. This paper studies this choice and imposes an implementation cost on the contracting entity to motivate such a restriction. The results, based on data for Swedish municipalities, suggest that contract specifications and municipality characteristics (that are assumed to influence the implementation cost) affect the volume of the procurement and the number of bidders but not necessarily the choice of procurement procedure.

  • 32.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Vårda(n)de resurser?: En regional och samhällsekonomisk lönsamhetsbedömning av det nätbaserade Sjuksköterskeprogrammet i Lycksele2007Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 33.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Bergman, Mats
    Södertörns Högskola.
    Kvalitet och styckkostnader i äldreboende2013Inngår i: Den offentliga sektorn: en antologi om att mäta produktivitet och prestationer / [ed] Lars Hultkrantz, Stockholm: Fritzes, 2013, 1, s. 115-133Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 34.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Bergman, Mats
    Tendering design when price and quality is uncertain2017Inngår i: International Journal of Public Sector Management, ISSN 0951-3558, E-ISSN 1758-6666, Vol. 30, nr 4, s. 310-327Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to analyze how local and central authorities choose between lowest price and more complex scoring rules when they design supplier-selection mechanisms for public procurements. Five hypotheses are tested: a high level of cost uncertainty and highly non-verifiable quality makes the use of the lowest-price supplier-selection method less likely. Organizational habits and transaction-cost considerations influence the choice of mechanism. Strong quality concerns make complex rules more likely.

    Design/methodology/approach – The analysis departures from normative theory (rational choice) and is based on the regression analysis and survey data comprising a gross sample of 40 contracting authorities and detailed information about 651 procurements.

    Findings – More complex scoring rules are used more often when the authority is uncertain about costs and about delivered quality. Authority effects are also found to directly and indirectly influence the choice of supplier-selection method, suggesting that tendering design is partly driven by local habits and institutional inertia.

    Practical implications – The authors argue that, from a normative point of view, lowest price is an adequate method when the degree of uncertainty is low, for example, because the procured products are standardized and since quality can be verified. When there is significant cost uncertainty, it is better to use the so-called economically most advantageous tender (EMAT) method. (Preferably this should be done by assigning monetary values to different quality levels.) If there is significant uncertainty concerning delivered quality, the contracting authority should retain a degree of discretion, so as to be able to reward good-quality performance in observable but non-verifiable quality dimensions; options to extend the contract and subjective assessments of quality are two possibilities. The main findings are that EMAT and more complex scoring rules are used more often when the contracting authorities report that they experience substantial uncertainty concerning delivered quality and actual costs and that these factors tend to decrease the weight given to price, in line with the predictions. However, the authors also find that this result is mainly driven by variations between authorities, rather than by between-products variation for the same authority. This is from a training of professionals and regulation perspective of policy relevance.

    Social implications – Contract allocation based on habits rather than rational ground could implicate the waste of resources (tax payers money) as it adventures the matching of the preferences of the public sector (the objective, subject matter, of the procurement) and what the potential supplier offers in its tender.

    Originality/value – Although the principles for supplier selection are regulated by law they give the contracting authority substantial freedom in designing the scoring rule and in choosing what quality criteria to use. The tension between different objectives and the more general question whether the choices made by authorities reflect rational decision making or institutional inertia together motivate the current study. While the design of the supplier-selection mechanism is an important consideration in procurement practice, it has attracted relatively little attention from the academic community.

  • 35.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Bergman, Mats A
    Södertörns Högskola.
    Sourcing for Government Goods and Services: Theory and Evidence from Swedish Cities and Authorities2012Inngår i: Charting a Course in Public Procurement Innovation and Knowledge Sharing / [ed] Gian Luigi Albano, Keith F Snider, Khi V Thai, Florida, 2012, s. 331-357Konferansepaper (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 36.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Edman, Åsa
    Henriksson, Helena
    Wijkman, Anders
    På jakt efter den goda affären: analys och erfarenheter av den offentliga upphandlingen2011 (oppl. 1)Bok (Annet (populærvitenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 37.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Indén, Tobias
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Juridiska institutionen.
    Expropriationsersättning och EU:s statsstödsregler: ekonomiska begrepp i en juridisk kontext2011Inngår i: Förvaltningsrättslig Tidskrift, ISSN 0015-8585, nr 1, s. 113-130Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 38.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Lunander, Anders
    Örebro Universitet.
    Bids and costs in combinatorial and noncombinatorial procurement auctions: evidence from procurement of public cleaning contracts2013Inngår i: Contemporary economic policy, ISSN 1074-3529, E-ISSN 1465-7287, Vol. 31, nr 4, s. 733-745Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Combinatorial procurement auctions enable suppliers to pass their potential cost synergies on to the procuring entity and may therefore lead to lower costs and enhance efficiency. However, bidders might find it profitable to inflate their stand-alone bids in order to favor their package bids. Using data from standard and combinatorial procurement auctions, we find that bids on individual contracts in simultaneous standard auctions without the option to submit package bids are significantly lower than the corresponding stand-alone bids in combinatorial auctions. Further, no significant difference in procurer’s cost as explained by auction format is found.

  • 39.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Lunander, Anders
    Örebro University.
    Combinatorial Auctions in Public Procurement: Experiences from Sweden2012Inngår i: Journal of Public Procurement, ISSN 1535-0118, E-ISSN 2150-6930, ISSN 1535-0118, Vol. 11, nr 1, s. 81-108Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 40.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Lunander, Anders
    Örebro Universitet.
    Different Design - Different Cost: An Empirical Analysis of Combinatorial Public Procurement Bidding of Road Maintenance2012Inngår i: Journal of Public Procurement, ISSN 1535-0118, E-ISSN 2150-6930, ISSN 1535-0118, Vol. 12, nr 3, s. 407-422Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 41.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Lundberg, Johan
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Retailer choice and loyalty schemes: evidence from Sweden2010Inngår i: Letters in spatial and resource sciences, ISSN 1864-4031, E-ISSN 1864-404X, Vol. 3, nr 3, s. 137-146Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    From economic theory, it is well known that consumer loyalty schemes can have lock-in effects resulting in entry barriers and higher prices. This paper concerns consumer loyalty schemes where the main issue is to test the hypothesis that loyalty scheme membership affects the choice of food retailer. This choice is modeled as a random utility maximization problem estimated with maximum likelihood. Based on a data set covering 1,551 Swedish households, we find evidence supporting this hypothesis. Further, according to the results, store characteristics and geographical distance matter for the choice of retailer while household characteristics are not found to have a significant effect.

  • 42.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Nationalekonomi.
    Madell, Tom
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Juridik.
    Skall vi singla slant? Om försäljningen av offentliga tillgångar.2008Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 43.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Marklund, Per-Olov
    Konjunkturinstitutet.
    Green public procurement and multiple environmental objectives2018Inngår i: Economia e Politica Industriale, ISSN 0391-2078, Vol. 45, nr 1, s. 37-53Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Policy makers can employ different instruments to address environmental policy objectives, and the guiding principles for a consistent system of environmental policy are (1) the policies should be effective, (2) there should be one objective per instrument, and (3) multiple objectives and multiple policy instruments must be mutually independent of each other. This paper evaluates these three principles for green public procurement (GPP). As an illustrative example, the analysis refers to the Swedish policy of using public purchase of organic foods as a policy instrument to increase the certified organic agricultural area as a share of the total agricultural area. Our analysis shows that GPP fails to satisfy principles (1) and (3), and the only way to satisfy principle (2) is then to have just one objective with the procurement, i.e., to run the operations. GPP might still have a positive environmental impact, but, if applied, the procuring authority has to be very specific with the one-to-one matching of criterion and objective.

  • 44.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Marklund, Per-Olov
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Green Public Procurement as an Policy Instrument: Cost effectiveness2013Inngår i: Environmental Economics, ISSN 1998-6041, E-ISSN 1998-605X, Vol. 4, nr 4, s. 75-83Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Estimates by the European Commission indicate that public authorities within the European Union typically purchase goods and services corresponding to approximately 16 percent of GDP per annum. Hence, it is believed, private firms can be stimulated to invest in less polluting production technologies if the market power of public bodies is exerted through Green Public Procurement (GPP) policies and legislation. It is commonly argued that there are considerable possibilities for cost-effective GPP. The aim of this paper is to scrutinize this argument by specifically answer the question whether GPP can work as a cost-effective environmental policy instrument in terms of leading firms to reducing emissions at least cost to society. Our main finding shows that this is not the case.

  • 45.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Marklund, Per-Olov
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för miljö- och naturresursekonomi (CERE).
    Offentlig upphandling eller gröna nedköp?: En ESO-rapport om miljöpolitiska ambitioner2013Rapport (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 46.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet.
    Marklund, Per-Olov
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Offentlig upphandling som miljöpolitiskt styrmedel2015Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 47. Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Marklund, Per-Olov
    The pivotal nature of award methods in green public procurement2011Inngår i: Environmental Economics, ISSN 1998-6041, E-ISSN 1998-605X, Vol. 2, nr 3, s. 64-73Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Internationally there is a strong trend of implementing Green Public Procurement (GPP), and it is seen as an environmental policy tool. By its purchasing power public authorities are via environmental concerns in procurement believed to have the power of stimulating firms to reduce emissions, be resource efficient, and developing products proper in line with a sustainable society. In allocating public contracts authorities use award methods and scoring rules. This paper discusses the procedure of allocating contracts when GPP is applied. Departing from previous research on this topic the paper explicitly discusses the pivotal role of using suitable award methods and scoring rules for GPP to functioning as an efficient environmental policy tool. It is most important that GPP matches the preferences of the society (e.g., a municipality or a state authority). Assuming that GPP can be used as an environmental policy tool, the authors present general guidelines for choosing an efficient award method and scoring rule in perspective of welfare and sustainability.The necessity of such guidelines cannot be emphasized enough, partly because previous scientific literature on the topic is very scarce and partly, which is most serious, empirical data (Swedish public procurement data) indicate that scoring rules that violates necessary conditions for efficient outcomes are commonly used. It cannot be ruled out that this unfortunate circumstance causes the society substantial costs. In this perspective it is also noteworthy that Sweden is regarded as a frontrunner in successfully implementing GPP (Kahlenborn et al., 2011).

  • 48.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Marklund, Per-Olov
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Brännlund, Runar
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Miljöhänsyn i offentlig upphandling: Samhällsekonomisk effektivitet och konkurrensbegränsande överväganden2009Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 49.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Marklund, Per-Olov
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM). Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för miljö- och naturresursekonomi (CERE).
    Strömbäck, Elon
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Is Environmental Policy by Public Procurement Effective?2016Inngår i: Public Finance Review, ISSN 1091-1421, E-ISSN 1552-7530, Vol. 44, nr 4, s. 478-499Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Advocates of green public procurement (GPP) argue that the public sector can use its purchasing power to influence producers and consumers to reduce their negative impact on the environment. Our aim is to assess GPP as an environmental policy instrument and its ability to lead to the achievement of environmental objectives. Central to our analysis is the extent to which polluting firms choose to adapt to the public sector’s environmental requirements and to invest in greener technologies. Our theoretical finding is that the potential of GPP to function as an objective effective instrument of environmental policy is limited and can actually be counterproductive. From an environmental policy point of view, it is crucial that the GPP aims for an environmental standard beyond the technology of the polluting firms and is designed with reference to defined environmental objectives.

  • 50.
    Lundberg, Sofia
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Marklund, Per-Olov
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för miljö- och naturresursekonomi (CERE). Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Strömbäck, Elon
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Sundström, David
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Using public procurement to implement environmental policy: an empirical analysis2015Inngår i: Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, ISSN 1432-847X, E-ISSN 1867-383X, Vol. 17, nr 4, s. 487-520Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Politicians expect Green public procurement (GPP) to serve as an environmental policy instrument. However, in order for GPP to work as an effective policy instrument it is important to take into consideration potential suppliers’ decisions to participate in the procurement process, the total number of bidders, and the screening of bidders with respect to mandatory green criteria. The aim of this paper is to empirically study GPP in this respect. The analysis presented here is based on data from Swedish cleaning services procurements that are unique in that they contain very detailed information on various environmental standards set by the contracting authorities. We find at best only a weak effect on supplier behavior, and this suggests that the use of GPP in this situation does not live up to its political expectations. 

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