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  • 1. Cantwell, John
    et al.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Rabinowicz, Wlodek
    McGee's Counterexample to the Ramsey Test2017In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 83, no 2, p. 154-168Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Vann McGee has proposed a counterexample to the Ramsey Test. In the counterexample, a seemingly trustworthy source has testified that p and that if not-p, then q. If one subsequently learns not- p (and so learns that the source is wrong about p), then one has reason to doubt the trustworthiness of the source (perhaps even the identity of the source) and so, the argument goes, one has reason to doubt the conditional asserted by the source. Since what one learns is that the antecedent of the conditional holds, these doubts are contrary to the Ramsey Test. We argue that the counterexample fails. It rests on a principle of testimonial dependence that is not applicable when a source hedges his or her claims.

  • 2.
    Gullberg, Ebba
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Semantics and the Justification of Deductive Inference2007In: Hommage à Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz, Department of Philosophy, Lund university , 2007Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 3. Holmström-Hintikka, Ghita
    et al.
    Lindström, StenUmeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.Sliwinski, Rysiek
    Collected Papers of Stig Kanger with Essays on his Life and Work: Volume I2001Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 4. Holmström-Hintikka, Ghita
    et al.
    Lindström, StenUmeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.Sliwinski, Rysiek
    Collected papers of Stig Kanger with essays on his life and work: Volume II2001Collection (editor) (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 5.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    A Note on Physicalism and Supervenience2002In: Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind, Department of Philosophy and Linguistics, Umeå , 2002, p. 125-132Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 6.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Challenges to Neologicism2007Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The period in the foundations of mathematics that started in 1879 with the publication of Frege's Begriffsschrift and ended in 1931 with Gödel's Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme can reasonably be called the classical period. It saw the development of three major foundational programmes: the logicism of

    Frege, Russell and Whitehead, the intuitionism of Brouwer, and Hilbert's formalist and prooftheoretic programme. In this period, there were also lively exchanges between the various schools culminating in the famous Hilbert-Brouwer controversy in the 1920s. The state of the foundational programmes at the end of the classical period is reported in the papers by

    Carnap, Heyting and von Neumann (Cf. Benacerraf and Putnam (1983)) from the Conference on Epistemology of the Exact Sciences in Königsberg 1930. This was the very same symposium at which Gödel announced his First Incompleteness Theorem.

    In this presentation I will concentrate on various varieties of Logicism inspired by Frege's original version which was outlined informally in his Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) and presented in formal detail in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1893/1903). I will discuss the motivation behind the logicist programme and the severe difficulties that it faces. In view of these difficulties it is tempting to pronounce the "Death of Logicism"; and obviously the programme cannot be pursued in anything like its original form. The original goal of showing that substantial mathematical theories can be based conceptually, epistemologically, and

    ontologically solely on something that deserves the label “logic” cannot—as far as I can see—be achieved. However, there are close connections between logic and mathematics that should be explored. Much can be learned both philosophically and technically from considering

    various logicist and neologicist programmes. Moreover, Logicism very much resembles the boar Särimner that according to Nordic mythology was slaughtered every night and eaten—just to be brought back to life the next day.

  • 7.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Church-Fitchs argument än en gång, eller: vem är rädd för vetbarhetsparadoxen?2017In: Från Skaradjäkne till Uppsalaprofessor: festskrift till Lars-Göran Johansson i samband med hans pensionering / [ed] George Masterton, Keizo Matsubara and Kim Solin, Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 2017, p. 160-171Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Enligt ett realistiskt synsätt kan ett påstående vara sant trots att det inte ens i princip är möjligt att veta att det är sant. En sanningsteoretisk antirealist kan inte godta denna möjlighet utan att accepterar en eller annan version av Dummetts vetbarhetsprincip:

    (K) Om ett påstående är sant, så måste det i princip vara möjligt att veta att det är sant.

    Det kan dock förefalla rimligt, även för en antirealist, att gå med på att det kan finnas sanningar som ingen faktiskt vet (har vetat, eller kommer att veta) är sanna. Man kan därför tänka sig att en antirealist skulle acceptera principen (K) utan att därför gå med på den till synes starkare principen:

    (SK) Om ett påstående är sant, så måste det faktiskt finnas någon som vet att det är sant.

    Ett mycket omdiskuterat argument – som ytterst går tillbaka till Alonzo Church, men som först publicerades i en uppsats av Frederic Fitch i Journal of Symbolic Logic 1963 – tycks emellertid visa att principen (K) implicerar principen (SK).

    I uppsatsen diskuterar jag några olika sätt att undgå Church-Fitch paradoxala slutsats. Ett tillvägagångssätt är att ersätta kunskapsoperatorn med en hierarki av kunskapspredikat. Ett annat är baserat på distinktionen mellan faktisk och potentiell kunskap och ett förkastande av den vanliga modallogiska formaliseringen av principen (K). Den senare typen av lösning betraktas både från ett realistiskt och ett icke-realistiskt perspektiv. Utifrån denna analys kommer jag fram till slutsatsen att vi, vare sig vi är realister eller antirealister rörande sanning, kan sluta oroa oss för vetbarhetsparadoxen och ändå uppskatta Church-Fitchs argument.

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  • 8.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Frege’s paradise and the paradoxes2003In: A Philosophical Smorgasbord: Essays on Action, Truth, and Other Things in Honour of Fredrick Stoutland, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala , 2003, p. 362-Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 9.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Hintikka and the origins of possible worlds semantics2005Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 10.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Horwich's minimalist conception of truth: some logical difficulties2001In: Logic and Logical Philosophy, Vol. 9, p. 161-181Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 11.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Introduction2012In: Epistemology versus Ontology: Essays on the Philosophy and Foundations of Mathematics in Honour of Per Martin-Löf / [ed] Dybjer, P.; Lindström, S.; Palmgren, E.; Sundholm, G., Dordrecht: Springer, 2012, p. vii-xivChapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This book brings together philosophers, mathematicians and logicians to penetrate important problems in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In philosophy, one has been concerned with the opposition between constructivism and classical mathematics and the different ontological and epistemological views that are reflected in this opposition. The dominant foundational framework for current mathematics is classical logic and set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC). This framework is, however, laden with philosophical difficulties. One important alternative foundational programme that is actively pursued today is predicativistic constructivism based on Martin-Löf type theory. Associated philosophical foundations are meaning theories in the tradition of Wittgenstein, Dummett, Prawitz and Martin-Löf. What is the relation between proof-theoretical semantics in the tradition of Gentzen, Prawitz, and Martin-Löf and Wittgensteinian or other accounts of meaning-as-use? What can proof-theoretical analyses tell us about the scope and limits of constructive and predicative mathematics?

  • 12.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Logicism and the Fregean Conception of Set2007In: Filosofidagarna 2007, Abstracts, Umeå, 2007Conference paper (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    Set theory, as developed within the tradition of Cantor and Zermelo, is a mathematical discipline that is autonomous relative to logic.

    According to the so-called iterative, or cumulative, conception of set, sets are mathematical objects built up from previously given objects by a process of “collecting them together”. More specifically, sets are formed in a transfinite succession of stages. At stage 0, the empty set is formed together with sets that only contain objects that are not sets (individuals). The sets formed at a successor stage a+1 are all possible collections of objects (individuals and sets) that are available at stage a. At limit stages all objects are collected together that have been obtained previously. The set-theoretic universe V contains all the objects (sets and individuals) that have been obtained in this process. The universe itself as well as such “inconsistent” totalities as the totality of ordinals, cardinals, and the totality of all sets that are not members of themselves, do not form sets. In this way the usual paradoxes of naive set theory are avoided.

    Frege, on the other hand, thought of sets—or classes—as “logical objects” which are definable within his logical system as extensions of concepts. Frege’s system is a higher-order logic, where the individual variables are taken to be absolutely unrestricted, ranging over absolutely all objects, and higher-order variables are interpreted as ranging over “unsaturated” entities—Fregean functions and concepts. Frege assumes that every concept of objects determines an object, namely, the class of all objects that fall under the concept. This assumption, in conjunction with strong existence assumptions concerning concepts, implies that Frege’s foundational system is inconsistent.

    In this talk I am going to discuss various proposals for developing a set theory along Fregean lines. In particular, I am going to consider various proposals for restricting Frege’s unlimited set-comprehension axiom.

  • 13.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Neo-Fregean Logicism and the A Priori Nature of Arithmetic2007In: Volume of Abstracts of the 13th International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (LMPS Beijing), 2007Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Frege tried to explain our knowledge of the natural numbers by reducing arithmetic to logic. This program, however, could not be carried out. The main reason was that the theory of extensions (or classes) that Frege used in defining the natural numbers turned out to be inconsistent. In addition, the program is in conflict with Godel´s first incompleteness theorem according to which every consistent formal system for arithmetic, with sufficient expressive power, contains true arithmetic statements that are not provable in the system. For a long time, therefore, Frege´s philosophy of mathematics came to be regarded as hopelessly passé. Recently, however, the situation has changed, mainly due to the revision of Frege´s program by Crispin Wright and Bob Hale and logical investigations carried out by the late George Boolos, Richard Heck, and others. It was pointed out that Frege in Grundgesetze makes only one essential use of his inconsistent axiom for classes, Basic Law V, namely to establish Hume’s principle, i.e., the statement that the cardinal numbers of the concepts F and G are equal if and only if the F’s and the G’s are equinumerous (can be put in a one-to-one correspondence with each other). Using this principle and appropriate definitions he then proved the fundamental axioms of arithmetic. In other words, Frege had established Frege’s theorem, i.e. the axioms of arithmetic due to Dedekind and Peano are provable from Hume’s Principle in second-order logic. Wright and Hale argue that Hume’s principle is analytically true of the concept of cardinal number and that it is knowable a priori. Thus, by using this principle instead of Frege’s inconsistent Basic Law V one can achieve a substantial part of Frege’s epistemological goals. Wright’s and Hale’s general program is to develop other branches of mathematics, like real and complex analysis and set theory, on the basis abstraction principles similar to Hume’s principle.

    In this paper I subject the neo-Fregean program of Hale and Wright to a critical examination.

    In particular, I concentrate on two questions:

    (i) Hale and Wright describe Hume’s principle as a stipulation about the meaning of “cardinal number”. A subject who is not in possession of the notion of a cardinal number can come to understand that concept by means of Hume’s principle. At the same time it is a very strong principle that implies the existence of infinitely many objects (cardinal numbers). How can one argue that such a strong principle is at the same time a stipulation and a priori true? In what sense can one introduce new entities by stipulation? The vague idea is that the left hand side (implying the existence of numbers) is just a “reconceptualization” of the right hand side (speaking of equinumerosity). I will analyse this idea that statements about numbers express nothing but facts about equinumerosity.

    (ii) If the derivation of Dedekind-Peano’s axioms from Hume’s principle preserves the property of being a priori, then we can also gain a priori knowledge of the fundamental laws of arithmetic. But how can we justify the claim that second-order logical consequence preserves apriority? This in turn leads to the question about the interpretation of second-order logic and its “logicality”.

  • 14.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Neo-Fregean Logicism in the Philosophy of Mathematics2007Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Frege tried to explain our knowledge of the natural numbers by reducing arithmetic to logic. This program, however, could not be carried out. The main reason was that the theory of classes (or extensions) that Frege used in defining the natural numbers turned out to be inconsistent. In addition, the program is in apparent conflict with Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem according to which every consistent formal system for arithmetic, with sufficient expressive power, contains true arithmetic statements that are not provable in the system. For a long time, therefore, Frege’s philosophy of mathematics came to be regarded as hopelessly passe. Recently, however, the situation has changed, mainly due to the revision of Frege’s program by Crispin Wright and Bob Hale and logical investigations carried out by the late George Boolos, Richard Heck, and others. The aim of the project is to subject the neo-Fregean program (and similar neo-logicist programs) in the philosophy of mathematics to a critical examination. Many of the assumptions and presuppositions of this program can be questioned. What is the epistemic status of the higher-order logic that is assumed? Can all the principles and rules of inference of this logic be justified on the basis of conceptual connections? Or is it rather,

    as critics have claimed, that the Neo-Fregeans have provided substantial mathematical assumptions with an innocent-looking logical disguise? What is the status of Hume’s principle and similar abstraction principles? What about the “bad company objection” against Fregean abstraction principles and the “Caesar objection” against implicit definitions? The focus will be on questions concerning the limits of logic, the interpretation of

    higher order logic, and the status of abstraction principles. The importance of the project lies in the clarity that it can provide concerning philosophically important concepts and problems.

  • 15.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    On the Semantics of Logical and Metaphysical Necessity2005In: Fifth European Congress for Analytic Philosophy, University of Lisbon, 27-31 August 2005: Book of Abstracts, 2005, p. 7-8Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Short abstract: We distinguish between two interpretations of the necessity operator of alethic modal logic: the logical and the metaphysical one. On the logical interpretation, ‘Necessarily A’ is true just in case A is logically true. According to the metaphysical interpretation, ‘Necessarily A’ is true if and only if it couldn’t have been the case that not-A. In this paper I describe a formal semantics (model theory) for a language of modal predicate logic that combines operators for logical and metaphysical necessity. The logical relationship between logical and metaphysical necessity is examined. Finally, I discuss to what extent this semantics gives us reasons to reject Quine’s criticism of quantified modal logic—especially the criticism of quantification into contexts governed by an operator for logical necessity.

  • 16.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Paradoxes of demonstrability2009In: Logic, ethics and all that Jazz: Essays in honour of Jordan Howard Sobel, Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 2009, p. 177-185Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 17.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Possible worlds semantics and the Liar: Reflections on a problem posed by Kaplan2009In: The Philosophy of David Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2009Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper I discuss a paradox, due to David Kaplan, that in his view threatens the use of possible worlds semantics as a model-theoretic framework for intensional logic. Kaplan’s paradox starts out from an intuitively reasonable principle that I refer to as the Principle of Plenitude.  From this principle he derives a contradiction in what he calls Naive Possible World Theory.  Kaplan’s metatheoretic argument can be restated in the modal object language as an intensional version of the Liar paradox. To solve the paradox, Kaplan favors a ramified theory of propositions, along the lines of Russell’s ramified theory of types. I shall attempt an alternative, less drastic, modification of the standard possible worlds methodology than the one favored by Kaplan.  The idea is to regard sentences that involve propositional quantifiers, like the Liar sentence: "All propositions contemplated by Epimenides are false" as being, in a sense, indexical: one and the same sentence can express different propositions when used in different possible worlds. Using this approach, I try to show that the intensional Liar paradox can be defused and no longer poses a threat to possible worlds semantics.

  • 18.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Possible-Worlds Semantics and the Liar: Reflections on a Problem Posed by Kaplan2003In: Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science: Selected Conributed Papers from the 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Kraków, 1999, Kluwer, Dordrecht , 2003Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 19.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Quine’s interpretation problem and the early development of possible worlds semantics2001In: The Logica Yearbook 2000, Filosofia, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Prag , 2001Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 20.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Sanningens paradoxer: om ändliga och oändliga lögnare2000In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 3, p. 42-52Article in journal (Other academic)
    Download full text (pdf)
    fulltext
  • 21.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Thinking impossible things2002In: Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality, Department of Philosophy and Linguistics, Umeå , 2002Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 22.
    Lindström, Sten
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Dybjer, PeterPalmgren, ErikSundholm, Göran
    Epistemology versus Ontology: Essays on the Philosophy and Foundations of Mathematics in Honour of Per Martin-Löf2012Collection (editor) (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This book brings together philosophers, mathematicians and logicians to penetrate important problems in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In philosophy, one has been concerned with the opposition between constructivism and classical mathematics and the different ontological and epistemological views that are reflected in this opposition. The dominant foundational framework for current mathematics is classical logic and set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC). This framework is, however, laden with philosophical difficulties. One important alternative foundational programme that is actively pursued today is predicativistic constructivism based on Martin-Löf type theory. Associated philosophical foundations are meaning theories in the tradition of Wittgenstein, Dummett, Prawitz and Martin-Löf. What is the relation between proof-theoretical semantics in the tradition of Gentzen, Prawitz, and Martin-Löf and Wittgensteinian or other accounts of meaning-as-use? What can proof-theoretical analyses tell us about the scope and limits of constructive and predicative mathematics?

  • 23.
    Lindström, Sten
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Krister, Segerberg
    Modal logic and Philosophy2007In: Handbook of Modal Logic / [ed] Patrick Blackburn, Johan van Benthem, Frank Wolter, Amsterdam, Boston: Elsevier, 2007, p. 1149-1214Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Modal logic is one of philosophy’s many children. As a mature adult it has moved out of the parental home and is nowadays straying far from its parent. But the ties are still there: philosophy is important for modal logic, modal logic is important for philosophy. Or, at least, this is a thesis we try to defend in this chapter.

  • 24.
    Lindström, Sten
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Palmgren, Erik
    Introduction: The Three Foundational Programmes2008In: Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism: What has Become of Them? / [ed] Sten Lindström, Erik Palmgren, Krister Segerberg, Viggo Stoltenberg-Hansen, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2008, p. 1-23Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The period in the foundations of mathematics that started in 1879 with the publication of Frege's Begriffsschrift and ended in 1931 with Gödel's Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I can reasonably be called the classical period. It saw the development of three major foundational programmes: the logicism of Frege, Russell and Whitehead, the intuitionism of Brouwer, and Hilbert's formalist and proof-theoretic programme. In this period, there were also lively exchanges between the various schools culminating in the famous Hilbert-Brouwer controversy in the 1920s.

    The purpose of this anthology is to review the programmes in the foundations of mathematics from the classical period and to assess their possible relevance for contemporary philosophy of mathematics. What can we say, in retrospect, about the various foundational programmes of the classical period and the disputes that took place between them? To what extent do the classical programmes of logicism, intuitionism and formalism represent options that are still alive today? These questions are addressed in this volume by leading mathematical logicians and philosophers of mathematics.

  • 25.
    Lindström, Sten
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Palmgren, ErikUppsala universitet.Segerberg, KristerUppsala universitet.Stoltenberg-Hansen, ViggoUppsala universitet.
    Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism: What has become of them?2008Collection (editor) (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The period in the foundations of mathematics that started in 1879 with the publication of Frege's Begriffsschrift and ended in 1931 with Gödel's Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I can reasonably be called the classical period. It saw the development of three major foundational programmes: the logicism of Frege, Russell and Whitehead, the intuitionism of Brouwer, and Hilbert's formalist and proof-theoretic programme. In this period, there were also lively exchanges between the various schools culminating in the famous Hilbert-Brouwer controversy in the 1920s.

    The purpose of this anthology is to review the programmes in the foundations of mathematics from the classical period and to assess their possible relevance for contemporary philosophy of mathematics. What can we say, in retrospect, about the various foundational programmes of the classical period and the disputes that took place between them? To what extent do the classical programmes of logicism, intuitionism and formalism represent options that are still alive today? These questions are addressed in this volume by leading mathematical logicians and philosophers of mathematics.

    The volume will be of interest primarily to researchers and graduate students of philosophy, logic, mathematics and theoretical computer science. The material will be accessible to specialists in these areas and to advanced graduate students in the respective fields.

  • 26.
    Lindström, Sten
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Palmgren, Erik
    Department of Mathematics, Stockholm University.
    Westerståhl, Dag
    Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University.
    Introduction: The philosophy of logical consequence and inference2012In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 187, no 3, p. 817-820Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 27.
    Lindström, Sten
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Sundström, PärUmeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind2002Collection (editor) (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 28.
    Nilsson, Jonas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Rationality in Flux: Formal Representations of Methodological Change2011In: Belief Revision meets Philosophy of Science / [ed] Erik J. Olsson, Sebastian Enqvist, Dordrecht: Springer, 2011, p. 347-356Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A central aim for philosophers of science has been to understand scientific theory change, or more specifically the rationality of theory change. Philosophers and historians of science have suggested that not only theories but also scientific methods and standards of rational inquiry have changed through the history of science. The topic here is methodological change, and what kind of theory of rational methodological change is appropriate. The modest ambition of this paper is to discuss in what ways results in formal theories of belief revision can throw light on the question of what an appropriate theory of methodological change would look like.

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