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  • 1.
    Andersson, Linda
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Wikström, Magnus
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Testing for vertical fiscal externalities2004In: International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 11, p. 243-263Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 2.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Environmental Policy, Efficient Taxation and Unemployment2005In: International Tax and Public FinanceArticle in journal (Refereed)
  • 3.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Optimal income taxation and decentralized fiscal federalism2010In: Regional Science and Urban Economics, ISSN 0166-0462, E-ISSN 1879-2308, Vol. 40, no 4, p. 187-195Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns redistribution and public good provision under asymmetric information, which are here ingredients of a policy-problem facing each member state (nation) of an economic federation with decentralized leadership. Each member state is assumed to have its own redistributive policy and pattern of public consumption, whereas the federal level redistributes (ex-post) between the member states. The results show how and why federal ex-post redistribution may modify the use of income taxation and public good provision at the national level, relative to the policy outcome in the absence of a federal government, as well as how the national policy incentives depend on whether or not the federal government uses distortionary taxes.

  • 4.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Public finance and the environment2010Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 5.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Social accounting and the Public sector2008In: International Economic Review, ISSN 1468-2354, Vol. 49, no 1, p. 349-375Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article contributes to the theory of social accounting. As such, it tries to extend earlier literature on the welfare equivalence of the comprehensive net national product in two main directions, both of which refer to the public sector. One is by considering welfare measurement problems associated with public good provision and redistributive policy, respectively, when the public revenues are raised by distortionary taxes. The other is by addressing the consequences of a “federation-like” decision structure, where independent tax and expenditure decisions are made both by the central government and by lower level governments.

  • 6.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Welfare measurement and public goods in a second best economy2010In: Handbook of environmental accounting / [ed] Thomas Aronsson, Karl-Gustaf Löfgren, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010, p. 101-126Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 7.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Welfare measurement, green accounting and distortionary taxes2011In: Green national accounting and sustainability / [ed] Karl-Gustaf Löfgren och Chuan-Zhong Li, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, p. 630-652Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns welfare measurement in the presence of distortionary taxes. One purpose is to explain why the traditional green NNP measure fails as a welfare indicator when distortionary taxes are present. Another is to derive a green NNP analogue in a second best environment. In the second best optimum, the efficiency cost of taxation will affect both the form of the national welfare measure and the proper principles of accounting for pollution.

  • 8.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Welfare measurement, involuntary unemployment and heterogeneity2010In: The Review of Income and Wealth, ISSN 0034-6586, E-ISSN 1475-4991, Vol. 56, no 3, p. 559-571Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns welfare measurement in an economy with union wage setting, where the equilibrium is characterized by unemployment. Contrary to results derived in the first best, the current value Hamiltonian is not an exact welfare measure in an economy with unemployment. Instead, the welfare measure also depends on “employment effect,” which are caused by the discrepancy between supply and demand in the labor market. In addition, since unemployment gives rise to heterogeneity, distributional effects will also characterize the welfare measure.

  • 9.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Andersson, Fredrik
    Friberg, Richard
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Kolm, Ann-Sofi
    Ohlsson, Henry
    Waldenström, Daniel
    Den första nationella konferensen i nationalekonomi i Sverige2011In: Ekonomisk debatt, Vol. 39, no 2, p. 67-73Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 10.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Axelsson, RogerUmeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.Brännlund, RunarUmeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    The theory and practice of environmental and resource economics: essays in honour of Karl-Gustaf Löfgren2006Collection (editor) (Other academic)
  • 11.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Backlund, Kenneth
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Environmental policy, sustainability, and welfare: an economic analysis2018Book (Refereed)
  • 12.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Backlund, Kenneth
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Sahlén, Linda
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Technology transfers and the clean development mechanism in a north-south general equilibrium model2010In: Resources and Energy Economics, ISSN 0928-7655, E-ISSN 1873-0221, Vol. 32, no 3, p. 292-309Article in journal (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyses the potential welfare gains of introducing a technology transfer from Annex I to non-Annex I in order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Our analysis is based on a numerical general equilibrium model for a world-economy comprising two regions; North (Annex I) and South (non-Annex I). In a cooperative equilibrium, a technology transfer from the North to the South is clearly desirable from the perspective of a ‘global social planner’, since the welfare gain for the South outweighs the welfare loss for the North. However, if the regions do not cooperate, then the incentives to introduce the technology transfer appear to be relatively weak from the perspective of the North; at least if we allow for Southern abatement in the pre-transfer Nash equilibrium. Finally, by adding the emission reductions associated with the Kyoto agreement, our results show that the technology transfer leads to higher welfare in both regions.

  • 13.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Backlund, Kenneth
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Wikström, Magnus
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Public goods, optimal distortionary taxation and union wage setting2006In: The theory and practice of environmental and resource economics: essays in honor of Karl-Gustaf Löfgren / [ed] Thomas Aronsson, Roger Axelsson, Runar Brännlund, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar , 2006, p. 102-127Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 14.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Bastani, Spencer
    Uppsala universitet.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Uppsala universitet.
    Vad är optimal beskattning2010In: Framtider, ISSN 0281-0492, print, Vol. 3, p. 18-21Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 15.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Department of Economics, Uppsala University.
    On environmental taxation under uncertain environmental damage2003In: Environmental and Resource Economics, ISSN 0924-6460, E-ISSN 1573-1502, Vol. 24, no 2, p. 183-196Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper addresses optimal taxation, when therelationship between the consumption of a`dirty' good and the resulting environmentaldamage is uncertain and treated as a randomvariable by policy makers. The main purpose isto analyze how increased uncertainty, measuredas a mean preserving increase in the spread ofthis random variable, affects the optimalcommodity tax on the dirty consumption good. Incase the only task of government is to correctthe environmental externality, and if thepreferences are characterized by nondecreasingabsolute risk aversion, we find that thecommodity tax on the dirty consumption goodincreases in response to additionaluncertainty. If, on the other hand, thegovernment provides a public good and uses alump-sum tax in addition to the commodity tax,it is possible that the commodity tax decreasesas a response to additional uncertainty, evenif the preferences are characterized bynondecreasing absolute risk aversion. A similarresult emerges, although for different reasons,if the lump-sum tax is replaced by a laborincome tax.

  • 16.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Optimal beskattning och informationsbrist: grundläggande insikter från ekonomisk teori2013In: Dags för enklare skatter, Stockholm: SNS förlag, 2013Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 17.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Department of Economics, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
    Optimal taxation, global externalities and Labor mobility2003In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 87, no 12, p. 2749-2764Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns transboundary environmental problems in the context of an optimal tax model. We assume that part of the labor force is mobile across countries, and that the set of tax instruments includes a nonlinear income tax and a commodity tax on the ‘dirty’ good that is causing damage to the environment. The purpose is to compare the (globally optimal) second best policy of a cooperative equilibrium with the policy implicit in a noncooperative equilibrium. We show that the commodity taxes differ between equilibria because of: (i) transboundary externalities not internalized by national governments, (ii) interaction effects between environmental and other policies, and (iii) labor mobility.

  • 18.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Department of Economics, Uppsala University.
    Redistribution and provision of public goods in an economic federation2008In: Journal of Public Economic Theory, ISSN 1097-3923, E-ISSN 1467-9779, Vol. 10, no 1, p. 125-143Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns redistribution and public good provision in an economic federation with two levels of government: a local government in each locality and a (first mover) central government. Each locality is characterized by two ability-types, and the ability-distribution differs across localities. The central government redistributes via a nonlinear income tax and a lump-sum transfer to each local government, while the local governments use proportional income taxes and provide local public goods. We show how the redistributive role of taxation is combined with a corrective role, and how the central government can implement the second best resource allocation.

  • 19.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Uppsala universitet.
    The standard deviation of life-length, retirement incentives and optimal pension design2010Report (Other academic)
  • 20.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Uppsala universitet.
    Uncertain Length of Life, Retirement Age, and Optimal Pension Design2018Report (Other academic)
  • 21.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Blomquist, Sören
    Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden .
    Micheletto, Luca
    University of Milan, Milan, Italy.
    Where should the elderly live and who should pay for their care?2010In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, ISSN 0347-0520, E-ISSN 1467-9442, Vol. 112, no 2, p. 289-314Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    We consider a model with a population consisting of earners and retired persons; elderlycare is publicly provided. There is one big city, where congestion effects and agglomerationforces are at work, and a number of small villages. We show how the externalities related topopulation mobility lead to an inefficient spatial distribution of earners and retirees, and wecharacterize the second-best solution. Decentralization of this solution in a fiscal federalismstructure requires the use of taxes and subsidies proportional to the number of earners andretired persons living in the city and the villages.

  • 22.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Brännäs, Kurt
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Household work travel time1996In: Regional studies, ISSN 0034-3404, E-ISSN 1360-0591, Vol. 30, no 6, p. 541-548Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This study derives and estimates models for the work travel time of each spouse in the household conditional on both spouses' hours of work. The model is estimated using Swedish household data. The own labour supply has a positive impact on travel time for females and a negative one for males. The estimated effects of the other spouse's labour supply are insignificant. An overall test of whether the hours of work are weakly separable from work travel time indicates that this hypothesis cannot be rejected for males but can be rejected for females.

  • 23.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Brännäs, Kurt
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    The importance of locational choice in an empirical labour supply model1996In: Applied Economics, ISSN 0003-6846, E-ISSN 1466-4283, Vol. 28, no 5, p. 521-529Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    An estimation of labour supply is modelled using the theory of urban household behaviour. The major purpose is to test the (implicit) assumption in previous labour supply studies that work travel and housing consumption are weakly separable from the hours of work. The results, which are obtained using Swedish data, imply that the hypothesis of weak separability is clearly rejected. We also find that the choice of location affects policy-relevant conclusions about the labour supply behaviour.

  • 24.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Cialani, Catia
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Genuine saving and the social cost of taxation2012In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 96, no 1-2, p. 211-217Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Following the 1987 report by The World Commission on Environment and Development, the genuine saving has come to play a key role in the context of sustainable development, and the World Bank regularly publishes numbers for genuine saving on a national basis. However, these numbers are typically calculated as if the tax system is non-distortionary. This paper presents an analogue to genuine saving in a second best economy, where the government raises revenue by means of distortionary taxation. We show how the social cost of public debt, which depends on the marginal excess burden, ought to be reflected in the genuine saving. By presenting calculations for Greece, Japan, Portugal, U.K., U.S. and OECD average, we also show that the numbers published by the World Bank are likely to be biased and may even give incorrect information as to whether the economy is locally sustainable.

  • 25.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Granlund, David
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Federal Governments Should Subsidize State Expenditure that Voters do not Consider when Voting2014Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This short paper analyzes whether a federal transfer system can be designed to increase welfare, when state governments create political budget cycles to increase the likelihood of reelection. The results show how the federal government may announce a transfer scheme in advance for the post-election year that counteracts the welfare costs of political budget cycles.

  • 26.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Granlund, David
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Federal subsidization of state expenditure to reduce political budget cycles2017In: International Tax and Public Finance, ISSN 0927-5940, E-ISSN 1573-6970, Vol. 24, no 3, p. 536-545Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this note, we analyze whether a federal transfer system can be designed to increase welfare when state governments create political budget cycles. The results show how the federal government can counteract the welfare costs of these cycles, without hindering politicians from signaling their type, by announcing a transfer scheme to subsidize expenditures that voters do not consider when voting.

  • 27.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Granlund, David
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Gender Norms, Work Hours, and Corrective Taxation2015In: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, ISSN 2214-8043, E-ISSN 2214-8051, Vol. 56, p. 33-39Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper deals with optimal income taxation based on a household model, where men and women allocate their time between market work and household production, and where households differ depending on which spouse has the comparative advantage in market work. The purpose is to analyze the tax policy implications of gender norms represented by a market work norm for men and household work norm for women. We show how the optimal (corrective) tax policy depends on the definition of social norms, the preferences for obeying these norms, and whether men or women have the comparative advantage in market work. Two extreme results are that (i) corrective taxation should not be used at all if the norms are based on the mean value of market work and household work, respectively, given that all households have the same preferences, and (ii) only the majority household type should be taxed at the margin if the norms are instead based on the modal value.

  • 28.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Granlund, David
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Gender Norms, Work Hours, and Corrective Taxation2013Report (Other academic)
  • 29.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Granlund, David
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Present-Biased Preferences and Publicly Provided Private Goods2014In: Finanzarchiv, ISSN 0015-2218, E-ISSN 1614-0974, Vol. 70, no 2, p. 169-199Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyzes the welfare effects of a publicly provided private good with long-term consequences for individual well-being, in an economy where consumers have present-biased preferences due to quasihyperbolic discounting. The analysis is based on a two-type model with asymmetric information between the government and the private sector, and each consumer fives for three periods. We present formal conditions under which public provision to the young and the middle-aged generation, respectively, leads to higher welfare. Our results show that quasihyperbolic discounting provides a strong incentive for public provision to the young generation - especially if the consumers are naive (as opposed to sophisticated).

  • 30.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Granlund, David
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Public goods and optimal paternalism under present-biased preferences2011In: Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765, E-ISSN 1873-7374, Vol. 113, no 1, p. 54-57Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns the provision of a state-variable public good in a two-type model under present-biased consumer preferences. The preference for immediate gratification facing the high-ability type weakens the incentive to adjust public provision in response to the self-selection constraint.

  • 31.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Heidrich, Stefanie
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Wikström, Magnus
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Social identity, education and tax policy2014Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyzes the implications of social identity and self-categorization in the context of optimal redistributive income taxation. A two-type model is supplemented by an assumption that individuals select themselves into social categories, in which norms are formed and education effort choices partly depend on these norms. Optimal tax policy is analyzed under two different assumptions about the social objective function: a welfarist objective based on consumer preferences and a paternalist objective that does not reflect the consumer preference for social identity. We show how the welfarist government implements a tax policy to internalize the externalities arising from social norms, while the paternalist government uses tax policy to make individuals behave as if their preferences for social identity were absent.

  • 32.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Jenderny, Katharina
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Lanot, Gauthier
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    The Quality of the Estimators of the ETI2017Report (Other academic)
  • 33.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    University of Gothenburg, SE-405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Conspicuous Leisure: Optimal Income Taxation When Both Relative Consumption and Relative Leisure Matter2013In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, ISSN 0347-0520, E-ISSN 1467-9442, Vol. 115, no 1, p. 155-175Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In previous studies on public policy under relative-consumption concerns, leisure comparisons have been ignored. In this paper, we consider a two-type optimal non-linear income tax model, in which people care about both their relative consumption and their relative leisure. Increased consumption positionality typically implies higher marginal income tax rates for both ability types, whereas leisure positionality has an offsetting role. However, this offsetting role is not symmetric; concern about relative leisure implies a progressive income tax component (i.e., a component that is larger for the high-ability type than for the low-ability type). Leisure positionality does not modify the policy rule for public-good provision.

  • 34.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Conspicuous Leisure: Optimal Income Taxation When Both Relative Consumption and Relative Leisure Matter2013In: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, ISSN 0347-0520, E-ISSN 1467-9442, Vol. 115, no 1, p. 155-175Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In previous studies on public policy under relative-consumption concerns, leisure comparisons have been ignored. In this paper, we consider a two-type optimal non-linear income tax model, in which people care about both their relative consumption and their relative leisure. Increased consumption positionality typically implies higher marginal income tax rates for both ability types, whereas leisure positionality has an offsetting role. However, this offsetting role is not symmetric; concern about relative leisure implies a progressive income tax component (i.e., a component that is larger for the high-ability type than for the low-ability type). Leisure positionality does not modify the policy rule for public-good provision.

  • 35.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Conspicuous leisure: Optimal income taxation when both relative consumption and relative leisure matterIn: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, ISSN 0347-0520, E-ISSN 1467-9442Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 36.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Conspicuous leisure: Optimal income taxation when both relative consumption and relative leisure matter2009Report (Other academic)
  • 37.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Genuine saving and positional externalities2017In: International Economic Review, ISSN 0020-6598, E-ISSN 1468-2354, Vol. 58, no 4, p. 1155-1190Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Much evidence suggests that people are concerned with their relative consumption. Yet, positional externalities have so far been ignored in savings-based indicators of sustainable development. This article examines the implications of relative consumption concerns for measures of sustainable development by deriving analogues to genuine saving when people are concerned with their relative consumption. Unless the positional externalities have been internalized, an indicator of such externalities must be added to genuine saving to arrive at the proper measure of welfare change. We also show how relative consumption concerns affect the way public investment ought to be reflected in genuine saving.

  • 38.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Keeping up with the Joneses, the Smiths and the Tanakas: on international tax coordination and social comparisons2015In: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 131, p. 71-86Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Recent evidence suggests that social comparisons between people in different countries have become more important over time due to globalization. This paper deals with optimal nonlinear income taxation in an international setting, where consumers derive utility from their relative consumption compared both with other domestic residents and people in another country. The optimal tax policy in our framework reflects both correction for positional externalities and redistributive aspects of such correction due to the incentive constraint facing each government. If the national governments behave as Nash competitors to each other, the resulting tax policy only internalizes the externalities that are due to within-country comparisons, whereas the tax policy chosen by the leader country in a Stackelberg game also to some extent reflects between-country comparisons. We also derive globally Pareto-efficient tax policies in a cooperative framework, and conclude that there are potentially large welfare gains of international tax policy coordination.

  • 39.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Keeping up with the Joneses, the Smiths and the Tanakas: Optimal Income Taxation and RelativeConsumption in a Multi-Country Economy2013Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Recent empirical evidence suggests that between-country social comparisons have become more important over time. This paper analyzes optimal income taxation in a multi-country economy, where consumers derive utility from their relative consumption compared with both other domestic residents and people in other countries. The optimal tax policy in our framework reflects both correction for positional externalities and redistributive aspects of such correction due to the incentive constraint facing each government. If the national governments behave as Nash competitors to one another, the resulting tax policy only internalizes the externalities that are due to within-country comparisons, whereas the tax policy chosen by the leader country in a Stackelberg game also reflects between-country comparisons. We also derive a globally efficient tax structure in a cooperative framework. Nash competition typically implies lower marginal income tax rates than chosen by the leader country in a Stackelberg game, and cooperation typically leads to higher marginal income tax rates than the non-cooperative regimes.

  • 40.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Paternalism against Veblen: Optimal Taxation and Non-respected Preferences for Social Comparisons2018In: American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, ISSN 1945-7731, E-ISSN 1945-774X, Vol. 10, no 1, p. 39-76Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper compares optimal nonlinear income tax policies of welfarist and paternalist governments, where the latter does not respect individual preferences regarding relative consumption. Consistent with previous findings, relative consumption concerns typically induce a welfarist government to increase the marginal tax rates to internalize positional externalities. Remarkably, the optimal marginal tax rules are often very similar in the paternalist case, where such externalities are not taken into account. We identify several cases where the marginal tax rules are indeed identical between the governments. Numerical simulations show that marginal and average tax levels and the overall redistribution are often also similar.

  • 41.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Positional concerns in an OLG model: optimal labor and capital income taxation2010In: International Economic Review, ISSN 0020-6598, E-ISSN 1468-2354, Vol. 51, no 4, p. 1071-1095Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article concerns optimal income taxation under asymmetric information in a two-type OLG model when individuals' relative consumption matters. Positional concerns affect the policy choices via two channels: (i) the average degree of positionality and (ii) positionality differences between the low-ability type and the mimicker. Under plausible empirical estimates, the marginal labor income tax rates become substantially larger, and the absolute value of the marginal capital income tax rate of the low-ability type becomes substantially smaller, than in the conventional model. In addition to measures of reference consumption based on average consumption, we also address within-generation and upward comparisons.

  • 42.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Positional preferences in time and space: Implications for optimal income taxation2010Report (Other academic)
  • 43.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Univ Gothenburg, Sch Business Econ & Law, Dept Econ, S-40530 Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Positional preferences in time and space: Optimal income taxation with dynamic social comparisons2014In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, ISSN 0167-2681, E-ISSN 1879-1751, Vol. 101, p. 1-23Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns optimal redistributive non-linear income taxation in an OLG model, where people care about their own consumption relative to (i) other people's current consumption, (ii) own past consumption, and (iii) other people's past consumption. We show that both (i) and (iii) affect the marginal income tax structure whereas (ii) does not. We also derive conditions under which atemporal and intertemporal consumption comparisons give rise to exactly the same tax policy responses. On the basis of the available empirical estimates, comparisons with other people's current and past consumption tend to substantially increase the optimal marginal labor income tax rates. Yet, such comparisons may either increase or decrease the optimal marginal capital income tax rates.

  • 44.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Publicly provided private goods and optimal taxation when consumers have positional preferences2014Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyzes optimal differential commodity taxation, together with optimal nonlinear income taxation, in order to deal with positional preferences. It also derives the optimal public provision of private goods both when differential commodity taxation is feasible and when it is not. It is shown that publicly provided non-positional private goods which are (possibly imperfect) substitutes for positional private goods should be used as a corrective instrument even if the tax system is optimal, i.e. even when differential commodity taxation is feasible. An exception is the special case where all consumers contribute equally much to the positional externality, in which the commodity tax constitutes a perfect instrument for internalizing the positional externality.

  • 45.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Göteborgs universitet.
    State-variable public goods and social comparisons2014In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, ISSN 0095-0696, E-ISSN 1096-0449, Vol. 68, no 2, p. 390-410Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The optimal provision of a state-variable public good, where the global climate is the prime example, is analyzed in a model where people care about their relative consumption. We consider both keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preferences (where people compare their own current consumption with others’ current consumption) and catching-up-with-the-Joneses preferences (where people compare their own current consumption with others’ past consumption) in an economy with two productivity types, overlapping generations, and optimal nonlinear income taxation. The extent to which the conventional rules for provision of state-variable public goods (a dynamic analog of the Samuelson rules) ought to be modified is shown to clearly depend on the strength of the relative concerns of both kinds, but also on the preference elicitation format.

  • 46.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    State-variable public goods when relative consumption matters: a dynamic optimal taxation approach2011Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns the optimal provision of a state-variable public good, where the global climate is the prime example. The analysis is based on a two-type optimal income tax model with overlapping generations, where people care about their relative consumption. We consider both keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preferences (where people compare their own current consumption with others’ current consumption) and catching-up-with-the-Joneses preferences (where people compare their own current consumption with others’ past consumption). The extent to which the rule for public provision ought to be modified is shown to depend crucially on the preference elicitation format.

  • 47.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, 40530, Göteborg, Sweden.
    Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class Revisited: Implications for Optimal Income Taxation2013In: Social Choice and Welfare, ISSN 0176-1714, E-ISSN 1432-217X, Vol. 41, no 3, p. 551-578Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Several previous studies have demonstrated the importance of relative consumption comparisons for public policy. Yet, almost all of them have ignored the role of leisure for status comparisons. Inspired by Veblen (The theory of the leisure class. Macmillan, New York, 1899), this paper assumes that people care about their relative consumption and that leisure has a displaying role in making relative consumption more visible, based on a two-type model of optimal income taxation. While increased importance of relative consumption typically implies higher marginal income tax rates, in line with previous research, the effect of leisure-induced consumption visibility is to make the income tax more regressive in terms of ability.

  • 48.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Veblen’s theory of the leisure class revisited: Implications for optimal income taxation2010Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Almost all previous studies on public policy under relative consumption concerns have ignored the role of leisure for status comparisons. Inspired by Veblen (1899), this paper considers a two-type optimal income tax model, where people care about their relative consumption, and where the importance of relative consumption increases with the use of leisure due to increased consumption visibility. We show that increased consumption positionality typically implies higher marginal income tax rates for both ability-types. Using a leisure-weighted measure of reference consumption, rather than a measure where leisure plays no role as in the previous literature, increases the marginal income tax rate implemented for the low-ability type and decreases the marginal income tax rate implemented for the high-ability type, i.e., it gives rise to a regressive tax component.

  • 49.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    When Samuelson Met Veblen Abroad: National and Global Public Good Provision when Social Comparisons Matter2014In: Economica, ISSN 0013-0427, E-ISSN 1468-0335, Vol. 81, no 322, p. 224-243Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper derives Pareto-efficient provision rules for national and global public goods in a two-country world, where each individual cares about his or her relative consumption of private goods compared to other domestic and foreign residents. We contrast these rules with those following from a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. Both national and global public goods are underprovided in Nash equilibrium under such relative consumption concerns. Finally, when individuals also care about the relative consumption of national public goods, based on between-country comparisons, the optimal provision rule depends on whether or not the national public goods are less positional than private consumption.

  • 50.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Göteborg, Sweden .
    When Samuelson met Veblen abroad: National and global public goods when social comparisons matter2012Report (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper derives Pareto efficient policy rules for the provision of national as well as global public goods in a two-country world, where each individual cares about relative consumption within as well as between countries. Furthermore, we compare these policy rules with those that follow from a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The results show that both global and national public goods are systematically under-provided in Nash equilibrium under such relative consumption concerns.

123 1 - 50 of 107
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