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  • 101.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Etik och moral i högre utbildning: ett diskussionsunderlag1999Book (Other academic)
  • 102.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies. Filosofi.
    Ett paket av känslor och beteenden2008In: Pedagogiska magasinet, no 4Article, book review (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [sv]

    Recension av Mats G. Hansson, "Integritet - i spänningen mellan avskildhet och delaktighet"

  • 103.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Läraren som fostrare, med gestaltskifte i sikte2005Report (Other academic)
  • 104.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Lärares yrkesetik2006Book (Other academic)
  • 105.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Läraryrkets sammansatta etik2002In: Pedagogiska magasinet, no 2, p. 8-15Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 106.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Morality of the Dark, Morality of the Light: Reflections on Ethics and the Holocaust2000In: Contemporary Portrayals of Auschwitz: Philosophical Challenges, Humanity Books, Prometheus Press, New York , 2000, p. 355-Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Starting from a dream where the author found himself in the middle of the Holocaust, this paper works out a distinction between two regions of morality: Morality of the Light and Morality of the Dark. The two regions complement each other, like in the Taoist symbol of yin and yang. Morality of the Light is that of moral agents, whereas Morality of the Dark is morality of non-moral agents, being non-rational, non-moral or non-agents. People victimized by the Nazi death-camps exemplify the latter region. Ethicists have hitherto largely ignored this region. Its methodology has similarities with that of art and religion rather than with scientific methodology.

  • 107.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Om relevansen av miljöetisk forskning för FjällMistra: rapport till FjällMistra2001Report (Other academic)
  • 108.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Placing the buck where it belongs: non-comparative value of individuals2005Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This essay disputes the attempt to reduce value to normative reason for fitting reactions, the so-called buck-passing account of value, mainly founded on Thomas Scanlon’s work. Using Scanlon’s contractual ethics as example it argues that the assumption of non-reducible value is defensible when morally structuring superior values are considered, namely superordinate values and what is called a ‘master value’. Since the point of the metaphor of buck-passing is to indicate the responsible dealer in a game, the buck would seem rightly to belong to the latter in the “game” of ethics.

  • 109.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Respect for Persons, Respect for Integrity: Remarks for the Conceptualization of Integrity in Social Ethics2005In: Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, Vol. 8, no 2, p. 231-242Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Even though respect for integrity is hailed in several authoritative legal and ethical documents, and is typically presented as a complement to respect for autonomy, it is largely neglected in many leading works in ethics. Is such neglect warranted, or does it express a prejudice? This article argues that the latter is the case, and that this is due to misplaced conceptual concerns. It offers some proposals as regards the conceptualization of integrity in social ethics in general and in biomedical ethics in particular. Five main directions of interpretation of ‘integrity’ are discerned and shown to be relevant for different areas of biomedical ethics. The defense of respect for integrity is served by a softening of principlism and by greater attention to context among the initial critics of this principle.

  • 110.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Signal, definition, function, constitution or what?: a question about the relation between value and reason-giving in the buck-passing account of value2007In: Hommage à Wlodek: philosophical papers dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz / [ed] Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Björn Petersson, Jonas Josefsson & Dan Egonsson, Lund: Department of Philosophy, Lund University , 2007Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The so called ‘buck-passing account of value’ claims to offer an account to the effect that the value, or goodness, of things is amenable to the existence of some natural properties giving us reason for certain pro-reactions. This essay argues that we hardly can accept that. The offer is obscure already when we consider the relation assumed in BPA to obtain between value and reason-giving. Once the various forms of this relation are distinguished BPA appears implausible or not more than a research program. As to the much debated ‘wrong kind of reason argument’ that Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen have developed, it is shown to be a trap for buck-passers.

  • 111.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Singer och speciesismen2009In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 30, no 1, p. 32-45Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 112.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Skolområdets etik: en studie i skolans fostran2004Book (Other academic)
  • 113.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Topprestationer och fascistiska värderingar1995In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 19, no 3, p. 15-20Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 114.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Utträde på rutschkana från universitetet2007In: Västerbottens-Kuriren, ISSN 1104-0246, no 31/10/07, DebattArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 115.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Varför har vi konstkritiker?2004In: Västerbottens-Kuriren, ISSN 1104-0246, no 2/6/04, KulturArticle in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 116.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Views of Normativity and Ethics in the Field of Education: Om etik, yrkesetik och pedagogik - en begreppsklargöring2006Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 117.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Vinnare och förlorare2007In: Västerbottens-Kuriren, ISSN 1104-0246, no 16/6/07Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 118.
    Fjellström, Roger
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Worth loving, a guideline for reflecting practitioners2005Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A problem with most models of learning through reflective practice, scenario based or not, is that they tend towards a descriptivist relativism, whereas the notion of learning has a ring of achieving a more valuable state, frequently termed ‘development’, ‘increased consciousness’, or ‘insight’. This tendency is due to the stress on the context, life stories and scenarios connected with practices, in combination with the epistemological rejection of a firm (objective) cognitive ground that practitioners can apply through the use of rules of rationality. Reflective practice is, as Donald Schön has put it, “awareness of indeterminate, swampy zones of practice that lie beyond its canons” (1987). The lack of a logically applicable cognitive ground is typically thought to characterize factual as well as evaluative/ normative judgments (or at least the latter). The decision of what mental changes constitute learning for practitioners engaged in reflective practice, then, is up to the contextually determined, story bound and scenario enacting individuals. In this paper I argue that any model of learning through reflective practice that aspires to be morally satisfying needs a universally acceptable foundation for evaluation. Such a foundation, I argue, is best offered by the ethical axiom that all human beings have equal value, or that all human beings are worth loving. The use of this axiom in moral evaluation of progress in learning is compatible with the view that reflective practice involves “indeterminate, swampy zones of practice that lie beyond its canons”. The reason is that the force of this axiom is not logical but psychological – which is what it takes to guide context-, story- and scenario sensitive reconsideration and change in views and attitudes. This force is due not only to its inherently persuasive character, but also to the persuasive character of the meta-ethical device justifying the axiom.

  • 119.
    Foka, Anna
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Humlab.
    Deconstructing Oedipus: Woody Allen's Mighty Aphrodite and the classical tradition2017In: The reception of ancient virtues and vices in modern popular culture: beauty, bravery, blood and glory / [ed] Eran Almagor and Lisa Maurice, Leiden and Boston: Brill Academic Publishers, 2017, 11, p. 167-186Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The chapter examines the philosophical dichotomy between Hellenism and Hebraism in order to show how Mighty Aphrodite may be seen as a contemporary example of merging cultural identities, previously thought in contradiction to one another. Allen's reiteration of Oedipal references may be read as a dismantling of Classical Hellenic culture and a rearrangement intended for a 21st century New York setting. Allen constructs a fictional tragic space that is embedded in the main plot and that manifests itself in the form of tragic dramaturgy and scenic conventions.

    Against this backdrop, Allen's overall use of classical tradition may be considered self-referential: it points out to the director's own understanding of classical culture as a twenty first century Jewish New York film director. Ancient cultural forms mingle with contemporary film and mirror 'the two way relationship between the source text or culture and the new work and receiving elements'. Abort of their original context of antiquity, ritual, drama and myth, tragedy and the very figure of Oedipus are (paradoxically) cinematically deconstructed as humorous, and are granted a place within contemporaneity, finding a specific leeway of expression in classical Hollywood film narratives. The film is a commentary on the potentials of reinstating dominant structures of classical reception per se: Oedipus may become Anti-Oedipus, tragedy may turn into comedy and binary structures such as Hellenism and Hebraism may mingle together in perfect harmony.

  • 120.
    Forsberg, Erik
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Retrospektivism och biologi: Om begreppens natur genom evolutionens ögon2018Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [sv]

    Begreppsatomismen lär oss att den metafysiska strukturen hos lexikala begrepp beror påbegreppens relation till yttervärlden men är oklar i hur denna relation förverkligas. Avsiktenmed denna uppsats är därför att utveckla en metafysisk tes för uppkomsten av begreppsligstruktur som också närmare visar hur lexikala begrepp förhåller sig till världen. Utredningenbestår i att jämföra två filosofiska positioner som står nära begreppsatomismen: å ena sidanPutnams externalism för naturliga typer och å andra sidan biosemantiken, här representeradav Dennett och Millikan. Genom att utgå ifrån Putnams tankeexperiment tvillingjord ochhans syn på strukturen hos lexikala begrepp nås slutsatsen att biosemantiken når längre av detvå. Men en närmare granskning visar att biosemantik i förening med principen om evolutiongenom naturligt urval ger att strukturen hos lexikala begrepp står i ett metafysiskt beroendetill framtiden och förverkligas retrospektivt, varvid retrospektiv begreppsatomism föreslås.

  • 121.
    Franklin, Anders
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    En rund boll är en bra början: - Miniminivån som förslag till dellösning på demarkationsproblemet2015Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [sv]

    Abstrakt

    Syftet med uppsatsen är att utreda hur miniminivån, genom tidig markering av vissa företeelser som icke-vetenskapliga, kan bereda mark för en fullständig (eller åtminstone mer fullständig) lösning på demarkationsproblemet. I uppsatsen redogörs huvudsakligen för begreppet miniminivån samt ett förslag till ett kriterium som krävs för att uppnå miniminivån, nämligen kriteriet för taktisk skepticism.

    Miniminivån utgör ett nödvändigt villkor för att en företeelse ska klassas som vetenskap.

    Innan en företeelse kan mätas mot kriterier bortom miniminivån, som tillsammans med kriterierna på miniminivån utgör ett tillräckligt villkor, måste miniminivåns kriterier uppfyllas. Detta kombinerar en monokriteriell ansats tydlighet med den flexibilitet som multikriteriella ansatser/ klusteransatser innehar genom dessas större mängd kriterier. ”Vetenskap” definieras i uppsatsen som bredare än det engelska ”science” som i vanliga fall motsvarar naturvetenskaperna.

    Ett allvarligt argument mot miniminivån är att det finns en risk att alla rimliga vetenskaps- kriterier är lika lämpliga att ha där. Skulle detta vara fallet har miniminivån bara lyckats göra frågan onödigt komplex. Därför formuleras ett krav och två desiderata som ställs på förslag som utgår från Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, Thomas S. Kuhn och Mario Bunge. Utifrån Mario Bunges resonemang formuleras kriteriet för taktisk skepticism som exkluderar förekomster av radikal dogmatism och radikal skepticism. Detta kriterium bedöms vara lämpligast av kandidaterna. En form av  kreationism utvärderas utifrån kriteriet för taktisk skepticism, och bedöms ej uppfylla kriteriet. Vid en korrekt förståelse av miniminivån försvagas förtroendet för den sortens kreationism kraftigt med avseende på dess roll som kunskapsförmedlare. Det tidigare nämnda motargumentet bedöms därmed vara bemött. Det konstateras att miniminivån har potential att tjäna ett praktiskt syfte både före och efter jakten på en lösning på demarkationsproblemet.

  • 122.
    Frech, Johannes
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Defending Carens - a Reply to Hosein: A contribution to the contemporary immigration debate2014Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [sv]

    Det primära syftet med denna uppsats är att kritisera ett argument med vilket Adam Hosein kritiserat Joseph Carens argument för öppna gränser. Carens argument för öppna gränser jämför rörelse mellan länder med rörelse inom länder. Han fastslår att rörelse mellan delar av ett land skall vara fri (ett tämligen okontroversiellt påstående). Han menar vidare att då ingen moralisk relevant skillnad mellan rörelse inom ett land och mellan länder existerar, bör dessa typer av rörelse behandlas på samma sätt. Således bör rörelse mellan länder vara fri - länder bör ha öppna gränser. Hosein kritiserar Carens argument, och pekar på två skillnader mellan fri rörlighet inom ett land och fri rörlighet mellan länder. Den ena skillnaden består i att vissa demokratiska värden står på spel i fallet med rörlighet inom ett land. Exempelvis måste politiker kunna träffa väljare runt om i landet. Det är också viktigt för den demokratiska processens legitimitet att människor kan besöka olika landsändar. Utan denna möjlighet kommer människor sakna den information som krävs för att kunna ta hänsyn till landet som helhet vid politiska val. Då demokrati, i avsaknad av en global sådan, bara existerar inom nationer, är detta värde bara relevant när det gäller inom-statlig rörlighet. Det andra värde som är relevant för rörlighet inom ett land handlar om kravet på alla människors lika möjligheter. Detta förutsätter fri rörlighet. Dock är detta värde begränsat till den nationella sfären; lika möjligheter behöver inte råda globalt, enligt de flesta politiska filosofer. Således kan fri rörlighet inom ett land, men inte mellan länder, även motiveras med att detta krävs för allas lika möjligheter.

    Jag argumenterar mot Hoseins position genom ett tankeexperiment. I detta tankeexperiment är den fria rörligheten inom ett visst land frikopplat från demokratiska värden (på grund av att demokratin i landet är satt ur spel), och rörlighet kopplad till lika möjligheter garanterad. Den fråga jag ställer i anslutning till detta tankeexperiment, är huruvida det skulle vara moraliskt berättigat att begränsa rörlighet mellan regionerna i detta land (dvs. rörlighet som inte är motiverad av lika möjligheter). Jag hävdar att svaret på den frågan är nekande. Utifrån detta drar jag slutsatsen att det, i motsats till vad Hosein hävdar, inte är berättigat att begränsa mellanstatlig rörelse med motiveringen att denna typ av rörelse inte befrämjar demokratiska värden, samt med påståendet att människors lika möjligheter inte är ett globalt krav. Snarare bör vi betrakta rörlighet mellan stater på samma sätt som vi behandlar rörlighet inom stater där de värden Hosein identifierar som unika för inomstatlig rörlighet inte står på spel (som den i mitt tankeexperiment). Således bör rörlighet mellan stater vara fri.

    Jag relaterar också Carens argument till andra argument för och emot öppna gränser. Jag konstaterar att hans argument kan besvara många argument för stängda gränser, samt att det utgör ett bra komplement till andra argument för öppna gränser.

  • 123.
    Frändberg, Charlotta
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Vem bryr sig?: Omsorgsetiska argument mot (ökad) handel med hushållstjänster2018Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    In this essay, I bring together the Swedish debate concerning tax subsidized household services – the so called RUT-deduction – with feminist care ethics, here represented mainly by philosopher Virginia Held.

    The first and main question asked, is how a care ethical argument against increased trade in housework can be formulated. The idea of the relational character of care as well as care representing an irreplaceable value, leads to the following argument: An increased trade in housework leads to less care and weakened care relations and this implies a loss both to individuals and to society. The second question posed, concerns the reach of the argument above: both with respect to what kind of housework that can reasonably be seen as part of the practice of care as well as within what type of relationships the idea of care practice applies. In this part I conclude that there is no ground for drawing a sharp line between housework which is, and housework which is not, part of care practice.

    The arguments presented are relevant for the discussion about what kind of gender equal society we should strive for. If justice is seen as a value superior to care, full time paid work for women as well as for men can be seen as a reasonable route towards gender equality. If the value of care and of care relations is placed alongside justice, other solutions than commodification of housework may be seen as needed.

  • 124.
    Gabrielsson, Daniel
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Är Sverigedemokraterna demokrater?2016Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 125.
    Galatius, Jonas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Det fria skolvalets legitimitet: En filosofisk analys om autonomins egenvärde, paternalistiska interventioner och rättviseteoretiska principer2019Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    The name of this essay is The legitimacy of the free choice of school – a philosophical studyabout the value of autonomy in the context of paternalistic interventions and principles ofjustice. The aim of this essay is to examine how the free choice of school can be legitimizedthrough perspectives regarding principles of justice. The results show that the free choice ofschool can be legitimized from several different standpoints such as the intrisic value ofautonomy, the negative concept of freedom and the rights based perspective of equality.Further, the free choice of school can also be legitimized from an epistemic viewpoint aswell as through theories about fair processes and compensatory efforts. My ambition withthis study is to broaden the discourse surrounding the topic. A discussion based on ideas andprinciples is a valuable complement to the more common debate about outcome regardingthe free choice of school.

  • 126.
    Gheaus, Anca
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Could There Ever Be a Duty to Have Children?2015In: Permissible Progeny? / [ed] Sarah Hannan, Samantha Brennan, Richard Vernon, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter argues that there is a collective responsibility to have enough children in order to ensure that people will not, in the future, suffer great harm due to depopulation. Moreover, if people stopped having children voluntarily, it could be legitimate for states to incentivize and maybe even coerce individuals to bear and rear children. Various arguments against the enforceability of an individual duty to bear and rear children are examined. Coercing people to have children would come at significant moral cost; however, none of the arguments against enforceability seem decisive. The existence of a collective responsibility to have children bears on the question of whether parents and non-parents ought to shoulder the costs of childbearing and child rearing together.

  • 127.
    Gheaus, Anca
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Feminism and gender2015In: Bloomsbury Companion to Political Philosophy / [ed] Andrew Fiala, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2015Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 128.
    Gheaus, Anca
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies. Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Sheffield, UK.
    Hikers in Flip-Flops: Luck Egalitarianism, Democratic Equality and the Distribuenda of Justice2018In: Journal of Applied Philosophy, ISSN 0264-3758, E-ISSN 1468-5930, Vol. 35, no 1, p. 54-69Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The article has two aims. First, to show that a version of luck egalitarianism that includes relational goods amongst its distribuenda can, as a matter of internal logic, account for one of the core beliefs of relational egalitarianism. Therefore, there will be important extensional overlap, at the level of domestic justice, between luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism. This is an important consideration in assessing the merits of and relationship between the two rival views. Second, to provide some support for including relational goods, including those advocated by relational egalitarianism, on the distribuenda of justice and therefore to put in a good word for the overall plausibility of this conception of justice. I show why relational egalitarians, too, have reason to sympathise with this proposal.

  • 129. Gheaus, Anca
    The 'intrinsic goods of childhood' and the just society2015In: The Nature of Children's Well-Being / [ed] Alexander Bagattini, Colin Macleod, Springer, 2015, p. 35-52Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 130.
    Gheaus, Anca
    Philosophy, University of Sheffield.
    The right to parent and duties concerning future generations2016In: The Journal of Political Philosophy, ISSN 0963-8016, E-ISSN 1467-9760, Vol. 24, no 4, p. 487-508Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 131.
    Gillemyr, Rikard
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Ansvarsgapet och moraliskt ansvar2017Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 132. Gislén, Ylva
    et al.
    Olofsson, Jonas
    Svensson, Erik
    Örestig, Johan
    Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Sociology.
    Människans politiska natur2011In: Fronesis, ISSN 1404-2614, no 35, p. 8-15Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 133.
    Grill, Kalle
    Uppsala University, Disciplinary Domain of Humanities and Social Sciences, Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy.
    Anti-paternalism and invalidation of reasons2010In: Public Reason, ISSN 2065-7285, E-ISSN 2065-8958, Vol. 2, no 2, p. 3-20Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    I first provide an analysis of Joel Feinberg’s anti-paternalism in terms of invalidation of reasons. Invalidation is the blocking of reasons from influencing the moral status of actions, in this case the blocking of personal good reasons from supporting liberty-limiting actions. Invalidation is shown to be distinct from moral side constraints and lexical ordering of values and reasons. I then go on to argue that anti-paternalism as invalidation is morally unreasonable on at least four grounds, none of which presuppose that people can be mistaken about their own good: First, the doctrine entails that we should sometimes allow people to unintentionally severely harm or kill themselves though we could easily stop them. Second, it entails that we should sometimes allow perfectly informed and rational people to risk the lives of themselves and others, though they are in perfect agreement with us on what reasons we have to stop them for their own good. Third, the doctrine leaves unexplained why we may benevolently coerce less competent but substantially autonomous people, such as young teens, but not adults. Last, it entails that there are peculiar jumps in justifiability between very similar actions. I conclude that as liberals we should reject anti-paternalism and focus our efforts on explicating important liberal values, thereby showing why liberty reasons sometimes override strong personal good reasons, though never by making them invalid.

  • 134.
    Grill, Kalle
    Division of Philosophy, KTH Royal Institute of Technology.
    Anti-paternalism and public health policy: the case of product safety legislation2009In: The philosophy of public health / [ed] Angus Dawson, Ashgate , 2009, p. 101-110Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 135.
    Grill, Kalle
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Antipaternalism as a filter on reasons2015In: New perspectives on paternalism and health care / [ed] Thomas Schramme, Springer, 2015, p. 47-63Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The charge of paternalism is a common objection to the actions of political and other authorities. Sometimes the charge is only that the authority has undervalued typical liberal values like freedom and autonomy relative to other values, such as physical, mental or financial wellbeing. Making this objection is consistent with accepting that in some cases, wellbeing outweighs freedom and autonomy and should be furthered at their expense. Other times, however, the charge of paternalism is more principled. The objection is not that wellbeing considerations are overstated, but that they are allowed to weigh in on the matter at all. This is the sort of antipaternalism that I will analyze in this article. My discussion and my proposals are meant to be helpful to the antipaternalist, and to anyone who wants to understand her. However, I should state at the outset that the antipaternalist position I describe and develop is not one I endorse.

  • 136.
    Grill, Kalle
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Asymmetric population axiology: deliberative neutrality delivered2017In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 174, no 1, p. 219-236Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Two related asymmetries have been discussed in relation to the ethics of creating new lives: First, we seem to have strong moral reason to avoid creating lives that are not worth living, but no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Second, we seem to have strong moral reason to improve the wellbeing of existing lives, but, again, no moral reason to create lives that are worth living. Both asymmetries have proven very difficult to account for in any coherent moral framework. I propose an impersonal population axiology to underpin the asymmetries, which sidesteps the problematic issue of whether or not people can be harmed or benefited by creation or non-creation. This axiology yields perfect asymmetry from a deliberative perspective, in terms of expected value. The axiology also yields substantial asymmetry for large and realistic populations in terms of their actual value, beyond deliberative relevance.

  • 137.
    Grill, Kalle
    Division of Philosophy, KTH Royal Institute of Technology.
    Evaluating consequences2009In: Encyclopedia of medical decision making / [ed] Michael W. Kattan, Sage Publications, 2009, p. 463-467Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 138.
    Grill, Kalle
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Expanding the Nudge: Designing Choice Contexts and Choice Contents2014In: Rationality, Markets and Morals, ISSN 1869-778X, E-ISSN 1869-778X, Vol. 5, p. 139-162Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    To nudge is to design choice contexts in order to improve choice outcomes. Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein emphatically endorse nudging but reject more restrictive means. In contrast, I argue that the behavioral psychology that motivates nudging also motivates what may be called jolting—i.e. the design of choice content. I defend nudging and jolting by distinguishing them from the sometimes oppressive means with which they can be im- plemented, by responding to some common arguments against nudging, and by showing how respect for preferences over option sets and their aggregate properties may require the trimming of option sets, as well as helpful choice contexts.

  • 139. Grill, Kalle
    Frihet i arbetet2003In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 7, no 1, p. 45-57Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 140.
    Grill, Kalle
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Good Parents, Better Babies: An Argument about Reproductive Technologies, Enhancement and Ethics (Review)2012In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 16, no 3, p. 40-49Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 141.
    Grill, Kalle
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    How Many Parents Should There Be in a Family?2019In: Journal of Applied Philosophy, ISSN 0264-3758, E-ISSN 1468-5930Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article, I challenge the widespread presumption that a child should have exactly two parents. I consider the pros and cons of various numbers of parents for the people most directly affected – the children themselves and their parents. The number of parents, as well as the ratio of parents to children, may have an impact on what resources are available, what relationships can develop between parents and children, what level of conflict can be expected in the family, as well as the costs involved in parenting and the experience of parenting a child. Indirectly, there is also an effect on who will have the opportunity to be a parent, as well as on wider social issues that I mention but do not discuss. Having considered all these factors, I conclude that there is some reason to believe that three or more parents is usually better than one or two, especially if children are to have siblings, which is typically beneficial. However, these reasons are not strong enough to support a general presumption in favor of any particular number. We should therefore jettison the two‐parent presumption and make different numbers of parents more socially accepted as well as legally possible.

  • 142.
    Grill, Kalle
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Incentives, equity and the able chooser problem2017In: Journal of Medical Ethics, ISSN 0306-6800, E-ISSN 1473-4257, Vol. 43, no 3, p. 157-161Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Health incentive schemes aim to produce healthier behaviors in target populations. They may do so both by making incentivized options more salient and by making them less costly. Changes in costs only result in healthier behavior if the individual rationally assesses the cost change and acts accordingly. Not all people do this well. Those that fail to respond rationally to incentives will typically include those who are least able to make prudent choices more generally. This group will typically include the least advantaged more generally, since disadvantage inhibits one's effective ability to choose well and since poor choices tend to cause or aggravate disadvantage. Therefore, within the target population, health benefits to the better off may come at the cost of aggravated inequity. This is one instance of a problem I name the Able Chooser Problem, previously emphasized by Richard Arneson in relation to coercive paternalism. I describe and discuss this problem by distinguishing between policy options and their effects on the choice situation of individuals. Both positive and negative incentives, as well as mandates that are less than perfectly effective, require some sort of rational deliberation and action and so face the Able Chooser Problem. In contrast, effective restriction of what options are physically available, as well as choice context design that makes some options more salient or appealing, do not demand rational agency. These considerations provide an equity-based argument for preferring smart design of our choice and living environment to incentives and mandates.

  • 143.
    Grill, Kalle
    Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
    Individual liberty in public health: no trumping value2011In: Public Health: ethical issues / [ed] Sirpa Soini, Köpenhamn: Nordic Council of Ministers , 2011, p. 21-33Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 144.
    Grill, Kalle
    Department of Philosophy, KTH Royal Institute of Technology.
    Liberalism, Altruism and Group Consent2009In: Public Health Ethics, ISSN 1754-9973, E-ISSN 1754-9981, Vol. 2, no 2, p. 146-157Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article first describes a dilemma for liberalism: On the one hand restricting their own options is an important means for groups of people to shape their lives. On the other hand, group members are typically divided over whether or not to accept option-restricting solutions or policies. Should we restrict the options of all members of a group even though some consent and some do not? This dilemma is particularly relevant to public health policy, which typically target groups of people with no possibility for individuals to opt out. The article then goes on to propose and discuss a series of aggregation rules for individual into group consent. Consideration of a number of scenarios shows that such rules cannot be formulated only in terms of fractions of consenters and non-consenters, but must incorporate their motives and how much they stand to win or lose. This raises further questions, including what is the appropriate impact of altruistic consenters and non-consenters, what should be the impact of costs and benefits and whether these should be understood as gross or net. All these issues are dealt with in a liberal, anti-paternalistic spirit, in order to explore whether group consent can contribute to the justification of option- restricting public health policy.

  • 145.
    Grill, Kalle
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Mänsklighetens undergång ur ett befolkningsaxiologiskt perspektiv2015In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 35, no 3, p. 20-26Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 146.
    Grill, Kalle
    Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
    Neutrality as a constraint on political reasoning2012In: Ethical Perspectives, ISSN 1370-0049, E-ISSN 1783-1431, Vol. 19, no 3, p. 547-557Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 147.
    Grill, Kalle
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Normative and Non-normative Concepts: Paternalism and Libertarian Paternalism2013In: Ethics in Public Health and Health Policy: Concepts, Methods, Case Studies / [ed] Daniel Strech, Irene Hirschberg, Georg Marckmann, Springer, 2013, p. 27-46Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter concerns the normativity of the concepts of paternalism and libertarian paternalism. The first concept is central in evaluating public health policy, but its meaning is controversial. The second concept is equally controversial and has received much attention recently. It may or may not shape the future evaluation of public health policy. In order to facilitate honest and fruitful debate, I consider three approaches to these concepts, in terms of their normativity. Concepts, I claim, may be considered nonnormative, normatively charged, or normative in that they involve more complex relationships between values or duties. While the last approach is often best, other approaches may be appropriate depending on the context and purpose of discussion. The chapter’s conceptual investigation is illustrated by application to two public health policies: a tax on the consumption of fat and the encouragement of health-promoting food displays in restaurants and supermarkets.

  • 148.
    Grill, Kalle
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Nudge: improving decisions about health, wealth, and happiness (review)2011In: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi, ISSN 1402-2710, Vol. 15, no 1, p. 58-62Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 149.
    Grill, Kalle
    Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Paternalism2011In: Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics / [ed] Ruth Chadwick, Academic Press, 2011, 2, p. 359-369Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Paternalism means, roughly, benevolent interference: benevolent because it aims at promoting or protecting a person’s good; interference because it restricts his liberty without his consent. The paternalist believes herself superior in that she can secure some benefit for the person that he himself will not secure. Paternalism is opposed by the liberal tradition, at least when it targets sufficiently voluntary behavior. In legal contexts, policies may be paternalistic for some and not for others, forcing trade-offs. In medical contexts, paternalism can be an open or hidden aspect of the relationship between caregiver and patient.

  • 150.
    Grill, Kalle
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Paternalism by and towards groups2018In: The Routledge handbook of the philosophy of paternalism / [ed] Kalle Grill and Jason Hanna, Routledge, 2018, p. 46-58Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In many or most instances of paternalism, more than one person acts paternalistically, or more than one person is treated paternalistically. This chapter discusses some complications that arise in such group cases, which are largely ignored in the conceptual debate. First, a group of people who together perform an action may do so for different reasons, which makes it more challenging to determine whether the action is paternalistic. This gives us some reason not to pin the property of being paternalistic on actions, since we may alternatively pin it on reasons for actions and allow that these differ between members in the group. Second, the prevention of harmful consensual interactions is sometimes paternalism towards both or all involved, but only if all benefit from interference with themselves rather than with other members in the group, or if all want the harm or risk (more or less) for its own sake. Third, interrelations between three components of paternalism - interference, benvolence and consent - gives us reason to allow that an action can be paternalistic towards some but not others of  those affected. This makes it even more difficult, and less relevant, to determine whether or not actions are paternalistic.

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