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  • 201.
    Bergqvist Karlsson, Daniel
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Om fenomenell kunskap och Förmågehypotesen: Information eller förmåga – vad lär vi oss när vi får en ny upplevelse?2019Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
    Abstract [sv]

    Fysikalism ifråga om vårt upplevande – fenomenella – medvetande; att det är helt och enbartfysiskt, står i kontrast till olika former av dualism, som säger att medvetandet inte helt låter sigreduceras till det fysiska.Frank Jackson har presenterat det så kallade kunskapsargumentet mot fysikalism. Eftersom vilär oss något nytt då vi får en ny upplevelse, och eftersom detta inte kan läras på något annatsätt än att själv erfara upplevelsen, så drar kunskapsargumentet slutsatsen att det finns ickefysiskafakta om världen, och att fysikalismen därför är falsk.Förmågehypotesen (eng. the Ability Hypothesis) är ett svar på detta argument som lagts framav David Lewis och Laurence Nemirow. De menar att det vi lär oss då vi får en ny upplevelseinte är något annat än vissa förmågor, och därför är kunskapsargumentets slutsats att det finnsicke-fysiska fakta om världen falsk.Syftet med föreliggande uppsats är att undersöka om Förmågehypotesen utgör ett hållbartförsvar för fysikalismen mot kunskapsargumentet. För att genomföra detta utvärderar jag feminvändningar mot Förmågehypotesen och de svar på dessa som Nemirow anför. Jag kommeratt argumentera för att två av dessa invändningar pekar på problem med Förmågehypotesensom inte låter sig lösas, och därför drar jag slutsatsen att Förmågehypotesen inte lyckas försvarafysikalismen mot Jacksons kunskapsargument.

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  • 202.
    Bergqvist, Madelene
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Arkeologisk Textil: Om Norra Sveriges Textilier under Järnålder och Medeltid2020Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 20 poäng / 30 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
    Abstract [en]

    The aim of this essay is to get a wider perspective on the early production and usage of textiles in Northern Sweden during the Iron Age and Middle Ages (up until the 17th century). The work consists of collecting digital data of finds, their location and approximate date, and then place them in l'chaîne opératiore, and group the finds accordingly. The groups of the production chain is presented on distribution maps. The lack of finds in large areas shows that, from this study, everyone using textiles were not necessarily creating them from their own raw material.

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  • 203.
    Bergström, Anna
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    ”Jag bekänner inför dig, helige Gud”: En komparativ teologisk analys av Tolvstegsprogrammet Anonyma alkoholisters rit och högmässans rit2023Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
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  • 204.
    Bergström, Arvid
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Vem kan tvätta händerna?: Sociala skillnader i dödlighet i Östersunds församling 1915–19222020Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
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  • 205.
    Bergström, Elina
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Bakom Kulisserna: En begreppshistorisk analys av begreppen ras och kultur i Vägen Framåt, 1946 – 19492019Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
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  • 206.
    Bergström, Jimmy
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Ämneslärarstudenters tolkning av värdegrundsuppdraget: I övrensstämmelse med den etik som förvaltas av kristen tradition2023Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
    Abstract [sv]

    Läroplanen kan realiseras i klassrummet på olika sätt eftersom lärarens kunskap och värderingar påverkar tolkningen. Detta innebär att skrivningar i läroplanen kommer tolkas olika av olika lärare. Syftet med denna studie är att skapa en förståelse för hur ämneslärarstudenter tolkar värdegrundsuppdraget med avgränsar till formuleringen ”i överensstämmelse med den etik som är förvaltad av kristen tradition” (lgr 22). Studien är en kvalitativ studie där sju ämneslärarstudenter har intervjuats. Resultatet analyseras utifrån läroplansteori samt sekulariseringsteori. Resultatet visar att skrivningen i läroplanen tolkas olika baserat på olika faktorer inom både läroplansteori och sekulariseringsteori.

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  • 207.
    Bergström, Jonathan
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Group Belief and Justification: Analyzing Collective knowledge2016Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
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  • 208.
    Bergström, Kai
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Barns arv och försörjning i de svenska medeltida landskapslagarna.2015Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
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  • 209. Berntson, Martin
    et al.
    Borgehammar, Stephan
    Girmalm, Thomas
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Halldorf, Joel
    Lejon, Kjell O.
    Wejryd, Cecilia
    Gör om prästers utbildning!2019Ingår i: Kyrkans tidning, ISSN 1651-405X, nr 19, s. 29-29Artikel i tidskrift (Övrig (populärvetenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 210. Berntson, Martin
    et al.
    Hägerland, Tobias
    Andersson, Daniel
    Girmalm, Thomas
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Lejon, Kjell O.
    Löfstedt, Torsten
    Maurits, Alexander
    Wassén, Cecilia
    Wejryd, Cecilia
    Skolverket bör backa om religionskunskap2019Ingår i: Svenska Dagbladet, ISSN 1101-2412Artikel i tidskrift (Övrig (populärvetenskap, debatt, mm))
  • 211.
    Bertilsdotter Rosqvist, Hanna
    et al.
    Södertörn university, Sweden.
    Hultman, Lill
    Södertörn university, Sweden.
    Österborg Wiklund, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Nygren, Anna
    Åbo Akademi, Finland; University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Storm, Palle
    Stockholm University, Sweden.
    Sandberg, Greta
    Södertörn University, Sweden.
    ADHD in higher education and academia2023Ingår i: Canadian Journal on Disability Studies, ISSN 1929-9192, Vol. 12, nr 3, s. 1-26Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we explore our own experiences of barriers to learning and academic knowledge production in academia and higher education. Our analyses are based on our collective autoethnographical accounts from our own experiences of ADHD and higher education, with a particular focus on post graduate education and our experiences of ADHD peer support in academic knowledge production. In our analysis, we have distinguished between three different dimensions of academia for ADHD graduate students and faculty: as a place of structural violence and vulnerability; as enabling or disabling, and as a place for neurodivergent community formation. There are few ADHD-centered traditions of learning within education. By ADHD-centered we refer to perspectives within education and support informed by an ADHD insider-perspective. We therefore stress the possibilities of ADHD learning informed by the emerging field of critical ADHD studies.  

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  • 212.
    Bertilsdotter Rosqvist, Hanna
    et al.
    School of Social Science, Södertörn University, Stockholm, Huddinge, Sweden.
    Hultman, Lill
    School of Social Science, Södertörn University, Stockholm, Huddinge, Sweden.
    Österborg Wiklund, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Nygren, Anna
    HDK-Valand-Academy of Art and Design, Gothenburg University, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Storm, Palle
    Department of Social Work, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Sandberg, Greta
    School of Social Science, Södertörn University, Stockholm, Huddinge, Sweden.
    Intensity and variable attention: counter narrating ADHD, from ADHD deficits to ADHD difference2023Ingår i: British Journal of Social Work, ISSN 0045-3102, E-ISSN 1468-263X, Vol. 53, nr 8, s. 3647-3664Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Literature on attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) has historically come from a cognitive deficit approach and lacked community authorship. In contrast, this article utilises a neurodiversity framework to explore ADHD as a cognitive difference through ADHDers' experiences. Specifically, here we analyse collective autoethnographic writings from neurodivergent academic researchers writing to one other about their experiences of intensity and variable attention or interest-based attention. Through the process of collective writing, we started to rename and restory our experiences, which has enabled us to understand intensity and variable attention as a valuable facet of human diversity, with both strengths and challenges. This project offers an example of how community-based research can elucidate individual experiences as ADHD/AuDHD researchers, facilitate exploration of varied experiences with intensity and attention and increase self-awareness and ability to give and receive neuroaffirmative support.

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  • 213.
    Bertilsdotter Rosqvist, Hanna
    et al.
    School of Social Science, Södertörn University, Huddinge, Sweden.
    Hultman, Lill
    School of Social Science, Södertörn University, Huddinge, Sweden.
    Österborg Wiklund, Sofia
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Nygren, Anna
    HDK-Valand–Academy of Art and Design, Gothenburg University, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Storm, Palle
    Department of Social Work, Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Sandberg, Greta
    School of Social Science, Södertörn University, Huddinge, Sweden.
    Naming ourselves, becoming neurodivergent scholars2023Ingår i: Disability & Society, ISSN 0968-7599, E-ISSN 1360-0508Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper we seek to restory what has been storied as “the problem of ADHD”. Informed by calls for a critical ADHD studies, we explore the possibilities of ADHD collective autoethnographic storytelling. Together we (en)counter narratives of ADHD. Within our collective writing space, from our ADHD/AuDHD bodyminds, we seek to re-story our ADHD/AuDHD. We map a field of critical ADHD research within social sciences and point out problems of outsider perspectives, stressing a need for insider perspectives. Our data consist of collective authoethnographic writings about ADHD. From the data we have explored our experiences of (En)Countering ADHD narratives, and a transition process which we refer to as from ”broken NT-scholars” to neurodivergent scholars, stressing the importance of ADHD:ers as independent as well as collective agents, and ADHD as epistemological standpoint within research.

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  • 214.
    Bjernefors, Sophia
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Kungamakt och kloster: Relationen mellan kungamakten och cisterciensiska kloster under svensk högmedeltid 1143-13502022Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (högskoleexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
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  • 215.
    Bjurestam, Johan
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Framgångsrik undervisning – praktik och teori: En kvalitativ studie om historielärares egen syn kring framgångsrik undervisning-2020Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (yrkesexamen), 20 poäng / 30 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
    Abstract [en]

    What are successful teaching-situations, and how do teachers in history perform them? These questions are examined by semi-structurally interviewing history teachers about their definitions of said situations and practical execution to reach such a performance. The empirical material is transcribed and categorized with aid of the phenomenographic method. The study is limited to a region in the middle parts of Norrland, although the results are still of importance in its purpose to exemplify what successful teaching-situations are and how to reach them. The general opinion of the informants seems to be that historical consciousness and learning goals are of importance, yet so too are the social and democratic fostering process if the purpouse are to become a good teacher who offer students successful teaching-situations.

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  • 216.
    Bjärstig, Therese
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen.
    Sténs, Anna
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Social values of forests and production of new goods and services: the views of Swedish family forest owners2018Ingår i: Small-scale Forestry, ISSN 1873-7617, E-ISSN 1873-7854, Vol. 17, nr 1, s. 125-146Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Forests are considered crucial assets for sustainable rural development, and contemporary forestry is an industry where production, environmental and social goals can – and should – be handled simultaneously. Swedish family forest owners (FFOs) are expected to both manage and conserve their forests for the benefit of the whole country, but there are contradictions between development and conservation and between traditional and alternative forms of utilization, representing dilemmas in rural areas. Tensions between urban and rural areas, between demands on what to produce and protect, are often linked to the FFOs’ views on opportunities for forest management. The aim of this study is to identify and analyse the extent to which FFOs perceive that social values have the ability to generate “new” goods and services as a supplement or alternative to traditional forestry, and to suggest how the forests might be managed to render high social values. Fifty-seven interviews were conducted with FFOs (both resident and non-resident). The results indicate that regardless of where they reside, FFOs have a multifunctional view of their forests and forest management, that the social values attached to forests can play an important role in the development of local recreation- and forest-based tourism activities, and in this respect they can enhance sustainable rural development. It is, however, not obvious who might start and develop these businesses, since there seems to be a lack of interest among the FFOs themselves.

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  • 217.
    Björklund, Hampus
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Liberalism, Radical Feminism and Prostitution:: A Reassessment of Two Perspectives on Prostitution2016Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
    Abstract [en]

    The current philosophical debate about prostitution is mainly concerned with two different points of view: (a) the permissibility of prostitution and if paternalistic interference on behalf of prostitutes is legitimate in a liberal democracy, and (b) feminist objections claiming that it is the unjust structures of the patriarchy that enables and affirms the institution of female bodies being sold on an open market for the sexual desires of males. The aim of this paper is to investigate if both of these perspectives take on too narrow a view when trying to address the phenomenon of prostitution. If so, the conclusions drawn may lead to unwanted consequences making it necessary for a more context-sensitive approach and/or a broader theoretical foundation.

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  • 218.
    Björklund, Samuel
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Omsorgsetiken som moralteori: En feministisk teori om omsorg2018Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
    Abstract [sv]

    I den här uppsatsen kommer jag försvara Nel Noddings omsorgsetik genom att argumentera mot Michael Slotes kritik av den och själv kritisera hans dygdetiska version av omsorgsetik. Enligt mig är den viktigaste skillnaden mellan teorierna att Noddings teori ger relationer så kallad ontologisk prioritet. Jag kommer argumentera för att den relationella ontologin ger bättre vägledning i omsorgssituationer, men också är att föredra som metaetisk grund. Jag kommer göra det genom att ta upp ett exempel som visar hur Slotes dygdetik bedömer en handling som omsorgsfull, även fast den inte nödvändigtvis är det. Sedan kommer jag argumentera för att Noddings omsorgsetik kräver en fylligare bild av exemplet och därför även ger bättre vägledning, vilket jag menar även gäller generellt i moralisk praktik. Jag kommer även argumentera mot Slote genom att belysa hur rimligheten i hans argument och teori förutsätter vad som kallas för en individualistisk ontologi, till skillnad från den relationella ontologin Noddings använder sig av. En relationell ontologi förutsätter att en relation finns mellan två (eller flera) individer i en situation, medan den individualistiska inte tar hänsyn till det. Den relationella ontologin är viktig för de flesta av omsorgsetikens förespråkare, varför jag anser att Slotes teori inte bör användas. Därför argumenterar jag för att använda den relationella ontologin även som metaetiskt antagande.

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  • 219.
    Björn, Norlin
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Sjögren, David
    Uppsala universitet.
    Educational history in the age of apology: The Church of Sweden's "White book" on historical relations to the Sami, the significance of education and scientific complexities in reconciling the past2019Ingår i: Educare, ISSN 1653-1868, E-ISSN 2004-5190, nr 1, s. 69-95Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Reconciliation processes – wherein governments and other organizations examine their past institutional practices to understand contemporary problems in relation to minorities or indigenous groups – have become a widespread international phenomenon in recent decades. In Sweden, such an ongoing process is the reconciliation work between the Church of Sweden and the Sami. In this process, which recently resulted in the publication of a scholarly anthology (or a “white book”), educational history has come to play a vital part. The present article uses the Church of Sweden’s White Book as an empirical object of study to examine in more detail the role and significance of knowledge of educational history for this specific reconciliation process. By focusing on various scientific complexities and epistemological tensions that tend to arise in these kinds of undertakings, this paper also aims to problematize the white book genre itself as a path to historical knowledge. By doing this, this article’s overall ambition is to contribute to future scholarly work in reconciliation activities, white papers and truth commissions. This study applies a qualitative content analysis and connects theoretically to the growing field of transitional justice research.

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  • 220.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier. University of Gothenburg.
    Contextualism in Ethics2013Ingår i: The International Encyclopedia of Ethics / [ed] H. LaFolette, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell , 2013Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    There are various ways in which context matters in ethics. Most clearly, the context in which an action is performed might determine whether the action is morally right: though it is often wrong not to keep a promise, it might be permissible in certain contexts. More radically, proponents of moral particularism (see particularism) have argued that a reason for an action in one context is not guaranteed to be a reason in a different context: whether it is a reason against an act that it breaks a promise or inflicts pain might depend on the particulars of the situation. In moral epistemology, Timmons (1999: Ch. 5) argues that whether a moral judgment is epistemically responsible depends both on the basic moral outlook of the moral judge and on whether the context of judgment is one of engaged moral thinking, or one of distanced, skeptical reflection. In the former, the judge’s basic moral outlook can serve to justify the judgment; not so in the latter (see epistemology, moral).

    Our focus here, however, will be on forms of metaethical, and more precisely semantic, contextualism in moral discourse and moral thinking. According to these forms of contextualism (henceforth “metaethical contextualism,” or just “contextu- alism”), the meaning or truth-conditions of a moral judgment depend not only on the properties of the act it concerns, but also on features of the context in which the judgment is made, such as the standards endorsed by the moral judge or the parties of the conversation. If metaethical contextualism is correct, it might be that when two persons judge that abortions must be banned, one person’s judgment might be true whereas the other person’s is false, because they accept different fundamental norms. This would undermine the idea that there are objectively correct answers to moral questions.

    Metaethical contextualism is supported from three directions. First, what is expressed by terms such as “good” and “ought” seems to be context-dependent when used outside ethics, being dependent on a variety of interests and concerns. One might therefore expect similar context dependence when these terms are used to express moral judgments, assuming a corresponding variety of interests and concerns in moral contexts. Second, many have thought that deep moral disagree- ments suggest that the interests and concerns behind moral judgments do vary in this way. Finally, contextualism promises to make sense of what seems to be an intrinsic yet defeasible connection between moral judgments and moral motivation, by tying the meaning or truth-conditions of moral judgments closely to interests and concerns of moral judges. At the same time, contextualism faces two broad kinds of problems: to make sense of the seemingly categorical or objective preten- sions of moral claims, and to explain why the parties to deep moral disagreement often behave as if they were disagreeing about substantive issues rather than talking past each other. In the sections that follow, we look closer at both sources of support and problems for contextualism.

  • 221.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Diagreement, correctness, and the evidence for metaethical absolutism2015Ingår i: Oxford Studies in Metaethics / [ed] Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Metaethical absolutism is the view that moral concepts have non-relative satisfaction conditions that are constant across judges and their particular beliefs, attitudes, and cultural embedding. Two related premises underpin the argument for absolutism: (1) that moral thinking and discourse display a number of features that are characteristically found in paradigmatically absolutist domains, and only partly in uncontroversially non-absolutist domains; and (2) that the best way of making sense of these features is to assume that absolutism is correct. This chapter defends the prospect of a non-absolutist explanation of these “absolutist” features, thus calling into question the second premise. The chapter proposes independently motivated general accounts of attributions of agreement, disagreement, correctness, and incorrectness that can explain both why absolutist domains display all “absolutist” features and why these non-absolutist domains display some, and thus provides preliminary reasons to think that these features of moral discourse can be given a non-absolutist explanation.

  • 222.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Do ‘objectivist’ features of moral discourse and thinking support moral objectivism?2012Ingår i: Journal of Ethics, ISSN 1382-4554, E-ISSN 1572-8609, Vol. 16, nr 4, s. 367-393Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Many philosophers think that moral objectivism is supported by stable features of moral discourse and thinking. When engaged in moral reasoning and discourse, people behave ‘as if’ objectivism were correct, and the seemingly most straightforward way of making sense of this is to assume that objectivism is correct; this is how we think that such behavior is explained in paradigmatically objectivist domains. By comparison, relativist, error-theoretic or non-cognitivist accounts of this behavior seem contrived and ad hoc. After explaining why this argument should be taken seriously (recent arguments notwithstanding), I argue that it is nevertheless undermined by considerations of moral disagreement. Even if the metaphysical, epistemic and semantic commitments of objectivism provide little or no evidence against it, and even if the alternative explanations of ‘objectivist’ traits of moral discourse and thinking are speculative or contrived, objectivism is itself incapable of making straightforward sense of these traits. Deep and widespread moral disagreement or, rather, the mere appearance of such disagreement, strongly suggests that the explanations operative in paradigmatically objective discourse fail to carry over to the moral case. Since objectivism, no less than relativism, non-cognitivism and error-theories, needs non-trivial explanations of why we behave ‘as if’ objec- tivism were correct, such behavior does not presently provide reason to accept objectivism.

  • 223.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Essentially shared obligations2014Ingår i: Midwest studies in philosophy, ISSN 0363-6550, E-ISSN 1475-4975, Vol. 38, nr 1, s. 103-120Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
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  • 224.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility2017Ingår i: Responsibility: The Epistemic Condition / [ed] Philip Robichaud, Jan Willem Wieland, Oxford University Press, 2017Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This chapter combines the familiar Strawsonian idea that moral blame and credit depend on the agent’s quality of will with an independently motivated account of responsibility as grounded in a normal explanatory relation between agential qualities and objects of responsibility. The resulting ‘explanatory quality of will condition’ on moral responsibility is then further motivated by being shown to account for the effects on moral blame and credit of justifications, excuses, and undermined control in cases where agents are fully aware of what they are doing. Having been independently motivated, the explanatory quality of will condition is then applied to cases involving lack of awareness. Though this condition involves no explicit epistemic condition on responsibility, it is shown how it accounts for the degrees to which lack of awareness can excuse.

  • 225.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Incompatibilism and ‘Bypassed’ Agency2014Ingår i: Surrounding Free Will: Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience / [ed] Alfred R. Mele, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, s. 95-122Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    In recent papers, Eddy Nahmias and Dylan Murray have proposed an error theory for intuitions supporting incompatibilism. They suggest that when people take responsibility to be undermined by determinism, they do so because they take determinism to imply that agents’ beliefs, desires, and decisions are bypassed, having no effect on their actions. This chapter first presents results from experiments designed to exclude certain sources of error in Nahmias and Murray’s studies, showing that their data, however puzzling, are robust with respect to minor variations in questionnaires. Second, it presents results from studies designed to provide more direct tests of the bypass hypothesis, results strongly suggesting that in spite of these data, the hypothesis is false. Third, it argues that, initial appearances notwithstanding, the explanation hypothesis can straightforwardly explain Nahmias and Murray’s data.

  • 226.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Moralisk oenighet utan metaetisk absolutism2015Ingår i: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 36, nr 3, s. 3-11Artikel i tidskrift (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 227.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Outsourcing the deep self: Deep self discordance does not explain away intuitions in manipulation arguments2016Ingår i: Philosophical Psychology, ISSN 0951-5089, E-ISSN 1465-394X, Vol. 29, nr 5, s. 637-653Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    According to manipulation arguments for incompatibilism, manipulation might undermine an agent's responsibility even when the agent satisfies plausible compatibilist conditions on responsibility. According to Sripada (2012), however, empirical data suggest that people take manipulation to undermine responsibility largely because they think that the manipulated act is in discord with the agent's “deep self”, thus violating the plausible compatibilist condition of deep self concordance. This paper defends Sripada's methodological approach but presents data from an experiment that corrects for crucial weaknesses in his study. These data strongly suggest that, contrary to Sripada’s contention, most of the effect of manipulation on attributions of moral responsibility is unmediated by worries about inadequate information or deep self discordance. Instead, it depends largely on worries that the action is ultimately explained by factors outside the agent’s control, just as proponents of manipulation arguments have proposed. More generally, data suggest that judgments of deep self discordance are themselves explained by worries about responsibility, and that the everyday notion of what an agent wants or is “deep down” is sensitive not only to the agent’s internal psychological structure, but also its source. This casts doubt on recent claims about the explanatory role of deep self judgments.

  • 228.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Quasi-Realism, Absolutism, and Judgment-Internal Correctness Conditions2013Ingår i: Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday / [ed] Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng, Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag, 2013, s. 96-119Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
    Abstract [en]

    The traditional metaethical distinction between cognitivist absolutism, on the one hand, and speaker relativism or noncognitivism, on the other, seemed both clear and important. On the former view, moral judgments would be true or false independently on whose judgments they were, and moral disagreement might be settled by the facts. Not so on the latter views. But noncognitivists and relativists, following what Simon Blackburn has called a “quasi-realist” strategy, have come a long way in making sense of talk about truth of moral judgments and its in- dependence of moral judges and their attitudes or standards. The success of this strategy would undermine the traditional way of understanding the distinction, and it is not obvious how it can be reformulated. In this paper, I outline the difficulty posed by quasi-realism, raise problems for some prior attempts to overcome it, and present my own suggestion, focusing on correctness conditions that are internal to the act of moral judgment.

  • 229.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Björklund, Fredrik
    Eriksson, John
    Francén Olinder, Ragnar
    Strandberg, Caj
    Recent Work on Motivational Internalism2012Ingår i: Analysis, ISSN 0003-2638, E-ISSN 1467-8284, Vol. 72, nr 1, s. 124-137Artikel, forskningsöversikt (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Reviews recent work on motivational internalism

  • 230.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Brülde, Bengt
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Normative responsibilities: structure and sources2017Ingår i: Parental responsibility in the context of neuroscience and genetics / [ed] Kristien Hens, Daniela Cutas, Dorothee Horstkötter, Cham: Springer, 2017, s. 13-33Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Normative responsibilities have a central role in everyday moral thinking, largely because they are taken to ground requirements to act and react in certain ways. If parents are responsible for the wellbeing of their children, for example, this might mean that they are morally required to feed them, attend to their emotional needs, or make sure that someone else does. But normative responsibilities are not well understood as lists of requirements to act or react, for such requirements will depend on what options and information the agent has available. In the first part of the paper, we instead propose to understand normative responsibilities as requirements to care about what one is responsible for: about the wellbeing of one’s child, about performing a certain action, or about playing the sort of role that one’s profession requires. Such requirements, we argue, are just the sort of things that will give rise to requirements to act and react given the right context. In the second part, we survey and discuss a variety of considerations that might give rise to normative responsibilities: capacities and costs; retrospective and causal responsibility; benefits; promises, contracts and agreements; laws and norms; and roles and special relationships.

  • 231.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Francén Olinder, Ragnar
    Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science, University of Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Enoch's defense of robust meta-ethical realism2016Ingår i: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 13, nr 1, s. 101-112Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch's book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch's position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central passages. We focus on Enoch's two original positive arguments for non-naturalist realism, one argument building on first order moral implications of different meta-ethical positions, the other attending to the rational commitment to normative facts inherent in practical deliberation. We also pay special attention to Enoch's handling of two types of objections to non-naturalist realism, objections having to do with the possibility of moral knowledge and with moral disagreement.

  • 232.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Francén Olinder, Ragnar
    Internalists Beware – We Might all be Amoralists!2013Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 91, nr 1, s. 1-14Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Standard motivational internalism is the claim that by a priori or conceptual necessity, a psychological state is a moral opinion only if it is suitably related to moral motivation. Many philosophers, the authors of this paper included, have assumed that this claim is supported by intuitions to the effect that amoralists—people not suitably related to such motivation—lack moral opinions proper. In this paper we argue that this assumption is mistaken, seeming plausible only because defenders of standard internalism have failed to consider the possibility that our own actual moral practice as a whole is one where moral opinions fail to motivate in the relevant way. To show this, we present a cynical hypothesis according to which the tendency for people to act in accordance with their moral opinions ultimately stems from a desire to appear moral. This hypothesis is most likely false, but we argue, on both intuitive and methodological grounds, that it is conceptually possible that it correctly describes our actual moral opinions. If correct, this refutes standard motivational internalism. Further, we propose an explanation of why many have seemingly internalist intuitions. Such intuitions, we argue, stem from the fact that standard amoralist cases allow (or even suggest) that we apprehend the putative moral opinions of amoralists as radically different from how we understand actual paradigmatic moral opinions. Given this, it is reasonable to understand them as not being moral opinions proper. However, since these intuitions rest on substantial a posteriori assumptions about actual moral opinions, they provide no substantial a priori constraints on theories of moral judgment.

  • 233.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier. University of Gothenburg.
    Hess, Kendy
    Corporate Crocodile Tears?: On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporations2017Ingår i: Philosophy and phenomenological research, ISSN 0031-8205, E-ISSN 1933-1592, Vol. 94, nr 2, s. 273-298Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Recently, a number of people have argued that certain entities embodied by groups of agents themselves qualify as agents, with their own (analogs of) beliefs, desires, and intentions; even, some claim, as moral agents. However, others have independently argued that fully-fledged moral agency involves a capacity for reactive attitudes such as guilt and indignation, and these capacities might seem beyond the ken of “collective” or “corporate” agents. Individuals embodying such agents can of course be ashamed, proud, or indignant about what the agent has done. But just as an entity needs to have its own beliefs, desires, and intentions to qualify as a bona fide agent, the required capacity for reactive attitudes is a capacity to have one’s own reactive attitudes. If fully-fledged moral agency requires reactive attitudes, the corporate agent must itself be capable of (analogs of) guilt and indignation. In this paper, we argue that at least certain corporate agents are. Or, more precisely, we argue that if there are bona fide corporate agents, these agents can have the capacities that are both associated with guilt and indignation and plausibly required for moral agency; in particular certain epistemic and motivational capacities.

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  • 234.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier. Göteborgs universitet.
    John, Eriksson
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Strandberg, Caj
    Universitetet i Oslo.
    Francén Olinder, Ragnar
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Björklund, Fredrik
    Lunds universitet.
    Motivational internalism and folk intuitions2015Ingår i: Philosophical Psychology, ISSN 0951-5089, E-ISSN 1465-394X, Vol. 28, nr 5, s. 715-734Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Motivational internalism postulates a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In arguing for and against internalism, metaethicists traditionally appeal to intuitions about cases, but crucial cases often yield conflicting intuitions. One way to try to make progress, possibly uncovering theoretical bias and revealing whether people have conceptions of moral judgments required for noncognitivist accounts of moral thinking, is to investigate non-philosophers' willingness to attribute moral judgments. A pioneering study by Shaun Nichols seemed to undermine internalism, as a large majority of subjects were willing to attribute moral understanding to an agent lacking moral motivation. However, our attempts to replicate this study yielded quite different results, and we identified a number of problems with Nichols' experimental paradigm. The results from a series of surveys designed to rule out these problems (a) show that people are more willing to attribute moral understanding than moral belief to agents lacking moral motivation, (b) suggest that a majority of subjects operate with some internalist conceptions of moral belief, and (c) are compatible with the hypothesis that an overwhelming majority of subjects do this. The results also seem to suggest that if metaethicists’ intuitions are theoretically biased, this bias is more prominent among externalists.

  • 235.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier. Göteborgs universitet.
    McPherson, Tristram
    Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the specification problem2014Ingår i: Mind (Print), ISSN 0026-4423, E-ISSN 1460-2113, Vol. 123, nr 489, s. 1-38Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Moral non-cognitivists hope to explain the nature of moral agreement and disagreement as agreement and disagreement in non-cognitive attitudes. In doing so, they take on the task of identifying the relevant attitudes, distinguishing the non-cognitive attitudes corresponding to judgements of moral wrongness, for example, from attitudes involved in aesthetic disapproval or the sports fan’s disapproval of her team’s performance. We begin this paper by showing that there is a simple recipe for generating apparent counterexamples to any informative specification of the moral attitudes. This may appear to be a lethal objection to non-cognitivism, but a similar recipe challenges attempts by non-cognitivism’s competitors to specify the conditions underwriting the contrast between genuine and merely apparent moral disagreement. Because of its generality, this specification problem requires a systematic response, which, we argue, is most easily available for the non-cognitivist. Building on premisses congenial to the non-cognitivist tradition, we make the following claims: (1) In paradigmatic cases, wrongness-judgements constitute a certain complex but functionally unified state, and paradigmatic wrongness-judgements form a functional kind, preserved by homeostatic mechanisms. (2) Because of the practical function of such judgements, we should expect judges’ intuitive understanding of agreement and disagreement to be accommodating, treating states departing from the paradigm in various ways as wrongness-judgements. (3) This explains the intuitive judgements required by the counterexample-generating recipe, and more generally why various kinds of amoralists are seen as making genuine wrongness-judgements.

  • 236.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Pereboom, Derk
    Free Will Skepticism and Bypassing2014Ingår i: Moral Psychology, vol 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility / [ed] Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, MIT Press, 2014, s. 27-35Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
  • 237.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Pereboom, Derk
    Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility2016Ingår i: A Companion to Experimental Philosophy / [ed] Justin Sytsma, Wesley Buckwalter, Wiley-Blackwell, 2016, s. 158-172Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
  • 238.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Persson, Karl
    University of Gothenburg.
    A unified empirical account of responsibility judgments2013Ingår i: Philosophy and phenomenological research, ISSN 0031-8205, E-ISSN 1933-1592, Vol. 87, nr 3, s. 611-639Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Skeptical worries about moral responsibility seem to be widely appreciated and deeply felt. To address these worries—if nothing else to show that they are mistaken—theories of moral responsibility need to relate to whatever concept of responsibility underlies the worries. Unfortunately, the nature of that concept has proved hard to pin down. Not only do philosophers have conflicting intuitions; numerous recent empirical studies have suggested that both prosaic responsibility judgments and incompatibilist intuitions among the folk are influenced by a number of surprising factors, sometimes prompting apparently contradictory judgments. In this paper, we show how an independently motivated hypothesis about responsibility judgments provides a unified explanation of the more important results from these studies. According to this ‘Explanation Hypothesis’, to take an agent to be morally responsible for an event is to take a relevant motivational structure of the agent to be part of a significant explanation of the event. We argue that because of how explanatory interests and perspectives affect what we take as significant explanations, this analysis accounts for the puzzling variety of empirical results. If this is correct, the Explanation Hypothesis also provides a new way of understanding debates about moral responsibility.

  • 239.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Persson, Karl
    The explanatory component of moral responsibility2012Ingår i: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068, Vol. 46, nr 2, s. 326-354Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
  • 240.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Shanklin, Robert
    ‘Must’, ‘Ought’ and the Structure of Standards2014Ingår i: Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ISSN 0302-9743, E-ISSN 1611-3349, nr 8554, s. 33-48Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns the semantic difference between strong and weak necessity modals. First we identify a number of explananda: their well-known intuitive difference in strength between ‘must’ and ‘ought’ as well as differences in connections to probabilistic considerations and acts of requir- ing and recommending. Here we argue that important extant analyses of the semantic differences, though tailored to account for some of these aspects, fail to account for all. We proceed to suggest that the difference between ’ought’ and ’must’ lies in how they relate to scalar and binary standards. Briefly put, must(φ) says that among the relevant alternatives, φ is selected by the relevant binary standard, whereas ought(φ) says that among the relevant alternatives, φ is selected by the relevant scale. Given independently plausible assumptions about how standards are provided by context, this explains the relevant differ- ences discussed.

  • 241.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Strandberg, CajFrancén Olinder, RagnarEriksson, JohnBjörklund, Fredrik
    Motivational Internalism2015Samlingsverk (redaktörskap) (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Motivational internalism—the thesis that there is an intrinsic or necessary connection between moral judgment and moral motivation—is a central thesis in a number of metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, it has provided a challenge for cognitivist theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality, and versions of internalism have been seen as having implications for moral absolutism, realism, non-naturalism, and rationalism. Being a constraint on theories of moral motivation and moral judgment, it is also directly relevant to wider issues in moral psychology. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism have also been seen as a problem for non-cognitivists. This volume is meant to help people appreciate the state of the art of research on internalism, to see connections between various aspects of the debate, and to deepen the discussion of a number of central aspects. The introductory chapter provides a structured overview of the debate with a focus on the last two decades or so, distinguishing several important threads and trends in recent developments. The 13 chapters of original research are divided into three parts. The essays in the first part focus on what evidence there is for or against various versions of internalism, those in the second on the relevance of versions of internalism for wider metaethical issues, and those in the third develop different ways of accommodating both internalist and externalist aspects of moral practice.

  • 242.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Strandberg, Caj
    Francén Olinder, Ragnar
    Eriksson, John
    Björklund, Fredrik
    Motivational Internalism: Contemporary Debates2015Ingår i: Motivational Internalism / [ed] Gunnar Björnsson, Caj Strandberg, Ragnar Francén Olinder, John Eriksson, and Fredrik Björklund, New York: Oxford University Press, 2015, s. 1-25Kapitel i bok, del av antologi (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Motivational internalism—the idea that moral judgments are intrinsically or necessarily connected to motivation—has played a central role in metaethical debates. In conjunction with a Humean picture of motivation, internalism has provided a challenge for theories that take moral judgments to concern objective aspects of reality, and versions of internalism have been seen as having implications for moral absolutism, realism, and rationalism. But internalism is a controversial thesis, and the apparent possibility of amoralists and the rejection of strong forms of internalism have also been seen as a problem for non-cognitivists. The last decades have seen a number of developments of internalist positions and arguments for and against internalism. This chapter provides a structured overview of the more important themes, including the development of new forms of conditional internalism, deferred internalism, and non-constitutional internalism, as well as the emergence of empirically-based arguments and new forms of a posteriori internalism.

  • 243.
    Blad, Tobias
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Eskilstunas Fornborgar: En GIS-baserad analys av relationen mellan fornborgarna och dess landskapsrum2023Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 20 poäng / 30 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
    Abstract [en]

    The excavations conducted on the Swedish prehistoric hillforts are very limited. However, a lot of people are drawn to them because of their impressive size, which include preserved walls that can reach over three metres in height. They are frequently associated with legends about giants who once lived there. The majority of the hillforts in Sweden were built during the Roman Iron Age and the Migration period. The purpose for which the hillforts were built has been the subject of intense debate, but it is now generally accepted that not every hillfort would have served the same function. The goal of this thesis is to map the hillforts in Eskilstuna municipality, Södermanland County, in order to better understand their purpose, their topographic locations, and the number of other hillforts that could have been seen from each hillfort. This will primarily be achieved through literature reviews of prior studies on the topic and the use of GIS.

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  • 244.
    Blixt, Pernilla
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Värdefulla Föremål: En inventering av testamenterade föremål under perioden 1200-13802022Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
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  • 245.
    Blom, Carin
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Vad hände med leopardens döttrar?: En kulturpsykologisk analys av kvinnorollen inom Bénin och Togos Vodoukult2020Självständigt arbete på avancerad nivå (magisterexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
    Abstract [sv]

    Vad hände med leopardens döttrar? En kulturpsykologisk analys av kvinnorollen inom Bénin och Togos Vodoukult. (What happened to the daughters of the Leopard? A cultural psychological analysis of the role of women in Bénin and Togo´s Vodoucult). Syftet med studien var att öka förståelsen för hur Vodoukulten kan bidra till hur kvinnorollen uttrycks och manifesteras. Det uppnåddes genom kvinnornas och andra utövares berättelser, samt iakttagelser av hur rollen uttrycktes i kulten och om det bidrog till eller frigjorde kvinnorna från etablerade könsroller. Studien utgick från Kvale & Brinkmanns intervjumetodik. Intervjuerna med informanterna och observationerna var viktiga för förståelsen av hur kulturen formade deltagarnas uppfattning om sig själv, samhället och religionen. Undersökningen utgick från Belzens tolkning av kulturpsykologi, Bourdieus teori om habitus, samt Lacans symbolic order. Studien tar också upp genus som Sky definierar den. Slutsatsen blev att kvinnor bidrar till formandet av sin roll inom Vodoun och att Vodoun är rigid när det kommer till könsroller.

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  • 246.
    Blom, Carin
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    “When fighting monsters …”: - How the post-9/11 propaganda contributed to the radicalization and totalization of the United States and its allies2022Självständigt arbete på avancerad nivå (masterexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
    Abstract [en]

    When President George W. Bush on September 11, 2001, said that USA was targeted because they were the beacon of light of justice and democracy in the world - and that those who conducted the attack were opposed to everything it entailed, he took the first step towards totalization and its handmaiden radicalization, as Lifton and Moghaddam describes it. The aim of this study is to explain the consequence’s when he labelled the act as a war instead of a criminal act and put forward that it was a deliberate rhetorical choice to detach the event from previous political and economic events. The word “war” frightens us and outmanoeuvre our rational thinking by activating adaptations such as predator-, pest- and infection control systems. These adaptations can be used in propaganda that are part of epideictic contexts where leaders want to arouse feelings for a favoured action and act on them. Fear becomes horror when propaganda dresses the conflict in apocalyptic terms. With the expression: "you are either with us, or with the terrorists", Bush created a thought-stopping cliché that prevented both self-reflection and alternative interpretations of the situation, thus helped free the monster within US-citizens and allies.

  • 247.
    Blomberg, Tina
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Existentiell hälsa?: En analys om existentiell hälsa och hur begreppet används.2023Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
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  • 248.
    Blomberg, Tina
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Undervisning i ett förändrat landskap: En komparativ studie av synen på undervisning i Svenska kyrkan och den Evangelisk-lutherska kyrkan i Finland2022Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
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  • 249.
    Blomkvist, Alva
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Same som same?: Hur uppdelningen av renskötande och icke renskötande samer diskuteras i Samefolket 1970-20002019Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
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  • 250.
    Boberg, Felicia
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Krigsfånge eller flykting?: Svenska interneringsläger för utländsk militär personal2017Självständigt arbete på grundnivå (kandidatexamen), 10 poäng / 15 hpStudentuppsats (Examensarbete)
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