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  • 251.
    Lindberg, Sharon
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Är turjämlikheten hjärtlös?2016Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 252.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Libertarianism, Information, and Unions2018In: Social Epistemology, ISSN 0269-1728, E-ISSN 1464-5297, Vol. 32, no 2, p. 103-111Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This article presents a normative epistemological argument for unions, developed from libertarian premises. According to Friedman, the state should set up rules for the market, whereas managers should focus on profits. On this view, business ethics can be handled by regulations, but Hayek’s theory of the market indicates that this position is problematic, since it relies on the state being able to collect the relevant ethical information. Hayek argued that a market system is more efficient than planned economies, since it handles information more efficiently. However, there is also reason to doubt that markets can provide the needed information. The price mechanism carries information solely about preferences, but ethics also concerns rights, voluntariness and needs. Moreover, Coase showed that inside firms there are no Hayekian price mechanisms. Firms are characterized by hierarchy, which means that both employers and employees may have incentives to not be forthcoming with information relevant information. The moral epistemology of Anderson, with an important role for civil society, is used to identify solutions to these informational problems. As a part of civil society, unions complement the market as a source of ethical information, and inside the firm they balance power and provide an avenue for voice.

  • 253.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Lyckat enligt Hattie är inte bättre för alla2016In: Pedagogiska Magasinet, ISSN 1401-3320Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 254.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Rawlsian Political Analysis: Rethinking the Microfoundations of Social Science2015In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, ISSN 1740-4681, E-ISSN 1745-5243, Vol. 12, no 4, p. 553-556Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 255.
    Lindblom, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Snåriga vägar till likvärdighet2015In: Pedagogiska Magasinet, ISSN 1401-3320Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 256.
    Lindblom, Lars
    et al.
    Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    Department of Philosophy and the History of Technology, Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Efficient Inspections2005In: Nordic Perspectives on Safety Management in High Reliability Organizations: Theory and Applications / [ed] Ola Svensson, Illka Salo, Pia Oedewald, Teemu Reiman and Ann Britt Skjerve, Roskilde, denmark: NKS Secretariat , 2005, p. 9-19Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Workplace inspections are undertaken because they are believed to lead to better conditions In the workplace. It is therefore essential to know if inspections have the desired effects on working conditions. We introduce a theoretical framework for the evaluation of workplace inspections with respect to their effects on working conditions. Criteria of efficiency and priority-setting are discussed. Some empirical results concerning priority-setting in Swedish inspection agencies are presented. Further, we argue that in order to obtain reliable information about the effects of different inspection methods, it is necessary to perform controlled comparative studies in which different methods are used in different workplaces. Given the facility with which such studies can be performed, it is surprising how few such studies have been made. We conclude by surveying some empirical studies that concern the issue of efficient inspections.

  • 257.
    Lindblom, Lars
    et al.
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Hansson, Sven Ove
    KTH, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Evaluating Workplace Inspections2004In: Policy and Practice in Health and Safety, ISSN 1477-3996, E-ISSN 1477-4003, Vol. 2, no 2, p. 77-91Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A theoretical framework is introduced for the evaluation of workplace inspections with respect to their effects on working conditions. The choice of a concept of efficiency is discussed, and its relation to criteria for a good working environment is clarified. It is concluded that in order to obtain reliable information on the effects of different inspection methods, it is necessary to perform controlled comparative studies in which different methods are used on different workplaces. Given the facility with which such studies can be performed, it is surprising how few such studies have been made. The studies that are available provide sufficient evidence that inspections can increase compliance with regulations and that they can also increase workplace safety, but not much can be concluded about the relative efficiency of different inspection methods.

  • 258.
    Linder, Johanna
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Grepp om upplevelsen: En undersökning av Blocks och Shoemakers diskussion angående kvalias tillgänglighet för subjektet, givet argumentet om frånvarande kvalia2016Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 259.
    Lindgren, Sofia
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    World alienation and place alienation: Thoughts about Arendt and the human condition2016Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 260.
    Lindner, Philip
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Det där är ingen icke-zebra!: epistemisk-deduktiv slutenhet och skepticism2011Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    Departing from Fred Dretske’s groundbreaking article, this essay explore the epistemic closure principle: the principle that states that knowledge is closed under known implication. It also explores the relationship to skepticism, various attempts to challenge and defend the principle, as well as developing a new perspective where the skeptical premise is seen as an a priori justified tautology that can be overriden by a posteriori experience. I argue that Dretske’s illuminating example makes it clear that there is an unescapable choice between either rejecting a skeptical premise  however intuitive it may seem  or inextricably having to admit a skeptical conclusion. 

  • 261.
    Lindqvist, Emil
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Libertarianism and Georgism on Private Property2015Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 262.
    Lindström, Anton
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Den absoluta sanningens konsekvenser för demokratin2018Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the adherence to absolute truth and moraluniversalism is compatible with democracy. The starting point is that there is absolute truthand absolute values.My thesis is that democracy in the form of universal suffrage is not necessarily in the wayof truth, but rather party politics and representative democracy. Abolishing the parties may besufficient to overcome both truth relativism and moral relativism, and thus provide analternative to abolishing universal suffrage. I suggest the problem lies in party politics, andthe way in which political talks are conducted, rather than in the right to vote.The investigation shows that democracy only have instrumental value. It shall be judgedbased on how well it promotes absolute truth and absolute values. Furthermore, representativedemocracy does not promote absolute truth and absolute values. One alternative isepistocracy. Another option is to abolish the parties, preserve universal suffrage, and createconditions for a new form of political dialogue. The conclusion is that the latter option is bestfor promoting the absolute truth.

  • 263.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Challenges to Neologicism2007Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The period in the foundations of mathematics that started in 1879 with the publication of Frege's Begriffsschrift and ended in 1931 with Gödel's Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme can reasonably be called the classical period. It saw the development of three major foundational programmes: the logicism of

    Frege, Russell and Whitehead, the intuitionism of Brouwer, and Hilbert's formalist and prooftheoretic programme. In this period, there were also lively exchanges between the various schools culminating in the famous Hilbert-Brouwer controversy in the 1920s. The state of the foundational programmes at the end of the classical period is reported in the papers by

    Carnap, Heyting and von Neumann (Cf. Benacerraf and Putnam (1983)) from the Conference on Epistemology of the Exact Sciences in Königsberg 1930. This was the very same symposium at which Gödel announced his First Incompleteness Theorem.

    In this presentation I will concentrate on various varieties of Logicism inspired by Frege's original version which was outlined informally in his Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884) and presented in formal detail in his Grundgesetze der Arithmetik (1893/1903). I will discuss the motivation behind the logicist programme and the severe difficulties that it faces. In view of these difficulties it is tempting to pronounce the "Death of Logicism"; and obviously the programme cannot be pursued in anything like its original form. The original goal of showing that substantial mathematical theories can be based conceptually, epistemologically, and

    ontologically solely on something that deserves the label “logic” cannot—as far as I can see—be achieved. However, there are close connections between logic and mathematics that should be explored. Much can be learned both philosophically and technically from considering

    various logicist and neologicist programmes. Moreover, Logicism very much resembles the boar Särimner that according to Nordic mythology was slaughtered every night and eaten—just to be brought back to life the next day.

  • 264.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Church-Fitchs argument än en gång, eller: vem är rädd för vetbarhetsparadoxen?2017In: Från Skaradjäkne till Uppsalaprofessor: festskrift till Lars-Göran Johansson i samband med hans pensionering / [ed] George Masterton, Keizo Matsubara and Kim Solin, Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 2017, p. 160-171Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Enligt ett realistiskt synsätt kan ett påstående vara sant trots att det inte ens i princip är möjligt att veta att det är sant. En sanningsteoretisk antirealist kan inte godta denna möjlighet utan att accepterar en eller annan version av Dummetts vetbarhetsprincip:

    (K) Om ett påstående är sant, så måste det i princip vara möjligt att veta att det är sant.

    Det kan dock förefalla rimligt, även för en antirealist, att gå med på att det kan finnas sanningar som ingen faktiskt vet (har vetat, eller kommer att veta) är sanna. Man kan därför tänka sig att en antirealist skulle acceptera principen (K) utan att därför gå med på den till synes starkare principen:

    (SK) Om ett påstående är sant, så måste det faktiskt finnas någon som vet att det är sant.

    Ett mycket omdiskuterat argument – som ytterst går tillbaka till Alonzo Church, men som först publicerades i en uppsats av Frederic Fitch i Journal of Symbolic Logic 1963 – tycks emellertid visa att principen (K) implicerar principen (SK).

    I uppsatsen diskuterar jag några olika sätt att undgå Church-Fitch paradoxala slutsats. Ett tillvägagångssätt är att ersätta kunskapsoperatorn med en hierarki av kunskapspredikat. Ett annat är baserat på distinktionen mellan faktisk och potentiell kunskap och ett förkastande av den vanliga modallogiska formaliseringen av principen (K). Den senare typen av lösning betraktas både från ett realistiskt och ett icke-realistiskt perspektiv. Utifrån denna analys kommer jag fram till slutsatsen att vi, vare sig vi är realister eller antirealister rörande sanning, kan sluta oroa oss för vetbarhetsparadoxen och ändå uppskatta Church-Fitchs argument.

  • 265.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Hintikka and the origins of possible worlds semantics2005Conference paper (Other academic)
  • 266.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Introduction2012In: Epistemology versus Ontology: Essays on the Philosophy and Foundations of Mathematics in Honour of Per Martin-Löf / [ed] Dybjer, P.; Lindström, S.; Palmgren, E.; Sundholm, G., Dordrecht: Springer, 2012, p. vii-xivChapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This book brings together philosophers, mathematicians and logicians to penetrate important problems in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In philosophy, one has been concerned with the opposition between constructivism and classical mathematics and the different ontological and epistemological views that are reflected in this opposition. The dominant foundational framework for current mathematics is classical logic and set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC). This framework is, however, laden with philosophical difficulties. One important alternative foundational programme that is actively pursued today is predicativistic constructivism based on Martin-Löf type theory. Associated philosophical foundations are meaning theories in the tradition of Wittgenstein, Dummett, Prawitz and Martin-Löf. What is the relation between proof-theoretical semantics in the tradition of Gentzen, Prawitz, and Martin-Löf and Wittgensteinian or other accounts of meaning-as-use? What can proof-theoretical analyses tell us about the scope and limits of constructive and predicative mathematics?

  • 267.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Logicism and the Fregean Conception of Set2007In: Filosofidagarna 2007, Abstracts, Umeå, 2007Conference paper (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
    Abstract [en]

    Set theory, as developed within the tradition of Cantor and Zermelo, is a mathematical discipline that is autonomous relative to logic.

    According to the so-called iterative, or cumulative, conception of set, sets are mathematical objects built up from previously given objects by a process of “collecting them together”. More specifically, sets are formed in a transfinite succession of stages. At stage 0, the empty set is formed together with sets that only contain objects that are not sets (individuals). The sets formed at a successor stage a+1 are all possible collections of objects (individuals and sets) that are available at stage a. At limit stages all objects are collected together that have been obtained previously. The set-theoretic universe V contains all the objects (sets and individuals) that have been obtained in this process. The universe itself as well as such “inconsistent” totalities as the totality of ordinals, cardinals, and the totality of all sets that are not members of themselves, do not form sets. In this way the usual paradoxes of naive set theory are avoided.

    Frege, on the other hand, thought of sets—or classes—as “logical objects” which are definable within his logical system as extensions of concepts. Frege’s system is a higher-order logic, where the individual variables are taken to be absolutely unrestricted, ranging over absolutely all objects, and higher-order variables are interpreted as ranging over “unsaturated” entities—Fregean functions and concepts. Frege assumes that every concept of objects determines an object, namely, the class of all objects that fall under the concept. This assumption, in conjunction with strong existence assumptions concerning concepts, implies that Frege’s foundational system is inconsistent.

    In this talk I am going to discuss various proposals for developing a set theory along Fregean lines. In particular, I am going to consider various proposals for restricting Frege’s unlimited set-comprehension axiom.

  • 268.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Neo-Fregean Logicism and the A Priori Nature of Arithmetic2007In: Volume of Abstracts of the 13th International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science (LMPS Beijing), 2007Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Frege tried to explain our knowledge of the natural numbers by reducing arithmetic to logic. This program, however, could not be carried out. The main reason was that the theory of extensions (or classes) that Frege used in defining the natural numbers turned out to be inconsistent. In addition, the program is in conflict with Godel´s first incompleteness theorem according to which every consistent formal system for arithmetic, with sufficient expressive power, contains true arithmetic statements that are not provable in the system. For a long time, therefore, Frege´s philosophy of mathematics came to be regarded as hopelessly passé. Recently, however, the situation has changed, mainly due to the revision of Frege´s program by Crispin Wright and Bob Hale and logical investigations carried out by the late George Boolos, Richard Heck, and others. It was pointed out that Frege in Grundgesetze makes only one essential use of his inconsistent axiom for classes, Basic Law V, namely to establish Hume’s principle, i.e., the statement that the cardinal numbers of the concepts F and G are equal if and only if the F’s and the G’s are equinumerous (can be put in a one-to-one correspondence with each other). Using this principle and appropriate definitions he then proved the fundamental axioms of arithmetic. In other words, Frege had established Frege’s theorem, i.e. the axioms of arithmetic due to Dedekind and Peano are provable from Hume’s Principle in second-order logic. Wright and Hale argue that Hume’s principle is analytically true of the concept of cardinal number and that it is knowable a priori. Thus, by using this principle instead of Frege’s inconsistent Basic Law V one can achieve a substantial part of Frege’s epistemological goals. Wright’s and Hale’s general program is to develop other branches of mathematics, like real and complex analysis and set theory, on the basis abstraction principles similar to Hume’s principle.

    In this paper I subject the neo-Fregean program of Hale and Wright to a critical examination.

    In particular, I concentrate on two questions:

    (i) Hale and Wright describe Hume’s principle as a stipulation about the meaning of “cardinal number”. A subject who is not in possession of the notion of a cardinal number can come to understand that concept by means of Hume’s principle. At the same time it is a very strong principle that implies the existence of infinitely many objects (cardinal numbers). How can one argue that such a strong principle is at the same time a stipulation and a priori true? In what sense can one introduce new entities by stipulation? The vague idea is that the left hand side (implying the existence of numbers) is just a “reconceptualization” of the right hand side (speaking of equinumerosity). I will analyse this idea that statements about numbers express nothing but facts about equinumerosity.

    (ii) If the derivation of Dedekind-Peano’s axioms from Hume’s principle preserves the property of being a priori, then we can also gain a priori knowledge of the fundamental laws of arithmetic. But how can we justify the claim that second-order logical consequence preserves apriority? This in turn leads to the question about the interpretation of second-order logic and its “logicality”.

  • 269.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Neo-Fregean Logicism in the Philosophy of Mathematics2007Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Frege tried to explain our knowledge of the natural numbers by reducing arithmetic to logic. This program, however, could not be carried out. The main reason was that the theory of classes (or extensions) that Frege used in defining the natural numbers turned out to be inconsistent. In addition, the program is in apparent conflict with Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem according to which every consistent formal system for arithmetic, with sufficient expressive power, contains true arithmetic statements that are not provable in the system. For a long time, therefore, Frege’s philosophy of mathematics came to be regarded as hopelessly passe. Recently, however, the situation has changed, mainly due to the revision of Frege’s program by Crispin Wright and Bob Hale and logical investigations carried out by the late George Boolos, Richard Heck, and others. The aim of the project is to subject the neo-Fregean program (and similar neo-logicist programs) in the philosophy of mathematics to a critical examination. Many of the assumptions and presuppositions of this program can be questioned. What is the epistemic status of the higher-order logic that is assumed? Can all the principles and rules of inference of this logic be justified on the basis of conceptual connections? Or is it rather,

    as critics have claimed, that the Neo-Fregeans have provided substantial mathematical assumptions with an innocent-looking logical disguise? What is the status of Hume’s principle and similar abstraction principles? What about the “bad company objection” against Fregean abstraction principles and the “Caesar objection” against implicit definitions? The focus will be on questions concerning the limits of logic, the interpretation of

    higher order logic, and the status of abstraction principles. The importance of the project lies in the clarity that it can provide concerning philosophically important concepts and problems.

  • 270.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    On the proper treatment of quantification in contexts of logical and metaphysical modalities2006In: Modality Matters: Twenty-Five Essays in Honour of Krister Segerberg, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 2006, p. 303-321Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 271.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    On the Semantics of Logical and Metaphysical Necessity2005In: Fifth European Congress for Analytic Philosophy, University of Lisbon, 27-31 August 2005: Book of Abstracts, 2005, p. 7-8Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Short abstract: We distinguish between two interpretations of the necessity operator of alethic modal logic: the logical and the metaphysical one. On the logical interpretation, ‘Necessarily A’ is true just in case A is logically true. According to the metaphysical interpretation, ‘Necessarily A’ is true if and only if it couldn’t have been the case that not-A. In this paper I describe a formal semantics (model theory) for a language of modal predicate logic that combines operators for logical and metaphysical necessity. The logical relationship between logical and metaphysical necessity is examined. Finally, I discuss to what extent this semantics gives us reasons to reject Quine’s criticism of quantified modal logic—especially the criticism of quantification into contexts governed by an operator for logical necessity.

  • 272.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Paradoxes of demonstrability2009In: Logic, ethics and all that Jazz: Essays in honour of Jordan Howard Sobel, Uppsala: Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University , 2009, p. 177-185Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 273.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Possible-Worlds Semantics and the Liar: Reflections on a Problem Posed by Kaplan2003In: Philosophical Dimensions of Logic and Science: Selected Conributed Papers from the 11th International Congress of Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Kraków, 1999, Kluwer, Dordrecht , 2003Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 274.
    Lindström, Sten
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Thinking impossible things2002In: Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality, Department of Philosophy and Linguistics, Umeå , 2002Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 275.
    Lindström, Sten
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Krister, Segerberg
    Modal logic and Philosophy2007In: Handbook of Modal Logic / [ed] Patrick Blackburn, Johan van Benthem, Frank Wolter, Amsterdam, Boston: Elsevier, 2007, p. 1149-1214Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Modal logic is one of philosophy’s many children. As a mature adult it has moved out of the parental home and is nowadays straying far from its parent. But the ties are still there: philosophy is important for modal logic, modal logic is important for philosophy. Or, at least, this is a thesis we try to defend in this chapter.

  • 276.
    Lindström, Sten
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Palmgren, Erik
    Introduction: The Three Foundational Programmes2008In: Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism: What has Become of Them? / [ed] Sten Lindström, Erik Palmgren, Krister Segerberg, Viggo Stoltenberg-Hansen, Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2008, p. 1-23Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The period in the foundations of mathematics that started in 1879 with the publication of Frege's Begriffsschrift and ended in 1931 with Gödel's Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I can reasonably be called the classical period. It saw the development of three major foundational programmes: the logicism of Frege, Russell and Whitehead, the intuitionism of Brouwer, and Hilbert's formalist and proof-theoretic programme. In this period, there were also lively exchanges between the various schools culminating in the famous Hilbert-Brouwer controversy in the 1920s.

    The purpose of this anthology is to review the programmes in the foundations of mathematics from the classical period and to assess their possible relevance for contemporary philosophy of mathematics. What can we say, in retrospect, about the various foundational programmes of the classical period and the disputes that took place between them? To what extent do the classical programmes of logicism, intuitionism and formalism represent options that are still alive today? These questions are addressed in this volume by leading mathematical logicians and philosophers of mathematics.

  • 277.
    Lindström, Sten
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Palmgren, ErikUppsala universitet.Segerberg, KristerUppsala universitet.Stoltenberg-Hansen, ViggoUppsala universitet.
    Logicism, Intuitionism, and Formalism: What has become of them?2008Collection (editor) (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The period in the foundations of mathematics that started in 1879 with the publication of Frege's Begriffsschrift and ended in 1931 with Gödel's Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I can reasonably be called the classical period. It saw the development of three major foundational programmes: the logicism of Frege, Russell and Whitehead, the intuitionism of Brouwer, and Hilbert's formalist and proof-theoretic programme. In this period, there were also lively exchanges between the various schools culminating in the famous Hilbert-Brouwer controversy in the 1920s.

    The purpose of this anthology is to review the programmes in the foundations of mathematics from the classical period and to assess their possible relevance for contemporary philosophy of mathematics. What can we say, in retrospect, about the various foundational programmes of the classical period and the disputes that took place between them? To what extent do the classical programmes of logicism, intuitionism and formalism represent options that are still alive today? These questions are addressed in this volume by leading mathematical logicians and philosophers of mathematics.

    The volume will be of interest primarily to researchers and graduate students of philosophy, logic, mathematics and theoretical computer science. The material will be accessible to specialists in these areas and to advanced graduate students in the respective fields.

  • 278.
    Lindström, Sten
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Sundström, PärUmeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Physicalism, Consciousness, and Modality: Essays in the Philosophy of Mind2002Collection (editor) (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 279.
    Linsmo, Sophie
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Det lika människovärdet2015Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 280.
    Loos, Leonard
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Hur smart är AI?: En undersökning av möjligheten av intelligenta maskiner2019Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    The reemergence of artificial intelligence during the last 30 years has introduced severalforms of weak AI to our everyday lives, be it in our smartphones or how the weather ispredicted. Modern approaches to AI, using methods like neural networks and machinelearning, also feel confident about creating strong AI, intelligence that is human-like orsuperior to humans. In this thesis, I discover the philosophical premises of artificialintelligence, how the research program views the mind and what implications this has for theform of intelligence that is being constructed. Furthermore, I derive at several criteria thatneed to be met to qualify a system as intelligent. To cover this rather wide field, the works ofHubert Dreyfus, an early commentator on AI, and David Chalmers, one of the most widelyread philosophers of mind, are interrogated about their views on human intelligence and howsuch a theory relates to the possibility of intelligent machines.Key

  • 281.
    Lundgren, Anna Sofia
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of culture and media studies. Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Ethnology.
    ”Vad/vem är jag när jag försvunnit?”2006Conference paper (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 282.
    Lyreskog, David
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Ethical Issues in the Decision Making Process of Paediatric Deep Brain Stimulation2014Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (Two Years)), 20 credits / 30 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [sv]

    Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) är en form av behandlingsmetod där elektroder implanteras i patientens hjärna, och där sedan en svag ström skickas via elektroderna till utvalda delar av hjärnan för att kompensera för neurologisk dysfunktion. Denna behandlingsmetod används främst för motoriska sjukdomar såsom Parkinsons sjukdom och dystoni, men har på senare år även börjat användas för att behandla vissa psykiatriska sjukdomar såsom Tourettes syndrom, depression och OCD-störningar. Många av sjukdomarna som behandlas med denna metod uppdagas hos patienten i ung ålder, och förvärras med åren. Röster har därför höjts för att påbörja behandling av sjukdomarna i ett tidigt skede, men behandlingsmetodens invasiva karaktär, samt behandlingsområdets känslighet, har lett till en diskussion kring hur beslutfattningsprocessen gällande DBS-behandling av barn bör utformas. I denna uppsats presenterar jag de vanligaste positionerna i denna diskussion, men finner dem otillräckliga då de inte i tillräckligt hög grad tar hänsyn till variationsgraden av autonomi inom patientgruppen. Jag presenterar därefter ett schema för hur beslutfattningsprocessen bör utformas så att hänsyn tas till patientens grad av autonomi. Jag analyserar också de värden som jag anser skall vägas in, och hur de står i relation till varandra, när det kommer till att fatta beslut rörande DBS-behandlingar av barn.

  • 283.
    Malm, Samuel
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Rawls problem of securing political liberties within the international institutions2018Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    In Law of Peoples Rawls tries to work out a theory that will ensure a fair interaction between the world’s ‘peoples’ (synonymous with “nations”). By this he means a description of international rules that both liberal and non-liberal peoples can accept, with the purpose of eradicating political injustices in the world; which Rawls believes is the big cause of the greatest evils in the world. Furthermore, in his theory, Rawls envisions a set of international institutions (WTO, World Bank and “the UN”) that will work as the basic structure for implementing this scheme of law; global rules of trade; providing loans; facilitation of capital investment, etc. However, the theory lacks a description of which political liberties the peoples would want to secure, within the international institutions, and of what principles of distribution they should be assigned. Accordingly, I will in this essay try to establish which rights the peoples—as Rawls envisions them—would want to secure, and why they would want to be viewed as equal to everybody else, by reasons of the institutions profound and pervasive effect on peoples success. Furthermore, I will contend that this equality in political liberties, and especially the ‘principle of equal participation’, will be impaired by the inequalities in resources that Rawls accepts between the peoples. Consequently, an issue of how wealthier peoples will use their power to promote their self-interest, and the lack of belief that constitutional safeguards, within the international institutions, will constrain them from using means of agitation.

  • 284.
    Medjed, Kristian
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Kan abstrakta egenskaper upplevas?2017Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 285.
    Melkerson, Sandra
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Mental kausalitet: Hållbarheten för Anthony Dardis teori2015Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 286. Michaelson, Eliot
    et al.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Uppsala University.
    Introduction2018In: Lying: language, knowledge, ethics, and politics / [ed] Eliot Michaelson and Andreas Stokke, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 1-36Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This introductory chapter first offers a sketch of the history of philosophical thinking about lying and insincerity. It traces some of the themes in this literature in the works of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, early modern casuists, David Hume, Thomas Reid, Immanuel Kant, and John Stuart Mill, through to twentieth-century philosophy. The chapter highlights some of the issues discussed in the contemporary literature, as represented in this collection of essays. It then presents an overview of the essays included in this volume. Some comments on the connections between them are offered, as well as on their relation to the historical debate.

  • 287.
    Michaelson, Eliot
    et al.
    Kings College London.
    Stokke, AndreasSwedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Uppsala University.
    Lying: language, knowledge, ethics, and politics2018Collection (editor) (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Philosophers have been thinking about lying for several thousand years, yet this topic has only recently become a central area of academic interest for philosophers of language, epistemologists, ethicists, and political philosophers. Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics provides the first dedicated collection of philosophical essays on the emerging topic of lying. Adopting an inter-subdisciplinary approach, this volume breaks new methodological ground in exploring the ways that a better understanding of language can inform the study of knowledge, ethics, or politics - and vice-versa. How can we lie when it is unclear what exactly we believe, or when we have contradictory beliefs? Can corporations lie, and if so how? Is lying always wrong, or always at least prima facie wrong? What can one learn from a liar? Can we lie to mindless machines? These engaging questions and many more are explored at length in this accessible reference text.

  • 288.
    Molina, Roque
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    On Kim's critique of non-reductive physicalism2015Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    Kim criticizes non-reductive physicalism as a suitable metaphysics of mind among things because of its failure on the issue of mental causation. The failure is especially present in the thesis of supervenience physicalism. Kim concludes that the causal powers of mental states can be reduced to the causal powers carried by the physical states realizing them. Such causal reduction might involve identity between mental properties and physical properties. I think this is not a necessary conclusion. I try to clarify some premises behind Kim’s analysis, regarding issues of irreducibility, downward causation and the structure of the physical domain. I think the main reason why Kim doubts the plausibility of non-reductive physicalism is his view that downward causation and non-reductive metaphysics indicate the physical domain being hierarchically divided into levels. It seems like Kim would take the opposite position regarding the structure of the physical: an undivided continuum. Yet, the question is if that position follows from the ontological tenet of physicalism. Finally, I conclude that not necessarily, and I develop some further implications and suggestions.

  • 289.
    Mullaart, Ida
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Education and Equality2014Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 290.
    Mullaart, Ida
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Ought we to be Limited in our Procreative Choices?: Parental Responsibility, Procreative Liberty, and In Vitro Fertilization2016Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (Two Years)), 20 credits / 30 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 291. Munthe, Christian
    et al.
    Sandman, Lars
    Cutas, Daniela
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Person centred care and shared decision making: implications for ethics, public health and research2012In: Health Care Analysis, ISSN 1065-3058, E-ISSN 1573-3394, Vol. 20, no 3, p. 231-249Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper presents a systematic account of ethical issues actualised in different areas, as well as at different levels and stages of health care, by introducing organisational and other procedures that embody a shift towards person centred care and shared decision-making (PCC/SDM). The analysis builds on general ethical theory and earlier work on aspects of PCC/SDM relevant from an ethics perspective.This account leads up to a number of theoretical as well as empirical and practice oriented issues that, in view of broad advancements towards PCC/SDM, need to be considered by health care ethics researchers. Given a PCC/SDM-based reorientation of health care practice, such ethics research is essential from a quality assurance perspective.

  • 292.
    Muullaart, Ida
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Choosing the Right Embryo: and not accepting the principle of procreative beneficence2015Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [sv]

    Är det möjligt att välja rätt embryo vid In-vitro fertilisering (IVF)? I sådana fall, vad innebär det att något är det rätta embryot? I denna uppsats diskuteras IVF och de moraliska dilemman som kan uppstå vid val av embryo. Vid IVF är det möjligt att ställa en preimplantorisk genetisk diagnostik (PGD) vilken kan ge information om genetiska sjukdomar och andra anlag, såväl som kön och kromosomfel. Enligt Julian Savulescu, som förespråkar the Principle of Procreative Beneficence, är vi moraliskt skyldiga att välja ett friskt embryo, vilket också anses vara det rätta embryot. I kontrast till detta ställs Christine Overall som menar att Savulescus princip innebär problem för hur vi bör se på barnafödande. Jag diskuterar vidare hur vi utifrån ett socialt och ett samhällsperspektiv kan se det som moraliskt tveksamt att förbjuda att personer med vissa anlag föds, samt försöker visa på Savulescus ignorans för hur IVF fungerar och att detta bidrar till att hans argument fallerar.

  • 293.
    Mägi, Daniel
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Workfare och motprestationer - Hur ser man på det i det svenska välfärdssystemet?2014Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [sv]

    I uppsatsen argumenteras för en tes om att det svenska samhället bör förändra sin syn på vad en acceptabel motprestation är för att få tillgång till ekonomiskt bistånd; tesen som presenteras menar att samhället bör acceptera andra former av motprestationer än förvärvsarbete och arbetsmarknadsinsatser. Under utredningsdelen argumenteras det för att samhället bör avkräva motprestationer men bör vara mer flexibel i vilka motprestationer som accepteras. Vidare presenteras fyra argument samt invändningar mot dessa argument, dessa är kontextuella-, självrespekts-, perfektions- samt parasitargumenten, mot så kallade workfare. I Sverige exemplifieras workfare av arbetsmarknadsinsatser, för att sedan undersöka vad en villkorslös basinkomst, så kallad medborgarlön, har för implikationer på dessa argument. Avslutningsvis i slutsatsen presenteras att en kombination av krav om motprestation samt en villkorslös biståndsdel måhända vore den bästa för människor som är i behov av samhällets stöd för att dessa inte skall bli stigmatiserade. Detta för att på ett adekvat sätt som möjligt vara inkluderande för individerna i ett samhälle utan att skada självrespekten eller placera dessa i kontexter som är orättvisa mot individen. 

  • 294.
    Mäkinen, Malena
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Namn och referens: Evans’ och Dickies kausalteorier2019Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    This essay is about proper names and reference. Its purpose is to compare Gareth Evans’causal theory with Imogen Dickie’s theory of fixing reference. After an introduction, I willexamine how the theories deal with a speaker’s introduction into a proper-name-usingpractise, that objects can change their names and that an object can have an unclear reference.Evans claims that a proper name gets its reference to an object via a group of producers andthen it is used in a proper-name-using practise in the community. The producers guarantee thereference of the name to the object, because they can identify the object known as NN. Agroup of consumers picks up the name-using practise from the producers, with the intention torefer to the object as NN. As long as the object is the dominant source of the speaker’sthoughts, these thoughts have the object as their referent.Dickie shows that Evans’ theory has difficulties in explaining certain examples and proposesan improved theory. She defines the principle of reference and justification which, combinedwith the mind’s need to represent, gives a framework for reference-fixing. Dickie identifiesthree groups of name-users and shows that they fix their reference in different ways. Theproducers by demonstration, the parasitic consumers to whoever the rest of the group istalking about, and the participating consumers by a careful uptake from testimony streamsthat converge on the object. As long as this uptake is governed by the object, the body ofbeliefs is about the object, thus fixing reference.I argue that Dickie’s theory is an improvement, although there are some problems that need tobe resolved.

  • 295.
    Nilsson, Jakub
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Confusion Causing Chimeras: An evaluation of the Moral Confusion argument against the creation of human-nonhuman chimeras2016Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 296.
    Nilsson, Jonas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    A Bootstrap Theory of Rationality2005In: Theoria, Vol. 71, p. 182-199Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 297.
    Nilsson, Jonas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Om logiska förutsättningar för rationell kritik2002In: Filosofisk tidskrift, no 3, p. 35-41Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 298.
    Nilsson, Jonas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    On the Idea of Logical Presuppositions of Rational Criticism2006In: Karl Popper: A Centenary Assessment: Volume II: Metaphysics and Epistemology, Ashgate, Aldershot , 2006, p. 109-117Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 299.
    Nilsson, Jonas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Rationality in inquiry: on the revisability of cognitive standards2000Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The topic of this study is to what extent standards of rational inquiry can be rationally criticized and revised. It is argued that it is rational to treat all such standards as open to criticism and revision.

    Arguments to the effect that we are fallible with regard to all standards of rational inquiry are presented. Standards cannot be ultimately justified and with certainty established either as adequate or as inescapable presuppositions. Apel's attempt to give ultimate justifications of certain moral and logical rules is examined and criticized. Special attention is given to our fallibility with regard to logical inference rules. The idea that certain logical rules cannot be put into question because any critical argument presupposes them is criticized.

    It has been claimed that there must be some basic standards which are such that they cannot be rationally evaluated and hence are rationally unrevisable. This is called "the unrevisability thesis". Related to this thesis is the normative policy according to which rationality requires that some standards be treated as unrevisable, the unrevisability policy. Two arguments that have been used to defend the unrevisability thesis and policy are examined and criticized. The conclusion is that we are not forced to accept either the thesis or the policy.

    The negation of the unrevisability policy is the revisability policy, according to which it is rational to treat all standards as open to rational criticism and revision. Objections that have been directed against the revisability policy are discussed and criticized. According to the objections, the revisability policy leads to rationality relativism. These objections are refuted, and it is argued that it is, on the contrary, rational to adopt the revisability policy and treat all standards of rational inquiry as criticizable and revisable.

    It is proposed that the rational change of standards should be viewed as a bootstrap process. General features of a bootstrap view of rational change of standards are presented, and it is argued that it is impossible to formulate a real theory of bootstrapping. Two models of standard change are presented and discussed: Laudan's reticulated model of scientific rationality and Briskman's bootstrap theory. It is claimed that in spite of defects and limitations, these models contribute to a richer understanding of bootstrapping.

    The fallibility and revisability of standards of rational inquiry have consequences for how the normativity of rationality should be understood. The book ends with an account of how the rationality of cognitive actions is related to the idea of the adequacy of standards. A distinction between absolute and standard-relative rationality is made, and it is argued that what an inquiring agent rationally ought to do coincides with what it is standard-relatively rational for him to do. It is shown that this view of rationality of inquiry is nevertheless inconsistent with rationality relativism, and that it is compatible with an objectivistic view of rationality.

  • 300.
    Nilsson, Jonas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Rationality, Substantive Belief, and the Metaphysical1998In: Nature and Lifeworld: Theoretical and Practical Metaphysics, Odense, Odense University Press , 1998Chapter in book (Other academic)
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