umu.sePublications
Change search
Refine search result
456789 301 - 350 of 436
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf
Rows per page
  • 5
  • 10
  • 20
  • 50
  • 100
  • 250
Sort
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
  • Standard (Relevance)
  • Author A-Ö
  • Author Ö-A
  • Title A-Ö
  • Title Ö-A
  • Publication type A-Ö
  • Publication type Ö-A
  • Issued (Oldest first)
  • Issued (Newest first)
  • Created (Oldest first)
  • Created (Newest first)
  • Last updated (Oldest first)
  • Last updated (Newest first)
  • Disputation date (earliest first)
  • Disputation date (latest first)
Select
The maximal number of hits you can export is 250. When you want to export more records please use the Create feeds function.
  • 301.
    Nilsson, Per
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Naturen, vetenskapen och förnuftet: upplysningens dialektik och det andra moderna2001Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The topic of this study is one specific area where the tension between instrumental rationality and value rationality becomes prominent: the question whether we have a rational responsibility for nature or not. Such a responsibility cannot be derived from instrumental reason, but it is argued that it can be derived from discourse ethics and communicative rationality.

    The study begins with an examination of Georg-Henrik von Wright's cultural criticism. It is argued that his subjectivist view of values limits reason to the realm of instrumental rationality.

    Horkheimer and Adorno's theory of instrumental reason is examined. They claim that instrumental reason, through the negative dialectics of the enlightenment, have created a vacuum with regard to values.

    Marcuse's anthropological solution to the problem of values, and his theory of an emancipatory science and technology, are examined and rejected as Utopian.

    The philosophy of Jürgen Habermas is examined, and it is shown how he solves the problem of his predecessors through the dual framework of work and interaction. His hypothesis of three knowledge- constitutive interests is analyzed, and it is concluded that a general theory of communication is needed in order to solve the problem of value rationality.

    It is shown how Habermas later theory of communicative rationality and discourse ethics overcomes the shortcomings of his earlier theory. It is argued, among other things, that his theory of communicative rationality is compatible with a correspondence theory of truth, ontological realism and epistemological fallibilism.

    Discourse ethics makes a rational discussion of values and norms possible. It is argued that it solves the problem of value rationality, but without providing a definition of the good or the right. It is shown that revisabilty is an important part of discourse ethics. This is manifested in the hypothetical status of discourse ethics, and in the revisability of the norms proposed.

    It is argued that we are in fact able to rationally propose a norm, which demands responsibility for nature within the framework of communicative rationality and discourse ethics, although such a norm must be the result of the outcome of a rational discourse and is itself, revisable.

  • 302.
    Nilsson, Peter
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Empathy and Emotions: On the Notion of Empathy as Emotional Sharing2003Book (Other academic)
  • 303.
    Nilsson, Peter
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Empathy and emotions: on the notion of empathy as emotional sharing2003Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The topic of this study is a notion of empathy that is common in philosophy and in the behavioral sciences. It is here referred to as ‘the notion of empathy as emotional sharing’, and it is characterized in terms of three ideas. If a person, S, has empathy with respect to an emotion of another person, O, then (i) S experiences an emotion that is similar to an emotion that O is currently having, (ii) S’s emotion is caused, in a particular way, by the state of O or by S’s entertaining an idea of the state or situation of O, and (iii) S experiences this emotion in a way that does not entail that S is in the corresponding emotional state. The aim of the study is to clarify this notion of empathy by clarifying these three ideas and by tracing the history of their development in philosophy.

    The study consists of two parts. Part one contains a short and selective account of the history in Western philosophy of the notion of empathy as emotional sharing. In chapter 2 Spinoza’s theory of imitation of affects and Hume’s theory of sympathy are presented. It is argued that these theories only exemplify the second idea characteristic of the notion of empathy as emotional sharing. Chapter 3 contains presentations of Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy, and Schopenhauer’s theory of compassion. These theories are shown to exemplify the second and the third idea. In chapter 4 there are presentations of Edith Stein’s description of Einfühlung, and Max Scheler’s account of empathy and fellow-feeling. It is shown that these accounts contain explicit specifications of the third idea, and it is argued that they also exemplify the second idea.

    In part two, the three ideas are further clarified and the notion of empathy as emotional sharing is defined. Chapter 5 contains a discussion of the main contemporary philosophical analyses of empathy. Three different views are distinguished: one that construes empathetic emotions as emotional states, one that construes them as imagined emotions, and one that construes them as off-line emotions. The first two views are criticized and rejected. The third is accepted and further developed in chapter 6, which contains a general analysis of the emotions. A distinction is made between two ways of experiencing an emotion, and it is argued that it is possible to have the affective experience characteristic of a particular kind of emotional state without being in that kind of state. In chapter 7, a definition of ‘empathy’ is proposed. This definition contains specifications of the three ideas characteristic of the notion of empathy as emotional sharing, and it shows both how the empathizer’s emotion resembles the emotion of the empathee, and how this emotion is caused and experienced.

  • 304.
    Nilsson, Peter
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Department of Social Work.
    Empati på lösa grunder: sommarfilosofi2007In: Västerbottens-Kuriren, ISSN 1104-0246, no 2007-06-29, p. 26-Article in journal (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 305.
    Nilsson, Peter
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Hume and Smith on Sympathy2005In: Philosophical Aspects on Emotions, Thales, Stockholm , 2005, p. 141-159Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 306.
    Nordlander, Ivar
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    From Ockhamism to Branching Modal Realism with Five-Dimensional Objects: A study on future contingents and the metaphysics of historical modality2016Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 307.
    Nordlund, Christer
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Historical Studies.
    Endocrinology and expectations in 1930s America: Louis Berman's ideas on new creations in human beings2007In: British Journal for the History of Science, ISSN 0007-0874, E-ISSN 1474-001X, Vol. 40, no 144:1, p. 83-104Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    in the first half of the twentieth century, hormones took pride of place as life's master molecules and the endocrinologist took precedence over the geneticist as the scientist offering the means to control life. But, as with molecular genetics and biotechnology today, the status of endocrinology was not based solely on contemporary scientific and medical practices. To a high degree it was also reliant on expectations or visions of what endocrinologists would soon be able to do. Inspired by the approach of social studies of techno-scientific expectations, the ann of this article is to explore some of the great expectations connected to the development of endocrinology in the 1930s. The analysis is based on popular books written by the American physician and endocrinologist Louis Berman. The paper argues that Berman thought not only that it was perfectly possible to understand human nature through hormone analysis but that endocrinologists would be able to control, design and 'improve' humans by using hormone replacement therapy. Furthermore, in contrast to most of the eugenics of his time, Berman suggested that the whole population of the world should be improved. As a political activist he wanted to contribute to the development of new human beings, 'ideal normal persons', thereby reaching an 'ideal society'. That HRT could involve risks was something that he seems not to have taken into account.

  • 308.
    Nowak, Ethan
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Complex demonstratives, hidden arguments, and presupposition2019In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Standard semantic theories predict that non-deictic readings for complex demonstratives should be much more widely available than they in fact are. If such readings are the result of a lexical ambiguity, as Kaplan (in: Almog, Perry, Wettstein (eds) Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1977) and others suggest, we should expect them to be available wherever a definite description can be used. The same prediction follows from ‘hidden argument’ theories like the ones described by King (Complex Demonstratives: a Quantificational Account, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2001) and Elbourne (Situations and Individuals, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2005). Wolter (That’s That; the Semantics and Pragmatics of Demonstrative Noun Phrases. Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Santa Cruz, 2006), however, has shown that complex demonstratives admit non-deictic interpretations only when a precise set of structural constrains are met. In this paper, I argue that Wolter’s results, properly understood, upend the philosophical status quo. They fatally undermine the ambiguity theory and demand a fundamental rethinking of the hidden argument approach.

  • 309.
    Odenstedt, Anders
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Cognition and cultural context: An inquiry into Gadamer's theory of context-dependence2009Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This study deals with the problem of the dependence of thought on its historical context, as discussed by the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002).

    Gadamer argues that historical contexts are cognitively homogeneous in an unreflected way, and that this state of affairs typically involves basic presuppositions (Vorurteile) that underlie seemingly divergent views in such a context. However, in opposition to this claim, it may be argued that historical contexts contain a shared conceptual framework, or a preoccupation with certain problems, but that they may nevertheless be heterogeneous in terms of presuppositions as such. But Gadamer holds that the cognitive heterogeneity of a historical context is easily overrated by individuals situated in it insofar as shared presuppositions are not questioned or even detected.

    A central issue of this study is the extent to which unreflected context-dependence persists in the modern era. Gadamer, while not denying that the very notion of this dependence requires that it is at least partly reflected, argues that the scope of this reflection has been overestimated, notably by philosophers in the Enlightenment tradition. Gadamer refers to Karl Popper and Jürgen Habermas as examples of this overestimation. According to Gadamer, the current awareness of context-dependence and of, e.g., the corresponding problem of anachronism in historical study, surpasses that of previous epochs, but this difference is nevertheless a matter of degree rather than kind.

    In what sense is it correct to say that the very notion of unreflected context-dependence requires reflection, and that it therefore casts doubt on the claims made by Gadamer himself? According to a rather frequent objection to Gadamer, awareness of context-dependence occurs in a situation in which this dependence is reduced. Conversely, an individual subject to unreflected context-dependence would not be able to recognise his or her predicament in this respect. In this study, this objection is discussed in connection with general problems of interpretation in cultural and historical studies.

  • 310.
    Odenstedt, Anders
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics. Filosofi.
    Cognition and Cultural Context: An Inquiry into Gadamer's Theory of Context-Dependence2001Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This study deals with the problem of the context-dependence of thought, as dealt with by the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002). Gadamer stresses what he sees as the difficulty of bringing to awareness and criticising influences which preserve such dependence, and the role of traditions (Überlieferungen) in this regard. This study seeks to distinguish between different ways in which Gadamer's claims in this respect might be understood and to assess them.

    Gadamer affirms the cohesion of historical contexts, thereby arguing that it typically involves basic presuppositions (Vorurteile) that underlie seemingly divergent views in a way which is not reflected on by individuals sharing such a context. However, in opposition to this claim, it may be argued that contexts contain a shared conceptual framework, or a preoccupation with certain problems, but that they may nevertheless be heterogeneous in terms of presuppositions as such. But Gadamer holds that the cognitive heterogeneity of contexts is easily overrated insofar as common presuppositions are not questioned or even detected.

    A central issue of this study is the extent to which unreflected context-dependence persists in the modern era. Gadamer, while not denying that the very notion of context-dependence requires that it is at least partly reflected, argues that the scope of this reflection has been overestimated, notably by philosophers in the Enlightenment tradition; he refers to Karl Popper and Jürgen Habermas as examples of this overestimation. According to Gadamer, the current awareness of context-dependence and of, e.g., the corresponding problem of anachronism in historical study, surpasses that of previous epochs, but this difference is nevertheless a matter of degree rather than kind.

    In what sense is it correct to say that the very notion of unreflected context-dependence requires reflection, and that it therefore casts doubt on the claims made by Gadamer himself? According to a rather frequent objection to Gadamer, awareness of context-dependence occurs in a situation in which this dependence is reduced. Conversely, an individual subject to unreflected context-dependence would not be able to recognise his or her predicament in this respect. In this study, this objection is discussed in connection with general problems of interpretation in cultural and historical studies.

  • 311.
    Odenstedt, Anders
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies. Filosofi.
    Hegel and Gadamer on Bildung2008In: The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 46, no 4, p. 559-580Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Hegel argues that Bildung (cultivation or education) involves an ability to reflect on one’s habitual beliefs in a detached, uncommitted way. According to Hegel, the educated (gebildete) individual is able to consider a manifold of standpoints on a given issue through awareness of the historical and cultural variability of beliefs. Hans-Georg Gadamer invokes Hegel’s account of Bildung in arguing that historical study permits current presuppositions (Vorurteile) to become reflected through the awareness of cognitive plurality and change that such study brings about. The paper mainly tries to show three things: (i) that Hegel is a source of inspiration for Gadamer in this regard, but that there are also important differences between their accounts of Bildung; (ii) that these accounts are not unambiguous; and (iii) that Gadamer, in particular, makes somewhat elusive claims on the power of Bildung.

  • 312.
    Persson, Erik
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Citizens of Mars Ltd.2015In: Human governance beyond earth: implications for freedom / [ed] Charles S. Cockell, Springer, 2015, p. 121-137Chapter in book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    When the time comes to decide how to govern an extraterrestrial settlement there will be many alternatives to chose from. We will have the opportunity to try new and so far untested theories, but there are also some old forms of government that might be tempting to try again. We might for instance let the company whose activities on the world are the reason for the establishment govern the settlement. This has been tried before on our own planet both because it was seen as convenient and as an incentive for colonisation. In this chapter I will ask what this solution would mean for the civil liberty of the settlers. To answer the question I will look at some historical analogues and have a philosophical discussion. The conclusion is that a settlement governed by a body whose sole reason for existence is to make money for the owners, that is led by a board that answers only to the owners and not to the people, that functions as both government and sole employer, and that has the unlimited power over the life support systems necessary for the survival of the settlers will not be a good basis for civil liberties.

  • 313.
    Persson, Erik
    Lunds Universitet.
    Philosophical aspects of astrobiology2013In: The History and Philosophy of Astrobiology / [ed] David Dunér, Joel Pathermore, Erik Persson, Gustav Holmberg, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2013, p. 29-48Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 314.
    Persson, Erik
    Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet, Alnarp .
    Sokratisk dialog som pedagogisk metod2015In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 36, no 2, p. 13-19Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 315.
    Persson, Erik
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    What are the core ideas behind the Precautionary Principle?2016In: Science of the Total Environment, ISSN 0048-9697, E-ISSN 1879-1026, Vol. 557-558, p. 134-141Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The Precautionary Principle is both celebrated and criticized. It has become an important principle for decision making, but it is also subject to criticism. One problem that is often pointed out with the principle is that is not clear what it actually says and how to use it. I have taken on this problem by performing an analysis of some of the most influential formulations of the principle in an attempt to identify the core ideas behind it, with the purpose of producing a formulation of the principle that is clear and practically applicable.

    It was found that what is called the Precautionary Principle is not a principle that tells us what do to achieve extra precaution or how to handle situations when extra precaution is called for. Instead, it was found to be a list of circumstances that each justify extra precaution. An analysis of some of the most common and influential formulations of the Precautionary Principle identified four such circumstances: (1) When we deal with important values that tend to be systematically downplayed by traditional decision methods – such as human health and the environment. (2) When we suspect that the decision might lead to irreversible and severe consequences and the values at stake are also irreplaceable, (3) When timing is at least as important as being right. (4) When it is more important to avoid false negatives than false positives.

    This interpretation of the Precautionary Principle does not say anything about what kind of actions to take when extra precaution is called for, but it does provide a clear and practically useful list of circumstances that call for extra precaution and that is not subject to the most common objections to the Precautionary Principle.

  • 316.
    Persson, Erik
    Lunds universitet.
    What does it take to establish that a world is uninhabited prior to exploitation?: A question of ethics as well as science2014In: Challenges, ISSN 2078-1547, E-ISSN 2078-1547, Vol. 5, no 2, p. 224-238Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    If we find life on another world, it will be an extremely important discovery and we will have to take great care not to do anything that might endanger that life. If the life we find is sentient we will have moral obligations to that life. Whether it is sentient or not, we have a duty to ourselves to preserve it as a study object, and also because it would be commonly seen as valuable in its own right. In addition to this we would also have a duty to our fellow humans and other earthly life forms not to expose them to danger by advertently or inadvertently exposing them to potentially harmful space organisms. When space exploration turns into exploitation it will therefore be important to be able to show that a world that is up for exploitation is uninhabited before the exploitation starts. Showing that a world is uninhabited is, however, a different kind of task than showing that it is inhabited. The latter task can be accomplished through one positive finding but it is not clear how to go about the former task. In this paper I suggest that it is a gradual process asymptotically approaching certainty rather than a discovery in the traditional sense of the word. It has to be handled in two steps. The first is to connect degree of certainty with research setup. The second is to decide how certain we need to be. The first step is about the number, diversity and quality of observations. The second step is a decision we have to make based on the purpose of the investigation. The purpose and therefore the degree of certainty needed to establish that a world is uninhabited will be different for a world that is up for exploitation than for a world that is not. In the latter case it is only a matter of epistemic values. In the former case also ethical values have to be considered.

  • 317.
    Persson, Marcus
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Mobilt arbetssätt inom sjukvården och patientens personliga integritet: Klarar patientens integritet att journalen görs tillgänglig för sjukvården mobilt?2014Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    In the light of new technology health care is now given the opportunity to form a more mobile way of working that would bring about potential gains in terms of efficiency and quality. On the other hand, a more mobile health care also requires a more generous handling of personal information, something that may raise issues in terms of privacy.

     

    This study shows that the privacy of the patient requires two things: (i) that the personal information of the patient is handled in a way that generates her an overall positive expected utility and that (ii) the negative expected utility that each risk of an information leakage causes is offset by the expected utility it also makes possible.

     

    The first requirement (i) is shown, in comparison with today’s way of working, to be met due to the potential gains in efficiency and quality in combination with no increase in the probability of informational leakage or negative effects of such a leakage. The second requirement (ii) was also considered met since no separate risks of information leakage could be identified that was not offset by the gains it made possible in terms of expected utility.

  • 318.
    Petersson, Filip
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Är det rationellt för parterna bakom slöjan att välja maximinprincipen?: En kritisk granskning av Harsanyis argument mot Rawls i originalpositionen.2015Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 319.
    Pettersson, Anders
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of culture and media studies.
    A Revisionary View of Texts, Textual Meaning, and Fictional Characters2017In: Organon F, ISSN 1335-0668, Vol. 24, no 3, p. 366-383Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Using ideas from John Searle, Roy Harris, Michael Reddy, and Nelson Goodman, I argue that texts, such as they are commonly conceived, lack brute existence. The common idea of texts is a conceptual construction which is useful in practical everyday contexts but not in serious theorizing, where it creates illusions and contradictions. One of these illusions is the idea of an objective textual" meaning, a meaning which is "in the text": what we actually have in the way of textual meaning are the ideas of various persons authors, readers, and commentators - about the meaning of the text. When applied to fictional characters, this way of viewing things explains why it makes sense to regard fictional characters as being created and as lacking brute existence.

  • 320.
    Pettersson, Anders
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of culture and media studies.
    Can texts be read?: the anatomy of a paradox2015In: Organon F, ISSN 1335-0668, Vol. 22, p. 118-132Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to standard philosophical analyses of the ontology of texts, texts are abstract objects. However, that analysis has the paradoxical consequence that texts cannot be read: one cannot read something that lacks material existence. The essay resolves the paradox by introducing a distinction between the ordinary conception of a text-the supposed object of the philosophical analysis of the concept of a text-and the philosophical conception of a text, the end-product of that analysis. It is demonstrated by means of examples that a text as ordinarily conceived is at once physical and immaterial (and so can certainly be read, because of its physical side), and at once one and many, while the philosopher, uninterested in the actual, obviously illogical character of the ordinary conception of a text, turns the text into one abstract object by fiat-an object which cannot, of course, be read. It is argued that the ordinary concept of a text is handy in practical contexts precisely because it ignores troublesome distinctions, while the philosophical concept of a text serves no genuine purpose, since the theoretical understanding of verbal communication requires a partly different intellectual framework

  • 321.
    Pettersson, Anders
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of culture and media studies.
    Language, Truth, and Literature: A Defence of Literary Humanism2016In: EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, ISSN 0966-8373, Vol. 24, no 3, p. 725-729Article, book review (Other academic)
  • 322.
    Praesto, John
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Principles of Beneficence: Moral and practical considerations2015Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 323.
    Quarfood, Marcel
    Stockholm University.
    A Kantian Perspective on Michael Thompson’s Logic of Life2018In: Natur und Freiheit: Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses / [ed] Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing, David Wagner, Walter de Gruyter, 2018, p. 3813-3820Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 324.
    Raman Sundström, Manya
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology.
    Öhman, Lars-Daniel
    Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Umeå Mathematics Education Research Centre (UMERC). Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Department of Mathematics and Mathematical Statistics.
    Beauty as fit: A metaphor in mathematics?2013In: Research in Mathematics Education, Vol. 15, no 2, p. 199-200Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Beauty, which plays a central role in the practice of mathematics, is almost absent in discussions of school mathematics. This is problematic, because students will decide whether or not to continue their studies inmathematics without having an accurate picture of what the subject is about. In order to have a discussion about how to introduce beauty into the school mathematicscurriculum, we need to have a clear idea about what beauty means. That is the aim ofthis study, with a focus on characterising beauty in mathematical proof.

  • 325.
    Raman-Sundström, Manya
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Department of Science and Mathematics Education.
    Öhman, Lars-Daniel
    Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Department of Mathematics and Mathematical Statistics.
    Mathematical fit: a case study2018In: Philosophia mathematica, ISSN 0031-8019, E-ISSN 1744-6406, Vol. 26, no 2, p. 184-210Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Mathematicians routinely pass judgments on mathematical proofs. A proof might be elegant, cumbersome, beautiful, or awkward. Perhaps the highest praise is that a proof is right, that is that the proof fits the theoremin an optimal way. It is also common to judge that a proof fits better than another, or that a proof does not fit a theorem at all. This paper attempts to clarify the notion of mathematical fit. We suggest six criteria that distinguish proofs as being more or less fitting, and provide examples from several different mathematical fields.

    The full text will be freely available from 2020-06-01 00:00
  • 326.
    Raman-Sundström, Manya
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Umeå Mathematics Education Research Centre (UMERC).
    Öhman, Lars-Daniel
    Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Department of Mathematics and Mathematical Statistics.
    Sinclair, Nathalie
    Faculty of Education, Simon Fraser University, CANADA.
    The Nature and Experience of Mathematical Beauty2016In: Journal of Humanistic Mathematics, ISSN 2159-8118, E-ISSN 2159-8118, Vol. 6, no 1, p. 3-7Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 327.
    Rasmusson, Arne
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Neuroethics as a Brain-Based Philosophy of Life: The Case of Michael S. Gazzaniga2009In: Neuroethics, ISSN 1874-5490, E-ISSN 1874-5504, ISSN 1874-5504 (online), Vol. 2, no 1, p. 3-11Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Michael S. Gazzaniga, a pioneer and world leader in cognitive neuroscience, has made an initial attempt to develop neuroethics into a brain-based philosophy of life that he hopes will replace the irrational religious and political belief-systems that still partly govern modern societies. This article critically examines Gazzaniga’s proposal and shows that his actual moral arguments have little to do with neuroscience. Instead, they are based on unexamined political, cultural and moral conceptions, narratives and values. A more promising way of interpreting the belief-forming system of the brain is to say that we cannot avoid thinking in terms of wider frameworks and narratives that are socially embedded and historically developed; consequently, any moral discussion has to be in terms of these frameworks and narratives.

  • 328.
    Redström, Johan
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Umeå Institute of Design.
    Wiltse, Heather
    Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Umeå Institute of Design.
    Changing things: the future of objects in a digital world2018Book (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many of the things we now live with do not take a purely physical form. Objects such as smart phones, laptops and wearable fitness trackers are different from our things of the past. These new digital forms are networked, dynamic and contextually configured. They can be changeable and unpredictable, even inscrutable when it comes to understanding what they actually do and whom they really serve.

    In this compelling new volume, Johan Redstrom and Heather Wiltse address critical questions that have assumed a fresh urgency in the context of these rapidly-developing forms. Drawing on critical traditions from a range of disciplines that have been used to understand the nature of things, they develop a new vocabulary and a theoretical approach that allows us to account for and address the multi-faceted, dynamic, constantly evolving forms and functions of contemporary things. In doing so, the book prototypes a new design discourse around everyday things, and describes them as fluid assemblages.

    Redstrom and Wiltse explore how a new theoretical framework could enable a richer understanding of things as fluid and networked, with a case study of the evolution of music players culminating in an in-depth discussion of Spotify. Other contemporary 'things' touched on in their analysis include smart phones and watches, as well as digital platforms and applications such as Google, Facebook and Twitter.

  • 329.
    Reinick, Finn-Lysander
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Hobbes och Absolutismen2015Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    Abstract

     

     

    While Thomas Hobbes´ theory of absolutism is in general considered to be one of the most influential theories of political philosophy, it at the same time seems to be widely misunderstood. Hobbes´ most famous work on absolutism Leviathan, is frequently falsely accused of promoting the ideas of despotism, tyranny and similar. The purpose of this essay is not only, to prove otherwise by showing that although some passages can be found in his works, that can be interpreted as pointing to the direction of the above mentioned ideas (this is nonetheless not what Hobbes´ theory really is about), but to show, that there are more arguments of greater weight supporting his thesis than there are arguments to suggest otherwise. This is done by comparing Hobbes´ thesis and arguments for and against it with the theories of his fellow social contract theorists (John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau) and their advantages and disadvantages. The essay then is not pleased with just proving there to be more arguments for Hobbes´ absolutism than against it, but goes so far, as to suggest that it could be favored over Locke´s and Rousseau´s theories by meeting a number of conditions.

  • 330.
    Robles, Renard Tatsuya
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Humility in Interpersonal Relationships2019Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    This paper aims to establish a conception of humility which can be of use in nurturing interpersonal relationships of intrinsic value. The conception of humility asserted herein is a doxastic one that demands that an individual make an as-accurate-as-possible estimation of her knowledge, merits, and accomplishments in relation to others, in relation to the totality of knowledge, merits, and accomplishments, both actual and possible, of humankind, and in relation to an ideal. This paper asserts that humility consists of both a cognitive and an attitudinal component. The necessary cognitive component is an acknowledgment of the presence of great unknowable mysteries at play in every situation and every interaction between persons, which is further specified as the acknowledgment of the unknowability of the inner lives and consciousnesses of others. It is asserted that the attitudinal component of humility must result from the cognitive component and consists in keeping this acknowledgment consciously in mind in interactions in personal relationships and adopting actions and responses to others which are congruent with this acknowledgement. The conception of humility advocated in this paper takes points from the traditional Jewish conception of humility as presented by Daniel M. Nelson, a later account as formulated by the Jewish philosopher Martin Buber as well the more recent accounts of humility asserted by André Comte-Sponville, Julia Driver, G. Alex Sinha, J.L.A Garcia and Aaron Ben-Ze’ev.

  • 331.
    Romar, Daniel
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    On the moral agency for high frequency trading systems and their role in distributed morality2015Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 332.
    Rosenkvist, Johan
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Utilitarism och jämlikhet2019Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    One of the most common objections to classic utilitarianism is that it does not take equality into account, this paper aims to defend utilitarianism against this specific criticism. Classic utilitarianism is based on the notion that one should always choose the option that leads to the greatest utility, where utility is defined as positive mental states. If the overall goal is to always maximize the overall utility, then, according to utilitarianism, one should accept inequality if it leads to an increase in utility, and consequently a conflict with the view of equality as intrinsically valuable can arise. The defense is based on two theses, (1) that utilitarianism often leads to a relatively equal distribution and (2) that there are good arguments for choosing the maximization of utility in cases where utilitarianism and equality are incompatible. The first thesis is based mainly on the fact that the utility of all individuals is equally important and that the utility of tangible assets increases the less one has, which is a strong utilitarian argument for the redistribution of resources. Furthermore, large inequalities in themselves create problems, such as crime and reduced affinity, which reduces the overall utility. The second thesis is based on the assumption that some inequality can increase the overall utility and thus be desirable, and that the consequences of having equality as a superior goal can become absurd and lead to situations that everyone loses on.

  • 333.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    At the centre of what?: a critical note on the centrism-terminology in environmental ethics2013In: Environmental Values, ISSN 0963-2719, E-ISSN 1752-7015, Vol. 22, no 5, p. 627-645Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    The distinction between anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric theories, together with the more fine-grained distinction between anthropocentrism, biocentrism and ecocentrism, are probably two of the most frequently occurring distinctions in the environmental ethics literature. In this essay I draw attention to some problematic aspects of the terminology used to draw these distinctions: the ‘centrism-terminology’. I argue that this terminology is ambiguous and misleading, and therefore confusing. Furthermore, depending on which interpretation it is given, it is also either asymmetric and non-inclusive, or superfluous. Although I find it unlikely that the centrism-terminology will be abandoned, I end the essay by providing a suggestion for an alternative way to categorise theories in environmental ethics.

  • 334.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Environmental pragmatism and environmental philosophy: a bad marriage!2010In: Environmental Ethics, ISSN 0163-4275, E-ISSN 2153-7895, Vol. 32, no 4, p. 405-415Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Environmental pragmatists have presented environmental pragmatism as a new philosophical position, arguing that theoretical debates in environmental philosophy are hindering the ability of the environmental movement to forge agreement on basic policy imperatives. Hence, they aim to lead environmental philosophers away from such theoretical debates, and toward more practical—and pragmatically motivated—ones. However, a position with such an aim is not a proper philosophical position at all, given that philosophy (among other things) is an effort to get clear on the problems that puzzle us.

  • 335.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Miljöetikens förvirra(n)de distinktioner2007Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Sedan miljöetikens framväxt på 70-talet har den dragits med tre särskilt seglivade – men i sammanhanget ofta både förvirrade och förvirrande – distinktioner. Den första är distinktionen mellan intrinsikalt och instrumentellt värde (hos naturen eller några av dess icke-mänskliga/icke-kännande komponenter). Den andra är distinktionen mellan individualistiska och holistiska teorier i miljöetik. Och den tredje, som vanligtvis förstås i termer av de två första, är distinktionen mellan antropocentrisk, biocentrisk och ekocentrisk miljöetik. Att dessa distinktioner både är relevanta och applicerbara på så gott som alla miljöetiska teorier är något som tas för givet inte bara av de flesta miljöetiker själva, utan ofta även av dem som kritiserar miljöetiken (som disciplin, eller idén att naturen eller några av dess icke-mänskliga/icke-kännande komponenter har direkt moralisk status). Detta faktum har fått såväl den interna miljöetiska debatten som den externa kritiken av densamma att frekvent skjuta bredvid målet, dvs. missa de verkligt intressanta frågorna. I det här föredraget anför jag exempel för att visa detta och argumenterar för att om vi överger den slentrianmässiga tillämpningen av dessa tre distinktioner så ökar förutsättningarna för att se, och på ett fruktbart sätt undersöka, miljöetikens verkliga problem och möjligheter.

  • 336.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    On the critique of “The environmental ethical project”: Why this critique has failed2010In: The Philosophy of the Environment - Programme and Abstracts, 2010, p. 117-118Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Ever since environmental ethics began to emerge as an academic discipline in the early 70’s, critical voices have been raised against what by many has been considered its project, namely to establish the direct moral importance of some non-human, non-sentient, non-conscious natural entities. We can distinguish between two main lines of this critique; one that is practical, or pragmatic (claiming that there are pragmatic reasons – given certain practical, “environmentalist”, goals – to avoid this project), and one that is theoretical. Here I am interested in the latter, theoretical, critique. This critique has appeared in many different forms, but all versions that I know of suffer from one of three flaws: (1) They apply only to some versions (not the most plausible ones) of the environmental ethical project (or they do not apply to any actual version of it); (2) they are not critiques against this project specifically, but against any normative ethical view (i.e. any view according to which there are moral reasons to do (or refrain from doing) this or that); (3) they simply beg the question against those who defend some version of this project. Among the critiques that suffer from (1) we find, e.g., allegations of misanthropy and “ecofascism” (or more generally, various critiques according to which the environmental ethical project has unacceptable normative implications). Among those that suffer from (2) we find, e.g., the critiques according to which the very notion of intrinsic value is untenable and ought to be abandoned. And among those that suffer from (3) we find, e.g., the critique according to which the central notion of moral importance is not intrinsic value, but moral standing (which is supposed to pertain only to sentient creatures). I will give some examples of critiques that suffer from (1) and (2), and explain why they do so, but I will focus on the critiques that suffer from (3). Doing so will reveal what a critique of the environmental ethical project that escapes (1), (2) and (3) would have to show, and what implications it would have. My conclusion is that it is very doubtful that a successful critique of this project can be formulated, and that each environmental ethical theory, therefore, should be judged on its own merits.

  • 337.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    On the Critique of "The Environmental Ethics Project": Why this Critique has Failed2014In: Issues in Human Relations and Environmental Philosophy / [ed] Sophia Boudouri & Kostas Kalimtzis, Athens: Ionia Publications, 2014, p. 303-319Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    Ever since environmental ethics began to emerge as an academic discipline in the early 70’s, critical voices have been raised against what by many has been considered its project, namely to establish the direct moral importance of some non-human, non-sentient, non-conscious natural entities. We can distinguish between two main lines of this critique; one that is practical, or pragmatic (claiming that there are pragmatic reasons – given certain practical, “environmentalist” goals – to avoid this project), and one that is theoretical. Here I am interested in the latter, theoretical critique. This critique has appeared in many different forms, but all versions that I know of suffer from one of three flaws: (1) They apply only to some versions (not the most plausible ones) of the environmental ethics project (or they do not apply to any actual version of it); (2) they are not critiques against this project specifically, but against any normative ethical view (i.e. any view according to which there are moral reasons to do (or refrain from doing) this or that); (3) they simply beg the question against those who defend some version of this project. Among the critiques that suffer from (1) we find, e.g., allegations of misanthropy and “ecofascism” (or more generally, various critiques according to which the environmental ethics project has unacceptable normative implications). Among those that suffer from (2) we find, e.g., the critiques according to which the very notion of intrinsic value is untenable and ought to be abandoned. And among those that suffer from (3) we find, e.g., the critique according to which the central notion of moral importance is not intrinsic value, but moral standing (which is supposed to pertain only to sentient creatures). I give examples of each of these critiques and explain why they fail. My conclusion is that it is very doubtful that a successful critique of the environmental ethics project can be formulated, and that each environmental ethical theory, therefore, should be judged on its own merits.

  • 338.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    On the demarcation problem and the possibility of environmental ethics: a refutation of "A refutation of environmental ethics"2010In: Environmental Ethics, ISSN 0163-4275, E-ISSN 2153-7895, Vol. 32, no 3, p. 247-265Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to a popular critique of environmental ethics, the view that nature has intrinsic value faces an insurmountable demarcation problem. This critique was delivered in a particularly forceful manner two decades ago by Janna Thompson in her paper “A Refutation of Environmental Ethics.” However, the demarcation problem, albeit a real problem, is not insurmountable. Thompson’s argument draws on the claim that the possibility of environmental ethics depends on the possibility that nature can be demarcated with respect to some allegedly morally significant property or set of properties. Her own view of nature’s moral significance is equally dependent on that possibility. Therefore, if the demarcation problem were insurmountable, that would imply a refutation of her own view on nature’s moral significance as well.

  • 339.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    On the Possibility of Evidence for Intrinsic Value in Nature2013In: Ethics and the Environment, ISSN 1085-6633, E-ISSN 1535-5306, Vol. 18, no 2, p. 101-114Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    One of the most common projects among environmental ethicists is to develop theories according to which some non-human natural entities possess intrinsic value. However, this project has not been unchallenged. From time to time we have seen efforts to refute it, the claim being that not only are the particular theories suggested flawed, but the very idea of intrinsic value in nature—at least in some allegedly important sense of “intrinsic value”—is in principle indefensible. One of the latest contributions to this line of efforts was recently provided by Toby Svoboda, whose target is mind-independent intrinsic value of non-human entities. Svoboda elegantly argues that there is no evidence for the existence of such value in non-humans, and that hence the position that some non-humans have such value is unjustified. In this paper I aim to show that Svoboda’s argument, elegant as it is, nevertheless is flawed.

  • 340.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Partisk vs. opartisk moral2015In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 36, no 3, p. 35-43Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 341.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Reasons and Values in Environmental Ethics2010In: Environmental Values, ISSN 0963-2719, E-ISSN 1752-7015, Vol. 19, no 4, p. 517-535Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Ever since environmental ethics (EE) began to take form as an academic discipline in the early 1970s, the notion of intrinsic value has occupied a prominent position within the field. Recently, however, various types of critique have emerged within EE against invoking this notion. Contrary to these critiques, I argue that appeals to intrinsic value are not problematic, given the reason-implying sense of ‘intrinsic value’ that is most relevant to EE. I further argue that also those who criticise ‘intrinsic-value-talk’ in EE actually need this reason-implying concept of intrinsic value. However, once we realise that this is the sense of ‘intrinsic value’ that is most relevant to EE, it also becomes clear that it is the concept of a reason, rather than that of intrinsic value, that is most important to EE.

  • 342.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Resolving the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem2013In: Swedish Congress of Philosophy 2013 = Filosofidagarna : 14-16 june, 2013: Abstracts, Stockholm: Kungl. tekniska högskolan , 2013, p. 177-178Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The wrong kind of reason problem (WKRP) has been presented as a problem for T. M. Scanlon’s ‘buck-passing account of value’ (BPA) (e.g. Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2004:393). According to this account, ‘being good, or valuable, is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons’ (Scanlon 1998:97). Now, WKRP arises because some objects which clearly lack value yet seem to have properties that constitute such reasons. If there are such objects, BPA can be upheld only if it can be shown that in these cases the reasons are of the wrong kind, in the sense that the properties which constitute them do not give rise to corresponding values of the objects which possess them. Hence, the challenge that WKRP poses for buck-passers is commonly understood as the challenge of convincingly explaining the difference between reasons of the wrong kind and reasons of the right kind. There have been several proposals for solution to WKRP, but all of them have been exposed to objections (see e.g. Lang, 2008; Olson, 2009; Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2011:33–45; Samuelsson, forthcoming). My suggestion for a solution to this problem is quite simple and straightforward, and it proceeds from recognizing an ambiguity in the expression ‘properties constituting (or providing) reasons’. The notion of a reason relevant to BPA is that of a normative reason, i.e. a fact that counts in favour of some response. Now, BPA is not formulated in terms of facts, but in terms of properties constituting reasons. However, properties are not themselves reasons, and there are different ways in which the property of an object can feature in a fact taken to provide a reason. My suggestion is that only one of these ways is relevant to whether the object in question possesses value. Thus, the solution to WKRP lies in understanding BPA in terms of facts, and getting the place of properties in these facts right. If BPA is adequately formulated in this way, it seems that WKRP does not arise in the first place – the problem will resolve. This solution that I propose bears similarities to a kind of solution to WKRP most thoroughly articulated by Stratton-Lake (2005), and can be seen as a further development and defence of that kind of solution.

  • 343.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Sustainable development and the value of future populations: Reviving the average view2018In: The 11th International Conference on Applied Ethics - Center for Applied Philosophy & Ethics - Kyoto University, Japan 15th-16th December 2018: Abstracts, Kyoto, 2018Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Philosophical investigations that explicitly concern sustainable development have largely been conducted separately from work within population ethics, and vice versa. In this paper I suggest that taking the idea of sustainable development (as expressed in the Brundtland report) seriously can provide important insights for population ethics, i.e. for the question of how to account for the value of future populations. I argue that a common sense intuition in line with the sustainability idea points in the direction of the so called average view within population ethics, a view that nowadays has rather few adherents and is generally considered deeply problematic for several reasons. This common sense intuition can be roughly expressed as follows: It is good if people in the future live good lives, irrespective of who they are and how many they are, and it is bad if they live bad lives. A way of capturing this thought is via the claim that it is better the higher the average well-being of these people is, which is the core idea of the average view. This view can be contrasted with the major alternative within population ethics, the total view, according to which it is better the higher the total well-being in the world is. This latter view seems to rhyme badly with the sustainability idea: at least prima facie it seems to speak in favour of increasing the human population, whereas sustainability is usually taken to point in the opposite direction. I show how a version of the average view based on the common sense intuition expressed above, and informed by philosophical theorizing about sustainability, can be construed so as to avoid the problems usually taken to be devastating for it.

  • 344.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    The Moral Status of Nature: Reasons to Care for the Natural World2009Book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The subject-matter of this essay is the moral status of nature. This subject is dealt with in terms of normative reasons. The main question is if there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in addition to the numerous indirect normative reasons that there are for doing so. Roughly, if there is some such reason, and that reason applies to any moral agent, then nature has direct moral status as I use the phrase. I develop the notions of direct normative reason and direct moral status in detail and identify and discuss the two main types of theory according to which nature has direct moral status: analogy-based nature-considerism (AN) and non-analogy-based nature-considerism (NN). I argue for the plausibility of a particular version of the latter, but against the plausibility of any version of the former.

    The theory that is representative of AN claims that nature has direct moral status in virtue of possessing interests. Proponents of this theory fail to show (i) that nature has interests of the kind that they reasonably want to ascribe to it, and (ii) that interests of this kind are morally significant. In contrast to AN, NN comes in a variety of different forms. I elaborate a version of NN according to which there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in virtue of (i) its unique complexity, and (ii) its indispensability (to all moral agents). I argue that even if these reasons should turn out not to apply to any moral agent, they are still genuine direct normative reasons: there is nothing irrational or misdirected about them.

    Finally, I show how the question of whether there are direct normative reasons to care for nature is relevant to private and political decision-making concerning nature. This is exemplified with a case from the Swedish mountain region.

  • 345.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    The moral status of nature: reasons to care for the natural world2008Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The subject-matter of this essay is the moral status of nature. This subject is dealt with in terms of normative reasons. The main question is if there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in addition to the numerous indirect normative reasons that there are for doing so. Roughly, if there is some such reason, and that reason applies to any moral agent, then nature has direct moral status as I use the phrase. I develop the notions of direct normative reason and direct moral status in detail and identify and discuss the two main types of theory according to which nature has direct moral status: analogy-based nature-considerism (AN) and non-analogy-based nature-considerism (NN). I argue for the plausibility of a particular version of the latter, but against the plausibility of any version of the former.

    The theory that is representative of AN claims that nature has direct moral status in virtue of possessing interests. Proponents of this theory fail to show (i) that nature has interests of the kind that they reasonably want to ascribe to it, and (ii) that interests of this kind are morally significant. In contrast to AN, NN comes in a variety of different forms. I elaborate a version of NN according to which there are direct normative reasons to care for nature in virtue of (i) its unique complexity, and (ii) its indispensability (to all moral agents). I argue that even if these reasons should turn out not to apply to any moral agent, they are still genuine direct normative reasons: there is nothing irrational or misdirected about them.

    Finally, I show how the question of whether there are direct normative reasons to care for nature is relevant to private and political decision-making concerning nature. This is exemplified with a case from the Swedish mountain region.

  • 346.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    The right version of the right kind of solution to the wrong kind of reason problem2011In: Seventh European Congress of Analytic Philosophy: Program and Abstract, 2011Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In a recent article – ‘The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’ – Gerald Lang suggests a solution to the so called ‘wrong kind of reason problem’ (the WKR problem) for T. M. Scanlon’s buck-passing account of value. In two separate replies to Lang, Jonas Olson and John Brunero, respectively, point out serious problems with Lang’s suggestion, and at least Olson concludes that the kind of solution that Lang opts for is the wrong kind of solution to the WKR problem. I argue that while both Olson and Brunero have indeed identified considerable flaws in Lang’s particular suggestion for solution to the WKR problem, they have not provided sufficient grounds for dismissing the kind of solution that Lang opts for. I show how a version of this kind ofsolution can be formulated so as to avoid both Olson’s and Brunero’s objections.

  • 347.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    The Right Version of 'the Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem'2013In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 25, no 3, p. 383-404Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In a recent article in Utilitas, Gerald Lang suggests a solution to the so-called ‘wrong kind of reason problem’ (WKR problem) for the buck-passing account of value. In two separate replies to Lang, Jonas Olson and John Brunero, respectively, point out serious problems with Lang’s suggestion, and at least Olson concludes that the solution Lang opts for is of the wrong kind for solving the WKR problem. I argue that while both Olson and Brunero have indeed identified considerable flaws in Lang’s suggestion for a solution to the WKR problem, they have not provided sufficient grounds for dismissing the kind of solution that Lang proposes. I show how a version of this kind of solution can be formulated so as to avoid both Olson’s and Brunero’s objections. I also raise some worries concerning an alternative solution to the WKR problem suggested by Sven Danielsson and Jonas Olson.

  • 348.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Transitivitet och omärkbara effekter: en invändning mot ett argument i Folke Tersmans bok Tillsammans2010In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 31, no 3, p. 40-50Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 349.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    "Two distinctions in final goodness"2009Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Den engelska titeln till trots hålls föredraget på svenska. Syftet med titeln är att anknyta till Christine Korsgaards artikel från 1983, ”Two Distinctions in Goodness”, i vilken hon visar att den traditionellt antagna distinktionen mellan intrinsikalt och instrumentellt värde i själva verket blandar ihop två olika distinktioner; en mellan intrinsikalt och extrinsikalt värde, och en mellan finalt och instrumentellt värde. Precis som det har skett en sammanblandning mellan dessa två distinktioner menar jag att det har skett en sammanblandning mellan två olika distinktioner inom den senare distinktionen (dvs. den mellan finalt och instrumentellt värde) – en sammanblandning vars implikationer påminner om implikationerna av den sammanblandning som Korsgaard uppmärksammar.I mitt föredrag urskiljer jag dessa två distinktioner (i finalt värde). Den första, som följer av den vanligt förekommande praxisen att ge en negativ karaktärisering av finalt värde som icke-instrumentellt värde (där instrumentellt värde förstås som det värde något har uteslutande i kraft av att vara ett medel till något annat som är värdefullt), liknar distinktionen mellan intrinsikalt och extrinsikalt värde (som den vanligtvis förstås) såtillvida att den vilar på en liknande indelningsgrund, nämligen en som utgår från vilket slags egenskaper som ligger till grund för värdet (dvs.: instrumentella egenskaper ligger till grund för instrumentellt värde, medan (åtminstone delvis) icke-instrumentella egenskaper ligger till grund för finalt värde). Den andra distinktionen vilar på en annan indelningsgrund, som har att göra med (för att använda Korsgaards ord) ”the way we value the thing”. Jag kommer att diskutera hur denna idé kan/bör förstås (eventuellt kan vi här finna flera relevanta/intressanta distinktioner). Ett objekt som endast har instrumentellt värde givet den första distinktionen kan mycket väl ha finalt värde givet den andra (något som bland annat Shelly Kagan har argumenterat för). Genom att göra en klar åtskillnad mellan de två distinktionerna i finalt värde kan vi förklara hur det är möjligt.

  • 350.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Lindström, Niclas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Reason and Emotion: How Teachers Respond to Ethical Problems2018In: Abstract Book: 20th Annual International Conference on Education: 21-24 May 2018, Athens, Greece / [ed] Gregory T. Papanikos, Athens: Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER), 2018, Vol. 20, p. 133-134Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Teachers frequently face ethical problems in their everyday practice, ranging from pedagogical choices affecting their pupils to pressing conflicts that need to be solved – e.g. conflicts between pupils, conflicts between colleagues, and conflicts between teachers and parents. In order to handle such problems, teachers need to be able to respond in a professional and thoughtful manner to the various ethical aspects involved.

    Given the centrality of the ethical dimension to the teaching profession, it is an important question how teachers tend to approach ethical problems within their profession. To the extent that teachers fail to approach such problems in a professional and thoughtful manner, this is an issue that should be brought to attention and considered by teachers and within the teacher education.

    Few studies have been carried out regarding how teachers tend to approach ethical problems in their profession. However, there are interesting international studies revealing how people in general tend to respond ethically to situations involving ethical aspects that evoke strong emotional reactions. Jonathan Haidt has constructed several more or less provoking examples involving social taboos, and investigated how people tend to react when confronted with them (Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993).

    The present paper is based on a survey of Swedish teacher students for which we have borrowed two of Haidts examples. These examples were chosen on the basis that one of them clearly represents a social taboo in a Swedish context while the other does not. Hence, letting the teacher students respond to both these examples allows us to get an indication of whether there is any significant difference in their response to an example evoking a strong emotional reaction as opposed to a more neutral example.

    We present our investigation and discuss the results, which show that the respondents in the more neutral case generally seem to make motivated judgments and in the more provoking case generally seem to rely on gut feelings. If these results can be taken as an indication of how teacher students and teachers tend to respond to real life situations, we argue, they generally have good chances of approaching ethical problems in a professional way. However, a provoking or emotionally laden context enhances the risk of making ethical choices which are not based on professional reasoning.

    We argue that these results indicate a need for teachers and teacher students to consciously reflect on their values and methods for approaching ethical problems.

456789 301 - 350 of 436
CiteExportLink to result list
Permanent link
Cite
Citation style
  • apa
  • ieee
  • modern-language-association-8th-edition
  • vancouver
  • Other style
More styles
Language
  • de-DE
  • en-GB
  • en-US
  • fi-FI
  • nn-NO
  • nn-NB
  • sv-SE
  • Other locale
More languages
Output format
  • html
  • text
  • asciidoc
  • rtf