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  • 351.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    The Right Version of 'the Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem'2013In: Utilitas, ISSN 0953-8208, E-ISSN 1741-6183, Vol. 25, no 3, p. 383-404Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In a recent article in Utilitas, Gerald Lang suggests a solution to the so-called ‘wrong kind of reason problem’ (WKR problem) for the buck-passing account of value. In two separate replies to Lang, Jonas Olson and John Brunero, respectively, point out serious problems with Lang’s suggestion, and at least Olson concludes that the solution Lang opts for is of the wrong kind for solving the WKR problem. I argue that while both Olson and Brunero have indeed identified considerable flaws in Lang’s suggestion for a solution to the WKR problem, they have not provided sufficient grounds for dismissing the kind of solution that Lang proposes. I show how a version of this kind of solution can be formulated so as to avoid both Olson’s and Brunero’s objections. I also raise some worries concerning an alternative solution to the WKR problem suggested by Sven Danielsson and Jonas Olson.

  • 352.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Transitivitet och omärkbara effekter: en invändning mot ett argument i Folke Tersmans bok Tillsammans2010In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, Vol. 31, no 3, p. 40-50Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 353.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    "Two distinctions in final goodness"2009Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [sv]

    Den engelska titeln till trots hålls föredraget på svenska. Syftet med titeln är att anknyta till Christine Korsgaards artikel från 1983, ”Two Distinctions in Goodness”, i vilken hon visar att den traditionellt antagna distinktionen mellan intrinsikalt och instrumentellt värde i själva verket blandar ihop två olika distinktioner; en mellan intrinsikalt och extrinsikalt värde, och en mellan finalt och instrumentellt värde. Precis som det har skett en sammanblandning mellan dessa två distinktioner menar jag att det har skett en sammanblandning mellan två olika distinktioner inom den senare distinktionen (dvs. den mellan finalt och instrumentellt värde) – en sammanblandning vars implikationer påminner om implikationerna av den sammanblandning som Korsgaard uppmärksammar.I mitt föredrag urskiljer jag dessa två distinktioner (i finalt värde). Den första, som följer av den vanligt förekommande praxisen att ge en negativ karaktärisering av finalt värde som icke-instrumentellt värde (där instrumentellt värde förstås som det värde något har uteslutande i kraft av att vara ett medel till något annat som är värdefullt), liknar distinktionen mellan intrinsikalt och extrinsikalt värde (som den vanligtvis förstås) såtillvida att den vilar på en liknande indelningsgrund, nämligen en som utgår från vilket slags egenskaper som ligger till grund för värdet (dvs.: instrumentella egenskaper ligger till grund för instrumentellt värde, medan (åtminstone delvis) icke-instrumentella egenskaper ligger till grund för finalt värde). Den andra distinktionen vilar på en annan indelningsgrund, som har att göra med (för att använda Korsgaards ord) ”the way we value the thing”. Jag kommer att diskutera hur denna idé kan/bör förstås (eventuellt kan vi här finna flera relevanta/intressanta distinktioner). Ett objekt som endast har instrumentellt värde givet den första distinktionen kan mycket väl ha finalt värde givet den andra (något som bland annat Shelly Kagan har argumenterat för). Genom att göra en klar åtskillnad mellan de två distinktionerna i finalt värde kan vi förklara hur det är möjligt.

  • 354.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Lindström, Niclas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Reason and Emotion: How Teachers Respond to Ethical Problems2018In: Abstract Book: 20th Annual International Conference on Education: 21-24 May 2018, Athens, Greece / [ed] Gregory T. Papanikos, Athens: Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER), 2018, Vol. 20, p. 133-134Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Teachers frequently face ethical problems in their everyday practice, ranging from pedagogical choices affecting their pupils to pressing conflicts that need to be solved – e.g. conflicts between pupils, conflicts between colleagues, and conflicts between teachers and parents. In order to handle such problems, teachers need to be able to respond in a professional and thoughtful manner to the various ethical aspects involved.

    Given the centrality of the ethical dimension to the teaching profession, it is an important question how teachers tend to approach ethical problems within their profession. To the extent that teachers fail to approach such problems in a professional and thoughtful manner, this is an issue that should be brought to attention and considered by teachers and within the teacher education.

    Few studies have been carried out regarding how teachers tend to approach ethical problems in their profession. However, there are interesting international studies revealing how people in general tend to respond ethically to situations involving ethical aspects that evoke strong emotional reactions. Jonathan Haidt has constructed several more or less provoking examples involving social taboos, and investigated how people tend to react when confronted with them (Haidt, Koller & Dias, 1993).

    The present paper is based on a survey of Swedish teacher students for which we have borrowed two of Haidts examples. These examples were chosen on the basis that one of them clearly represents a social taboo in a Swedish context while the other does not. Hence, letting the teacher students respond to both these examples allows us to get an indication of whether there is any significant difference in their response to an example evoking a strong emotional reaction as opposed to a more neutral example.

    We present our investigation and discuss the results, which show that the respondents in the more neutral case generally seem to make motivated judgments and in the more provoking case generally seem to rely on gut feelings. If these results can be taken as an indication of how teacher students and teachers tend to respond to real life situations, we argue, they generally have good chances of approaching ethical problems in a professional way. However, a provoking or emotionally laden context enhances the risk of making ethical choices which are not based on professional reasoning.

    We argue that these results indicate a need for teachers and teacher students to consciously reflect on their values and methods for approaching ethical problems.

  • 355.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    et al.
    Umeå University.
    Lindström, Niclas
    Umeå University.
    Teaching Ethics to Non-Philosophy Students2017In: Abstract Book: 19th Annual International Conference on Education 15-18 May 2017, Athens, Greece / [ed] Gregory T. Papanikos, Aten: Athens Institute for Education and Research (ATINER), 2017, p. 185-186Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is not only philosophy students who read ethics in universities and colleges. Nor are they the only ones who have reason to do so. Dealing with ethical issues is a central aspect of many professions, and hence e.g. teacher students, engineering students, police students, medicine students, social worker students and research students are commonly taught ethics within their educational programs, just to mention some.

    In this paper we address the question of how ethics is most appropriately taught to such “non-philosophy” student groups – on a general level, that is; of course there may be important differences between these various professions and areas of study, calling for partly different approaches to teaching ethics.

    The standard way to introduce ethics to non-philosophy students is doubtlessly to present and briefly explain a number of ethical theories (or kinds of theory), such as utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, virtue ethics and moral pluralism. And indeed, most introductory books to ethics adopt this approach, be it general introductions or introductions specialized towards a specific profession or subject matter.

    We refer to this approach as the “smorgasbord approach” to teaching ethics, due to the false impression that it is likely to make on non-philosophy students approaching ethics as an academic discipline for the first time. This approach invites the conception that adopting an ethical position is mainly a matter of simply choosing from this smorgasbord of different theories.

    We find this approach problematic for several reasons:

    To start with, it tends to misrepresent the field of ethics as well as ethical reasoning. These students generally lack the prerequisites required to critically examine and evaluate these theories, to understand the different motivations behind them, and to put them in context. Indeed, it is even difficult, given the usually quite limited time frame for such courses, to give the students an appropriate understanding of what these theories really are theories about. To get a thorough enough understanding of the field for it to be meaningful to focus on ethical theories in introducing non-philosophy students to ethics would require a much more comprehensive ethics education than what there is usually room for within the kinds of educational program mentioned above.

    Furthermore, the smorgasbord approach is likely to be infeasible. How is such an approach supposed to aid the students in practical decision-making – which, first and foremost, is the rational for having them take ethics courses in the first place? Which of these theories should they apply, and why? The different theories give different verdicts in most tricky cases, and these students lack the background knowledge required to critically choose between them. Nor is it obvious that it is desirable to choose one such theory and then apply it in one’s practical reasoning.

    In light of these problematic features of a smorgasbord approach to teaching ethics we suggest a methodology-based approach as a more fruitful alternative. Instead of presenting a list of theories this approach focuses on conveying basic methods for ethical reasoning. We argue that there is almost unanimous agreement among moral philosophers (at least within a broadly analytical tradition) as regards certain basic methods for ethical reasoning, even if these methods are rarely explicitly formulated. These methods can be summarized roughly under three main headings: information, vividness and coherence.

    The main purpose of this paper is to explain and defend the methodological approach to teaching ethics to non-philosophy students. In doing so we also consider and reply to some possible expected objections to this approach.

    Lastly we consider whether the approach should be complemented in some way. One useful complement, we think – if the time and space in the educational program in question allows it – is to bring up the question of character traits – what kind of person one should be.

  • 356.
    Samuelsson, Lars
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Rist, Lucy
    Stakeholder Participation as a Means to Produce Morally Justified Environmental Decisions2016In: Ethics, Policy & Environment, ISSN 2155-0085, E-ISSN 2155-0093, Vol. 19, no 1, p. 76-90Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Stakeholder participation is an increasingly popular ingredient within environmental management and decision-making. While much has been written about its purported benefits, a question that has been largely neglected is whether decision-making informed through stakeholder participation is actually likely to yield decisions that are morally justified in their own right. Using moral methodology as a starting point, we argue that stakeholder participation in environmental decision-making (if adequately designed) may indeed be an appropriate means to produce morally justified decisions, the reason being that such participation may constitute an efficient way to satisfy the standard requirements on moral reasoning and moral justification. This finding also emphasizes the importance of identifying those settings most conducive to allowing different stakeholders to both challenge each other’s arguments and to adopt each other’s perspectives in order to make effective use of participation in environmental decision-making for the purpose of reaching morally justified decisions.

  • 357.
    Sandgren, Alexander
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Koji, Tanaka
    Two Kinds of Logical Impossibility2019In: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, we argue that a distinction ought to be drawn between two ways in which a given world might be logically impossible. First, a world w might be impossible because the laws that hold at w are different from those that hold at some other world (say the actual world). Second, a world w might be impossible because the laws of logic that hold in some world (say the actual world) are violated at w. We develop a novel way of modelling logical possibility that makes room for both kinds of logical impossibility. Doing so has interesting implications for the relationship between logical possibility and other kinds of possibility (for example, metaphysical possibility) and implications for the necessity or contingency of the laws of logic.

  • 358. Schoubye, Anders J.
    et al.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    What is Said?2016In: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068, Vol. 50, no 4, p. 759-793Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It is sometimes argued that certain sentences of natural language fail to express truth conditional contents. Standard examples include e.g. Tipper is ready and Steel is strong enough. In this paper, we provide a novel analysis of truth conditional meaning (what is said) using the notion of a question under discussion. This account (i) explains why these types of sentences are not, in fact, semantically underdetermined (yet seem truth conditionally incomplete), (ii) provides a principled analysis of the process by which natural language sentences (in general) can come to have enriched meanings in context, and (iii) shows why various alternative views, e.g. so-called Radical Contextualism, Moderate Contextualism, and Semantic Minimalism, are partially right in their respective analyses of the problem, but also all ultimately wrong. Our analysis achieves this result using a standard truth conditional and compositional semantics and without making any assumptions about enriched logical forms, i.e. logical forms containing phonologically null expressions.

  • 359.
    Schuessler, Rudolf
    et al.
    Department of Philosophy, University of Bayreuth, Germany.
    van der Rijt, Jan-WillemUmeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Focal Points in Negotiation2020Collection (editor) (Refereed)
  • 360.
    Schäring, Hampus
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Affärsetik i hållbarhetsredovisning: Är CSR en moralisk skyldighet även om det kostar pengar?2018Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    This essay focus on ethics in sustainability reports and whether CSR is a moral obligation even if it costs the company money. There is a main focus towards Kants ethics and the categorical imperative in which I find to be applicable and desirable in CSR. The essay also evaluate utilitarianism and I find weaker evidence to fully apply it in CSR since it might have worse effects on the environment. It is widely accepted that a company has an obligation to maximize its profits. My conclusion is that CSR is a moral obligation because CSR as a tool will likely maximize our profits today and in the future.

  • 361.
    Sivesson, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Välmående och basinkomst2017Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 362.
    Sjöblom, Emma
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    The Shortcomings in John Rawls's ´The Law of Peoples´: An Evaluation of the Theory based on the Syrian Civil War2016Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    This essay presents and discusses John Rawls’s ‘The Law of Peoples’ and it’s ability to be used in practice. The theory’s ability to judge right and wrongful actions in liberal intervention is tested when applied to the current conflict in Syria, and is used to evaluate the actions made by the liberal state France, during its involvement in the crisis.

    The essay will discuss shortcomings in the theory, and possible solutions to these and will also come to discuss central ideas in the theory and the liberal ism. Other writers such as Michael Doyle and Simon Caney are discussed and presented more briefly.

    The essay will argue that the theory in The Law of Peoples is not sufficient to alone evaluate the conflict it is applied upon, and therefore not comprehensive enough to be used in practice without adjustments.

  • 363.
    Skoglund, Nicole
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Bristen av ett upplevt erkännande leder till radikalisering: Hermeneutisk analys i förklarandet av våldbejakande extremisthandlingar2016Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 364.
    Skytt, Torbjörn
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    The "hard problem" of consciousness is a dead end2014Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    Consciousness and the feeling of existence have yet not been fully explained. There are interesting arguments from panpsychist as well as from eliminative materialistic (neuroscientific) positions. A panpsychist perspective is normally one where the innermost part of the physical world consists of some kind of mental entities or experiences, while the materialistic perspective claim such entities are only material (non-mental). In between these two positions there are numerous ideas how consciousness is to be explained. As long as no final explanation has been found, we can keep on presenting theories of mind. Philosophical argumentation will however not be sufficient to validate a specific standpoint. I argue in this paper that the problem of consciousness should not be isolated as a separate problem as argued by Chalmers (1995). He defines the hard problem, and also presents an outline of a theory of consciousness, claiming this covers possible solutions. Rupert Read (2008) argues the separation of the hard problem is based  in  the view presented by Descartes as the separation of body and mind. He says this separation only will prevent us from really finding an explanation. I claim it is not possible to infer the nature of consciousness from philosophical reasoning only, why isolating part of the problem out from such reasoning is a dead  end. To understand conscious brain processes, we should strive to unify as many knowledge spheres as possible, not separate some parts as if it would be possible to tell within which sphere a solution is to be found. I am not arguing for a certain view but claim we need to be open to all possible explanations, and an Chalmers’ outline to a theory of consciousness does not at all fulfil the demands for a fundamental theory of consciousness.

  • 365.
    Sköld, Erik
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Struktur & Mening2017Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 366.
    Smajdor, Anna
    et al.
    University of Oslo.
    Cutas, Daniela
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies. Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden.
    Takala, Tuija
    University of Helsinki.
    Artificial gametes, the unnatural and the artefactual2018In: Journal of Medical Ethics, ISSN 0306-6800, E-ISSN 1473-4257, Vol. 44, no 6, p. 404-408Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In debates on the ethics of artificial gametes, concepts of naturalness have been used in a number of different ways. Some have argued that the unnaturalness of artificial gametes means that it is unacceptable to use them in fertility treatments. Others have suggested that artificial gametes are no less natural than many other tissues or processes in common medical use. We suggest that establishing the naturalness or unnaturalness of artificial gametes is unlikely to provide easy answers as to the acceptability of using them in fertility medicine. However, we also suggest that we should be cautious about repudiating any relationship between nature and moral evaluation. The property of being natural or man-made may not per se tell us anything about an entity’s moral status, but it has an important impact on the moral relationship between the creator and the created organism.

  • 367.
    Sporre, Karin
    Umeå University, Faculty of Teacher Education, Department of Teacher Education in Swedish and Social Sciences.
    En introduktion till Iris Marion Young2000In: Att kasta tjejkast: Texter om feminism och rättvisa av Iris M Young i urval, Atlas, Stockholm , 2000Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 368.
    Sporre, Karin
    Umeå University, Faculty of Teacher Education, Department of Teacher Education in Swedish and Social Sciences.
    "Först när vi får ansikten": Etik i en postkolonial epok2001In: Akka: Tidskrift för kultur & lärande vid Högskolan Dalarna, ISSN 1404-1871, no Våren 2001, p. 83-113Article in journal (Other academic)
  • 369.
    Sporre, Karin
    Umeå University, Faculty of Teacher Education, Department of Teacher Education in Swedish and Social Sciences.
    "Älska ingen mer än du älskar dig själv": Om etik, förtryck och motstånd2001In: Det nya motståndet.: Om regnbågar mot förtryck., Agora, Stockholm , 2001Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 370.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    And and And*2013In: Brevity / [ed] Laurence Goldstein, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 198-214Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 371.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
    Bullshitting2019In: The Oxford handbook of lying / [ed] Jörg Meibauer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 264-276Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 372.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Insincere TestimonyManuscript (preprint) (Other academic)
  • 373.
    Stokke, Andreas
    University of Lisbon and University of Oslo.
    Insincerity2012In: Noûs, ISSN 0029-4624, E-ISSN 1468-0068Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper argues for an account of insincerity in speech according to which an utterance is insincere if and only if it communicates something that does not correspond to the speaker's conscious attitudes. Two main topics are addressed: the relation between insincerity and the saying-meaning distinction, and the mental attitude underlying insincere speech. The account is applied to both assertoric and non-assertoric utterances of declarative sentences, and to utterances of non-declarative sentences. It is shown how the account gives the right results for a range of cases.

  • 374.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Arché—Philosophical Research Centre, Department of Logic and Metaphysics, University of St Andrews, St Andrews, UK .
    Intention-sensitive semantics2010In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 175, no 3, p. 383-404Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 375.
    Stokke, Andreas
    University of Oslo, Norway.
    Lying and asserting2013In: Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0022-362X, E-ISSN 1939-8549, Vol. CX, no 1, p. 33-60Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 376.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Lying and Misleading in Discourse2016In: Philosophical Review, ISSN 0031-8108, E-ISSN 1558-1470, Vol. 125, no 1, p. 83-134Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 377.
    Stokke, Andreas
    University of Lisbon and University of Oslo.
    Lying, deceiving, and misleading2013In: Philosophy Compass, ISSN 1747-9991, E-ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 8, no 4, p. 348-359Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 378.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University.
    Lying, sincerity, and quality2019In: The Oxford handbook of lying / [ed] Jörg Meibauer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 134-148Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 379.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Manipulation, bedrag og det forkerte i at lyve2015In: Filosofisk Tidskrift, ISSN 0348-7482, no 3Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 380.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Metaphors and Martinis: a response to Jessica Keiser2017In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 174, no 4, p. 853-859Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This note responds to criticism put forth by Jessica Keiser against a theory of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Keiser objects that this view wrongly counts particular kinds of non-literal speech as instances of lying. In particular, Keiser argues that the view invariably counts metaphors and certain uses of definite descriptions as lies. It is argued here that both these claims are false.

  • 381.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Proposing, Pretending, and Propriety: A Response to Don Fallis2017In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 95, no 1, p. 178-183Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This note responds to criticism put forth by Don Fallis of an account of lying in terms of the Stalnakerian view of assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Fallis objects by presenting an example to show that one can lie even though one does not propose to make what one says common ground. It is argued here that this objection does not present a problem for the view of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. Responding to the objection brings out important features of this view of discourse and of assertion.

  • 382.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Centre for the Study of Mind and Nature, Oslo.
    Protagonist projection2013In: Mind and language, ISSN 0268-1064, E-ISSN 1468-0017, Vol. 28, no 2, p. 204-232Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 383.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Review of Wright and Jang (eds.), New Waves in Truth2011In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 384.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Saying too Little and Saying too Much: Critical Notice of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said by Jennifer Saul2013In: Disputatio, ISSN 0873-626X, E-ISSN 2182-2875, Vol. V, no 35, p. 81-91Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 385.
    Stokke, Andreas
    LanCog, University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal and CSMN, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway.
    Truth and Context Change2014In: Journal of Philosophical Logic, ISSN 0022-3611, E-ISSN 1573-0433, Vol. 43, no 1, p. 33-51Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Some dynamic semantic theories include an attempt to derive truth-conditional meaning from context change potential. This implies defining truth in terms of context change. Focusing on presuppositions and epistemic modals, this paper points out some problems with how this project has been carried out. It then suggests a way of overcoming these problems. This involves appealing to a richer notion of context than the one found in standard dynamic systems.

  • 386.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Uoprigtighed og viden via vidnesbyrd2013In: Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift, ISSN 0029-1943, E-ISSN 1504-2901, Vol. 48, no 2, p. 121-132Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper argues that when insincerity on the part of a testifier blocks knowledge acquisition, this failure is due to a type of unreliability. This motivates a principle according to which it is a necessary condition on testimonial knowledge that the testimony be given on a reliable basis. Such a principle differs from other reliability conditions on testimonial knoweldge by engendering a narrower conception of such knowledge.

  • 387.
    Sundqvist, Max
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Climate justice: three roads towards a sustainable future2017Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    In this I will explore the ethical challenge of global climate change by analysing three accounts of how responsibility for climate change should be distributed. I explore why it is valuable to view climate change as part of a bigger ethical problem of resources, distribution and global justice. Furthermore, I will argue that a road towards change by a cosmo political theory of justice is the most reasonable option. The theme of my argumentation is that the challenge of global climate change should be understood as a problem between human beings, not between states, or via schemes for distribution or rigid systematic solutions. Many theories of justice fail to do so with challenging and potentially dangerous consequences.

  • 388.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    A somewhat eliminativist proposal about phenomenal consciousness2008In: Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences: Papers of the 31st International Wittgenstein Symposium, The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society: Kirchberg am Wechsel , 2008, p. 340-342Conference paper (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper develops a proposal about phenomenalconsciousness that is (somewhat) eliminativist in two respects. First, regarded in the light of some commonways of conceiving of consciousness, the proposal is "deflationary". Second, it opens up space for adevelopment in which what we now naturally think about as consciousness turns out to be many different things.

  • 389.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Are colours visually complex?2013In: Johanssonian Investigations: Essays in Honour of Ingvar Johansson on His Seventieth Birthday / [ed] Christer Svennerlind, Jan Almäng and Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson, Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag, 2013, p. 627-639Chapter in book (Other academic)
  • 390.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Are Sensory Concepts Learned by "Abstraction" from Experience?2019In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 84, no 5, p. 1159-1178Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In recent years, many philosophers and scientists have argued or accepted that it is impossible to learn primitive sensory concepts like "blue" and "red". This paper defends a more qualified picture. I try to show that some received characterisations of "learning" are nonequivalent and point towards different learning-nonlearning distinctions. And, on some ways of specifying such a distinction, it might be correct that we do not and cannot "learn" a concept of blue. But on other ways of specifying such a distinction, we can and do sometimes "learn" a concept of blue from experiences of blue. The latter part of the argument connects with some traditional "abstractionist" views, and I defend the present claims in view of some widely circulated concerns about "abstracting" concepts from experience. I close with some reflections on how one might, in view of all this, think about "the learning-nonlearning distinction".

  • 391.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Finns blått?2005Other (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 392.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    How physicalists can - and cannot - explain the seeming "absurdity" of physicalism2018In: Philosophy and phenomenological research, ISSN 0031-8205, E-ISSN 1933-1592, Vol. 97, no 3, p. 681-703Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to a widely held physicalist view, consciousness is identical with some physical or functional phenomenon just as liquidity is identical with loose molecular connection. To many of us, this claim about consciousness seems more problematic than the claim about liquidity. To many—including many physicalists—the identification of consciousness with some physical phenomenon even seems "absurd" (Papineau 2002) or "crazy" (Perry 2001). A full defence of physicalism should explain why the allegedly correct hypothesis comes across this way. If physicalism is true and we have reason to accept it, why does it seem "absurd"? One possibility is that this is fully explained by the fact that we have an erroneous understanding of consciousness or its physical basis. This explanation is embraced by few if any physicalists. It is rejected by many, including proponents of the "phenomenal concept strategy", which lately has become the dominant strategy for defending physicalism. But the "error explanation" is clearly the most plausible explanation that is available to physicalists. So this paper argues.

  • 393.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Is the mystery an illusion?: Papineau on the problem of consciousness2007In: Hommage à Wlodek: philosophical papers dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz / [ed] Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen, Lund: Lund University , 2007Chapter in book (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. According to David Papineau's version of this view, the difference between our "phenomenal" and "material" concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts can't co-refer. I claim that this account is incorrect. It is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn't be. Further, and worse, the account seems to predict that an "intuition of distinctness" will arise in cases where it does not. I also make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and (physicalist) alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim (ii).

  • 394.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Is the mystery an illusion?: Papineau on the problem of consciousness2008In: Synthese, ISSN 0039-7857, E-ISSN 1573-0964, Vol. 163, no 2, p. 133-143Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A number of philosophers have recently argued that (i) consciousness properties are identical with some set of physical or functional properties and that (ii) we can explain away the frequently felt puzzlement about this claim as a delusion or confusion generated by our different ways of apprehending or thinking about consciousness. This paper examines David Papineau’s influential version of this view. According to Papineau, the difference between our “phenomenal” and “material” concepts of consciousness produces an instinctive but erroneous intuition that these concepts can’t co-refer. I claim that this account fails. To begin with, it is arguable that we are mystified about physicalism even when the account predicts that we shouldn’t be. Further, and worse, the account predicts that an “intuition of distinctness” will arise in cases where it clearly does not. In conclusion, I make some remarks on the prospects for, constraints on, and (physicalist) alternatives to, a successful defence of the claim (ii).

  • 395.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    On imagism about phenomenal thought2011In: Philosophical Review, ISSN 0031-8108, E-ISSN 1558-1470, Vol. 120, no 1, p. 43-95Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Imagism about Phenomenal Thought is (roughly) the view that there is some concept Q (for some sensory quality Q) that we can employ only while we experience the quality Q. I believe this view is theoretically significant, is or can be made intuitively appealing, and is explicitly or implicitly accepted by many contemporary philosophers. However, there is no good reason to accept it. Or so I argue.

  • 396.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    On representationalism, common-factorism, and whether consciousness is here and now2019In: Philosophical Studies, ISSN 0031-8116, E-ISSN 1573-0883, Vol. 176, no 10, p. 2539-2550Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    A strong form of representationalism says that every conscious property of every mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. A weaker representationalism says that some conscious property of some mental state can be identified with some part of the state’s representational properties. David Papineau has recently argued that all such theories are incorrect since (a) they construe consciousness as consisting (partly or wholly) in ‘‘relations to propositions or other abstract objects outside space and time’’, whereas (b) consciousness is ‘‘concrete’’ and ‘‘here and now’’. Papineau defends instead a kind of ‘‘qualia theory’’ according to which all conscious properties are intrinsic non-relational properties of subjects. He argues that this theory bypasses the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. Similar worries about representationalism, and similar ideas to the effect that some qualia theory, adverbial theory, or sense-datum theory fares better with respect to these worries are relatively wide-spread. I argue that Papineau’s theory does not bypass the difficulties he identifies for representationalism. In fact, Papineau’s theory arguably has no advantage at all over representationalism with regard to these issues. The features that concern Papineau about representationalist views do not derive—or do not derive solely—from the representationalism of these views. They (also) derive from a common-factorism of these views. And this common-factorism is embraced by Papineau as well as by most theories of consciousness and perception.

  • 397.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Phenomenal concepts2011In: Philosophy Compass, ISSN 1747-9991, E-ISSN 1747-9991, Vol. 6, no 4, p. 267-281Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    It’s a common idea in philosophy that we possess concepts of a peculiar kind by which we can think about our conscious states in ‘inner’ and ‘direct’ ways, as for example, when I attend to the way a current pain feels and think about this feeling as such. Such ‘phenomenal concepts’ figure in a variety of theoretical contexts. The bulk of this article discusses their use in a certain strategy – the phenomenal concept strategy– for defending the physicalist view that conscious states are reducible to brain states. It also considers, more briefly, how phenomenal concepts have been used to defend dualism about consciousness, and how they have been used to explain our special access to our consciousness. It concludes with a discussion about whether, and in what more precise sense of the term, we at all possess ‘phenomenal concepts’ of our conscious states.

  • 398.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Primitive Colors: A Case Study in Neo-pragmatist Metaphysics and Philosophy of Perception2018In: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, ISSN 1538-1617, E-ISSN 1538-1617Article, book review (Refereed)
  • 399.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Philosophy and Linguistics.
    Psychological phenomena and first-person perspectives: critical discussions of some arguments in philosophy of mind1999Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    The topic of this thesis is how different phenomena, commonly regarded as "psychological" or "mental", are or can be apprehended in the first person. The aim is to show that a number of influential texts of contemporary philosophy display a particular type of oversight on this topic. The texts in question display, I argue, an insufficient appreciation of the case for holding that "non-qualitative" psychological phenomena are apprehended in an exclusive way in the first person.

    To make this case, I begin by isolating a limited class of phenomena. The class, which is called the class of 'occurrent psychological doings', includes performances such as searching for a flower and adding two numbers. In chapter 2, I submit a case for holding that it is logically necessary that if an agent is performing an occurrent psychological doing, then he has a certain apprehension of what he is doing. This claim is called The First-Person Thesis'.

    In chapter 3, I submit a case for holding that the type of apprehension mentioned in The First-Person Thesis is logically exclusive: it is an apprehension which an agent who is doing so-and-so can have of the fact that he is doing so-and-so but which it is logically impossible for someone else to have of this fact. This claim is called 'The Exclusiveness Thesis'.

    In chapters 4 and 5, the two theses are used in critical discussions of some influential texts of contemporary philosophy. In chapter 4,1 examine two arguments of Wittgenstein's to the effect that one may perform some selected actions without having a particular type of "experience", or "sensation". I try to show that these arguments, while valid, have rather limited implications. I use The First-Person Thesis to illustrate the limited scope of these implications. I then try to show that the limited significance of the arguments has often been obscured by commentators of Wittgenstein.

    In chapter 5, I examine a position commonly held in contemporary philosophy of mind, and often associated with Nagel. The position is that "qualitative" phenomena such as perceptual experiences and bodily sensations are, because of the appearances they present in the first person, particularly difficult to explain in physical terms. An implication of this view is the claim that other phenomena do not present appearances to subjects in the allegedly problematic way that "qualitative" phenomena do. The First-Person Thesis and The Exclusiveness Thesis are used to argue that this position, as exemplified in the writings of McGinn and Chalmers, involve controversial assumptions for which insufficient justification is provided.

  • 400.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Review of David Papineau's Thinking about Consciousness2006In: Theoria, ISSN 0040-5825, E-ISSN 1755-2567, Vol. 72, no 1, p. 80-86Article, book review (Other academic)
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