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  • 401.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Wittgenstein, consciousness and the mind2005In: Sorites - Digital Journal of Analytical Philosophy, ISSN 1135-1349, E-ISSN 1135-1349, Vol. 16, p. 6-22Article in journal (Refereed)
  • 402.
    Svensson, Frans
    Stockholm Univ, Stockholm, Sweden.
    Non-Eudaimonism, The Sufficiency of Virtue for Happiness, and Two Senses of the  Highest Good in Descartes’s Ethics2015In: British Journal for the History of Philosophy, ISSN 0960-8788, E-ISSN 1469-3526, Vol. 23, no 2, p. 277-296Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In his reflections on ethics, Descartes distances himself from the eudaimonistic tradition in moral philosophy by introducing a distinction between happiness and the highest good. While happiness, in Descartes's view, consists in an inner state of complete harmony and satisfaction, the highest good instead consists in virtue, i.e. in 'a firm and constant resolution' (e.g. CSMK: 325/AT 5: 83) to always use our free will well or correctly. In Section 1 of this paper, I pursue the Cartesian distinction between happiness and the highest good in some detail. In Section 2, I discuss the question of how the motivation to virtue should be accounted for within Descartes's ethical framework. In Section 3, I turn to Descartes's defence of the view that virtue, while fundamentally distinct from happiness, is nevertheless sufficient for obtaining it. In the final section of the paper (Section 4), my concern is instead with a second and sometimes neglected distinction that Descartes makes between two different senses of the highest good. I show that this distinction does not remove the non-eudaimonistic character of Descartes's ethics suggested in Section 1, and present two reasons for why the distinction is important for Descartes's purposes.

  • 403.
    Svensson, Frans
    Univ Arizona, Dept Philosophy, Tucson, AZ 85721 USA.
    Virtue Ethics and the Search for an Account of Right Action2010In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, ISSN 1386-2820, E-ISSN 1572-8447, Vol. 13, no 3, p. 255-271Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Conceived of as a contender to other theories in substantive ethics, virtue ethics is often associated with, in essence, the following account or criterion of right action: VR: An action A is right for S in circumstances C if and only if a fully virtuous agent would characteristically do A in C. There are serious objections to VR, which take the form of counter-examples. They present us with different scenarios in which less than fully virtuous persons would be acting rightly in doing what no fully virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. In this paper, various proposals for how to revise VR in order to avoid these counter-examples are considered. I will argue that in so far as the revised accounts really do manage to steer clear of the counter-examples to VR, something which it turns out is not quite true for all of them, they instead fall prey to other damaging objections. I end by discussing the future of virtue ethics, given what has come to light in the previous sections of the paper. In particular, I sketch the outlines of a virtue ethical account of rightness that is structurally different from VR. This account also faces important problems. Still, I suggest that further scrutiny is required before we are in a position to make a definitive decision about its fate.

  • 404.
    Södermark, Philip
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Of Moral Wizardry and Experiential Transformation: A Case for Consent as a Mental State2018Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    In ethics, a highly relevant and divisive topic is that of consent. Many moral dilemmas and ethical forks in the road turn on the question of consent. But how do we differentiate between the consensual and the non-consensual? There is no simple answer to this question and philosophers are quite divided, as they tend to be. Some believe that consent is a mental state whereas others maintain that it is a behavioral expression of some kind. There are others still who argue that consent is some combination of mental states and communication. In this paper, I shall defend the view that consent is a mental state and that it does not depend on any type of behavior. My central thesis is that only this view accounts for the ethical importance of consent in a liberal moral framework where consent matters due to its connection to our intrinsic right to personal autonomy. Additionally, views that make consent dependent on behavior have counterintuitive, and sometimes morally unacceptable, consequences for what is and isn’t consensual. I argue that only the view that I defend can account for the moral significance that consent should have.

  • 405.
    Söderstedt, Jesper
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    A Ground for Moral Standing2017Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    The concept of moral standing applies to those who are of a direct moral concern, i.e. we have a reason to directly include those with a moral standing in our moral deliberation- they matter for themselves. How one accounts for the concept in question is controversial and thus there are several different accounts that one can consult when pondering what content the concept ought to have. This paper investigates the plausibility of some of the most influential accounts of moral standing, concluding that they, as they stand alone, are insufficient. Instead an alternative account of moral standing with a kantian foundation is offered, an account which is heavily based on Christine Korsgaard’s notion of final goods, with moral standing understood as a comparative concept as its distinguishing component.

  • 406.
    Tardelius, Tom
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Inte fullt så extremt -: En granskning av Garrett Cullitys alternativ till Peter Singers hållning i frågan om skyldigheten att hjälpa människor i nöd2017Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 407.
    Tistelgren, Mathias
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Can I Have a Robot Friend?2018Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    The development of autonomous social robots is still in its infancy, but there is no reason tothink that it will not continue. In fact, the robotics industry is growing rapidly. Since this trendis showing no signs of abating it is relevant to ask what type of relations we can have withthese machines. Is it for example possible to be friends with them? In this thesis I argue that it is unlikely that we will ever be able to be friends with robots. To believe otherwise is to be deceived, a trap it is all too easy to fall into since the efforts put on making social robots as human-like as possible and to make the human-robot interaction as smooth as possible are huge. But robots are not always what they seem. For instance, the capacity to enter into a friendship of one’s own volition is a core requirement for a relationship to be termed friendship. We also have a duty to act morally towards our friends, to treat them with due respect. To be able to do this we need to have self-knowledge, a sense of ourselves as persons in our own right. We do not have robots who display these capacities today, nor is it a given that we ever will.

  • 408.
    Tolentino, Felicia
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, History and Theory of Art.
    Jacques Derrrida och försvinnandets filosofi2005In: À Derrida x 13 / [ed] Kristi Burman & Roland Spolander, Umeå: Institutionen för konstvetenskap, Umeå universitet , 2005, p. 45-45Chapter in book (Other (popular science, discussion, etc.))
  • 409.
    Täljedal, Inge-Bert
    Umeå University, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Integrative Medical Biology (IMB), Histology and Cell Biology.
    Esse est percpi and percept identity in C. J. Boström's philosophy2013In: Idealistic Studies, ISSN 0046-8541, E-ISSN 2153-8239, Vol. 43, no 1-2, p. 63-70Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Berkeley's 'esse is percipi' has been criticized for implying epistemological solipsism, the main argument being that different minds cannot harbor numerically one and the same idea. Similarly, C. J. Boström, the dominating Swedish philosopher in the 19th century, was early scorned because his principle of esse est percipi allegedly contradicts the simultaneous claim that two spirits (God and a human, or two humans) can perceive the same thing under qualitatively different appearances. Whereas the criticism against Berkeley is here regarded as valid, it is argued that Boström successfully defended himself by employing a dual concept of meaning, resembling Frege's Sinn and Bedeutung some thirty years later, and by postulating an ontology that permits human minds to share in the divine ideas that constitute reality.

  • 410.
    Täljedal, Inge-Bert
    Umeå University, Faculty of Medicine, Department of Integrative Medical Biology (IMB), Histology and Cell Biology.
    The idea of being is not uniquely innate2016In: Principia: an International Journal of Epistemology, ISSN 1414-4247, E-ISSN 1808-1711, Vol. 20, no 3, p. 343-359Article, review/survey (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    According to the Italian philosopher Antonio Rosmini (1797-1855), being is an innate idea that is requisite for contemplating anything. He emphatically claims that it is the one and only innate idea. Rosmini makes a sharp distinction between sensations and perceptions. Perceptions are thought to arise when the undetermined idea of being (tantamount to possibility) is combined with sensations, universals when being is combined with perceptions. It is argued here that Rosmini’s explanation of the origin of universals does not work. If the idea of being is regarded as innate, then several others should be similarly regarded, notably the idea of qualitative identity which is an idea necessary for deriving universals.  Although Rosmini holds that certain properties are necessarily present in real objects and therefore implicit in the idea of being, the property of being qualitatively identical with something else is not among those properties. Theological motives may have encouraged  Rosmini to emphasize being as a peculiarly fundamental idea. However, if the idea of being is more fundamental than other universals, it may be regarded so in virtue of its generality,  not because it has a uniquely innate character.

  • 411.
    Uhrbom, Frida
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Skillnader i teorier angående skäl för handling: Scanlon och Korsgaard2019Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 412.
    Vaassen, Bram
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Basic Beliefs and the Perceptual Learning Problem: A Substantial Challenge for Moderate Foundationalism2016In: Episteme: A journal of individual and social epistemology, ISSN 1742-3600, E-ISSN 1750-0117, Vol. 13, no 1, p. 133-149Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In recent epistemology many philosophers have adhered to a moderate foundationalism according to which some beliefs do not depend on other beliefs for their justification. Reliance on such ‘basic beliefs’ pervades both internalist and externalist theories of justification. In this article I argue that the phenomenon of perceptual learning – the fact that certain ‘expert’ observers are able to form more justified basic beliefs than novice observers – constitutes a challenge for moderate foundationalists. In order to accommodate perceptual learning cases, the moderate foundationalist will have to characterize the ‘expertise’ of the expert observer in such a way that it cannot be had by novice observers and that it bestows justification on expert basic beliefs independently of any other justification had by the expert. I will argue that the accounts of expert basic beliefs currently present in the literature fail to meet this challenge, as they either result in a too liberal ascription of justification or fail to draw a clear distinction between expert basic beliefs and other spontaneously formed beliefs. Nevertheless, some guidelines for a future solution will be provided.

  • 413.
    Vaassen, Bram
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Causal after all: a model of mental causation for dualists2019Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    In this dissertation, I develop and defend a model of causation that allows for dualist mental causation in worlds where the physical domain is physically complete.

    In Part I, I present the dualist ontology that will be assumed throughout the thesis and identify two challenges for models of mental causation within such an ontology: the exclusion worry and the common cause worry. I also argue that a proper response to these challenges requires a thoroughly lightweight account of causation, i.e. an account that allows for causes to be metaphysically distinct from the phenomena that produce or physically necessitate their effects.

    In Part II, I critically evaluate contemporary responses to these challenges from the philosophical literature. In particular, I discuss (i) List and Stoljar’s criticism of exclusion worries, (ii) Kroedel’s alternative dualist ontology, (iii) concerns about the notion of causal sufficiency, and (iv) Lowe’s models of dualist mental causation. I argue that none of these proposals provide independent motivation for a thoroughly lightweight account of causation and therefore leave room for improvement.

    In the first four chapters of Part III, I develop a thoroughly lightweight model of causation, which builds on interventionist approaches to causation. First, I explain how so-called ‘holding fixed’-requirements in standard interventionist accounts stand in the way of dualist mental causation. I then argue that interventionist accounts should impose a robustness condition on causal correlations and that, with this condition in place, the ‘holding fixed’-requirements can be weakened such that they do allow for dualist mental causation. I dub the interventionist model with such weakened ‘holding fixed’-requirements ‘insensitive interventionism’, argue that it can counter the exclusion worry as well as the common cause worry, and explain under which circumstances it would predict there to be dualist mental causation. Importantly, these circumstances might, for all we know, hold in the actual world.

    In the final three chapters of Part III, I defend insensitive interventionism against some objections. I consider the objection that causation must be productive, the objection that causes must (in some sense) physically necessitate their effects, and the objection that insensitive interventionism is too permissive. I respond by drawing from the literature on causation by absences and on the relation between causation and fundamental physics. Overall, insensitive interventionism performs as well as standard interventionist accounts. I conclude that insensitive interventionism is a credible model of causation.

  • 414.
    Vaassen, Bram
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies. 1630 Idésam, Umeå University.
    Dualism and Exclusion2019In: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Many philosophers argue that exclusion arguments cannot exclude non-reductionist physicalist mental properties from being causes without excluding properties that are patently causal as well. List and Stoljar (Australas J Philos 95(1):96–108, 2017) recently argued that a similar response to exclusion arguments is also available to dualists, thereby challenging the predominant view that exclusion arguments undermine dualist theories of mind. In particular, List and Stoljar maintain that exclusion arguments against dualism require a premise that states that, if a property is metaphysically distinct from the sufficient cause of an effect, this property cannot be a cause of that effect. I argue that this premise is indeed likely to exclude patently causal properties, but that exclusion arguments against dualism do not require this premise. The relation that enables metaphysically distinct properties to cause the same effect in the relevant way turns out to be tighter than the relation typically posited between dualist conscious properties and their underlying physical properties. It is therefore still plausible that the latter causally exclude the former and that compelling exclusion arguments against dualism can be formulated by using a weaker exclusion premise. I conclude by proposing such a formulation.

  • 415.
    Valijani, Alex
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Hermeneutisk orättvisa: Vit okunskap2019Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    In this essay i will explore whether Miranda Frickers definition of hermeneutical injustice isfavourable when analyzing cases of white ignorance as the phenomena has been characterized byCharles Mills. First, I will argue that the anomaly José Medina claim cases of white ignoranceconstitute is not necessarily incompatible with Frickers account. I will do so by considering suchcases as what Fricker calls ’midway cases’. Thereafter, I will argue that Frickers account issufficiently extensive to cover some cases of white ignorance. I will do so by bringing light to howwhite ignorance, similar to hermeneutical injustice, can be thought of as occurring structurally andepistemically non-culpable. However, since white ignorance not only is a structural but also awillful phenomena, while Frickers hermeneutical injustice is purely structural and non-culpable, Iwill ultimately argue that Frickers definition is not favourable when analyzing white ignorance assuch. Understanding white ignorance as a subcategory of hermeneutical injustice would obscurethe full range of the ignorance, why, I take it, the two phenomena should rather be seen as distinctfrom each other.

  • 416.
    van der Rijt, Jan-Willem
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    The Quest for a Rational Explanation: An Overview of the Development of Focal Point Theory2020In: Focal Points in Negotiation / [ed] Rudolf Schuessler & Jan-Willem van der Rijt, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 15-44Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 417.
    van der Rijt, Jan-Willem
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Schuessler, Rudolf
    University of Bayreuth, Department of Philosophy.
    Lessons for Theory and Practice2020In: Focal Points in Negotiation / [ed] Rudolf Schuessler & Jan-Willem van der Rijt, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 203-219Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 418.
    van der Rijt, Jan-Willem
    et al.
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Schuessler, Rudolf
    University of Bayreuth, Department of Philosophy.
    The Significance of Conspicuity2020In: Focal Points in Negotiation / [ed] Rudolf Schuessler & Jan-Willem van der Rijt, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 1-14Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 419.
    Verboy-Ekstrand, Marcus
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Visar Perebooms fyrfalls-argument att determinismen är ett hot mot moralisk förtjänst?2015Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 420.
    Vesterlund, Christian
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Frankfurt-style cases and responsibility for omissions2018Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    Frankfurt-style cases are purported counterexamples to the principle of alternate possibilities, since they arecases in which agents appear to be morally responsible for their actions, even though they lack the ability todo otherwise. Philip Swenson has recently challenged these Frankfurt-style cases as effective counterexamplesto PAP by presenting a scenario in which an agent seems to lack morally responsibility for failing to save achild, since he couldn’t do otherwise. And since there’s no morally relevant difference between this case ofomission, and the traditional Frankfurt-style cases, we should therefore conclude that the agents in theFrankfurt-style cases lack morally responsibility for their actions as well. In the following paper I argue thatone could simply run Swenson’s argument in reverse, thereby showing that it is the agent in his case that ismorally responsible for his omission, rather than the other way around, and that Swenson therefore has failedto demonstrate that Frankfurt-style cases should be rejected as effective counterexamples to PAP.

  • 421.
    Wahlberg, Mats
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    A Cosmological Argument against Physicalism2017In: European Journal of Philosophy of Religion, ISSN 1689-8311, Vol. 9, no 2, p. 165-188Article in journal (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    In this article, I present a Leibnizian cosmological argument to the conclusion that either the totality of physical beings has a non-physical cause, or a necessary being exists. The crucial premise of the argument is a restricted version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, namely the claim that every contingent physical phenomenon has a sufficient cause (PSR-P). I defend this principle by comparing it with a causal principle that is fundamental for physicalism, namely the Causal Closure of Physics, which says that every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause (CC). I find that the evidence for Causal Closure is weaker than the evidence for PSR-P, which means that physicalists who take CC to be justified must concede that PSR-P is also justified, and to a higher degree. Since my Leibnizian cosmological argument succeeds if PSR-P is granted, I conclude that physicalists must either give up CC and thereby physicalism, or accept that a necessary being exists.

  • 422.
    Wellen, Linus
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Legalisering av cannabis: Filosofiska argument för och emot från ett svenskt perspektiv2014Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 423.
    Wengelin Grantén, Elin
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    En Darwinistisk reduktionism2018Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    Alex Rosenbergʼs Darwinian reductionism is a more recent form of reductionism that aims at settling the dispute between reductionists and antireductionists in philosophy of biology. The idea is that the principle of natural selection can be viewed as a physico-chemical law that can ground biology in physics and chemistry, and hence make reductionism possible despite issues such as multiple realizability and downward causation. Rosenbergʼs proposal has received a lot of critique, so my aim is to investigate whether this critique is sound, and to enquire into whether Rosenbergʼs understandings of reductionism, antireductionism and physicalism are reasonable, and if Darwinian reductionism can survive the critique presented. My conclusion is that Rosenberg indeed is quite controversial and makes some strong claims, but also that a lot of the critique he receives is misguided and focused on asserting that Rosenberg is mistaken, rather than actually arguing against Rosenbergʼs claims. Despite some problematic assumptions, I do think that Rosenbergʼs proposal contributes to a philosophical pluralism within philosophy of biology.

  • 424.
    Wernberg, Johan
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    "Allt är mycket gott": Om Martinus metafysik och hur den kan ge stärkt stöd åt påståendet att Gud existerar2014Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
  • 425.
    Wernberg, Johan
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Det nödvändiga väsendet: En filosofisk analys av det kosmologiska argumentet2017Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (Two Years)), 20 credits / 30 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper I examine the existence of God through a focus on the cosmological argument as it ispresented here. My aim is to show that this argument provides support for the existence of God. To do this I examine that which I call the three steps of the cosmological argument: the first step being the accepting of the world as an ordered something, the second step being the ultimate question why this ordered something is there to begin with and the third step being that of God viewed as the only plausible answer. I argue that the ultimate question’s claim for an ultimate answer ought to be accepted due to the inability of individual things to explain the mere existence and order of things in general, which implies that the explanation for existence and order as such is to be searched beyond those things. Regarding the third step I argue that there has to be something rather than noting and that this something is to be viewed as something living due to the orderly nature of the world. From this I, finally, argue in favor of the explanatory value of a necessary being - i.e. God.

  • 426.
    Wettström, Rune
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Kan vi tro på kvalia?: En granskning av Amy Kinds underkännande av transparenstesen2017Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    In this thesis Amy Kind’s argument for qualia realism is scrutinized. In the paper from 2008, “How to Believe in Qualia”, she claims that the transparency thesis pose a threat to qualia realism. A major part of this thesis therefore deals with investigating her refutation of the transparency thesis. The thesis gives her some, but not fully, conclusive support and consequently gives some support for qualia realism. The thesis also sets out other arguments against the transparency thesis, arguments which however pose a threat to qualia realism.

  • 427.
    Wettström, Rune
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Kan vi tro på kvalia?: En granskning av Amy Kinds underkännande av transparenstesen2017Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    In this thesis Amy Kind’s argument for qualia realism is scrutinized. In the paper from 2008, “How to Believe in Qualia”, she claims that the transparency thesis pose a threat to qualia realism. A major part of this thesis therefore deals with investigating her refutation of the transparency thesis. The thesis gives her some, but not fully, conclusive support and consequently gives some support for qualia realism. The thesis also sets out other arguments against the transparency thesis, arguments which however pose a threat to qualia realism.

  • 428.
    Wiltse, Heather
    Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Umeå Institute of Design.
    Conceptualizing digital mediations2018Conference paper (Refereed)
    Abstract [en]

    Postphenomenology provides a productive framework for thinking through technological mediation. However, understanding digital mediations in particular requires further development and expansion of its conceptual toolkit, even as the orientation in postphenomenology toward ’the ways in which we are present in our world and the world is present to us’ (Verbeek 2005) highlights the very real mediations of these not-only-virtual technologies. In order to unpack the ways in which digital technologies can mediate perception and engagement by making activities visible, I have developed a conceptualization of digital material mediation involving substrates and traces (Wiltse 2014) . The ways in which digital technologies now often configure themselves in relation to particular users calls for analytic sensitivity to multiinstability (Redström and Wiltse 2015). Building on a conceptualization of digital networked things as fluid assemblages (Wiltse, Stolterman and Redström 2015;; Redström and Wiltse 2015), multiintentionality (Wiltse 2017) points to the multiple intentional relations involved in these things, including reverse intentionality in which use of a thing is a means for other actors to find out more about the one doing the using. This is the model of dataveillance in a contemporary context in which data is the resource fuelling social, economic, and governance processes. An incisive conceptualization of digital mediations is needed to understand and articulate the role they now play in not only experience, but also in distributions of power and agency, visibility and invisibility—and to provide insight on how to design in order to better care for their consequences.

  • 429.
    Wiltse, Heather
    Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Umeå Institute of Design.
    Mediating (Infra)structures: Technology, Media, Environment2017In: Postphenomenology and media: essays on human-media-world relations / [ed] Yoni Van Den Eede, Stacy O'Neal Irwin, Galit Wellner, Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, 2017, p. 3-25Chapter in book (Refereed)
  • 430.
    Wittfooth, Fredrik
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Consciousness and Freedom: The role of phenomenal consciousness in free will and free action2017Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    The issue of whether consciousness is necessary for free will has been largely ignored in the literature, despite the fact that many take this for granted. I will here argue that phenomenal consciousness is not causally or functionally necessary for free will or free action, at least according to Fischer and Ravizza’s “reasons-responsiveness”-account, but this seems true for most compatibilist theories on free will. Still, it seems that there can be no freedom without consciousness. I argue that this is because phenomenal consciousness is necessary for the “ownership” by an agent, of the choices and mechanisms that produce actions. Furthermore, I find Fischer and Ravizza’s proposed account on ownership lacking, and therefore propose an alternative that properly takes consciousness into account.

  • 431.
    Wittfooth, Fredrik
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Self-neuropathologisation and Psychopathology: Neuroscientific understanding, reification, objectification and subjectification2019Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (Two Years)), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    There is an increasing tendency among sufferers of psychopathology to construe their disorder primarily, or exclusively, in neuroscientific terms. I argue that this tendency can be understood as a symptom of a lack of recognition, resulting in a tactic of construing one’s psychopathology in overly objective and neuroscientific terms. The question is whether this is a sound way of understanding and relating to one’s psychopathology. I argue that it is not. Such construals are problematic since they erroneously construe psychopathology as thing-like, or so I will argue. I also argue that an excessively neuroscientific understanding of psychopathology is problematic to the extent that it objectifies sufferers, for instance by inviting them to view themselves as causal systems lacking freedom and responsibility. Lastly, I argue that such self-objectification can become a way of understanding and classifying oneself, and constituting oneself as a neuroscientific subject.

  • 432.
    Wittfooth, Fredrik
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    What is a Mental State?: The Phenomenal Individuation of Mental States2018Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (One Year)), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    Mental states are usually thought to be individuated by two different individuation principles: one for intentional states and one for phenomenal states. This calls in question the underlying unity of the mental. I’ll here argue that this Standard View of individuating mental states can have several unwanted consequences if combined with other common assumptions. These mainly concern the individuation of intentional states, and, more specifically, individuation by content. I propose that all mental states should be individuated by one individuation principle, namely by phenomenology. I’ll, then, reply to some objections to this view.

  • 433.
    Yliaho, Linda Charlotta
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Rättvisa för ickemänskliga djur: En filosofisk undersökning av Martha C. Nussbaums förmågemodell och dess perspektiv på rättvisa över artgränserna2016Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [sv]

    Syftet med denna uppsats har varit att granska påståenden om djurs rättigheter och tolkningen av rättvisa för ickemänskliga djur utifrån Martha C. Nussbaums förmågemodell, och undersöka om den är förenlig med en fortsatt djurhållning. För att besvara min frågeställning har jag studerat Nussbaums förslag om hur människan kan och bör främja förmågor när det kommer till andra arter, samt direkta liksom indirekta kommentarer inom ämnet från utilitaristen Peter Singer och abolitionisten Gary L. Francione.

    Nussbaum är trevande i sitt försvar av rättigheter för ickemänskliga djur och motsätter sig inte dödandet av dem – även om detta konstateras som en form av skada, görs viss skillnad mellan olika arter och dödandet av dem värderas olika både utifrån art och syfte. Denna tanke återfinns inom utilitarismen, där det främsta målet är att minska lidande men dödandet av andra arter kan rättfärdigas av ändamål såsom kulinarisk njutning och ekonomisk vinning.

    Inom det abolitionistiska synsättet krävs nolltolerans när det gäller nyttjandet och dödandet av ickemänskliga djur, grundat i att det saknas en moralisk grund för människan att döda kännande varelser när andra valmöjligheter finns.

    Min slutsats blev att oavsett vilken teori vi ansluter oss till har vi i egenskap av människor en maktposition i relationen till ickemänskliga djur, vilket medför en skyldighet att inte utsätta andra arter för lidande eller ta deras liv ifrån dem då det inte är en fråga om en absolut nödvändighet.

  • 434.
    Öhman Mägi, Daniel
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Mening och moral: - Är minimal moralisk anständighet nödvändigt för ett meningsfullt liv?2017Independent thesis Advanced level (degree of Master (Two Years)), 20 credits / 30 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    In this thesis, I argue for the hypothesis that a minimal moral decency is in fact a criterion for livinga meaningful life. To argue that point I present four different arguments about the relation between morality and a meaningful life. These four arguments are grounded in different forms of theories that discuss the concept and conceptions of meaning and a meaningful life. The four arguments are built on the philosophies of: John Cottingham, Laurence Thomas, Susan Wolf and Thaddeus Metz. Two of the arguments are in favor of morality being a criterion for a meaningful life while the other two are against it. The most powerful argument against morality being a part of a meaningful life is built on Metz fundamentality theory which is presented last in the thesis. When we look closer upon Metz description of anti-matter, which can be considered to be the opposite of meaning, come to the conclusion that when avoiding certain anti-matter we live lives with a minimal form of moral decency. The conclusion of this thesis is that a minimal moral decency is in fact a criterion for a meaningful life.

  • 435.
    Österlund, Henrik
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    Contestability and Legitimacy: The Case for Contestability as Political Legitimization in the Presence of Problematic Contracts2019Independent thesis Basic level (degree of Bachelor), 10 credits / 15 HE creditsStudent thesis
    Abstract [en]

    In this essay, I discuss the merits of contestability in contrast with consent as a meansof legitimizing the state. Particularly I have been concerned with problematiccontracts: Contracts with undefined obligations and their implications on thelegitimacy of voluntarist consent. Through my argumentation, I have shown thatvoluntarist consent to political mandates has a hard time legitimizing politicalauthority in the presence of problematic contracts – and instead, that legitimationbased on the the ability to contest decisions may provide a better degree of politicallegitimacy. Contestability can seemingly also be combined with elements of voluntaristconsent to further cement the legitimacy of decisions.

  • 436.
    Östman, Jesper
    Umeå University, Faculty of Arts, Department of historical, philosophical and religious studies.
    It's All in the Brain: A Theory of the Qualities of Perception2013Doctoral thesis, monograph (Other academic)
    Abstract [en]

    This dissertation concerns the location and nature of phenomenal qualities. Arguably, these qualities naively seem to belong to perceived external objects. However, we also seem to experience phenomenal qualities in hallucinations, and in hallucinations we do not perceive any external objects. I present and argue for a theory of the phenomenal qualities, "brain theory", which claims that all phenomenal qualities we experience are physical properties instantiated in the brain, regardless of whether they are experienced in veridical perceptions or in hallucinations.

    I begin by more carefully identifying the phenomenal qualities, discussing how they are related to "qualia" and "phenomenal character". Then I present brain theory, and investigate its implications for the perceptual relations we stand in to external objects, noting that it is mostly neutral. I also compare brain theory to a similar theory of perception advocated by Bertrand Russell. Next, I provide an overview over the competing theories of phenomenal qualities, and relate them to theories of perception, such as representationalism, qualia theory, sense data theory and disjunctivism.

    The majority of my argumentation for brain theory focuses on arguing that the phenomenal qualities are instantiated in the brain, rather than on arguing that they are physical properties. Instead, I largely assume physicalism. However, even independently of the physicalism assumption, I show that we have reason to believe that phenomenal qualities are experienced in hallucinations, and that qualities experienced in hallucinations are instantiated in internal objects, such as our brains or sense data. In the first step towards this conclusion I argue that theories which deny that phenomenal qualities are experienced in hallucinations face serious problems. In the next step I argue that theories which deny that phenomenal qualities experienced in hallucinations are instantiated in internal objects face serious problems. Finally, an important part of the argumentation is my replies to objections against brain theory, including common sense objections and the "observation objection". From these conclusions, together with the physicalism assumption, I infer that we have reason to believe that brain theory is true about hallucinations. On this basis, I then argue, through a generalizing argument, that the same is the case for veridical perceptions.

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