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  • 51.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, Göteborg University, Göteborg, Sweden.
    When the Joneses’ consumption hurts: Optimal public good provision and nonlinear income taxation2008Inngår i: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 92, nr 5-6, s. 986-997Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper considers a model with nonlinear income taxation and public good provision when people care about their relative consumption compared to others. The standard optimality expressions are modified by terms that reflect the extent to which people care about relative consumption. The extent to which the public good provision rule should be modified is shown to depend critically on the preference elicitation format. The modified tax formulas imply substantially higher marginal income tax rates than in the conventional case, under plausible assumptions and available empirical estimates regarding comparison consumption concerns.

  • 52.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Social Comparisons and Optimal Taxation in a Small Open Economy2016Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 53.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Social Comparisons and Optimal Taxation in a Small Open Economy2019Inngår i: Scandinavian Journal of Economics, ISSN 0347-0520, E-ISSN 1467-9442, Vol. 121, nr 4, s. 1500-1532Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    In this paper, we analyze how international capital mobility affects the optimal labor and capital income tax policy in a small open economy when consumers care about relative consumption. The main results crucially depend on whether the government can tax returns on savings abroad. If the government can use flexible residence-based capital income taxes, then the optimal policy rules from a closed economy largely carry over to the case of a small open economy. If it cannot, then capital income taxes become completely ineffective. The labor income taxes must then indirectly also reflect the corrective purpose that the absent capital income tax would have had.

  • 54.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Wendner, Ronald
    University of Graz, Österrike.
    Charity as income redistribution: a model with optimal taxation, status, and social stigma2019Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    In light of the increasing inequality in many countries, this paper analyzes redistributive charitable giving from the rich to the poor in a model of optimal nonlinear income taxation. Our framework integrates (i) public and private redistribution, (ii) the warm glow of giving and stigma of receiving charitable donations, and (iii) status concerns emanating from social comparisons with respect to charitable donations and private consumption. Whether charity should be taxed or supported largely depends on the relative strengths of the warm glow of giving and the stigma of receiving charity, respectively, and on the positional externalities caused by charitable donations. In addition, imposing stigma on the mimicker (which relaxes the self-selection constraint) strengthens the case for subsidizing charity. We also consider a case where the government is unable to target the charitable giving through a direct tax instrument, and we examine how the optimal marginal income tax structure should be adjusted in response to charitable giving. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the quantitative effects of the aforementioned mechanisms can be substantial.

  • 55.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Wendner, Ronald
    Úniversity of Graz, Österrike.
    Charity, status, and optimal taxation: welfarist and paternalist approaches2019Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper deals with tax policy responses to charitable giving, defined in terms of voluntary contributions to a public good, to which the government also contributes through public revenue; the set of tax instruments contains general, nonlinear taxes on income and charitable giving. In addition to consumption, leisure and a public good, individuals obtain utility from the warm glow of giving and social status generated by their relative contributions to charity as well as their relative consumption compared with others. We analyze the conditions under which it is optimal to tax or subsidize charitable giving and derive corresponding optimal policy rules. Another aim of the paper is to compare the optimal tax policy and public good provision by a conventional welfarist government with those by two kinds of paternalist governments: The first kind does not respect the consumer preferences for status in terms of relative giving and relative consumption, while the second kind in addition does not respect preferences for warm glow of giving. The optimal policy rules for marginal taxation and public good provision are similar across governments, except for the stronger incentive to tax charitable giving at the margin under the more extensive kind of paternalism. Numerical simulations supplement the theoretical results.

  • 56.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Johansson-Stenman, Olof
    Göteborgs universitet.
    Wendner, Ronald
    University of Graz.
    Redistribution through Charity and Optimal Taxation when People are Concerned with Social Status2016Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 57.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Koskela, Erkki
    Helsingfors universitet.
    Optimal income taxation, outsourcing and policy cooperation in a dynamic economy2009Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 58.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Koskela, Erkki
    University of Helsinki, Department of Economics.
    Outsourcing and optimal nonlinear taxation: a note2009Inngår i: Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765, E-ISSN 1873-7374, Vol. 102, nr 2, s. 135-137Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns optimal taxation and outsourcing. If the government has a direct instrument for taxing outsourcing, the policy rules for marginal income taxation remain as in the standard model. Otherwise, outsourcing contributes to a more progressive income tax structure.

  • 59.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Koskela, Erkki
    Helsingfors universitet.
    Outsourcing, public input provision and policy cooperation2009Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 60.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Koskela, Erkki
    Helsingfors universitet.
    Redistributive income taxation under outsourcing and foreign direct investment2011Inngår i: Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765, E-ISSN 1873-7374, Vol. 110, nr 2, s. 86-89Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper deals with optimal income taxation under international outsourcing and FDI. We show how the joint effect of outsourcing and FDI on the optimal marginal income tax rates depends on whether FDI is horizontal or vertical.

  • 61.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Lundberg, Johan
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM). Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Wikström, Magnus
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Regional income growth and net migration in Sweden, 1970-19952001Inngår i: Regional studies, ISSN 0034-3404, E-ISSN 1360-0591, Vol. 35, nr 9, s. 823-830Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns the regional growth pattern in Sweden, and the purpose is to analyse what factors determine the growth rate of average income and the net migration at the regional level. We find a negative relationship between the initial level of regional average income and subsequent income growth. The results also imply that the initial endowment of human capital (measured as the percentage of the population with higher education) has a positive effect on the subsequent net migration. Other determinants of regional income growth and population movements are 'fixed endowments' (related to geography and climate) and regional labour market characteristics.

  • 62.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Lundberg, Johan
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi. Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Centrum för regionalvetenskap (CERUM).
    Wikström, Magnus
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    The Impact of regional public expenditures on the local decision to spend2000Inngår i: Regional Science and Urban Economics, ISSN 0166-0462, E-ISSN 1879-2308, Vol. 30, nr 2, s. 185-202Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper studies the hypothesis that local (municipal) expenditures in part can be explained by the expenditures of the regional (county) government. To accomplish this task, we derive and estimate a model of local public (municipal) spending that is defined conditional on the level of regional public expenditures. The empirical analysis is based on panel data from the Swedish local public sector for the time period 1981–1986. Among the results, we find that the hypothesis that regional expenditures are weakly separable from local expenditures can be rejected. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the regional expenditures are weakly exogenous in the local expenditure equation.

  • 63.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    An introduction to the theory of social accounting2010Inngår i: Handbook of environmental accounting / [ed] Thomas Aronsson & Karl-Gustaf Löfgren, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010, s. 1-27Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 64.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Löfgren, Karl-GustafUmeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Handbook of environmental accounting2010Collection/Antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 65.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    National product related welfare measures in the presence of technological change, externalities and uncertainty2011Inngår i: Green national accounting and sustainability / [ed] Chuan-Zhong Li och Karl-Gustaf Löfgren, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, s. 178-189Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The purpose of this paper is to discuss under what conditions welfare can be measured by observables related to the national product (or Hamiltonian along the optimal trajectory). Under nonattributable technological or environmental change, welfare will depend on time itself, meaning that the Hamiltonian along the optimal trajectory will be a biased measure of welfare. This result will also hold if we make the time dependence of welfare endogenous, by replacing technological change will externalities that are not internalized during optimization. On the other hand, if we take the externalities fully into account, then the Hamiltonian will represent the appropriate measure of welfare. Similar results also hold in the case of uncertainty, where we show that a ‘generalized’ Hamiltonian provides a welfare measure, and that the deterministic measures are special cases of their stochastic counterparts.

  • 66.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Welfare equivalent NNP and habit formation2008Inngår i: Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765, E-ISSN 1873-7374, Vol. 98, nr 1, s. 84-88sArtikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This note concerns the importance of habit formation for social accounting. With internal habit formation, earlier procedures for welfare measurement in the first best apply with minor modifications. This result strengthens the idea behind using the comprehensive net national product as a welfare indicator. If, on the other hand, part of the habit formation is exogenous to each consumer, the exact welfare measure will also reflect the associated external effect.

  • 67.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Backlund, Kenneth
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Welfare measurement in imperfect markets: A growth theoretical approach2004Bok (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 68.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Löfgren, Karl-Gustaf
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Marklund, Per-Olov
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    On output of the Swedish education sector: Additional remarks1999Inngår i: The Review of Income and Wealth, ISSN 0034-6586, E-ISSN 1475-4991, Vol. 45, nr 4, s. 535-542Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    The main purpose of this paper is to relate the empirical attempt of measuring output from the education sector to theoretical results about the welfare significance of an extended net national product (NNP) measure. We show that economic theory provides a more focused way of interpreting such output estimates, which has not been recognized in previous studies. The paper also contains new estimates of the output from the Swedish education sector.

  • 69.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Mannberg, Andrea
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Positional preferences for housing: income taxation as a second best policy2014Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyzes whether marginal taxation of labor and capital income might be useful second best instruments for internalizing the externalities caused by conspicuous housing consumption, when the government is unable to implement a first best corrective tax on housing wealth. The rationale for studying income taxation in this particular context is that first best taxes on housing wealth may be infeasible (at least in a shorter time perspective), while income taxes indirectly affect both the level and composition of accumulated wealth. We show that a suboptimally low tax on housing wealth provides an incentive for the government to subsidize financial saving and tax labor income at the margin.

  • 70.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Mannberg, Andrea
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi. Tromsø University Business School, Tromsø, Norway.
    Relative consumption of housing: marginal saving subsidies and income taxes as a second-best policy?2015Inngår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, ISSN 0167-2681, E-ISSN 1879-1751, Vol. 116, s. 439-450Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyzes whether marginal taxation of labor and capital income are useful second best instruments for internalizing the externalities caused by conspicuous housing consumption, when the government is unable to implement a first best corrective tax on housing wealth. The rationale for studying income taxation in this particular context is that first best taxes on housing wealth may be infeasible (at least in a shorter time perspective), while income taxes indirectly affect both the level and composition of accumulated wealth. We show that a suboptimally low tax on housing wealth provides an incentive for the government to subsidize financial saving and tax labor income at the margin.

  • 71.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Mannberg, Andrea
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Self-Control Problems and Conspicuous Housing Consumption: Implications for Tax Policy2013Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 72.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Markström, Mikael
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Public provision of private goods and equilibrium unemployment2005Inngår i: Finanzarchiv, ISSN 0015-2218, E-ISSN 1614-0974, Vol. 61, nr 3, s. 353-367Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper deals with public provision of a private good in a two-type model with optimal nonlinear income taxation. We assume that the wage rates are determined by bargaining between unions and firms, meaning that the equilibrium is characterized by unemployment. The results show that imperfect competition in the labor market gives rise to additional policy incentives associated with the self-selection constraint, which may justify either more or less public provision than under perfect competition. The paper also addresses employment-related motives behind public provision of private goods.

  • 73.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Micheletto, Luca
    University of Milan.
    Optimal Redistributive Income Taxation and Efficiency Wages2017Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 74.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Micheletto, Luca
    Uppsala Center for Fiscal Studies (UCFS), Uppsala University, SE 753 13 Uppsala, Sweden; Bocconi University, Italy .
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    A Note on Public Goods in a Decentralized Fiscal Union: Implications of a Participation Constraint2014Inngår i: Journal of Urban Economics, ISSN 0094-1190, E-ISSN 1095-9068, Vol. 84, s. 1-8Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper re-examines the question of whether federal ex-post redistribution in terms of public funds leads to under-provision of public goods when member states may leave the economic federation. We show that federal ex-post redistribution under a binding participation constraint does not necessarily mean under-provision of local and federal public goods.

  • 75.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Micheletto, Luca
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    A Note on Public Goods in a Voluntary Federal Union: Implications of a Participation Constraint2012Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 76.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Micheletto, Luca
    Bocconi University, Milan, Italy.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Public Goods in a Voluntary Federal Union: Implications of a Participation Constraint2012Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 77.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Persson, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Decentralized fiscal federalism revisited: Optimal income taxation and public goods under horizontal leadership2012Inngår i: Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765, E-ISSN 1873-7374, Vol. 117, nr 1, s. 223-226Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns optimal taxation and public goods in an economic federation with decentralized leadership, where one lower level government is the first mover also in the horizontal dimension. Under plausible assumptions, horizontal leadership reinforces the incentives created by decentralized leadership.

  • 78.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Persson, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Does wage bargaining justify environmental policy coordination?2008Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper analyzes the welfare consequences of coordinated tax reforms in an economy where a transboundary environmental externality and an international wage bargaining externality are operative at the same time. We assume that the wage in each country is decided upon in a bargain between trade-unions and firms, and the wage bargaining externality arises because the fall-back profit facing firms depends on the profit they can earn if moving production abroad. Using the noncooperative Nash equilibrium as a reference case, our results imply that the international wage bargaining externality may either reinforce or weaken the welfare gain of a coordinated increase in environmental taxation, depending on (among other things) how the reform affects the wage. For a special case, we also derive an exact condition under which a coordinated increase in the environmental tax leads to higher welfare.

  • 79.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Persson, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Mixed Taxation and Transboundary Externalities: A Model with Large Jurisdictions2014Inngår i: Public Finance Review, ISSN 1091-1421, E-ISSN 1552-7530, Vol. 42, nr 2, s. 254-282Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns income taxation and commodity taxation in a multi-jurisdiction framework with transboundary environmental damage. The decision-problem facing the government in each such jurisdiction is represented by a two-type model (with asymmetric information between the government and the private sector). We show how the possibility to influence the world-market producer price adds mechanisms of relevance for redistribution and externality-correction which, in turn, affect the domestic use of taxation. Finally, with the noncooperative Nash equilibrium as a reference case, we consider the welfare effects of policy coordination.

  • 80.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Persson, Lars
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Mixed taxation, public goods and transboundary externalities: a model with large jurisdictions2008Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns income taxation, commodity taxation, production taxation and public good provision in a multi-jurisdiction framework with transboundary environmental damage. We assume that each jurisdiction is large in the sense that its government is able to influence the world-market producer price of the externality-generating commodity. The decision-problem facing the government in each such jurisdiction is represented by a two-type model (with asymmetric information between the government and the private sector). We show how the possibility to influence the world-market producer price adds mechanisms of relevance for redistribution and externality-correction which, in turn, affect the domestic use of taxation and public goods. Finally, with the noncooperative Nash equilibrium as a reference case, we consider the welfare effects of policy coordination.

  • 81.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Schöb, Ronnie
    Adaptation, Anticipation-Bias and Optimal Income Taxation2012Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Adaptation is omnipresent but people systematically fail to correctly anticipate the degree to which they adapt. This leads individuals to make inefficient intertemporal decisions. This paper concerns optimal income taxation to correct for such anticipation-biases in a framework where consumers adapt to earlier consumption levels through a habit-formation process. The analysis is based on a general equilibrium OLG model with endogenous labor supply and savings where each consumer lives for three periods. Our results show how a paternalistic government may correct for the effects of anticipation-bias through a combination of time-variant marginal labor income taxes and savings subsidies. Furthermore, the optimal policy mix remains the same, irrespective of whether consumers commit to their original life-time plan for work hours and savings decided upon in the first period of life or re-optimize later on when realizing the failure to adapt.

  • 82.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Schöb, Ronnie
    Freie Universität, Berlin.
    Adaptation, taxation and public goods2014Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper shows how the first-best and second-best rules for optimal public good provision depend on the adaptation to private and public consumption. Adaptation in private consumption typically leads to over-provision relative to the Samuelson condition, while adaptation in public consumption works the other way around. The two sources of adaptation only cancel out in the extreme case of full adaptation.

  • 83.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Schöb, Ronnie
    Freie Universität, Berlin.
    Climate change and psychological adaptation: a behavioral environmental economics approach2014Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    Economic models of climate policy (or policies to combat other environmental problems) typically neglect psychological adaptation to changing life circumstances. People may adapt or become more sensitive, to different degrees, to a deteriorated environment. The present paper addresses these issues in a simple model of tax policy to combat climate change and elaborates on the consequences for optimal climate policies, and argues from a normative point of view that psychological adaptation needs to be taken into account by a pure welfarist government, which aims at internalizing an intertemporal externality.

  • 84.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Schöb, Ronnie
    Climate change and psychological adaptation: A behavioral environmental economics approach2018Inngår i: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, ISSN 2214-8043, E-ISSN 2214-8051, Vol. 74, s. 79-84Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Economic models of climate policy (or policies to combat other environmental problems) typically neglect psychological adaptation to changing life circumstances. People may adapt, to different degrees, to a deteriorated environment. The present paper addresses these issues in a model of optimal tax policy to combat climate change and discusses the consequences for optimal climate policies. Furthermore, from a normative-methodological point of view, we argue that psychological adaptation needs to be taken into account even by a pure welfarist policy maker, who aims at internalizing an intertemporal externality.

  • 85.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Schöb, Ronnie
    Freie Universität, Berlin.
    Consumption adaptation, anticipation-bias, and optimal income taxation2017Inngår i: Journal of Public Economic Theory, ISSN 1097-3923, E-ISSN 1467-9779, Vol. 19, nr 3, s. 713-731Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    Adaptation is omnipresent but people systematically fail to correctly anticipate the degree to which they adapt, leading them to make irrational intertemporal decisions. This paper concerns optimal income taxation to correct for such anticipation-biases in a framework where consumers adapt to earlier consumption levels. The analysis is based on a general equilibrium OLG model with endogenous labor supply and savings where each consumer lives for three periods. The results show how a paternalistic government may correct for the effects of anticipation-bias through a combination of time-variant-marginal labor income taxes and savings subsidies/taxes. The optimal policy mix remains the same, irrespective of whether consumers commit to their original life time plan for work hours and consumption or reoptimize later on when realizing that they have already adapted more than expected.

  • 86.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Schöb, Ronnie
    Freie Universität, Berlin.
    Habit Formation and the Pareto-Efficient Provision of Public Goods2017Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 87.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    An optimal tax approach to alcohol policy2010Inngår i: Finanzarchiv, ISSN 0015-2218, E-ISSN 1614-0974, Vol. 66, nr 2, s. 153-169Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper deals with optimal income and commodity taxation in an economy, where alcohol is an externality-generating consumption good. In our model, alcohol can be bought domestically, imported, or produced illegally. Border trade alone implies an incentive to set the domestic alcohol tax below the marginal social damage of alcohol, and to tax (subsidize) commodities that are complementary with (substitutable for) alcohol. The income tax will also be used as a corrective instrument. Furthermore, although the effects of adding illegal production are ambiguous in general, a realistic outcome is, nevertheless, that it reduces both the optimal alcohol tax and the marginal income tax rate.

  • 88.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Efficient taxation, wage bargaining and policy coordination2004Inngår i: Journal of Public Economics, ISSN 0047-2727, E-ISSN 1879-2316, Vol. 88, nr 12, s. 2711-2725Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper is related to the literature on optimal nonlinear taxation under right-to-manage wage formation, and we assume that the fall-back profit facing firms during wage bargaining depends on the profit they can obtain if moving production abroad. The purpose is to study how policy coordination among countries can be used to increase the welfare level in comparison with an uncoordinated equilibrium. We consider coordinated policy reforms with respect to the marginal taxation of labor income, the unemployment benefit and the provision of a public good. The results show that policy coordination that leads to fewer hours of work per employee and/or a reduction of the unemployment benefit will increase welfare compared to the uncoordinated equilibrium.

  • 89.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Income Taxation, Commodity Taxation and Provision of Public Goods under Labor Market Distortions2003Inngår i: FinanzArchiv, Vol. 59, nr 3, s. 347-370Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 90.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Nationalekonomi.
    Is the Optimal Labor Income Tax Progressive in a Unionized Economy?2004Inngår i: The Scandinavian Journal of EconomicsArtikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 91.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Optimal income taxation and social norms in the Labor market2010Inngår i: International Tax and Public Finance, ISSN 0927-5940, E-ISSN 1573-6970, Vol. 17, nr 1, s. 67-89Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns optimal income taxation in a two-type model extended to allow for social interaction and social norms in the labor market. One norm refers to “normal behavior” with respect to work hours (the hours of work norm), whereas another means that “one should earn one’s living by working” (the participation norm). The results show how the hours of work norm gives rise to a corrective motive for using income taxation. We also show how the interaction between the hours of work norm and the private incentive to participate in the labor market (which reflects the participation norm) gives rise to an employment motive for using the income tax.

  • 92.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Optimal Taxation, Redistribution, and Environmental Externalities2017Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 93.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Optimal Taxation, Redistribution, and Environmental Externalities2017Inngår i: International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, ISSN 1932-1465, E-ISSN 1932-1473, Vol. 11, nr 3, s. 233-308Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper surveys research on optimal redistributive taxation in economies with environmental externalities. A key question is whether externality correction only motivates an adjustment of the tax policy rule for the externality-generating activity, or whether the marginal value of the externality directly enters the policy rules for other tax instruments as well. In a static benchmark model with an atmospheric consumption externality, where the government uses a mix of a nonlinear income tax and linear commodity taxes, one can show that Sandmo's (1975) additivity property applies. This means that externality correction leads to an additional term (measuring the marginal value of the externality) in the commodity tax formula for the externality-generating good, while the policy rules for commodity taxation of clean goods and marginal income taxation take the same form as in the absence of any externality. We also extend this benchmark model to capture a number of scenarios (such as non-atmospheric externalities, border trade in the externality-generating good, and competition between governments in a multi-country framework), where the additivity property no longer applies. We end by examining an intertemporal model of optimal taxation with a stock-externality, allowing us to integrate the study of optimal redistributive taxation with literature on environmental economics and policy based on dynamic models.

  • 94.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Quasi-hyperbolic discounting and mixed taxation2009Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
  • 95.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Quasi-hyperbolic discounting, paternalism and optimal mixed taxation2016Inngår i: Mathematical Social Sciences, ISSN 0165-4896, E-ISSN 1879-3118, Vol. 84, s. 24-36Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper develops a dynamic model with endogenous labor supply, savings and health capital, where the consumers differ in ability as well as suffer from a self-control problem generated by quasi-hyperbolic discounting. The purpose is to analyze how a paternalistic government, which implements a time-consistent mix of labor income taxation, capital income taxation and commodity taxation, ought to use this tax system for purposes of redistribution and correction when individual ability is private information. Among the results, we show how the (nonlinear) income taxes ought to be used as indirect instruments for influencing the commodity demand behavior at the individual level: the intuition is that linear commodity taxes are not flexible enough to achieve proper incentives for consumption of unhealthy goods.

  • 96.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Tax policy and present-biased preferences: paternalism under international capital mobility2014Inngår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, ISSN 0167-2681, E-ISSN 1879-1751, Vol. 106, nr October, s. 298-316Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper deals with tax-policy responses to quasi-hyperbolic discounting. Earlier research on optimal paternalism typically abstracts from capital mobility. If capital is mobile between countries, it may no longer be possible for national governments to control domestic savings via capital taxation (as in a closed economy). In this paper, we take a broad perspective on public policy responses to self-control problems by showing how these responses vary (i) between closed and open economies, (ii) between small open and large open economies, and (iii) depending on whether or not both source based and residence based capital taxes can be used.

  • 97.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Dalin, Torbjörn
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
    Optimal taxation and redistribution in an OLG model with unemployment2009Inngår i: International Tax and Public Finance, ISSN 0927-5940, E-ISSN 1573-6970, Vol. 16, nr 2, s. 198-218Artikkel i tidsskrift (Fagfellevurdert)
  • 98.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Sjögren, Tomas
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Witterblad, Mikael
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Optimal taxation and asymmetric information in an economy with second-hand trade2008Rapport (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns optimal income and commodity taxation in a two-type overlapping generations model, where used durable goods are traded in a second-hand market. As second-hand transactions are difficult to observe, we assume that the government is unable to directly control second-hand transactions via commodity taxation. A basic question is how the government in this case may use the second-hand market as a channel for relaxation of the self-selection constraint. We show how the appearance of a second-hand market for used durable goods affects the optimal use of labor income and capital income taxation as well as the optimal use of commodity taxation on new durable goods.

  • 99.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    Thunström, Linda
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Institutionen för nationalekonomi.
    A note on optimal paternalism and health capital subsidies2008Inngår i: Economics Letters, ISSN 0165-1765, E-ISSN 1873-7374, Vol. 101, nr 3, s. 241-242Artikkel i tidsskrift (Annet vitenskapelig)
    Abstract [en]

    This paper concerns the policy implications of a potential self-control problem underlying the consumption of unhealthy food. Our results show that subsidies on wealth and healthcapital can be used to implement a socially optimal resource allocation.

  • 100.
    Aronsson, Thomas
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskaplig fakultet, Nationalekonomi.
    Walker, James
    Arbetsutbud, skattebas och ekonomisk politik2005Inngår i: NBER rapporten 2, SNS förlag , 2005Kapittel i bok, del av antologi (Fagfellevurdert)
123 51 - 100 of 107
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