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I en tid då skyddet för grundläggande rättigheter och värnet mot otillbörlig maktutövning blir allt mer aktuellt är den konstitutionella rättens betydelse för rättssystemet och rättsstaten påtaglig. De gränser som den konstitutionella rätten ställer upp för utövandet av offentlig makt ökar således i betydelse, men samtidigt blir det konstitutionellrättsliga läget allt mer komplext, inte minst på grund av europarättens inflytande.Konstitutionell rätt behandlar den konstitutionella rättens tre centrala teman:Maktdelning och andra förutsättningar för utövande av offentlig makt, skyddet för grundläggande rättigheter samt rättsligt genomdrivande av konstitutionellrättsliga normer. Utifrån dessa tre teman behandlar författarna konstitutionella bestämmelser med ursprung i svensk nationell rätt, EU-rätten och Europakonventionen om mänskliga rättigheter.Boken är anpassad för att kunna användas som lärobok på juristutbildningen, men riktar sig också till en bredare publik. Konstitutionell rätt är relevant läsning för såväl erfarna jurister som läsare som är intresserade av konstitutionella frågor mer allmänt.

I turbulenta tider, då grundläggande rättigheter och begränsningar för maktutövning utmanas, ökar betydelsen av de gränser som den konstitutionella rätten ställer upp för utövandet av offentlig makt. Samtidigt blir det konstitutionellrättsliga läget allt mer komplext, inte minst på grund av europarättens inflytande.

Konstitutionell rätt behandlar den konstitutionella rättens tre centrala teman: maktdelning och andra förutsättningar för utövande av offentlig makt, skyddet för grundläggande rättigheter samt rättsligt genomdrivande av konstitutionellrättsliga normer. Utifrån dessa tre teman behandlar författarna konstitutionella bestämmelser med ursprung i svensk nationell rätt, EU-rätten och Europakonventionen om mänskliga rättigheter.

Boken är anpassad för att kunna användas som lärobok på juristutbildningen, men riktar sig också till en bredare publik. Konstitutionell rätt är relevant läsning för såväl erfarna jurister som läsare som är intresserade av konstitutionella frågor mer allmänt. Denna andra upplaga är påtagligt omarbetad och utvidgad.

Public and private organizations are increasingly implementing various algorithmic decision-making systems. Through legal and practical incentives, humans will often need to be kept in the loop of such decision-making to maintain human agency and accountability, provide legal safeguards, or perform quality control. Introducing such human oversight results in various forms of semi-automated, or hybrid decision-making – where algorithmic and human agents interact. Building on previous research we illustrate the legal dependencies forming an impetus for hybrid decision-making in the policing, social welfare, and online moderation contexts. We highlight the further need to situate hybrid decision-making in a wider legal environment of data protection, constitutional and administrative legal principles, as well as the need for contextual analysis of such principles. Finally, we outline a research agenda to capture contextual legal dependencies of hybrid decision-making, pointing to the need to go beyond legal doctrinal studies by adopting socio-technical perspectives and empirical studies.

This article analyses the issue of online antagonism (defined as antagonistic harassment, defamation, insults and threats online) and the positive obligations of states to counter such antagonism under the European Convention on Human Rights, from a legal and victimological perspective. The article illustrates how the necessary balancing between positive obligations to protect privacy under article 8, and the protection of freedom of speech under article 10, will result in different levels of protection depending on the victim and the type of victimisation in question. This may affect the possibilities for individual victims to gain legal redress, specifically access to the criminal justice system. By comparisons to the current Swedish legislative context, the article highlights some avenues for legislatures to enhance protection for certain groups without interfering with article 10. It also concludes that a failure to protect victims of online antagonism through criminal law may ipso facto weaken the foundations of public discourse that article 10 is supposed to protect, which should be taken into account in a balancing of the rights in question. 

EU law places a number of requirements on administrative authorities that puts them in potentially invidious positions; while EU law today does not require institutionally independent administrative authorities or provide protection for the independence of authorities beyond the field of data protection, it does require administrative authorities to act independently through the loyal and effective enforcement of EU law. This requirement of acting independently without institutional independence raises certain implications for the role of administrative authorities acting within the hierarchical administrative orders of Member States. Using the case of Sweden – a Member State where administrative authorities enjoy significant constitutionally protected independence in the application of law and decision of cases – this article argues that the effect of EU law obligations of effectiveness and loyalty is a weakening of the hierarchical influence of the government over its own authorities, with a resulting shift of influence towards the legal arena through the provision of politically expedient interpretations of EU law. The invidious position of administrative authorities within the scope of EU law is likely to make them vulnerable to such influence, which may ultimately interfere with the effective administration of EU law.

This contribution examines the relationship between automation, discretion, and proportionality. It argues that automation efforts in public administration need to be further discussed and analyzed in relation to requirements of proportionality flowing from both national and European law, as the principle carries important implications for both the implementation of automated systems and the responsibilities of decision-makers within those systems. The different facets of proportionality flowing from, inter alia, constitutional, and human rights law, administrative law, and data protection law are explored, with four distinct stages of proportionality analysis identified: legislative, system, decision, and ex post proportionality. These stages all carry different implications for discretion and the prospects of automation. Through the requirements in these different stages, the authors conclude that proportionality ought to act as another driver of keeping human oversight of automated systems. This human oversight will however, in relation to proportionality, require further contextual awareness and control of correct output proportionality, a role which may be significantly more demanding than a more limited oversight implied by current legal discussions on "humans in the loop".

Författarna beskriver utmaningar med att använda AI samt att digitalisera och automatisera beslutsfattande. Rättsstatliga principer som legalitet, proportionalitet och likabehandling riskerar att inte uppfyllas i såväl utformningen av systemen som i tillämpning och uppföljning av beslut som fattas maskinellt. Exempel från svenska myndigheters användning av digitala beslutsstöd visar att brister kan få långtgående konsekvenser.

To efficiently ensure that EU law will have an impact on the national level, the EU is dependent on the loyal cooperation of national administrative authorities, which has been described as a distributed administration. To further this, the CJEU has developed certain responsibilities flowing from EU law ensuring that national administrative authorities will give full effect to EU law within their respective areas of responsibility. This includes a responsibility that in many states would be otherwise reserved for courts – namely, to disapply national legislation when it conflicts with requirements under EU law. In this post, which is based on our recently published article ‘Administrative independence under EU law: Stuck between a rock and Costanzo?’ in European Public Law, we will illustrate how this may create a tension between the hierarchical structure of Member State administrations on the one hand, and the mandates and responsibilities provided to administrative authorities on the other. It may force a subordinate administrative authority to override their own government. Similar to courts, national administrative authorities thus have the invidious position of serving two masters at once, while not enjoying the same structural or legal independence towards the national government.