



UMEÅ UNIVERSITET

NATIONALISM IN EUROPE

**A quantitative study about the relationship between
different kinds of nationalism and liberal democracy**

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Abstract

This article sets out to examine how different types of nationalism are correlated with the level of democracy in a country, a relationship that has not received much attention in previous research. I aim to investigate this relationship by examining how five forms of nationalism affect democracy in 23 European countries. Individual-level data about nationalism come from ISSP (2013). I use latent class analysis (LCA), an exploratory method, to reveal the different types of nationalism that exist in Europe. Then I investigate these nationalisms' relationship to democracy. The dependent variable is an index of democracy developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit (2016). Results indicate a significant and strong association between nationalism and democracy. Ethnic nationalism is negatively correlated with levels of democracy, while civic nationalism is positively associated with democracy.

Keywords

Nationalism, collective identity, political culture, democracy, ethnic, civic, LCA, ISSP

Introduction

Some nationalism is necessary for democracy. From a historical perspective, a community is a crucial precondition for the development of stable democratic institutions, and nationalism can help develop and strengthen the bonds of community. On the other hand, too much nationalism can potentially undermine democratic principles, practices and institutions. The relationship between nationalism and the level of democratic development is still unexplored, at least in terms of empirical measurements. How do different kinds of nationalism correlate with the level to which democracy is established?

In the classical work *The idea of nationalism: A study in its origins and background* (1944), Hans Kohn argued that Western Europe emphasized the political dimension of nationhood, while the nation-states of Eastern Europe tended to emphasize the ethnic and cultural dimension of belonging. He used these labels, 'Western' and 'Eastern', to denote both the geographic locations of countries on the European continent and two ideal-types of nationhood: civic and ethnic. Yet do these two ideal types accurately describe European nationalisms? Do these two broad types actually capture the range of Europeans' ideas about their countries of origin?

Kohn's distinction is, on the surface, persuasive but may be too simplistic, as it seems unlikely that any nation has only one type of nationhood. Rather, it seems more reasonable to assume that within a country, there are different ways of identifying, or not identifying, with the nation. Further, the increased mobility between countries, especially in recent decades due to the expansion of the European Union, makes it theoretically more possible for individuals to identify with more than one nation. On one hand, it is possible to refer to the prevailing conception of nationhood, that there is a 'national character' that is typical for each nation. On the other hand, it is reasonable to assume competing conceptions of nationhood, with tensions driven by other elements beyond civic vs. ethnic nationalisms.

Nationalism is not only a political project it's also a cognitive and affective practice: a way of belonging to an imagined community of the nation. The idea of the nation can be seen as a reference point for thoughts, feelings and actions that are endemic in modern cultural and political life (Brubecker 1996). In everyday life, meanings attached to a nation vary within and across countries populations, with essential effects for political beliefs and behaviour, absorbed by existing institutions, which animate everyday politics in European democracies (cf. Bonikowski 2016a).

In this thesis, I use previous research and theory to guide my operationalization of nationalism; however, I will also make use of an exploratory method to reveal different types of nationalism and therefore more accurately capture what exists in reality. The aim is to reveal what proportions of different types of nationalism exist in different countries, which has not been explored in the European context.

In principle, democracies share important features, such as rule by the people. In practice, levels and features of democracy vary across countries. For instance, both former and current communist regimes refer to themselves as democratic republics, based on the idea that ‘all power comes from the people’ but is embodied by the leader (e.g., The Democratic Republic of North Korea). Furthermore, democracy can also mean a ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Madison et al [1788]/1961); the majority principle as an overriding value (Schumpeter 1942), or the protection of minorities where normative implications precedes the majority principle (Mill [1856]/1991; Rawls 1972). Indeed, the concept of democracy refers to both an *ideal* and an *actuality*. Essential, according to the former, is that we stress moral judgements, which, for instance, aims to describe why we prefer democracy rather than authoritarian regimes. The latter, formal democratic rules, procedures, and institutions, refers to empirical judgements (Dahl 1998); for instance, we can describe the differences between constitutional and institutional conditions in Norway and North Korea.

To overcome this difficulty, that democracy might encompass different properties for different people, I assess and report how variants of nationalism affect the items that constitute liberal democracy, e. g. the levels of civil rights and democratic culture, which capture the core values of democracy, and level of diversity of political parties, which describe actual constitutionally conditions.

The purpose of the article is two-fold, first to investigate the existence of nationalism and second to examine how the distribution of different kinds of nationalism correlate with the level to which formal democracy is established. More specifically, I design research to analyse how the presence of different kinds of nationalism among the electorate affects the features that constitute liberal democracy. To do this, I first rely on data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) and an exploratory method called latent class analysis (LCA) to reveal the different types of identities that exist in Europe. After describing the character and prominence of these clusters, I create independent variables based on the size of these clusters within countries. To measure the relationship between nationalisms and formal democracy, I regress data from the *Economist* on the level of democracy in these countries on these clusters.

Hence, in two aspects this article fills gaps in the literatures on nationalism and democracy. One is to study nationalism in European countries with an exploratory method. The other one is to investigate the relationship between the various types of nationalism and the level of democracy. In the current situation in Europe, radical right parties emphasizes on narratives of xenophobia, nostalgia and the nation's alleged lack of success, which echoes pro-nationalistic approaches, are held by large segments of citizens. It seems reasonable to assume that this development will not only shape election outcomes, policy decisions' and social movements, but liberal democracy as such (Bonikowski 2016b). Therefore, this study may also contribute to an increased understanding of the possible consequences of the neo-nationalist movement in Europe.

The article is organized in the following way. The first section describes various factors that affect the level of democracy and highlights nationalism as a factor that has not been explored. In section 2, I describe theoretical assumptions about the relationship between different kinds of nationalism and democracy. In Section 3, I review previous research focused on different operationalizations of nationalism (and national identity) and empirical relationships between different kinds of nationalism political beliefs. Section 4 describes the data, method and measurements. In section 5, I derive hypotheses from theories of nationalism and the core values of democracy. In section 6, I report on different kinds of nationalism and how their proportions affect the items that constitute liberal democracy. In the concluding section, I summarize the main findings, discuss their wider implications, and suggest avenues for future research.

1. Democracy

Previous research finds many different correlates of democracy: the balance of power among social classes (Rueschemeyer, E. H. Stephens, and J. D. Stephens 1992), the availability of and dependence on domestic natural resources (Ross 2011), ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Reilly 2000), level of democracy at neighbouring countries (Brinks and Coppedge 2006), democracy imposed by military intervention (Therborn 1977), decolonization, foreign trade (Manger and Pickup 2016), international cooperation (Pevehouse 2002), the threat of civil conflicts (Aidt and Leon 2016), urbanization (Glaeser and Steinberg 2016) and education (Alemán and Kim 2015). Surprisingly, the empirical analysis of the relationship between nationalism, or national identity, and level of democracy are absent.

Thus, I first discuss three of the more often cited correlates of democracy, wealth, social structure, and institutions. These will be used as control variables in this study. Then, I argue that there are theoretical reasons to expect that nationalism, a type of political culture, is related to democracy.

Wealth. Democracy was very rare before the industrial revolution. Following modernisation theory, many empirical analyses shows that economic development either increases chances for a transition to democracy, or helps newly established democracies consolidate. Despite this positive correlation it's difficult to prove that increased per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the reason why democracy occurs. The debate about whether democracy is a consequence of wealth, a cause of it, or both processes are unrelated, is far from conclusive (Traversa 2014). For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2008) shows that the political and economic development paths are interwoven. Some countries appear to have embarked upon a development path associated with democracy and economic growth, while others pursued a path based on dictatorship, repression, and more limited growth. The rise of pro-nationalistic political movements, such as the Nazis in Weimar Germany, can be seen as an obvious counter-example. The pro-nationalists abolished democracy although Germany was already an advanced economy, which indicates that nationalism might affect level of democracy.

Institutions. The age of the democratic institutions should say something about the level of stability; the more years, the more established democracy. Drawing on writings of Kaufmann (2000) and A.D. Smith (1998), Kuzio (2001, 2002) advances an evolutionary model that relates the proportional mix of civic and ethnic practices in a given state to the age of that state and to the consolidation of democratic institutions: countries that made the transition at an earlier point may have better established and more resilient institutions. Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring have analysed the development of democracy in South America and conclude that an 'early history of democracy has a powerful impact on levels of democracy among contemporary competitive regimes' (2013:385). Similar empirical evidence has been found in Africa (Bratton and van de Walle 1994).

I use the age of democracy as a control variables. In unreported models, I also looked at the effect of Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP), which is often used as a predictor because of the theoretical expectation that a higher level of development might be favourable to a higher level of democracy. But these two variables demonstrated multicollinearity, therefore, I only use age of democracy.

Social structure. A forceful contemporary statement of an instrumental argument for democracy is provided by Amartya Sen, who argues that ‘no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government’ (1999:152). This suggests that decision-makers in pluralistic democracies have incentives to respond to the expressions of needs of the poor (cf. Dahl 1998:23 as well). There are also empirical findings showing that democracy is more stable in egalitarian societies (Przeworski 2000).

I use the Gini coefficient as a second control variable. The Gini coefficient measures social structures: income inequality. The coefficient ranges between 0 and 1 and is based on residents’ net income. The number describes the gap between the rich and the poor, with 0 representing complete equality and 1 representing perfect inequality. Hence, it’s reasonable to expect that a low level of income inequality correlates with high score of democracy index.

Culture. From a historical perspective, democracy has been brought into existence whenever the accurate conditions have come to light. According to a cultural perspective, values that support and contribute to democracy:

‘are imbedded in the country’s culture and are transmitted, in large part, from one generation to the next. In other words, a country possesses a democratic political culture’ (Dahl 1989:157).

Specific normative elements that exist in a culture consequently constitute a factor that might affect the level of democracy. In order to describe this relationship, we first need to define the core values of democracy and then observe if these values exist in the norm system of the current culture. If these values are embedded in a political culture they will evidently affect the level to which democracy is established.

According to Dahl, the core value is referred to as ‘the logic of equality’; specific value frameworks and practices that are crucial to democracy (1998:10). Dahl links these values to the golden rule; ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you’, which may be somewhat abstract. Working ‘bottom-up’, I suggest that this value builds on social experience and its role in framing moral outlooks toward others which directs behaviour. It is about motivation to act in a certain way, a sense of impartiality, not making exceptions in your own favour, and a willingness to see something from someone else's perspective.

This emphasis eases the primary role of the principle; socialization. On the one hand, based on cognitive role-taking, the logic of equality urges more feasible thoughts and actions

conditioned by external norms in its outlook, on the other hand it's about one's own scale of values. In regard to the former this value can be followed through rational attachment to social reciprocity conventions and their approved norms. According to the latter, the principle implicates a self-centred logical empathy that generates sympathy with oneself, or antipathy if the act or preference is irrational. That is, knowledge of oneself that logically implies a coinciding preference for a specific situation; whoever makes a moral judgment is dedicated to the same judgment in any context where the same relevant facts obtain (cf. Hare 1981).

Taken together, the logic of equality as norm system and the individual's motivation to act, the principle can be applicable by an individual (as method or conclusion) to actual or imagined situations by assuming that existing trends will continue or similar behaviour will be applicable among others. The inherent flaws of the logic of equality also can function as a procedural standard for judging the moral legitimacy of certain conventions.

Linked to democratic practice; if the logic of equality is practiced, a majority will not oppress a minority or remove democracy even if the majority have these opportunities and citizens will not use their the democratic right to vote for a non-democratic candidate.

Hence, democracy requires universalistic rationality, moral principles heeded for their own sake as external norms or out of self-interest, in order to avoid controversial decisions and election results. Then it's easy to understand why this value, when it is embedded in a political culture, might affect the level to which democracy is established.

Further, the logic of equality implies emphasises on 'intrinsic equality'; 'We ought to regard the good of every human being as intrinsically equal to that of any other' (Dahl 1998:9-10). This means that one person's life, liberty and happiness is not intrinsically superior or inferior to the life of, liberty and happiness of any other. All persons ought to be treated as if they possess equal claims to fundamental goods and interests. It seems reasonable to suggest that civil rights, democratic culture (e.g., the losing part of an election hand over the power to the winner) and universal suffrage with pluralist party systems require the presence of the core value of democracy.

In this article, I treat nationalism as a type of political culture. Based on this reasoning, I propose three appropriate indicators to investigate whether the logic of equality is present or absent: *inclusive/exclusive attitudes* (in this case, few or many restrictions in order to become a true member of the community); *rational/irrational attachment to the national governments acts*; and *statements and attitudes towards egalitarianism*. These factors are

discussed in detail in the sections describing the operationalization of nationalism and hypotheses.

2. Theoretical assumption about the relationship between nationalism and level of democracy

By using a cultural perspective to frame the role of nationalism in democracy, we can ask: what kind of nationalism provides the normative elements that coincide with the core values of democracy? In the system-building tradition, system building is seen as a bounded structuring continuous process where increased closure of territorial boundaries, united with deeper internal loyalty, contributes to strengthening the cohesion among in-group members. Similar interconnecting components of in-group members can be found in democratic theory (e.g., ‘group identity, little outside interference, an assumption of equality’ (Dahl 1998)). Any community so large where its members do not know each other on a face-to-face basis must be imagined to some degree (Anderson 1983). Nationalism can provide these properties. Nationalism is a sentiment that binds people together: a political roof (Calhoun 1997).

As pointed out in the introduction, there is a variation in historical framing and contemporary features associated with different kinds of nationalism, e.g. with regards to more civic or ethnic forms. From the traditional perspective it is more likely for a society to have legitimate, functional democratic institutions if the political community is ‘thick’; a collective identity characterized by cultural homogeneity (e. g. Barrington, 1997). Lack of cultural homogeneity (multiculturalism) can even be seen as a potential weakness for the stability of democracy. The perspective of liberal nationalism raises questions about equality and cultural pluralism in a less restrictive manner, but still assumes that some form of collective culture is intrinsic for democratic institutions to be functional (Kymlicka, 1995; Moore, 2001; Tamir, 1993), although the normative elements of such a collective culture remain to be defined.

A ‘thin’ collective identity, with emphasis on political community, can be found in ideas of civic patriotism as advocated by Habermas (1992); cohesive properties are related to the procedures of the civic society and identification of others as honouring such agreements. This means that some national states are not considered to be based on a thick version of nationalism but nonetheless possess a strong sense of community. The ‘thin’ civic position

can also be observed in Scharpf's (1999) notion of 'governing for the people' and thereby conditioning institutional performance capabilities. Hence, the ethno-cultural part of nationalism can be feeble, but there still might be enough community to support functioning democratic institutions.

But given the divergent characteristics of each of these forms of nationalism has, it can be expected that they will impact differently on the level of democracy. From the conservative view, the 'thick' (or more ethnic) form of nationalism associates with a high level of democracy, and thus lower levels of democracy can be expected in countries with a 'thin' nationalism. On the other hand, the strong connection to the common procedures, rationality and agreements inherent in the civic nationalism, will make it closer to the idea of democratic society.

In sum, the notion that some collative identity is related to democracy is found in several theoretical traditions, but the specific kind of the collective identity, which constitutes a certain kind of nationalism, and in what way it correlates with the level of democracy, needs to be further developed. What kind of nationalism promotes democracy?

I suggest that democratic institutions and democratic values, at least to some extent, are an extension of a specific type of nationalism projected onto democratic political institutions and thereby democratic conditioning institutional performance capabilities. Therefore, I highlight the everyday perspective of nationalism; a heritage identity complex, which influences habituated modes of thoughts, speech and behaviour. Various types of nationalist preferences will therefore guide policy choices, both for individuals and groups, in different ways (Bonikowski 2016a). Different kinds of nationalism generate different kind of practices.

In order to hypothesise how these practises constitute a predictor of level of democracy, the causal relationship needs to be clarified. Cognitive cultural sociology provides an answer to what way these practices relate to the cultural meaning of nationalism. Different types of nationalism have different meaning, which are embedded in different cognitive schemes and learned via socialization (cf. DiMaggio 1997). Therefore, if people's perceptions about the nation are observed, this will capture the wide range of believes that constitute peoples' nation schemas. These cognitive schemes are indicative when answering questions like, who is a legitimate member of the nation? Should citizen support their country even if the country is in the wrong? Should all humans have equal rights?

The answers to such questions reveal normative elements that indicate weather the citizens have inclusive or excluding criteria's for in-group membership, rational/irrational

attachment to the nation's statements and political decision and their attitudes towards egalitarianism, and thereby give a certain kind of nationalism its distinctiveness, which is likely to form the conditions of possibility for different political realities.

For instance, the presence or absence of civil rights and democratic culture presuppose the presence or absence of specific normative elements (the core values of democracy). If these specific normative elements are absent or present in the cognitive scheme of a specific kind of nationalism, it might determine the absence or presence of civil rights and democratic culture. Hence, different kinds of nationalism, that is, different cognitive schemes with specific normative elements, are assumed to be more or less consistent with the core values of democracy.

By understanding the variation of meanings attached to the nation, we can begin illuminating the relationship between different kinds of nationalism and democracy.

3. Nationalism

There are two ways of think about the operationalization of nationalism; one way is to employ the theoretical distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism, and the other is to apply an exploratory method. Ethnic nationalism emphasizes citizenship based on common roots, a congenital inheritance that engenders emotional attachment, implying an ethnic fraternity. Put simply, this version of nationalism takes ethnicity, as an ascribed trait, as the foundation of membership in the nation-state. In contrast, civic nationalism emphasizes consent to laws, including those that define rights to citizenship, and a shared political state-like organization, which is a result of rational choice and rational attachment. Thus, the loyalties of the group members are 'civic', as opposed to 'ethnic', in nature.

Jones and Smith (2001a, 2001b) used seven questions from ISSP 1995 to investigate the criteria for membership; How important do you think each of the following is?

1. *To have been born in (Country)*
2. *To have (Country) citizenship*
3. *To have lived in (Country) for most of one's life*
4. *To be able to speak (Country's language)*
5. *To be a (Religion)*
6. *To respect (Country's) political institutions and laws*
7. *To feel (Country Nationality)*

A rotated factor analysis clustered two distinct dimensions, in most of the countries one capturing the items born, citizenship, lived and religion, which they labelled 'ascriptive/objectivist', and the other correlate strongly with laws, feel and language, which they labelled 'civic/-voluntaristic'. Jones and Smith concede that the items may have been understood variously in different countries. Thus, whereas place of birth (born) may have been related with the state, or a province, and its territory in countries like France and the USA which are usually believed to have strong traditions of civic nationhood, the same item may have been understood as a substitute for descent and ancestry in countries with supposedly stronger emphasise on the ethnic dimension. Further, the authors discuss whether ability to speak the dominant language might have been understood as an indicator for assimilation into the larger (civic) community in migrant nations like Australia and the US, while it may have been regarded as referring to native language (i.e. an ethnic characteristic) in countries that have no tradition of immigration. However, Smith and Jones decided to omit reference to a general ethnic-civic distinction, conditioned by geographical location, in their description of the two dimensions.

Another study using the ISSP data source (Shulman 2002) did not investigate whether the survey items clustered in different dimensions. Focusing on the same variables as Jones and Smith and using an additional item about the sharing of traditions, Shulman assumed that the indicators born, citizenship, lived, laws and feel is associated to civic nationalism and the items language, religion and traditions refers to a ethno cultural dimension of nationhood. Eight countries represented the West and an equal number represented East. Shulman's showed that there were as many indicators contesting the civic-West/ethnic-East argument as supporting it.

Hence, both Jones & Smith and Shulman suggest that there are no substantial differences between regions in the strength of civic/voluntaristic or ethnocultural/ascriptive identity; they stress that the East-West component of the ethnic-civic framework seems to be absent

in popular conceptions of nationhood. But, as these articles use ISSP 1995, the variable 'ancestry' is missing, which is a disadvantage. The studies also show that it can be complicated to compare national identities in different parts of the world, because one and the same item can relate to both 'ethnic' and 'civic'.

Jan Germen Janmaat (2006) used survey data of the Eurobarometer 2002 to explore the ethnic/civic dichotomy in 9 European countries. Janmaat argued that a three-dimensional model is better suited to characterize popular notions of nationhood than a strict ethnic-civic dichotomy or a continuum with ideal types as poles. The ethnic-civic framework where illustrated with clusters in three dimensions; political, cultural and ethnic. The mean scores for each country and each region (East/West) on the three dimensions showed that East European countries consider cultural and ethnic criteria more important markers of nationhood than the Western countries. The difference between the regions is being the largest on the ethnic dimension. Regarding the political dimension, it is deemed less relevant by the Eastern countries. Hence, the results are clearly in line with the ethnic-East/civic-West argument. An important reason why this contradicts previous results is probably because 'ancestry' is included. The results emphasize that the ethnic-civic framework should be disaggregated into two different modes of interpreting national identity: one relating to boundary mechanisms and another to symbolic resources. This suggests that nationalism should be considered as multidimensional phenomena, which I will explore further in this article. Evidently, these does not reveal how proportions of different competing stories of nationhood coexist in a country, nor in what way the items coexist at the individual level.

Christian Albrekt Larsens (2017) used ISSP (1995, 2003, 2013) and found the classic distinction between 'civic/Western/political' and 'ethnic/Eastern/cultural' to be of relevance as well. Larsen emphasised a two-dimensional structure in the responses, rather than a dichotomy or a continuum. To accomplish this, he used eight items (born, to have citizenship, lived, language, religion, political institutions and laws, and feel) and multi-classification analysis. The two-dimensional structure illustrates four quadrants. One dimension indicates high/low importance of political community (civic values) and high/low importance of cultural community (ethno cultural emphasis). The second dimension shows high/low level of mobilizations; once nationalistic attitudes are mobilized, it begins to assign importance both to ethnic and civic elements.

Some countries scoring high/high, a quadrant labelled national liberalism or 'high intensity civic nationalism'. Low/low, labelled de-constructivism or 'low intensity ethnic nationalism'; the kind that most rejecting the basic ideas of belonging to a nation state.

High/low is associated to republicanism or 'low intensity civic nationalism'; constitutional patriotism rather than imagined shared cultural content. Low/high is labelled national conservatism, or 'high intensity ethnic nationalism', associated with Johann G. Herder (who carried folk theory to an extreme by maintaining that 'there is only one class in the state, the *volk*'; 'the people' is the basis for the emergence of a classless but hierarchical national body) and Kohn's notion of 'ethnic'; the nation should be formed around a common cultural community and not a political community.

Most of the Northern European countries were located in the republican segment and most of the Eastern European countries were located in the national conservative quadrant. But, some countries, like Germany, Finland, Norway, Iceland, Estonia, Slovenia end up in the republican quadrant, which would be an anomaly in a rigid application of Kohn's framework.

Larsen found that most of Northern European countries, Germany included, were stably located in the republican segment. Thus, despite the inflow of migrants and the rise of new right parties, the stories of nationhood largely remained stable at aggregated level. The nationhood in Eastern European countries is considered to be much less stable. Poland and Bulgaria were stably located in the national conservative quadrant, but Russia, Hungary and Slovakia 'arrived' in this quadrant, while Slovenia became more republican. Larsen refers to Kuzio (2002) and suggest that the democratisation of the Eastern European countries of the 1990s created opportunities to install new imaginations of nationhood in this region. Based on voting patterns Larsen also displays within-country variation in perceptions of nationhood, but still not its accurate proportions.

With two indices, one for civic and one for ethnic, one can investigate how the levels of these two types of nationalism correlate with a dependent variable. An advantage of assuming this civic/ethnic distinction is that one is in dialogue with a large share of previous research, but this method also has disadvantages. First, the items that create these indices can belong to 'ethnic' in one part of the world and 'civic' in another part of the world. Second, the method shows neither whether or not, or how, the civic item coexists with ethnic items on individual level. Third, the 'civic/Western/political vs. ethnic/Eastern/cultural argument' does not reveal how proportions of different competing stories of nationhood coexist in a country or coexist with other aspects of nationalism (e.g. national hubris). In this article, I will use an explorative method to overcome these difficulties.

Although previous research has not used an exploratory method to reveal different types of nationalism in Europe, Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2016) use an exploratory method, latent class analysis (LCA), to examine the different variants of national identities in the United States. They view nationalism as a multidimensional phenomenon beyond the civic/ethnic distinction. Based on data from GSS (2004) they use 23 variables that capture four aspects of American nationalism: *National identification*, *Criteria of national membership* (civic/ethnic), *National pride*, and *National hubris*. They identify four kinds of nationalism with defined proportions and characteristics. The first two are more extreme and the two latter are more moderate. *Ardent nationalists*: Scored highest on every dimension of nationalism (24 percent of the respondents) and refer to ethnic nationalism. *The disengaged*: Low levels of pride in state institutions and appeared to refrain from wholesale engagement with nationalist preferences; least likely to endorse any characteristic of criteria of national membership, least likely to express high levels of national pride and least likely to endorse any of the hubris items (24 percent of the respondents). The disengaged has similarities to what Larsen described as de-constructionists. *Restrictive nationalist*: The largest group (38 percent), Moderate levels of national pride but defined being ‘truly American’ in particularly exclusionary ways (emphasises on ethnic items; close to Ardent nationalists). Moderate in national identification and national hubris. *Creedal nationalist*: Accounts for 22 percent of the sample and fits the profile of civic nationalism more aptly than any other. The differences between creedal and restrictive nationalists are especially evident in their responses to criteria of membership; creedal nationalists are less restrictive. Scored high on national pride, with emphasis on the ‘way democracy works’ and science, instead of army as did the ardent nationalists. This class also displayed high levels of national identification and were less likely to score high on the hubris variables than ardent nationalists.

4. Hypotheses

Through an exploratory analysis, this study will not only give a more accurate description of the nationalisms that exist in Europe but also assess their relationship to democracy. By doing this, I will contribute to the democracy and nationalism literatures. This will help refine theories of nationalism and shed light on the usefulness of the civic/ethnic distinction, while bringing political culture into the discussion of democracy.

The hypotheses are based on the relationship between the normative elements, which are implicated in the three aspects of nationalism, and the core values of democracy.

Hypothesis founded on membership criteria

The hypothesis is based on two premises. Firstly, empirical findings in previous research shows that a strong civic national identity is supportive to democracy whereas a strong ethnic national identity is positive correlated with attitudes towards authoritatively governance. Secondly, it is very rare, or if it exists at all, that a geographic unit is entirely ethnically homogenous. At the same time, the core values of democracy requires a moral judgments: the logic of equality and intrinsic equality. Therefore, a restrictive membership setting that is inherently exclusionary, seems to be incompatible with the core values of democracy, since different ethnic affiliation, within one and the same geographic unit, generates different opportunities to fundamental goods and interests.

Therefore, I posit that nationalism characterized by restrictive ethnocentrism is disadvantageous for democracy and associated with low level of democracy, whereas nationalism with less restrictive criteria membership has a positive effect on the level to which democracy is established.

Hypothesis founded on preferences about importance of common language

Since ability to use the common language is important in terms of political participation and deliberative aspects of democracy, a preference that emphasizes the importance of common language is hypothesised as a positive predictor for the level of democracy.

Hypothesis founded on egalitarianism

I posit that a kind of nationalism that more closely embodies egalitarianism is likely to favour democracy, since it is consistent with the core value of democracy. An alternative principle which emphasizes the inequality: the good and interest of my group are superior to those of all others (regarding class, gender, race or whatever), is reasonably more difficult to reconcile with democracy.

Hypothesis founded on national hubris

A kind of nationalism that articulates supremacy and do not reject an action that one's country has committed, although it is acknowledged that that the action is wrong, must be designated as irrational. When citizen supporting statements they agree with and not support

the statements they disagree with, that is rational and in line with the core value of democracy; a rational relation that judge the moral legitimacy of certain statements and their approved norms. If citizens support government statements and decisions without questioning, even if they do not agree, that is also irrational and not in line with the core value of democracy.

In such an irrational relationship between the national state and the citizen, the subjects cannot distinguish what is truly useful or harmful to themselves or the national state. This preference encourage passivity and to rely upon the judgement of the head of the national state. Such a cognitive scheme is rather linked to despotism (cf. Kant 1793/1970:74-5), while the citizen, which is practising the core values of democracy, is characterized by moral autonomy, rational principles and maxims associated with the common good (see also Mill 1861/1972:216-18).

As mentioned in the literature review, the ideal democracy presupposes a universal overriding emphasis on rationality: the logic of equality. Thus, a nationalism that is characterized by irrational attachment towards the nations statements and political decisions does not seem to be consistent with democracy. This aspect linked to a certain kind of nationalism will therefore be hypnotised to have a negative affect on the level to which democracy is established.

5. Data and Methods

Measuring nationalism

For information on individual level characteristics and attitudes I use data from the from International Social Survey Programme (ISSP 2013), which is a programme for international comparative attitude studies. Most of the cross-national empirical analyses of the ‘ethnic–civic’ distinction and other aspects of nationalism, such as national pride and patriotism, have used the ISSP module on nationalism. This is for good reason as it is the most comprehensive dataset on perceptions of different aspects of nationalism. The module was fielded in 23 nation states in 1995, 33 in 2003 and 33 in 2013. In each nation state, a representative sample of adults (18 years old and above) has been asked a common set of standard survey items.

The operationalization of nationalism is based on insights in regard to previously research, mainly Bonikowski and DiMaggio’s approach (2016a) and their way of combining

different aspects of nationalism; membership criteria, pride, hubris and national identification. I will not use pride, because it might be difficult to measure cross-nationally. Considering that three of the items that have been used to operationalize national pride (the way democracy works, economic achievements, social security), refer to achievements that Western nations can obviously take much greater pride in than Eastern states. For example, Russians in comparison with Norwegians would be less proud of how democracy works. Therefore, this aspect of nationalism will be excluded. Thus, three aspects of nationalism will be used.

1. Criteria of national membership. Previously research shows that born, lived, language, citizenship and feel can refer to both ethnic and civic nationhood depending on the current context. The crucial difference between ethnic and civic seems to be ancestry vs. laws (Zimmer 2003; Hjerm & Berg 2010). But using only these two variables would be too much simplification. To add complexity language is included, which is an important element for creating an imagined community (Anderson 1983). Individuals' valuation of language can also be linked to the functioning of democracy, since ability to use the common language is important in terms of political participation and deliberative aspects of democracy. Religion is also included, which is assumed to measure cultural affiliation. Hence, four items are used to measure membership criteria: laws, ancestry, language and religion. Respondents have answered the following questions:

Some people say that the following things are important for being truly [NATIONALITY]. Others say they are not important.

How important do you think each of the following is...

- to have [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] ancestry?*
- to respect [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] political institutions and laws?*
- to be able to speak [COUNTRY LANGUAGE]?*
- to be a [religion]?*

- 1 *Very important*
- 2 *Fairly important*
- 3 *Not very important*
- 4 *Not important at all*
- 8 *Can't choose*
- 9 *No answer*

Variable values 1 and 2 have been recoded to 2 (important), 3 and 4 to 1 (not important), and remaining variable values have been recoded as missing.

2. *National egalitarianism.* Regarding national identification the assumption ‘nationalism is successful when it takes precedence over available alternative foci of affiliation such as kinship, religion, economic interest, race or language (Citrin et al. 1994:2)’, Bonikowski & Dimaggio operationalized with ‘how close do you feel to your country’ (2016a). In ISSP (2013) there are four variables that describe closeness to city, region, country and the continent. To feel close to the country is therefore not about overriding, for example, race or religion. Rather, to feel close to the country can be seen as a way to strengthen identification with a restrictive or inclusive nationhood. Therefore, this aspect of nationalism will not be used. Instead, I operationalize egalitarianism. This value underlines that people ought to be treated as equals. Citizens and immigrants have equal fundamental worth and dignity; they are equally morally considerable. In this sense, a sample non-egalitarian would be one who believes that people born into a higher social class or a favoured race, ethnicity or nationality (Dworkin 2000). The following question has been answered:

There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in [COUNTRY]. (By 'immigrants' we mean people who come to settle in [COUNTRY]).

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? ^[L]_[SEP] Legal immigrants to [COUNTRY] who are not citizens should have the same rights as [COUNTRY NATIONALITY] citizens.

- 1 Agree strongly*
- 2 Agree*
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree*
- 4 Disagree*
- 5 Disagree strongly*
- 8 Can't choose*
- 9 No answer*

3. *National hubris*. Regarding national hubris I use one item instead of five as did Bonikovski & DiMaggio. This variable measures whether the citizen has a rational or irrational attachment to the nation:

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.

- 1 Agree strongly*
- 2 Agree*
- 3 Neither agree nor disagree*
- 4 Disagree*
- 5 Disagree strongly*
- 8 Can't choose*
- 9 No answer*

Variable values 1 and 2 have been recoded to 2 (agree), 4 and 5 to 1 (disagree), and remaining variable values have been recoded as missing. Table 1 shows the number of respondents and how the questions were answered.

Table 1. Nationalism Measures: Ns and Frequencies for all participating countries

<i>Criteria of national membership</i>	<i>N</i>		
Some people say that the following things are important to be a truly [Nationality]?		1. Not important	2. Important
- To be a [religion]?	29,319	63.0	37.0
- To respect political institutions and laws?	30,052	7.7	92.3
- To have [Country Nationality] ancestry?	29,633	41.5	58.5
- To be able to speak [Country language]	30,052	7.7	92.3
<i>National Hubris</i>			
How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?		1. Disagree	2. Agree
- People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.	22,567	48.7	51.3
<i>Egalitarianism</i>			
How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?		1. Disagree	2. Disagree
- Legal immigrants to [C.] who are not citizens should have the same rights as [Country nationality] citizens.	22,622	49.5	50.5

Measuring democracy

There are several different indexes that are commonly used to measure level of democracy: Polity IV, Freedom House, the Economist, and others. All indexes are biased in a specific direction. For instance, the full index from the Economist Intelligence Unit (2016) measures liberal democracy and emphasizes the normative aspects of democracy, i.e., individual rights and political culture. This index is the most suitable for this article for two reasons. First, liberal democracy is the most common condition in Europe. Second, we want to know to what extent the core values of democracy are institutionalized.

This democracy index describes the level to which democracy is established for 165 independent states. These measurements are well established and often referred to when the level of development of democracy is described.

To overcome potential problems associated with using the index (i.e., democracy might encompass different properties for different people and the full index is biased against liberal democracy) I report the correlations with each category, which entails six dependent variables. The index of democracy from economist is based on the ratings for 60 indicators grouped in the five categories:

1. *Electoral process and pluralism*: ‘if we accept the desirability of political equality, then every citizen must have an equal and effective opportunity to vote, and all votes must be counted as equal’ (Dahl 1989:96). This indicator measures the fairness of elections, free choice of candidates and the transparency of campaigns. The existence of the core values of democracy can be seen as a precursor to formal political equality.
2. *Civil liberties*: The scope of the term differs between countries. Basically it refers to the principle of the protection of human rights and personal guarantees and freedoms that the state cannot override, either by law or judicial interpretation, without due process. This factor is an extension of the core values of democracy; intrinsic equality.
3. *The functioning of government*: This category refers to the extent to which democratically based decisions cannot or are not implemented in society.
4. *Political participation*: A well functioning democracy requires deliberation. This is, active, freely chosen participation of citizens in public life; willingness^[1] to participate in public debate, elect representatives and to join political parties.
5. *Political culture*: A democratic culture is crucial for the legitimacy of democracy. The electoral process periodically divides the population into winners and losers. A successful democratic political culture implies that the losing parties and their supporters accept the judgment of the voters, and allow for the peaceful transfer of power. A democratic culture presupposes the implication of the core values of democracy.
6. *Overall score*: The overall index of democracy is the simple average of the five category indexes.

Table 2 reports levels of the various factors in each country.

Table 2. Democracy index

	Overall score	Election and pluralism	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil Liberties
Norway	9.93	10.00	9.64	10.00	10.00	10.00
Iceland	9.50	10.00	8.93	8.89	10.00	9.71
Sweden	9.39	9.58	9.64	8.33	10.00	9.41
Denmark	9.20	9.58	9.29	8.33	9.38	9.41
Switzerland	9.09	9.58	9.29	7.78	9.38	9.41
Finland	9.03	10.00	8.93	7.78	8.75	9.71
Germany	8.63	9.58	8.57	7.78	7.50	9.71
United Kingdom	8.36	9.58	7.14	7.22	8.75	9.12
Spain	8.30	9.58	7.14	7.22	8.13	9.41
France	7.92	9.58	7.14	7.78	6.25	8.22
Portugal	7.86	9.58	6.79	6.67	6.88	9.41
Estonia	7.85	9.58	7.86	6.11	6.88	8.82
Czech Republic	7.82	9.58	7.14	6.67	6.88	8.82
Belgium	7.77	9.58	8.57	5.00	6.88	8.82
Slovenia	7.51	9.58	7.14	6.67	6.66	8.53
Lithuania	7.47	9.58	5.71	6.11	6.25	9.71
Latvia	7.31	9.58	5.71	5.56	6.88	8.82
Slovakia	7.29	9.58	7.14	5.56	5.63	8.53
Croatia	6.75	9.17	6.07	5.56	5.00	7.94
Hungary	6.72	9.17	6.07	4.44	4.38	7.06
Georgia	5.93	8.67	4.29	6.11	5.00	5.59
Russia	3.44	2.67	2.50	5.00	2.50	3.53

Source: Economist 2016. Each category has values between from 0 to 10. Full democracies, scores of 8-10; Flawed democracies, scores of 6 to 7.9; Hybrid regimes, scores of 4 to 5.9; Authoritarian regimes, scores below 4.

Control variables

Regarding the age of democratic institutions variable values are coded to 1, which represents democracy before 1989 and 0 represents non-democracy before 1989.

The Gini index measures income inequalities of country's residents. Data come from Central Intelligence Unit (2006-2013).

Methods

Latent class analysis (LCA) is a statistical method for finding subtypes of related classes. That is, given a sample of aspects of nationalism measured on several variables, one wishes to know if there is a small number of basic groups into which cases fall. This will demonstrate the significance of the three aspects of nationalism in different existent classes of nationalism. By doing so, I expect to discover subcategories of the average type of nationalism for each country.

I use Latent Gold 5.0 software package (Vermunt and Magidson 2005). LCA defines latent classes by the criterion of 'conditional independence'; within each latent class, each

variable is statistically independent of every other variable. For example, within a latent class that corresponds to a distinct configuration of the aspects of nationalism, the presence/absence of an attitude structure is viewed as unrelated to presence/absence of all others. In other words, if one removes the effect of latent class membership, all that remains is randomness (Lazarsfeld & Henry 1968).

LCA assumes a simple parametric model and uses data to estimate parameter values for the model. There are two parameters for the model. One is the prevalence of each of the latent classes. The other is the conditional response probabilities; the probabilities for each combination of latent class or (manifest) variable, and response level for the variable, that a randomly selected member of that class will make that response to that variable.

Consider a simple example with one of the four items about criteria of national membership (coded 'not important' and 'important') and two latent classes ('ethnic nationalism present' and 'ethnic nationalism absent'). The model parameters are: (1) the prevalence of cases in the 'ethnic nationalism present' and 'ethnic nationalism absent' latent classes, but only one of the two prevalences needs to be estimated, since they must sum to 1.0. And, (2) for each item and each latent class, the probability of the item being present/absent for a member of the latent class. Once again, for each item and latent class, only the probability of item presence or item absence needs to be estimated, since one probability is obtained by subtracting the other from 1.0.

Parameters are estimated by the maximum likelihood (ML) criterion. The ML estimates are those most likely to account for the observed results; a measure of model fitness. LCA creates different solutions with varying number of clusters (latent classes). Postestimation statistics will guide which number of cluster that fit the data the best. A reduction of L^2 and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) statistics is an indication of model fitness.

I use ordinary least squares (OLS) regress to measure the relationship between nationalism and democracy. This is a method for estimating the unknown parameters in a linear regression model, with the goal of minimizing the sum of the squares of the differences between the observed responses on level of democracy in the given dataset and those predicted by a linear function of a set of different proportions of different kinds of nationalism.

Ethical considerations

Ethical considerations have been taken, which aim to protect people who are subjects of research, addressing physical, mental, and integrity-related concerns. According to data regulations in participating countries, only anonymized data are made available to users, and all respondents participated voluntarily. This research is conducted in accordance with good research practices; all research results are reported openly so that other researchers can check and repeat the research (Scientific Council, 2017-05-01).

The results can be offensive to people representing radical right populist discourse, because it is possible that the results will show that this discourse has a negative effect on liberal democracy. From a teleological perspective, this can probably be offset, since this research generate knowledge that is important for society as a whole (Ratchie & Levis (eds.) 2013:79); democracy is better than non-democracy. There is strong empirical evidence for this position (Dahl 1998).

I prefer an open democratic society, instead of a closed society ruled by an authoritarian demagogue. This can implicitly bias me against radical right populist discourse and reactionary aspects of nationalism. Therefore, reflexivity is important. This means that I try to avoid bias and try to be as neutral as possible. This applies both to the choice of data, and its analysis, presentation, and interpretation (Ratchie & Levis (eds.) 2013:22).

6. Results

The result section is organized in the following way. First, the number of latent classes is determined, that is, the number of different types of nationalism. Then the characteristics of each cluster are described and linked to the hypotheses. After that, cross-country differences in cluster sizes are reported, namely, how the shares of each cluster are represented in each country. Finally, I investigate how these proportions correlate with democracy index.

Five cluster model

Table 3 reports model fit statistics for various cluster solutions. A comparison of statistics will help determine which cluster solution is superior.

Table 3. Model Fit Measures for One-cluster Model to Eight-cluster Model with Adjacent Models.

Model	L^2	df	L^2 Reduction (%)	BIC (Based on L^2)	Sig.
One cluster	25013.6	1443	0.0	103561.8	3.5e-4228
Two cluster	14688.1	1414	41.3	93516.9	2.8e-2167
Three cluster	6588.1	1385	73.7	85697.6	6.4e-664
Four cluster	4966.8	1356	80.1	84357.0	8.9e-405
Five cluster	3692.8	1327	85.2	83363.6	1.3e-221
Six cluster	2675.0	1298	89.3	82626.0	9.3e-98
Seven cluster	2134.3	1269	91.5	82366.5	5.4e-47
Eight cluster	1741.6	1240	93.0	82254.4	1.4e-19

BIC = Bayesian information criterion.

The L^2 statics, for the one-cluster model, states the maximum correlation between manifest variables that can be explained by any given number of clusters (i.e., latent classes). The model with the lowest BIC value and substantial decrease in L^2 should be selected. Table 3 reports that each addition to three clusters, L^2 and BIC decreases less. Based on this, it's reasonable to consider 4-6 clusters. The sixth cluster turned out to be a rather small, only part .07 percent of the total pooled data, and the complexity, with three aspects of nationalism, is already high. Therefore, I have chosen the five-cluster model.

In an unreported model I tried to use 23 variables, as did Bonikowski and DiMaggio, and additionally comparing a large number of countries. The model fitness was found to be substandard, which means that it was not possible to discern a specific numbers of disparate classes (that is, different kinds of nationalism). Using LCA and cross-national comparisons requires reduced complexity. Therefore, I use only six variables.

Five different kinds of nationalism

Table 4 reports the probability of particular responses for each of the six variables within each cluster. The table shows the probabilities that an individual emphasize a specific preference given that the respondent belongs to that cluster.

Table 4. Item Response Probabilities, by Cluster.

	Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4	Cluster 5
<i>Cluster size</i>	0.30	0.23	0.21	0.18	0.07
<i>Criteria of national membership</i>					
Political institutions and laws					
Not important	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Important	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00
Language					
Not important	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00
Important	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00
Ancestry					
Not important	0.83	0.05	0.12	0.18	0.73
Important	0.17	0.95	0.78	0.72	0.27
Religion					
Not important	0.97	0.02	0.77	0.71	0.81
Important	0.03	0.98	0.33	0.29	0.19
<i>National hubris</i>					
Support even wrong					
Agree	0.20	0.68	0.68	0.65	0.34
Disagree	0.80	0.32	0.32	0.35	0.66
<i>National egalitarianism</i>					
Legal immigrants same rights					
Agree	0.55	0.46	0.00	0.99	0.34
Disagree	0.45	0.54	1.00	0.01	0.66
<i>Summery</i>	Civic	Ethnic Religious	Ethnic	Ethnic	Non- restrictive
	Rational loyalty	Irrational loyalty	Irrational loyalty	Irrational loyalty	Rational loyalty
		Nonegal.	Egal.	Nonegal.	

Cluster 1 emphasises high probabilities of importance of laws (1.0) and language (1.0) and underlines ancestry (.83) and religion (.97) as not important for being a truly member of the nation. In regard to national hubris, it is the only cluster where members articulate a high probability to disagree with the statement that people should support their country even if the country is in the wrong (.80). Cluster 1 does not indicate a clear direction whether immigrants should have the same rights (.55). Cluster 1, which accounts for 31 percent of the sample, fits the profile of civic nationalism more clearly than any other. Their form of nationalism places few restrictions on who can claim to be truly member of the nation. A plurality disagree that one should support one's country even if it is in the wrong.

Regarding cluster 1-4, and the theoretical distinction 'ethnic/civic', table 3 shows that the difference is not in probabilities concerning civic *or* ethnic emphasis; all respondents unequivocally cite respect political institutions and laws as important. The essential difference is found in the way that the ethnic items are valued. Compared to cluster 1, in

cluster 2-4 the respondents are much more likely to emphasise belonging based on ethnicity. Cluster 1 could therefore be linked to civic nationalism, while cluster 2-4 is associated to ethnic nationalism.

Further, in regard to civic nationalism social cohesion is a result of rational choice and rational attachment. The loyalties of the group members are 'civic', as opposed to 'ethnic', in nature. Therefore, the hubris item demonstrates a clear cut between cluster 1 on the one hand cluster 2-4 on the other hand, since cluster 1 underlines rational attachment while cluster 2-4 emphasize irrational attachment. Hence, linked to theory and previously empirical analyses cluster 1, which represents 30 percent of all respondents, is closest to the idea of *civic nationalism*

Cluster 2 follows the same pattern about laws and language, but expresses the opposite relationship towards ancestry (.05). Cluster 2 is the only latent class that underlines high probability to stress that being a truly member of the nation ought to be conditioned by religiosity. The hybrid item is articulated in the opposite direction as well; people should support their country even if the country is in the wrong (.68). Cluster 2, which represents 23 percent of all respondents, is similar to what Bonikowski and DiMaggio denoted as *ardent nationalism*. These respondents are more likely to say it is 'important' for a true [Nationality] to possess all relevant characteristics about which respondents were asked about national membership, which crystallizes an ethnic religious nationalism; more likely than cluster 1, 4 and 5 to agree with measures of irrational national hubris.

Cluster 3 constituting 21 percent of the sample. In comparison with ardent nationalists, cluster 3 emphasizes slightly lower probability to endorse importance of ancestry (.78) and the probability to accentuate religiosity is lower (.33). Members of this cluster espouse high levels of the hubris item; same as ardent and higher than civic. Compared to civic, cluster 3 is more endorsed to the view that citizenship presupposes religiosity. In the same way as ardent nationalism, there is an emphasis on ethnic nationalism. Regarding egalitarianism, cluster 3 express the highest levels of non-egalitarianism. The probability to emphasize non-egalitarianism is the highest of all clusters (1.0). Cluster 3 is referred to as *restrictive nationalists*.

The clear cut between restrictive nationalists and cluster 4 is observable through the preferences of egalitarianism. In cluster 3 the ethnic restrictiveness is reinforced, while cluster 4 inclines to universalism. Otherwise, basically the same pattern as cluster 3. Therefore, I label cluster 4 as *liberal nationalism*.

While cluster 2 is the most extreme ‘thick’ class, the other extreme class, cluster 5, is the smallest, making up 13 percent of the sample. The respondents appear to refrain from wholesale engagement with nationalistic preferences. The strongest evidence for this inference comes from responses to laws and language item; the odds are .00 that the respondents in this group reported ‘important’, compared to 1.00 for the remainder of the sample. Even religion and having ancestry are underlined as not important. Not surprisingly, respondents in cluster 5 are also less likely than respondents in cluster 2-4 to support the hubris item and the last variable indicates a feeble emphasis on non-egalitarianism. This cluster has similarities to what Larsen denoted as ‘de-constructivists’, or ‘low intensive ethnic nationalism’, and Bonikowski’s and DiMaggio’s label *The disengaged*. I will use the latter designation.

In table 5, the clusters are connected with the hypothesis described in the previous section.

Table 5. Expected effects on democracy based on aspects of different types of nationalism.

	Ethnic/Civic	Language	Hubris	Egalitarianism	Summary
Ardent Nationalism	Ethnic Religious	Important	Irrational attachment	Neither or	
<i>Expected effect</i>	<i>Strongly negative</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Negative</i>	<i>None</i>	<i>Negative</i>
Restrictive Nationalism	Ethnic	Important	Irrational attachment	Nonegalitarianism	
<i>Expected effect</i>	<i>Negative</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Negative</i>	<i>Negative</i>	<i>Negative</i>
Liberal Nationalism	Ethnic	Important	Irrational attachment	Egalitarianism	
<i>Expected effect</i>	<i>Negative</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Negative</i>	<i>Strongly positive</i>	<i>Positive</i>
Civic Nationalism	Civic	Important	Rational attachment	Neither or	
<i>Expected effect</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>None</i>	<i>Strongly Positive</i>
The Dis-engaged	Absent	Not important	Rational loyalty	Non-egalitarianism	
<i>Expected effect</i>	<i>Negative</i>	<i>Negative</i>	<i>Positive</i>	<i>Negative</i>	<i>Negative</i>

Cross-country Differences in Cluster Sizes

The characteristic of each cluster is identical across countries, but the probability of being in any one cluster varies cross-nationally. Table 6 reports country-specific cluster sizes of each type of nationalism across the relevant countries. The most ‘thick’ variant of nationalism, thus an emphasis on ethno-cultural community, is placed to the left. The ‘thinnest’ variant of nationalism, the disengaged, is located to the right of the table.

Table 6. Country-specific Cluster Sizes, by Cluster

Ardent Nationalism (Cluster 2)		Restrictive Nationalism (Cluster 3)		Liberal Nationalism (Cluster 4)		Civic Nationalism (Cluster 1)		The Disengaged (Cluster 5)	
				← ‘Thick’ ‘Thin’ →					
TR	0.88	HU	0.58	ES	0.70	SE	0.83	HR	0.19
GE	0.74	CH	0.53	PT	0.62	NO	0.67	FI	0.14
RU	0.64	LV	0.38	CZ	0.50	DE	0.60	LV	0.14
HR	0.42	BE	0.32	IS	0.32	FI	0.57	BE	0.11
SK	0.40	CZ	0.32	LT	0.31	FR	0.56	SI	0.11
LT	0.39	EE	0.34	EE	0.31	DK	0.49	TR	0.10
HU	0.25	UK	0.29	SI	0.26	UK	0.48	RU	0.10
UK	0.16	FR	0.30	SK	0.23	BE	0.44	ES	0.09
PT	0.14	DK	0.29	HR	0.19	SI	0.38	SE	0.09
DE	0.11	IS	0.26	HU	0.15	CH	0.35	GE	0.07
NO	0.11	SK	0.24	RU	0.15	LV	0.32	EE	0.07
FI	0.10	LT	0.22	DE	0.12	EE	0.28	IS	0.06
DK	0.10	NO	0.20	BE	0.12	IS	0.25	DE	0.05
IS	0.10	FI	0.19	LV	0.10	HR	0.14	LT	0.05
SI	0.09	SI	0.16	FR	0.07	PT	0.10	DK	0.05
CZ	0.06	GE	0.11	DK	0.08	ES	0.10	SK	0.05
LV	0.06	DE	0.11	UK	0.02	CZ	0.09	CH	0.04
SE	0.04	PT	0.10	CH	0.04	SK	0.08	UK	0.04
FR	0.04	RU	0.10	GE	0.04	GE	0.04	PT	0.04
CZ	0.04	HR	0.06	TR	0.00	LT	0.03	FR	0.03
BE	0.00	SE	0.04	SE	0.00	RU	0.02	CZ	0.03
EE	0.00	ES	0.03	FI	0.00	TR	0.01	NO	0.02
ES	0.00	TR	0.01	NO	0.00	HU	0.00	HU	0.02

BE = Belgium; CH = Switzerland; CZ = Czech Republic; DE = Germany; DK = Denmark; EE = Estonia; ES = Spain; FI = Finland; FR = France; GB = Great Britain; GE = Georgien; HU = Hungary; HR = Croatia; IS = Island; LT = Lithuania; LV = Latvia; NL = Netherlands; NO = Norway; PT = Portugal; RU = Russia; SE = Sweden; SI = Slovenia; SK = Slovakia; TR =Turkey, UK = United Kingdom.

There is substantial cross-country variation in all the clusters. Yet although ardent nationalism (cluster 2) is one of the largest (23 percent), there are only a handful of countries where these preferences (or cognitive schema) dominate: Turkey (.88), Georgia (.74), and Russia (.64). The respondents in these countries are also less likely to be civic nationalists; Georgia (.04), Turkey (.01) and Russia (.02). However, for 70 percent of all countries, the odds of holding these attitudes, which corresponds to ardent nationalism, are below average and absent in Spain, Estonia and Belgium.

The probability of being restrictive nationalist (cluster 3) is high in countries such as Hungary (.58) and Switzerland (.53), whereas it is low in countries such as the Sweden (.04), Estonia (.03) and Turkey (.01). A total of twelve countries are above average with regard to the size of this cluster.

Representing 30 percent of the pooled sample, the probability of being a civic nationalist (cluster 3), is equal to or above average in eleven countries and is especially high in Sweden (.83), Norway (.67), and Denmark (.60).

Liberal nationalists (cluster 4) represent 18 percent of the pooled data. This kind of nationalism is common in countries such as Spain (.70) and Portugal (.62), whereas it is absent in the Nordic countries. A total of nine countries are above average with regard to the size of this cluster.

The disengaged (cluster 5), constitutes only seven percent of the European sample and eleven countries are equal to or above average in this regard, with Croatia (.35) at the top and Hungary (.02) and Norway (.02) at the bottom.

Taken together, results from LCA confirm striking cross-country differences in cluster sizes and demonstrate that several types of nationalism coexist within single countries. For example, although people from Estonia are some of the least likely to identify with one the most 'thick' kind of nationalism (ardent (.00)) and are much more likely demonstrate a 'thin' kind of nationalism (civic nationalism (.28)), they are also the likely to oppose restrictive nationalism (.34) and liberal nationalism (.31) and takes place in the lower half regarding the disengaged nationalism (.07).


Correlations between different types of nationalism and democracy

In this section, I report the relationship between the different types of nationalism and the level to which democracy is established. The combination of the latent classes proportions of each country are assumed to correlate with the level of democratic development. I use each latent class (a type of nationalism) as dummy variables, which is divided into proportions of the pooled data/population. The number of dummies must not be too many because there are only 23 cases (countries). A maximum of four dummies are used in each model. This is assumed to measure the affect of the cluster size in respect of the level to which democracy is established. One option is to divide into cluster sizes of 25 percent (0-24, 25-50, etc.). But then too many countries will end up in the reference category. Regarding the disengaged, all countries will end up in the reference category. Therefore, a smaller reference category and larger categories were chosen to measure any affects on level of democracy:

1. 0-9 percent, negligible affect (ref.)
2. 10-34 percent, tangible affect
3. 35-59 percent, large affect
4. 60 percent or more, hegemonic position

Figure 1 assesses the continuous relationship between largest cluster, civic nationalism, and democracy. There seem to be a positive relationship between the proportion of civic nationalists and democracy index. Among all scatter plots, this bivariate correlation appears the strongest. It is clear that the proportions of civic nationalism that exceed 40 percent only exist in western Europe, while very small proportions of civilian nationalism are more common in Eastern Europe.

Figure 1. Civic Nationalism and Democracy.



Sources: ISSP (2013), Economist (2016)


Table 7 demonstrates a significant categorical correlation between civic nationalism and democracy index. Regarding the constituent elements of liberal democracy, proportions of civic nationalists above 10 percent are significantly correlated with all of the items. But, these significant correlations, except civil rights, lapses when we include Gini and age of

democracy. When proportions reach between 35-59 percent of the country's population, the correlation to political culture and civil rights is significant. Finally, when civic nationalism reaches a hegemonic position it also affects the overall level of democracy. Proportions over 60 percent are associated with overall score between 7.54 and 10.00. The Gini-coefficient reinforces this relationship, which, on the one hand is significant even when the age of democracy is taken into account, on the other hand, the size of the coefficient and the level of significance both decrease.

R^2 is 0.72; the variation of democracy index can be explained by civic nationalism and Gini at a level of 72 percent. Hence, more civic nationalism, more democracy.

Figure 2 describes the relationship between proportions of the second largest class of nationalism, ardent nationalism (23 present of respondents) and democracy index (overall score). The linear regression line is negative, which indicates that large proportions of ardent nationalism is associated with a low level of democracy. Proportions of ardent nationalism that exceed 20 percent in a country only exist in Eastern Europe.

Figure 2. Ardent Nationalism and Democracy




Sources: ISSP (2013), Economist (2016)

Table 8 reports the relationships between ardent nationalism and the items that constitute the democracy index. As expected, the more ardent nationalism, the less democracy.

Countries with more than 60 percent ardent nationalists, such as Russia and Turkey, have less democratic electoral processes and less pluralism, fewer civil liberties and lower levels of overall democracy. These statistically significant relationships remain when I control for Gini and the age of democracy. R^2 is high; in regard to the significant correlations R^2 is between 0.67-0.82. The negative relationship between ardent nationalism and political culture disappears when age of democracy is included, which indicates that institutional stability plays a more important role in political culture. Among all items of democracy index, a hegemonic position of ardent nationalism has greatest impact on civil rights; constant $6.80 (\pm 1.22) - 5.31 (\pm 1.08)$ provides a level of civil rights between 0 and 3.79. Based on democracy's core values, it is implied that liberal democracy is not possible without civil rights. It seems difficult to combine large proportions of ardent nationalism and high level of democracy.

Figure 3 visualizes the relationship between restrictive nationalism and democracy. Contrary to expectations, the scatter plot indicates a positive continuous correlation. There is no clear division between East and West.

Figure 3. Restrictive Nationalism and Democracy




Sources: ISSP (2013), Economist (2016)

Table 9 reports the relationship between restrictive nationalism and democracy. There is no correlation between restrictive nationalism and democracy at all. Only the Gini coefficient is significantly related to electoral processes and pluralism. The correlation is negative, which means that increased economic equality benefits the functioning of government. The same pattern is observable regarding the full index. The age of democracy correlates positively with political participation and political culture as well.

The next scatter plot displays the relationship between liberal nationalism and democracy. Of all relationships, this seems to be the weakest. The regression line is flat, indicating no relationship.

Figure 4. Liberal nationalism and democracy.




Sources: ISSP (2013), Economist (2016)

Table 10 report the association between Liberal nationalism and democracy. I hypothesized that liberal nationalism should be positively correlated with democracy, but it is not. When the control variables are included similar patterns, as did Restrictive nationalism, appears. Thus, countries such as Spain and Portugal that accommodates large proportions of liberal nationalists must rely on the affects of robust democratic institutions, moderate levels of economic inequality and the tangible positive caused by smaller proportions of civic nationalists. The proportion of liberal nationalism does not affect the level of liberal democracy.

The last figure shows the relationship between the smallest latent class, the disengaged (7 percent of the pooled data) an democracy index. The regression line indicates a negative correlation; larger proportion of the disengaged, less democracy. We cannot perceive that the disengaged are more common in western than in Eastern Europe.

The last figure shows the relationship between the smallest latent class, the disengaged (7 percent of the pooled data), and the democracy index. The regression line indicates a negative correlation: the larger proportion of the disengaged, the less democracy in a country. There is no clear division between East and West.

Figure 5. The Disengaged and Democracy



Sources: ISSP (2013), Economist (2016)

Table 11 reports the relationship between country-level proportions of the disengaged and democracy index. Consistent with expectations, the share of disengaged has a negative effect on democracy index. This affect, however, is much weaker than the affect of ardent and civic nationalism. Proportions between 10 and 34 percent can affect the overall score of democracy index negatively with 0.58-1.26 points. For example, this may help explain why Finland has lower democracy index (9.03) than other Nordic countries, as the share of disengaged nationalists is relatively higher in Finland than in other Nordic countries. The negative association is also observable in the regard to political participation, political culture and civil liberties.

Table 7. Civic Nationalism and Democracy

	Electoral process and pluralism		The functioning of government		Political participation		Political culture		Civil liberties		Full Index	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Civic, 0-9% (ref.)												
Civic, 10-34%	1.86 (0.83) *	1.26 (0.96)	1.79 (0.70) *	0.57 (0.66)	1.48 (0.60) *	0.70 (0.66)	1.98 (0.73) *	1.14 (0.83)	1.68 (0.96) †	2.18 (1.06) †	1.76 (0.55) **	0.90 (0.58)
Civic, 35-59%	2.04 (0.76) *	1.21 (1.07)	2.68 (0.64) ***	0.85 (0.74)	1.73 (0.55) **	0.49 (0.74)	2.97 (0.69) ***	1.72 (0.92) †	2.09 (0.97) *	2.75 (1.13) *	2.33 (0.51) ***	1.04 (0.65)
Civic, more than 60%	2.21 (1.18) †	1.04 (1.40)	4.34 (0.99) ***	1.68 (0.97)	3.80 (0.85) ***	1.79 (0.97) †	4.27 (0.90) ***	2.61 (1.21) *	2.52 (1.26) †	3.38 (1.50) *	3.68 (0.73) ***	1.69 (1.07) †
GINI		-0.10 (0.06) †		-0.12 (0.03) **		-0.02 (0.04)		-0.03 (0.05)		-0.10 (0.06)		-0.08 (0.03) *
Democracy before 1989		0.04 (0.81)		1.05 (0.75) †		1.34 (0.56) *		1.36 (0.67) †			0.15 (0.95)	0.84 (0.63)
Constant	8.43 (0.49) ***	11.38 (2.18) ***	5.30 (1.16) ***	9.81 (1.51) ***	5.37 (0.43) ***	6.05 (1.50) ***	5.63 (0.39) ***	5.97 (1.88) ***	9.80 (2.40) ***	6.18 (0.67) ***	6.61 (0.32) ***	8.87 (1.33) ***
R2	0.31	0.42	0.56	0.76	0.54	0.65	0.60	0.68	0.44	0.50	0.58	0.73
N	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23

†p<0.1*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p<.001

Sources: ISSP (2013), Economist (2016)

Table 8. Ardent Nationalism and Democracy

	Electoral process and pluralism		Functioning of government		Political participation		Political culture		Civil liberties		Full Index	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Ardent, 0-9% (ref.)												
Ardent, 10-34%	0.00 (0.54)	-0.21 (0.54)	0.26 (0.63)	-0.35 (0.53)	0.80 (0.61)	0.26 (0.56)	0.34 (0.50)	-0.34 (0.67)	-0.06 (0.52)	-0.27 (0.55)	-0.34 (0.42)	-0.52 (0.40)
Ardent, 35-59%	-0.14 (0.77)	-0.09 (0.77)	-1.43 (0.86)	-0.40 (0.75)	-0.97 (0.84)	-0.36 (0.79)	-1.92 (0.99) †	-0.75 (0.96)	-0.19 (0.72)	0.20 (0.78)	-0.94 (0.58)	-0.26 (0.56)
Ardent, more than 60%	-3.86 (1.07) ***	-4.18 (1.07) ***	-3.45 (0.86) ***	-0.85 (1.05)	-0.60 (1.24)	0.22 (1.10)	-3.17 (0.99) **	-1.70 (1.33)	-4.99 (0.71) ***	-5.31 (1.08) ***	-3.31 (0.58) ***	-2.36 (0.78) **
GINI		0.03 (0.06)		-1.29 (0.05) *		-0.05 (0.06)		0.02 (0.07)		0.06 (0.06)		-0.02 (0.04)
Democracy before 1989		-0.16 (0.59)		1.55 (0.58) *		1.70 (0.61) *		2.06 (0.74) *		0.84 (0.60)		1.17 (0.43) *
Constant	9.58 (0.33) ***	8.79 (1.66) ***	7.74 (0.43) ***	10.56 (1.67) ***	8.53 (0.42) ***	7.33 (1.75) ***	7.55 (0.50) ***	7.10 (2.12) **	8.92 (0.36) ***	6.80 (1.22) ***	8.11 (0.29) ***	8.10 (0.65) ***
R2	0.67	0.67	0.53	0.74	0.37	0.67	0.46	0.63	0.75	0.78	0.69	0.79
N	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23

†p<0.1*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p<.001

Sources: ISSP (2013), Economist (2016),

Table 9. Restrictive Nationalism and Democracy

	Electoral process and pluralism		The functioning of government		Political participations		Political culture		Civil liberties		Full Index	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Restrictive, 0-9% (ref.)												
Restrictive, 10-34%	0.58 (0.93)	0.22 (0.80)	-0.02 (1.02)	-0.52 (0.56)	0.43 (0.81)	0.23 (0.58)	-0.21 (1.10)	-0.57 (0.74)	1.05 (1.13)	0.61 (0.93)	0.37 (0.85)	0.00 (0.52)
Restrictive, 35-60%	0.90 (1.28)	0.74 (1.09)	-0.21 (1.40)	-0.26 (0.77)	-0.60 (1.10)	-0.40 (0.73)	-0.31 (1.50)	-0.09 (1.01)	1.08 (1.55)	0.98 (1.27)	0.34 (1.16)	0.36 (0.70)
GINI		-0.13 (0.05) *		-0.16 (0.04) ***		-0.04 (0.04)		-0.08 (0.05)		-0.14 (0.06)		-0.11 (0.03) **
Democracy before 1989		0.59 (0.65)		1.60 (0.46) **		1.74 (0.47) **		2.33 (0.60) ***		1.15 (0.75)		1.47 (0.42) **
Constant	8.54 (0.83) ***	12.45 (1.27) ***	7.23 (0.91) ***	11.58 (1.42) ***	6.53 (0.72) ***	7.10 (1.46) ***	7.19 (0.94) ***	8.75 (1.86) ***	7.35 (1.01) ***	11.46 (2.34) ***	7.37 (0.76) ***	10.22 (1.30) ***
R2	0.03	0.38	0.00	0.73	0.07	0.58	0.00	0.61	0.04	0.44	0.01	0.68
N	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23

†p<0.1*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p<.001

Sources: ISSP (2013), Economist (2016)

Table 10. Liberal Nationalism and Democracy

	Electoral process and pluralism		The functioning of government		Political participation		Political culture		Civil liberties		Full Index	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
Liberal, 0-9% (ref.)												
Liberal, 10-34%	-0.55 (0.80)	0.10 (0.75)	-1.55 (0.79) †	-0.51 (0.53)	-1.17 (0.63) †	-0.31 (0.55)	-2.04 (0.80) *	-0.92 (0.68)	-0.70 (0.97)	0.15 (0.87)	-1.22 (0.67) †	-0.30 (0.49)
Liberal, 35-59%	0.23 (1.13)	0.69 (1.17)	-1.83 (1.12)	-0.76 (0.82)	-1.97 (0.89) *	-0.68 (0.86)	-2.08 (1.14) †	-0.48 (1.06)	-0.23 (1.37)	0.51 (1.35)	-1.02 (0.95)	0.05 (0.76)
Liberal, more than 60%	0.37 (1.33)	0.88 (1.19)	-1.17 (1.31)	-0.77 (0.83)	-0.59 (1.04)	-0.76 (0.87)	-0.62 (1.02)	-0.74 (1.07)	0.97 (1.60)	1.53 (1.38)	-0.22 (1.12)	-0.01 (0.78)
GINI		-0.13 (0.06) *		-0.15 (0.0) **		0.04 (0.04) *		-0.07 (0.05)		-0.17 (0.07) *		-1.11 (0.04) *
Democracy before 1989		0.58 (0.88)		1.38 (0.62) *		1.67 (0.64)		2.05 (0.80) *		0.94 (1.02)		1.36 (0.58) *
Constant	9.21 (0.56) ***	12.70 (1.48) ***	8.13 (1.11) ***	11.49 (1.54) ***	7.31 (0.44) ***	7.04 (1.61) ***	8.13 (0.57) ***	8.60 (1.97) ***	8.46 (0.68) ***	12.59 (2.55) ***	7.74 (0.36) ***	10.40 (1.44) ***
R2	0.05	0.39	0.21	0.75	0.25	0.59	0.29	0.63	0.07	0.46	0.16	0.68
N	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23

†p<0.1. *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p<.001

Sources: ISSP (2013), Economist (2016)

Table 11. The Disengaged and Democracy

	Electoral process and pluralism		The functioning of government		Political participation		Political culture		Civil liberties		Full Index	
	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE	b	SE
The disengaged, 0-9% (ref.)												
The disengaged, 10-19%	-1.32 (0.66) †	-1.16 (0.56) †	-0.96 (0.75)	-0.51 (0.49)	-0.89 (0.61)	-0.47 (0.45)	-1.19 (0.80)	-0.65 (0.56)	-1.84 (0.79) *	-0.83 (0.71) *	-1.28 (0.59) *	-0.92 (0.34) *
GINI		-0.13 (0.05) **		-0.15 (0.04) ***		-0.05 (0.04)		-0.08 (0.05) †		-0.15 (0.05) **		-0.11 (0.03) ***
Democracy before 1989		0.27 (0.58)		1.48 (0.44) **		1.71 (0.46) **		2.15 (0.58) ***		1.51 (0.63)		1.23 (0.35) **
Constant	10.34 (1.11) ***	13.48 (1.64) ***	10.34 (1.11) ***	11.34 (1.73) ***	6.79 (0.34) ***	7.43 (1.28) ***	7.42 (0.47) ***	8.58 (1.61) ***	8.86 (0.47) ***	12.21 (1.79) ***	8.12 (0.35) ***	10.82 (0.98) ***
R2	0.16	0.48	0.07	0.74	0.09	0.58	0.10	0.62	0.21	0.57	0.16	0.76
N	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23	23

*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p<.001

Sources: ISSP (2013), Economist (2016)

In sum, two forms of nationalism—the extremes in the matter of ‘thick’ vs. ‘thin’, ardent and the disengaged—negatively affect democracy. Restrictive and liberal nationalisms do not, however, affect the level of democracy. Civic nationalism is the only kind of nationalism that positively affects democracy. Table 12 displays an overview of these relationships and whether or not my hypotheses are supported.

Table 12. Relationships between different types of nationalism and democracy.

	Election and pluralism	Functioning of government	Political participation	Political culture	Civil Liberties	Overall score	H, Supported
Ardent nationalism	Strongly Negative	None	None	None	Strongly Negative	Negative	Yes
Restrictive nationalism	None	None	None	None	None	None	No
Liberal nationalism	None	None	None	None	None	None	No
Civic nationalism	None	None	Positive	Positive	Positive	Positive	Yes
The dis-engaged	Negative	None	None	Negative	Negative	Negative	Yes

7. Conclusions

In this article I used an exploratory method to investigate the types of nationalism that exist in European countries. Five different types of nationalism were found. Three of them refer to ethno-cultural nationhood, where one, ardent nationalists, is more extreme than the other two: restrictive nationalists and liberal nationalists. The fourth latent class is close to the idea of a civic nationalism, although this group does not correspond to any perfected egalitarianism. The fifth group, the disengaged, is the grouping that mostly deemphasized importance of national affiliation. The findings contribute to the literature in three ways.

First, the use of LCA reveals that none of the countries accommodates only one kind of nationalism. In more than two-thirds of the countries, the five varieties of nationalism are represented with different proportions. Second, concerning the ethnic-civic discussion, or the ethnic-East/civic-West argument, the LCA sheds light on how the civic item coexists with ethnic items on individual level. On the one hand, results clearly show that ardent nationalism is more common in Eastern Europe and civic nationalism is more common in Western Europe. But, interestingly, the difference is not about the emphasis of civic items, the dissimilarity appears in the lack of accentuation of ancestry and religion among civic nationalists. This challenges the classical distinction where ethnic is in opposition to civic.

Even Larsen found that Kohn's geographic distinction still seems to have some merit. But, consequently, the 5-cluster model did not capture any latent class with civic low/ethnic high, which Larsen referred to as 'conservative nationalism' or 'high intense ethnic nationalism'. Third, the hubris item shows that irrational attachment is typical to ardent nationalism but in regard to civic nationalists it is not. This suggests that nationalism should be considered as a multidimensional phenomenon, not only a question about criteria of membership.

In this article I also incorporated nationalism into the study of democracy—something previous research has not considered. The results emphasize a significant and strong association between different kinds of nationalism and the level of democracy. Even when controlling for Gini, the age and democracy, and GDP per capita, three types of nationalism are significantly associated with the level of democracy.

To explain this relationship, I elaborated Dahl's idea about the core value of democracy, the logic of equality, and assumed that the benign nationalism must provide normative elements that are consistent with these values. The different types of everyday nationalism should have different meanings, which are embedded in various cognitive schemes that produce core values, normative elements, which give a certain kind of nationalism its cultural distinctiveness. I asked: what kind of nationalism provides the normative elements that coincide with the core values of democracy?

The type of nationalism consisting of habituated modes of thoughts, speech and behaviour, which is consistent with the core-values of democracy, is undoubtedly civic nationalism. The cognitive scheme with normative elements that determine few restrictions on who should be viewed as a true member of the nation and stresses rational attachment towards the nation's statements and decisions, positively affect political culture and civil rights in reality. These normative elements comply with the core values of democracy. Therefore, civic nationalism affects the level of democracy positively.

In the opposite way, a hegemonic position of nationalism constituted by a cognitive scheme characterized by restrictive and exclusive criteria's of membership, where in-group membership is conditional on religious ethno-cultural affiliation, which also emphasizes irrational attachment to the nation and intrinsic inequality, cannot be merged into the core values of democracy. Therefore, the cognitive, emotional and behavioural dispositions of ardent nationalism are not consistent with the features of liberal democracy. Undoubtedly, ardent nationalism has a negative affect on electoral process and pluralism civil liberties and overall score. Thus, these three features of liberal democracy, factors that presuppose the core values are adversely affected. Interestingly, political participation and functioning of

government, which is not conditioned by the presence of the core values of democracy, is not affected, which indicates that the causal relationship seems to be plausible.

Hence, ardent nationalism is not compatible with liberal democracy. Ardent nationalism counteracts democracy as a whole. No country seems to be able to accommodate hegemonic position of ardent nationalism and exist as a fully developed democracy at one and the same time; democracy requires another kind of nationalism.

Restrictive and liberal nationalism is less extreme than ardent nationalism, but still not to the advantage of liberal democracy. These two types of nationalism did not show any significant correlations to level of democracy.

Interestingly, the absence of nationalist preferences, which can be located to the Disengaged, affects political pluralism and civil rights negatively, although the effect is weak.

Regarding the relationship between nationalism and democracy this article contributes to literature both empirically and theoretically. Concerning the former, nationalism is a factor that affects level of democracy and different kinds of nationalism have different effects. This innovation help explain levels of democracy better than the theories controls (Gini, GDP and age of democracy).

The study also contributes with theory development. Based on the stated hypothesis, criterion for citizenship and rational/irrational attachment seems to be stronger indicators for level of democracy than preferences about common language and egalitarianism.

In regard to the ‘thick vs. thin-argument’, if nationalism is to ‘thick’ (ardent nationalism), it becomes a path towards authoritarian regime (democracy index between 0-4), or ‘ethnocracy’; low levels of political pluralism and individual rights. None of the three variants of nationalism that emphasize the importance of ethnic affiliation, a ‘thick’ community, affect democracy in a positive way. Hence, the idea of a ‘thick’ ethno-cultural community/homogeneity as cohesive glue for liberal democracy seems to be an exterior contemplation without equivalent in the cognitive scheme among the citizens; an idea that is only adaptable with itself, not with individuals’ perceptions of reality. On the other hand, a variant that is too ‘thin’ (the disengaged) does not contribute positively to level of democracy either. The phenomenon of nationalism says something about a moral tension. The community must not be too ‘thick’ or too ‘thin’. The cognitive scheme, that provides suitable ‘thickness’ to interlace with the core values of democracy, seems to be hosted by civic nationalists, which appears to be the lifeblood and spinal column of the liberal democratic society. Democracy seems to derive from the notion of ‘demos’ rather than from the notion of ‘ethos’.

There are two shortcomings of the study. First, the national egalitarianism demonstrated by liberal nationalists had no positive effect, which was unexpected. Perhaps better data is needed to operationalize this aspect of nationalism. In countries such as Portugal and Spain, societies with low development of welfare, ‘rights’ might have been interpreted as ‘negative rights’ (which imposes a negative duty on others, meaning a duty to do nothing and not interfere), while ‘rights’ in welfare societies, such as Sweden and Norway, are interpreted as positive rights; welfare benefits. Therefore, the effect of this aspect becomes unclear. Second, the analysis includes only 23 countries, which is to the disadvantage of the study. If the number were doubled, we could include more variables and tune up the appreciation of the relationship between nationalism and the level of democracy.

This is first article that set out to measure the relationship between nationalism and level of democracy, and there is much more to explore. It would be interesting to study how this relationship has changed over time and in other parts of the world. The longitudinal approach could focus upon the causal direction: does democratic institutions cause civic nationalism, or, does civic nationalism cause democratic institutions? Another possibility is to perform in-depth comparisons between a few countries, taking into account their history and constitutional organization. For example, why does Switzerland have 53% restrictive nationalists but still a high democracy index (9.09)? Why does the Swedish parliament host one of the world's largest parties with a direct link to primordial nationalism and Nazism (‘The Swedish democrats’, about 14 percent of the votes), while the proportion of ardent nationalism is only .04? Another possibility is to link clusters of nationalism into a political domain, by focusing on elites’ political projects, discursive practices and voting patterns. Which kind nationalism is associated to radical right populism, or so-called ‘neo-nationalism’ (Eger & Valdez 2015), and how do these parties affect the citizens' nationalist preferences?

In sum, the level democracy is a matter in which different types of nationalism are of crucial importance, a relationship that endures even taking into consideration theoretical controls. Given that the methodology in this article is deductive and the existence of the resulting correlation, if ardent nationalism is increasing, the level of democracy is at risk. Current events in Europe are suggestive, for example, democracy's failure in Russia (ardent .64) and decline in Turkey (ardent .88). The decline of democracy in Hungary can be seen in the light of harbouring large proportions of both restrictive (.58) and ardent (.25) nationalists and too few civic nationalists (.00). Among Western democracies Great Britain houses most citizens emphasizing “thick” nationalism; ardent .16 and restrictive .29. That can be linked to the success of ‘Brexit’, which ‘requires a reassertion of the ethos of the unitary state’ (The

Guardian, 18 March, 2017). The emergence of neo-nationalist parties in Western democracies may therefore justify an ounce of concern

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