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ABSTRACT

The UNFCCC initiated mechanism Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) is an important policy instrument for combating climate change, using payments to create economic incentives for developing countries to preserve their forests. However, there is a need for closer scrutiny of whether the mechanism is able to generate its intended outputs and outcomes. The study assessed REDD+ productivity performance in collaborative governance using an instrumental case study of a Collaborative Governance Regime (CGR), the CarBi project in Vietnam. The assessment was based on Emerson and Nabatchi’s productivity performance matrix encompassing three units of analysis - the Participant Organisations, the CGR and the Target Goals. The study was conducted as a Minor Field Study (MFS) using in-depth interviews, complemented with official documents. The findings showed that progress was made in achieving target goals such as forest restoration and enhanced biodiversity, but that REDD+ was not adapted to suit the CGR’s need for stable payments and was not financially feasible to implement in a conservation focused project. Instead, outputs and outcomes were sustained as a result of the transition to the national Payment for Forest Ecosystem Services (PFES). However, the REDD+ safeguards, supporting the inclusion of local communities and indigenous peoples, were lost in the transition and PFES reliance on funding from hydropower dams posed both environmental and social challenges to CGR sustainability.

Keywords: forests, collaborative governance, Vietnam, REDD+, Payment for Ecosystem Services, local communities, payment mechanisms, climate change.
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ABBREVIATIONS

CarBi: Carbon and Biodiversity Project
DARD: Department of Agriculture and Rural Development
FPD: Forest Protection Department
FPDF: Forest Protection and Development Fund
MoU: Memorandum of Understanding
PES: Payment for Ecosystem Services
PFES: Payment for Forest Ecosystem Services
REDD+: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation
UNFCCC: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WWF: World Wildlife Fund
1 INTRODUCTION

Deforestation and forest degradation are considered to be one of the major sources of global greenhouse gas emissions (Carlowicz, 2012; UN-REDD Programme, 2018). Forest ecosystems play a significant role in climate change mitigation by acting as carbon sinks, thereby preventing carbon from entering the atmosphere (Settele et al, 2014). Reducing emissions from forests will therefore play a fundamental role in climate change mitigation (Rogelj et al., 2018). Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is a mechanism adopted by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to address deforestation and forest degradation through payments for ecosystem services (PES) (UNFCCC, 2008; Wunder, 2005). By putting a financial value on forests, developed countries attempt to create incentives for developing countries to preserve their forests through results-based payments (The REDD desk, 2016). As one of the countries expected to be most severely affected by climate change (The World Bank, 2013), Vietnam has shown extensive commitment to the implementation of the REDD+ mechanism (Thuy et al, 2012; Hicks, 2019).

Vietnam has seen a strong economic development since the reforms initiated in the 1980’s, going from being one of the world’s poorest countries to a lower middle-income country (The World Bank, 2018). Yet this rapid development has strained natural resources in the country and loss of forests through forest degradation and deforestation is one of the main sources of national greenhouse gas emissions (UNDP Viet Nam, n.d.). The World Bank (2013) expects that the county’s vulnerability to climate change and natural disasters will also have a negative impact on economic growth and GDP. Apart from the REDD+ ambitions to preserve forests and combat climate change, the REDD+ mechanism highlights that projects should be based on inclusive participation from government, non-state, international and local actors as well as the inclusive participation of indigenous peoples and local communities (UNFCCC Secretariat, 2016; UNFCCC 2011).

Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) defines this inclusive participation of multiple actors to preserve an ecosystem service as a collaborative governance regime (CGR), where complex policy challenges with contending interests often result in an independently convened CGR, initiated by a neutral third party. In an independently convened CGR the convening actor plays a central role in balancing participants’ interests and generate shared motivation for
project implementation. A CGR with these characteristics that attempted to incorporate a REDD+ component is the CarBi project. This CGR is found in the Central Annamites region in Vietnam and Laos and was initiated by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) (WWF Greater Mekong, n.d.).

So far, a first phase of the project has been completed. The first phase aimed to secure a sustainable forest management, working with aspects such as forest restoration, enhancement of biodiversity and prevention of illegal logging. It also strived to include a sustainable funding mechanism. However, trying to incorporate a REDD+ element, along with its collaborative ideas in the contrasting Vietnamese governance context can seem challenging (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017; Quoc-Anh et al, 2017). Numerous studies have stressed the risk of local community interests being overlooked when focusing on the realisation of environmental goals for projects incorporating PES or REDD+, also known as a social-ecological trade-off (Kane, 2018; Huynh and Keenan, 2017; Duchelle et al, 2017; Makino and Masashiro, 2012; Paudyal et al, 2018; Thompson et al, 2017).

In a time when public management of complex issues such as climate change often occurs in collaboration with organisations, businesses, citizens and other external actors who inform the decision-making process, assessing collaborations in terms of their productivity performance is becoming increasingly important (Koliba, 2011). Considering the requirements of collaboration between multiple actors in REDD+ implementation (UNFCCC Secretariat, 2016; UNFCCC 2011), it is of scientific and public interest to examine REDD+ implementation in an authoritarian governance context. Identifying challenges and opportunities for CGRs operating in this setting can contribute to improving CGR productivity performance in forest management and climate change mitigation. To this end, the study will assess REDD+ productivity performance in collaborative governance. For this assessment a model developed by Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) will be utilised. Emerson and Nabatchi (2015a:720) define productivity performance as “encompassing the actions, outcomes, and adaptation resulting from collaboration” and present a matrix for assessing productivity performance in CGRs. The matrix comprises three units of analysis: the participant organisations, the CGR and the target goals. Thereby, the model allows for a comprehensive evaluation. Advances in this field have the potential to benefit other areas of research such as conflict resolution in environmental issues and management of natural resources (Koontz and Thomas, 2012). The same is true for public participation and
democratic deliberation (Nabatchi, 2012).

1.1 Research Aim and Research Questions
The aim of the thesis is to assess REDD+ productivity performance in collaborative governance using an instrumental case study of the CarBi project in Vietnam. The assessment is based on Emerson and Nabatchi’s productivity performance matrix encompassing three units of analysis - the participant organisations, the CGR and the target goals. Specifically, the following questions are addressed:

- *Who are the key participant organisations in the CGR and how do they benefit from participating in the CGR (participation organisation unit of analysis)?*
- *In what way is the CGR process shaped to achieve the target goals of the CGR (CGR unit of analysis)?*
- *To what extent have the CGR target goals been accomplished and what potential do they have to be sustained over time (Target Goals unit of analysis)?*

2 BACKGROUND
This section first explains the PES mechanism and the development of the REDD+ mechanism, its safeguards and carbon credit system. This is followed by an overview of previous research on PES, REDD+ and collaborative forest governance.

2.1 Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES)
All life on Earth is dependent on natural ecosystems and the services they produce for its survival, for example water quantity and quality and regulation of the climate (WWF, n.d.; Adhikari and Boag, 2013). Due to human activities and over-exploitation, many ecosystems have become strained and might not be able to provide the services as before. An increasingly popular approach to address this degradation of ecosystems is through economic policy instruments, such as PES schemes (Arriagada and Perrings, 2009). These aim to preserve a public good that suffers because of private decision making. The choice to conduct one form of land use practice might be optimal for separate individual but can have negative consequences for the common good. Seemingly rational actions from an individual perspective are often deemed so because they are not compensated for upholding a public good. PES schemes address this market failure by helping the land users make financial
decisions that include the value of ecosystem services. Wunder (2005:3) describe PES schemes as “(a) a voluntary transaction where (b) a well-defined ecosystem service or a land use likely to secure that service (c) is being ‘bought’ by a (minimum one) service buyer (d) from a (minimum one) service provider (e) if and only if the service provider secures service provision (conditionality)”. This market-based policy has been prominent in rural areas in developed countries but has not been as frequently applied in poorer developing countries in the global South (McElwee, 2014).

2.2 Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+)

REDD+ falls under the definition of a PES scheme and applies the tools of results-based payments for the protection of forests, creating a financial value for carbon stored in forests. Its purpose is to reduce carbon emissions by creating incentives for developing countries to manage their forests in a sustainable manner. The principal objective of REDD+ is to halt deforestation and forest degradation, conserve and enhance forest carbon stocks and improve sustainable forest management in developing countries (UNFCCC, 2011; UNFCCC Secretariat, 2016; UN-REDD Programme, 2018). In 2005 REDD appeared as a concept for the first time in discussions during climate change negotiations in Montreal. It has then developed over time and incorporated more aspects of forest protection. In 2007 a decision on REDD developed at the UNFCCC meeting on Bali (UNFCCC, 2008), the thirteenth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP13). The meeting recognized that forest degradation and its emissions should also be taken into account in the work on reducing emissions from deforestation. At COP13 the Bali Action Plan was adopted to address the need for greater action on climate change. It considers “Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries” (UNFCCC, 2008:3). The broadened mandate of REDD through the inclusion of conservation and sustainable management resulted in the addition of the plus to the REDD conversation. Apart from establishing the scope of REDD+, the Cancun Agreements created in 2010 during COP16 introduced safeguard requirements for REDD+ implementation. The safeguards had the purpose of ensuring that projects do not contribute to social or environmental harms (UNFCCC, 2011). In 2013 the COP19 adopted the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, based on previous decisions, which meant that REDD+ could officially be implemented under the UNFCCC. The Framework for REDD+, or the
‘REDD+ rulebook’, set the guidelines for how REDD+ should be implemented, also incorporating the safeguard requirements (Climate Law and Policy, 2014; UNFCCC, n.d.,a).

REDD+ processes are run on a national level with the support of the UN-REDD Programme in design and implementation. Today, the Programme covers over 60 developing countries in Africa, Asia-Pacific and Latin America. The Programme offers support to countries for activities carried out within the Programme as well as technical capacity building, for example by sharing knowledge and data (UN-REDD Programme, 2018). Through the application of the safeguards, the ambition is also to create meaningful participation for all involved actors, including indigenous peoples and local forest dependent communities (UN-REDD Programme, n.d.). In the Cancun Agreement seven safeguards were created to urge REDD+ programs to: (a) complement national forest programs and international conventions and agreements; (b) maintain transparent governance; (c) respect the knowledge and rights of indigenous people and local communities; (d) obtain effective participation in REDD+ design and implementation; (e) promote forest conservation and other environmental and social co-benefits; (f) address risks of reversals; and (g) reduce leakage (UNFCCC 2011). In order to qualify for payments, countries have to develop information systems that monitor and report on REDD+ social and environmental impacts (Duchelle et al, 2017).

2.3 The REDD Carbon Credit System
REDD credits were introduced as a way of securing international funding from carbon markets to better be able to mitigate climate change (Angelsen et al, 2014). Funds have generally been provided by development aid from wealthy countries or from efforts made by developing countries themselves. REDD credits are not included in larger compliance markets such as the European Union Emission trading system (EU-ETS) or the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol. Incorporating REDD credits in these carbon markets is debated among UNFCCC parties, NGO’s, researchers and businesses. Considering the vital role of forests in reducing greenhouse gases some argue that including this resource in a global climate change agreement would help to reduce greenhouse gases considerably (Eliasch Review, 2008). The ethical dilemma that arises when using REDD credits in a global carbon market is that wealthier countries could then substitute their domestic emissions by buying carbon reductions outside their borders. This could diminish the system’s effectiveness and presents an equity challenge in the relations between North and South (Anger et al, 2012). Flooding carbon markets with REDD credits without adjustments would
lower the carbon price and risk crowding out other mitigation initiatives. A lowered carbon price might also result in the development of cleaner technologies being delayed (Fuss et al, 2011; Angelsen et al, 2014). Since REDD credits are not included in the major carbon markets it is transacted in voluntary carbon markets, but the volumes are quite small in relation to other funding (International Finance Corporation, 2016; The World Bank, 2011).

3.1 Previous Research

In the collection of research literature on PES, REDD+ and collaborative forest governance, several studies have examined the actions or outputs in REDD+ or PES schemes. One study discovered that households involved in PES schemes did not always fully understand why they receive payments (McElwee, 2014). The study stated that this could be partly due to weak PES enforcement and that households did not experience enough pressure to convert from unsustainable land use practices. In terms of local participation, active community engagement was in some cases able to shape PES schemes to better fit local communities’ own needs, shifting from an environmental to a more social focus (Shapiro-Garza, 2013). Altering policy goals towards social development, moving away from only focusing on environmental results was seen in national PES programs in Mexico where policy shifted towards poverty alleviation (Shapiro-Garza, 2013a). In Vietnam on the other hand, the issue of structural inequalities within REDD+ seemed to generally be persistent (Fujisaki et al, 2012). The main reason for this was because civil society actors, private sector, indigenous peoples’ and local communities were excluded from decision-making processes on a higher level in REDD+ national networks and working groups. As a result, the potential gains from REDD+ became limited for the excluded groups and actors. REDD+ was also criticized because actions have not always been in line with its overarching goals (Rosendal and Schei, 2014). For example, a PES scheme could contribute to ecosystem service protection, but carbon markets were not always capable of properly valuing biodiversity as with forest carbon stocks. Creating plantations for carbon sequestration was often more economically appealing but risked shifting the actions from conservation to production forestry.

In terms of equity, studies on PES monitoring found that methodologies with greater local participation and data resolution were perceived as performing higher in terms of accuracy, costs, local equity and local legitimacy (Wells et al, 2017). A key measure to consider in PES design was informing local actors on forest monitoring, its accuracy and benefits for locals and the PES scheme. Supporting local actors in conducting analysis of ecosystem services on
their own land could also be an alternative to incorporate. Other equity aspects that can play a vital part in PES implementation is how the benefits are distributed (Bee, 2017; Thompson et al, 2017). At the same time, studies on the effectiveness of REDD+ outcomes indicate that creating incentives for rural participants to participate in forest management can present both social and ecological benefits (von Hedemann and Osborne, 2016). Through a PES scheme, participants could continue to benefit from their land in a sustainable manner and also encouraged other community members to engage. Compensation for prior conservation activities also lead to poverty reduction.

Still, REDD+ collaboration outcomes did not always seem to produce employments and incomes and effects on ecosystem services were sometimes unclear, even though the implementation of schemes received the consent from local populations (Ganz et al, 2013). To reach social development and environmental protection goals, generating inclusive community participation and better information on project design was vital (Krause et al, 2013). Payment focus could also matter to outcomes of carbon storage and climate benefits, where biodiversity payments in some cases managed to indirectly produce greater effects compared the same amount of direct carbon payments. This finding indicated that biodiversity payments were important to reach the REDD+ climate change mitigation goals (Busch, 2013). There was also evidence that PES scheme implementation could result in a decrease in deforestation and degradation compared to a business-as-usual scenario where there would instead be negative environmental effects on ecosystem services and greater risk of leakage. It was suggested that PES had the potential to act as a viable alternative to traditional land-use practices (Capitani et al, 2016). One study found that another method to achieve increased viability in PES schemes was to apply the principle of environmental subsidiarity to PES design (Martinez de Anguita et al, 2014). By allowing the least centralized authority to manage environmental issues and only let a central authority work with questions that could not be addressed on lower levels, a project stood a greater chance of being beneficial and maintained over time. This way it was easier for local communities to see the benefits of ecosystem services for their own well-being and gave them a stronger connection to their forests. The question of establishing future authorities for a collaboration have not only been present in developing country contexts but is a more general challenge encompassing developed country settings, along with the challenge of securing increased or stable funding (Davies and White, 2012; Fortier et al, 2013; Kretser et al, 2018; Takeshi and Ken, 2013).
In the review of the collection of literature on PES, REDD+ and collaborative forest governance the strongest consensus seems to be that schemes often risk generating a social-ecological trade off, where social development becomes subordinate to the ecological development goals of the project (Kane, 2018; Huynh and Keenan, 2017; Duchelle et al, 2017; Makino and Masashiro, 2012; Paudyal et al, 2018; Thompson et al, 2017). In fact, REDD+ can become a driver of forest conflict, for example when restricting access to and use of forest resources or when tenure rights are unclear or overlapping. To avoid this, social aspects of competing demands and benefit distribution need to be considered REDD+ implementation (Kane et al, 2018). Communities that are exposed to disincentives alone, such as restricted forest access, experience a reduced tenure security and general well-being over time (Duchelle et al, 2017). Incentives to adopt alternative livelihoods need to be in place to minimize the risk of communities reverting back to unsustainable land use practices (Makino and Masashiro, 2012). In other words, adaptation to local contexts is seen as crucial for REDD+ implementation and long-term sustainability. Several researchers point out the sometimes seemingly weak link between PES schemes and conservation. In some cases, projects helped to achieve local community benefits such as tenure rights, but the most vulnerable groups such as indigenous peoples were often disadvantaged by the initiation of PES or REDD+ in their area (Fujisaki et al, 2012). Thus, the disparities in power or influence between participants were reproduced within the scheme (Bee, 2017). In line with these studies, the viability of a project was connected to the degree of local ownership and non-inclusive participation sometimes contributed to reduced project legitimacy (Wells et al, 2017). Many of the studies incorporate one or several dimensions of CGR productivity performance found in the Emerson-Nabatchi (2015) theoretical framework, but none could be found that embraces all aspects of the framework.

3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The term Collaborative Governance Regime (CGR) was introduced by Kirk Emerson and Tina Nabatchi and is defined as “the particular mode of, or system for, public decision making in which cross-boundary collaboration represents the prevailing pattern of behavior and activity” (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015a:721). To assess the productivity performance of a CGR the authors have constructed a performance matrix with nine critical dimensions of CGR productivity. The framework, along with its underlying ideas about CGR typology and
collaboration dynamics are presented below. Note that the term CGR will be used for both the CarBi project and for the CGR unit of analysis.

3.1 The typology of CGRs

Some approaches to CGR classification have focused on the specific context of conflict or shared opportunity (Gray, 1989), others on functional typologies such as planning, education, outreach and implementation (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001) and some on community level versus large-scale collaborations (Cheng and Daniels, 2003). Moore and Koontz (2003) classify management of collaborative processes as citizen-based, agency-based or mixed-partnership. Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) however, argue that these typologies do not allow for distinction between different CGRs and that a central aspect to understanding CGR development lies in understanding how they are initiated. To address this need for a new perspective on CGR classification, the authors have created a typology for CGR classification focused on how a CGR is formed by examining the manner in which people organise to create and direct a CGR. This in its turn affects CGR composition and dynamics and results in a path-dependence since the formative type impacts how CGRs evolve over time. Emerson and Nabatchi have identified three ways for CGRs to form: self-initiated, independently convened or externally directed. In the self-initiated CGR, individuals are inspired by core-stakeholders and come together to create a CGR. In the independently convened, an independent third party creates processes for interaction and gathers participants – an independently convened CGR. Finally, a CGR can be classified as externally directed. This is the result of outside entities with sufficient authority and resources that create an incentive or mandate for participants to work together in a predetermined way.

The manner in which CGRs are constructed is also connected to the prevailing conditions, where varying challenges demand different approaches (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). An acute policy challenge is often severe and directly affects a variety of local stakeholders, while an extensive policy challenge is reoccurring in many different settings. Apart from the nature of the policy challenge, a second prevailing condition determines the CGR type, namely the configuration of the determining authorities; the public, private or non-profit decision-making powers for that specific context. These can be diffuse, mixed or concentrated. The first is characterized by a loose structure and several fragmented powers with limited or undefined responsibilities. Another type is concentrated authorities where the stakeholders are few, well-coordinated and with clear responsibilities. Mixed authorities
contain both diffuse and concentrated authorities. Acute policy challenges with an unclear decision-making power will most likely result in a self-initiated CGR, while more complex policy challenges with mixed authorities leads to an independently convened CGR. Recurring challenges and concentrated authorities often lead to an externally directed CGR.

3.2 Collaboration Dynamics by Formative Type

Just as prevailing conditions can vary, the CGR formative types are based on different patterns of collaboration dynamics that can change over time and impact CGR development and participants. Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) present three formative types of collaboration dynamics based the components of shared motivation, capacity for joint action and principled engagement. Shared motivation is a cycle based on elements of trust, mutual understanding, internal legitimacy and commitment. Trust is built over time as participants get to know each other and the other’s reliability through for example consistency in performance. This will lead to respect for participants’ differences and mutual understanding, which is also important when building trust. The two other elements, internal legitimacy and commitment, are active both on an interpersonal level between participants and indirectly between organisations. Shared motivation can be attained through the communication from participating representatives to the organisation their representing in the collaboration. Shared motivation then moves from the interpersonal level to the interorganisational level. Also, the level of authority granted to an organisation’s representative might differ between CGR participants and can impact shared motivation. Therefore, confidence in and commitment to the CGR from the participants needs to be built by the parent organisation.

Principled engagement is a process of defining, discussing and addressing interests and tensions between diverse participants to develop a shared theory of change, a strategy to achieving the CGR purpose and target goals (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). Participants might have different expectations on formality or information sharing. The learning process of principled engagement is based on elements of discovery, definition, deliberation and determinations. Participants need to discover their personal concerns and, along with other participants, define common understanding of concepts and terminology that are used to discuss challenges and opportunities. Participants then begin deliberation to agree on measures to be taken to finally make determinations or decisions. Capacity for joint action on the other hand is a combination of the elements procedural and institutional arrangements, leadership, resources and knowledge. Unlike the other two components these are not
necessarily sequential and some of the elements may be present at the outset of the CGR. Procedural and institutional arrangements such as rules and protocols are important to provide a structure for interactions between CGR participants. When the CGR grows larger or more complex, so does the need for more explicit protocols. One essential element of joint action is leadership and a CGR can require a leader to take on additional roles. Some roles can be vital in the beginning of a CGR, during deliberations or implementation. Knowledge is the currency of collaborations, where data and information need to be collected, divided and reassembled and new information also needs to be generated and shared for a functioning collaboration. Resources and funding are important to cover costs for communication, administration, logistics and other practical arrangements. Power is a central resource that is often unevenly distributed among participants. The CGR’s resource management can determine its perceived and real fairness, legitimacy and efficacy.

The formative types are path dependent, which means that the manner in which a CGR is created at the outset to some extent determines its continued development (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). Different CGR types also face different challenges and changes in collaboration dynamics over time. A challenge for this specific formative type found in CarBi is that participants often have a history of conflict and diverging interests or values. The convener needs manage these conflicts and recognise the differences in participants to build shared motivation, which might be quite weak at the start. The convener must keep in mind the likelihood of coalitions forming and be able to manage these. Another challenge is implementation of CGR plans. Again, the role of the convener is central and the individual or organisation in charge must raise the discussion with participants early on to share knowledge on strategic implementation of the CGR.

3.3 The Productivity Performance Matrix
Based on the prevailing conditions and formative type of CarBi, the project is expected to follow a path-dependency of an independently convened CGR (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). To assess the productivity performance of CGRs, Emerson and Nabatchi have presented a Productivity Performance Matrix. The matrix incorporates three units of analysis and three performance levels resulting in nine critical dimensions. In this thesis all nine dimension will be applied in the analysis.
There three performance levels are Actions/Outputs, Outcomes and Adaption. Regarding Actions/Outputs, the matrix focuses on whether outputs have been generated that could not have been accomplished by the participant organisations’ alone (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). These actions might include securing endorsements, educating the public, enacting policy measures or carrying out new management practices. A central part at the Participant Organisation unit of analysis is the efficiency of collaborative outputs in terms of gains or reduced costs connected to participation in the CGR, often measured with hard data or through the organisations’ perceptions about efficiency gains or costs. The second unit of analysis is the CGR itself, focusing on output efficacy and to what extent the generated outputs through actions are in line with the purpose of the CGR. To rate the consonance between the CGR’s reported goals or theory of change and the outputs produced can work as a measurement for this unit. Having a shared theory of change within a CGR means that participants have a common idea of how to reach the established target goals. This also connects back to how participants view the CGR’s initial problem or challenge. The last unit is the Target Goals and the dimension of equity, generally aimed at achieving benefits proportionate to the costs and risks of the CGR. The question is whether CGR outputs equitably address the multiple interests and needs of beneficiaries. Indicators could be measures of CGR benefit distribution and the beneficiaries’ perception of whether the benefits and cost have been equally distributed.

The performance level Outcomes is often the initial reason for collaborating (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). Outcomes could be added value of an improved public good or more efficient delivery of a public service. These outcomes can be physical, environmental, social, economic, and/or political as well as short-lived or long-term, very specific or quite broad in

![Figure 1: Performance matrix created by Emerson and Nabatchi (2015:199) in order to assess CGRs, divided into three units of analysis and three performance levels.](image-url)
their reach, and/or discrete or cumulative in nature. The effectiveness of outcomes looks at whether the CGR outcomes have contributed to individual participants’ capacity to accomplish their own goals or missions. This could be the participants’ perception of their increased capacity connected to the CGR as well as more direct evidence of specific improvements or benefits within the organisation. On the CGR unit of analysis the concern is the external legitimacy of the CGR, whether outcomes generate positive perceptions about the CGR among external actors who are important for the future of the CGR in terms of funding or public support. This could be measured through statements from relevant actors, press coverage or internal perceptions of reputational benefits. The Target Goals unit addresses effectiveness, or to what extent the outputs achieve their intended results or target goals. Evidence of this can be found in direct or indirect changes in the conditions, goods, services or product targeted.

The performance level of Adaptation examines whether the collaboration has resulted in a transformation or change of direction in the context or if the issue was solved by the CGR actions (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). The changes can manifest themselves within the CGR indirectly through changed collaboration incentives, or directly in for example in the addition of a new participant organisation or a change in mandate. Adaptation can also be found within participating organisations, for example through changes in resource allocation or priorities. Participant organisations need to find an equilibrium between maintaining internal stability and adapting to new challenges in order to strengthen organisational resilience. A suitable measurement is the participant organisations’ perceptions about resilience and the distribution of costs and benefits of actions connected to the CGR as well as more objective measurements of costs and benefits. At the CGR unit, looking at the CGR capacity to adapt to continue generating outputs long-term, its viability, is a central part. An indicator of long-term CGR success could be an increased number of participants or other types of CGR capacity. The Target Goals unit addresses whether effects are stable, resilient and maintained long-term. This sustainability of CGR adaptation can be measured through the endurance of adaptive responses to outcomes over time.

The units of analysis identified in the matrix can also be connected to the REDD+ safeguards agreed upon by the UNFCCC (2011). The promotion of forest conservation as well as other environmental and social shared benefits (safeguard e) corresponds to the Target Goals unit and relates to the dimensions of equity, effectiveness and sustainability. Reducing leakage
(safeguard g), along with managing risks of reversals (safeguard f) to secure the sustainability of the CGR also connects to this unit. Other safeguards fall under the CGR unit of analysis. A successful CGR process has to complement other international and national laws and conventions (safeguard a) in order to obtain CGR efficacy, external legitimacy and viability. This is also true in the case of transparency of governance (safeguard b). In a CGR process, the inclusion and rights and effective participation of all relevant participant organisations should be observed in design and implementation (safeguard c and d).

4 METHODS
In order to answer the research questions stated in the initial section, an in-depth case study was conducted. Apart from gaining knowledge of the case itself, the primary interest was to facilitate an understanding beyond the case, leading this to be an instrumental case study. This type of case study emphasizes the importance of the case in question but also the ability to make generalisations or build on theory beyond the case. In contrast to an intrinsic case study, the case itself is not the main focus of the research but rather a tool to gain knowledge of a larger phenomenon or issue (David and Sutton, 2004). By examining the REDD+ PES scheme in the CarBi CGR the study attempted to understand the productivity performance of the REDD+ mechanism in collaborative governance, thereby adding to the theory used in the thesis. Through the use of an instrumental case study approach the aim was to contribute to the body of literature on collaborative governance and REDD+ implementation that, until now, has mainly revolved around actions, outcomes or adaptation but rarely addressed all three levels of analysis. Another advantage of the instrumental case study is its aspiration to build on theory, which this study also intended to do, by contributing to the development of the theoretical framework on collaborative governance by Emerson and Nabatchi (2015). Since the application of the framework suggests a predetermined structure for how the topic is examined, a deductive approach was used (David and Sutton, 2004). Simply put, the extent to which the nine critical dimensions are fulfilled in the CarBi case will determine the CGR and REDD+ productivity performance (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015).

4.1 Case Selection and Choice of Method
Vietnam was chosen as the country of study because of its commitment to REDD+ (Hicks, 2019), its vulnerability to climate change related threats (The World Bank, 2013) and the country’s governance structure (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2017; Quoc-Anh et al, 2017).
The CarBi phase one was trans-boundary, covering Thua Thien Hue and Quang Nam provinces in Vietnam and Salavan and Xekong provinces in Laos, all placed in the Central Annamites region (The REDD desk, n.d., a; WWF Greater Mekong, n.d., a). The Central Annamites is one of the world’s biodiversity hotspots, containing some of the Indochina region’s last intact evergreen forests (WWF, 2017). Because of the unique biodiversity and vital ecosystem services, it is one of WWF Vietnam’s prioritized areas and there are sizable amounts of capital, approximately 10 Million Euros, invested in the project so far (Nguyen and Bekker, 2017). All these aspects made the case suitable for this study. CarBi operated between 2011 and 2017 and included four protected areas: The Xe Sap National Protected Area in Laos and the Thua Thien Hue Saola Reserve, the Quang Nam Saola Reserve and the Bach Ma National Park in Vietnam (Stanley et al, 2013). The CGR target goals were to create a sustainable forest management, enhance biodiversity, restore forests, reduce illegal logging between Laos and Vietnam and create a sustainable funding mechanism for conservation (Nguyen and Bekker, 2017; WWF, 2017). CarBi was initiated by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in Vietnam, a non-governmental organisation working for nature conservation and protection of natural resources (WWF, n.d.), making CarBi an Independently Convened CGR (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015).

Interviews and archival documents were used as the two methods for data collection. Nine interviews were conducted with informants from some of the participant organisations who had been involved in the first phase of CarBi. Five informants came from the WWF, three from provincial level government agencies and one from a district level government agency called Song-Kon. The other three represented the three protected areas of Bach Ma National Park and the two Saola Nature Reserves. All were chosen because they were identified as central CGR participant organisations, representing perspectives from non-state, government province and government district level. Informants were selected for their competence and experience with the project and forest management. These participant organisations were also acknowledged as central actors in the final report document used in the study (Nguyen and Bekker, 2017). The sensitivity of the study meant that local communities could not be interviewed, but the situation for this participant organisation could still be examined through other informants’ interview answers along with documents and previous research. To complement the interviews, official documents related to CarBi were included in the study, provided by the WWF. This data source consisted of a final report on CarBi (Nguyen and Bekker, 2017), a feasibility study for including REDD+ in CarBi (Stanley et al, 2013) and
another report on CarBi titled the CarBi book (WWF, 2017). By gaining access to this data the study was able to encompass multiple sources to get a more nuanced understanding of CGR actions, processes and results (David and Sutton, 2004).

4.2 The Research Process

A briefing on CarBi and its participants was given by the WWF during an initial meeting. In close dialogue they facilitated the contact with WWF informants and other project participants, a form of snowballing (David and Sutton, 2004). The use of this strategy is suitable to reach people that might otherwise be difficult or impossible to access. This also makes it hard to determine whether the sample is a representative selection, since people might recommend others with similar viewpoints. I tried to find informants from different types of participant organisations and make them aware that their names would not be included in the final version of the thesis. During the interviews it became evident that all informants had in-depth knowledge about CarBi, forest management and the country at large, making the selection of lesser concern. Based on briefings, the theoretical framework and previous literature, an interview manual (Appendix 1) was developed. The manual was carefully adapted to suit this particular research condition without losing the initial purpose of the study, because of the sensitivity of the research topic and government involvement. A situation where a gatekeeper is present can be a challenging aspect of conducting research since consent is normally needed in order to access relevant study participants. In order to gain access to informants, I had to ensure that the WWF would get the chance to read and comment on the thesis before it was submitted and published. Once a relationship was established with the WWF, this was used to connect with other key informants. Some informants requested to be interviewed in written form to better ensure their safety. Statements from informants were made unofficially and do not necessarily represent the views of their organisation.

The interviews were of a semi-structured nature, giving room for informants to provide more elaborate and detailed answers and the interviewer to use follow-up questions to get more substance in the data (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2014). Questions were placed in three themes in the interview manual, connected to the three units of analysis in the theoretical framework; Stakeholder Participation (Participant Organisations), The Collaborative Process (The CGR) and Project Outcomes (Target Goals). The manual also included introductory questions to get an idea of the informants’ expertise and views on CarBi and the value of forests as well as the
respective participant organisations. At the end of the interview all informants were given the chance to add to or clarify their answers. A document including information on the study, the researcher, contact details and ethical guidelines (Appendix 3) was shared with the informants before the interviews. The information document and the interview manual were both translated into Vietnamese (Appendix 2 and 4) by a Vietnamese-speaking contact who is not connected to CarBi. This was done to better avoid misinterpretations and the risk of bias in the translation. During the interviews the interview manual was used as support to keep the conversation within the topic and related to the research questions without limiting the informants’ answers too much. This was done to make the data easier to analyse. Interviews were held in person, over Skype or in written form with respect for the comfort and safety of informants. The interviews were recorded with the consent of the informants. To avoid information being misinterpreted or forgotten, the interviews were transcribed right after they were held. Notes were taken during the interviews and then compared to the transcriptions.

The final report, the feasibility study, and the CarBi book were critically examined to establish the quality of a source, since this is important when working with archival data or documents (Patel and Davidsson, 2011). The publishing date, the publisher’s interests, the reliance on other sources and the sources’ authenticity must be considered when including this type of material in a study. When was the document created and how long after the event it portrays? Does the author have interests in the matter? Is the author dependent on other sources or a main source? Is there reason to suspect that the source is fabricated (Patel and Davidsson, 2011; Leth and Thurén, 2000)? The documents were written in connection to the events that they were portraying. The final report and the external report were written immediately after the project ended and the feasibility study was made when the project was still running. Their credibility is therefore strengthened because they were created during or right after the project. The feasibility study was conducted and written by an independent consultant company working with these types of studies. Even though the company was contracted by the WWF there is still no clear reason to believe that the company had an interest in adapting its findings because of its employer, since the WWF relied on the company’s findings to develop the project further. The final project report and the external report on the other hand might not portray a nuanced or objective image of the project since they were written by the WWF, who has an interest in presenting the project in a positive light to secure funding or general legitimacy for the project or the organisation itself. The external report was created specifically with the purpose of marketing the project. Nevertheless, the
WWF are accountable towards donors, requiring a certain amount of transparency and accuracy. They are therefore likely to have more to gain from presenting correct and valid results in their reports. Also, even if the documents are not completely objective they can still be of relevance to the study in presenting the perspective of this particular project participant. Overall, there is no reason to believe that the sources were fabricated and the documents rely on information from a variety of sources.

4.3 Coding of Data
Qualitative content analysis was used to analyse the findings of the study. This method is well-suited to analyse semi-structures interviews and other types of text documents (David and Sutton, 2004). The purpose of qualitative data analysis is to find meaning in the content and identify meaningful themes, ideas or practices. It is a way to investigate the area of interest and develop or test theories. When attempting to find meaning in the data, qualitative content analysis is used to categorize the content by placing it in themes in order to summarize it and underline its more central elements. This type of analysis was deemed suitable in this case because of the study’s aim to examine REDD+ productivity performance in collaborative governance while also contributing to the theory on CGR productivity performance. The study used a deductive form of coding by coding the collected data into predetermined themes of the nine dimensions in the theoretical framework. The transcribed interviews and the documents were read through thoroughly multiple times, since it is important to be familiar with the content when working with qualitative content analysis (David and Sutton, 2004). This was done to better understand context and nuance in the data. Relevant parts of the texts were then placed into themes of the nine dimensions found in the productivity performance matrix to identify key themes and answer the research questions. A theme was also used for more general information and facts about the project and its background. The key themes that were significant for the overarching research questions were then analysed. A descriptive part on CarBi and its key participant organisations also derived from the data.

4.4 The Researcher’s Position
The interviews were held in English, a second language for the interviewer and the informants, which increased the risk of misinterpretations. By in advance sending both the English and Vietnamese versions of the interview manual to the informants along with the information document was one measure that was taken to alleviate the communication
between interviewer and informant. This was also done by using follow-up questions when necessary. Since it was important to make the informants comfortable in the interview situation it was left to each informant to decide on where and how the interview should take place (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2014). However, it is inevitable that power dynamics between the interviewer and informant and their perceptions of each other shapes their interaction. Trying to take my own position as an “outsider” and Westerner in consideration in the interview situation was a central part of the interviews’ success. Attempting to mitigate the potential effects of these positions by taking time in the initial stages of the thesis process to create a close and open dialogue and build trust between me and informants was one way of bridging some of the aspects that might influence interactions. This was a positive aspect of the gatekeeper, who was then able to vouch for me towards the other informants.

4.5 Ethical Considerations
When using interviews as a research method some ethical aspects should be considered, specifically the informed consent of the informant, confidentiality, consequences of the study and researcher’s role (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2014; Vetenskapsrådet, 2002; Vetenskapsrådet, 2017). The informants were informed in advance about the purpose of the study, the conditions for their participation and how the collected data would be used. It was made sure that they were aware of the voluntary nature of their participation and their right to decide to participate or not and to cancel the interview at any point. This was included in the information document distributed to participants ahead of the interviews. The informants also had the opportunity to review their own contribution to the thesis before the submission of the thesis. It was also explained that the informants’ personal information would not be included in the thesis and that there would be no unauthorized access to the data for both integrity and safety reasons. Conversations were held with my local contact person and the WWF on the country context, the sensitivity of my research to the project and its participants and suggestions for data collection. This was done to better understand the consequences of the thesis (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2014). The interviews were held during informants’ office hours, which meant their participation took time from their work tasks. It was therefore made sure that they were aware of how long the interviews would take and that the interviews did not exceed two hours. They could also make use of the results of the thesis in their work and were informed on where to find it once it was published. Another problematic aspect was the fact that some of the expected results of the study could be considered as criticism towards the Vietnamese government. This fact was deemed as potentially harmful to the well-being of
some of the informants if their participation was known. Therefore, informants’ names or other personal information are not included in quotes or other part of the thesis. All interviews were done informally, and the views of the informants do not necessarily represent the views of their organisation.

4.6 The Quality of the Study

Some common measurements to determine the quality of research are reliability, validity and transferability, although generally referred to in research using quantitative methods (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2014). Riege (2003) recommends certain techniques for increased reliability and validity in case studies and the ones suitable for this study were applied and are described below.

If a study is considered to have high reliability other researchers should be able to replicate the results of the study by using the same procedures as described in the study. In this study, the reliability was improved by transparently accounting for each phase of the research process and considerations and choices that were made (Riege, 2003). The interview guide was also included as an appendix, but follow-up questions that were asked during the interviews were not since these were adapted to the situation and informant. The interviews were recorded and notes taken during the talks, but these were also not included in the final version of the thesis, partly because of the integrity and safety of the participants. This might make it difficult to replicate the study in detail. Interviewers can also manage and interpret interviews and answers differently and this could also result in differences in the final results. To prevent the risk of misinterpretations and provide the reader with an understanding of the interpretations of the author, quotes from the interviews have been included in the presentation of the results. This also increased the reliability of the study.

The findings presented in the study should also portray some kind of reality or, through a broader interpretation more suitable for qualitative studies, measure what it intended to measure, the validity (Kvale and Brinkmann, 2014). With the assistance of individuals more well-informed about the context and people involved in forest management, relevant informants with extensive experience and knowledge could be identified. Fitting the interview manual to the research purpose and overarching questions is also an important aspect. Thereby, good conditions were created for greater validity. Creating verbatim interview transcripts allowed for correct citations and cross checking of sources (Riege, 2003).
Informants have also been offered to read the transcripts of the interviews, the quotes and analysis to clarify or change these if something appeared unclear. Finally, triangulating interviews, documents and observations helped to strengthen the results and protect against researcher bias. The analysis also compared the evidence found in the study to the existing literature to outline the contributions of the study and the boundaries of generalization. The study in itself is context specific, but knowledge from one case can provide further understanding for future studies on the topic of REDD+ implementation. Even if results are not statistically generalizable they can be tested in other cases or contexts. The study has a theoretical point of departure and can therefore contribute to further development of theory.

5 RESULTS
The results of the study are presented below, placed in the three units of analysis from Emerson and Nabatchis (2015) theoretical framework.

5.1 The Participant Organisations
An independently convened CGR is generally facilitated by a neutral third party, sometimes because of the history of the conflict or contending interests. Shared motivation is therefore less developed at the outset but can evolve over time through good-faith participation. The third party is likely to assess the situation in order to understand how to develop engagement from stakeholders by creating good conditions for it and then involve the relevant stakeholders. When it comes to capacity for joint action, the third party has an important task in spreading knowledge to the participants about the shared challenges and that these need to be overcome through collaborative action. In the case of CarBi, this role has been taken on by the WWF as the convener of the project, putting the CGR in the second formative type category of an Independently Convened CGR.
The WWF has a leadership role in the CGR and is therefore naturally one of the most central participant organisations with the main goal of conservation of nature and its resources. The conservation needs and the increasing level of threats to the central Annamites area was what lead to the initiation of the CarBi project. The WWF’s prominent role was described by WWF informants and informants from other participant organisations as the coordinator and manager of the project. Their responsibility was to deliver project outcomes in line with the CGR target goals by coordinating the various participant organisations, planning activities, sharing information and reporting on results to the donors and the Vietnamese government, according to one informant:

“It is us that manage the project, deliver outcomes and coordinate activities with relevant stakeholders and relevant agencies, both at the provincial and the central levels of Vietnam to make sure that all the project activities are conducted and that the project outputs are delivered.”

(WWF Vietnam, March 2019)
In this leadership position, the WWF had deep insight into the project and an overview of project participants and what they expected to contribute with to the project. All the WWF informants stressed the importance of maintaining a strong relationship and collaboration between the organisation and government participants on central, provincial and district levels. This was also stated in the final report and the CarBi book, where the key participant organisations were presented. These documents listed the protected areas Bach Ma National Park and Saola Nature Reserves in Quang Nam and Thua Thien Hue as the central partners in the collaboration. The protected areas are units under the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) and the Forest Protection Department FPD in Quang Nam and Thua Thien Hue, which were also listed as central partners. The government participant Bach Ma National Park described their role as managers of their own protected area under CarBi. At the provincial level of management, they contracted forest rangers to supervise forest activities and also worked with local communities in patrols. Through CarBi they had participated in several workshops to strengthen their law enforcement capacity, described by an informant:

“Carbi project phase 1 has been supporting Bach Ma National Park through organising forest patrolling, forest law enforcement in the area of the forest management, organise training courses on building law enforcement capacity for interdisciplinary patrol team members. […] Bach Ma will check and supervise forest protection through the forest rangers at the stations.”

(Bach Ma National Park, April 2019)

The Saola Nature Reserves in Thua Thien Hue and Quang Nam employed a similar role as Bach Ma National Park, since they were also provincial level managers and supervisors of their own protected areas within CarBi. They took part in the project’s capacity building workshops and stressed the significant support they had received for patrolling and equipment and the assistance in expanding the Saola Nature Reserve in Thua Thien Hue. An informant saw this as important contributions to the protected areas’ forest management and the same was true for the help to develop management plans and strategies for law enforcement among other things:

“Establishment of forest protection groups greatly contributes to the management of the
Nature Reserve’s resources. [...] Training on capacity building for MB (management board) staff and stakeholders, activities to support the development of management plans, law enforcement strategies, conservation needs assessment contribute to management at the unit.”

(Saola Nature Reserve in Thua Thien Hue, April 2019)

The Song Kon is a government participant on district level under DARD. They described their own role as the managers of CarBi project activities, which was confirmed by the final report and other informants. They worked mainly with distributing payments and organising local forest patrols. The main difference between the Song Kon and the Saola Nature Reserves is that Song Kon was primarily responsible for forest classified as protected forest, while the reserves focused on special use forest. The classifications will be described further down. Even though the documents and informant did not explicitly describe local communities as key participant organisations in the CGR, they were presented as the implementors of the CarBi project, carrying out designated activities such as tree planting and forest patrolling. This was stated by an informant from Song-Kon:

“The people in communities are allowed to participate in forest protection contracts by groups of households support by the project program in the forest protection.”

(Song-Kon, March 2019)

The elements to build capacity for joint action were all to some extent present at the outset of the CGR but also developed over time. The CGR leadership was the WWF, both because of their role as initiators and because they possessed much of the financial resources and knowledge or information shared through capacity building workshops. This also meant that they possessed the resource of power, making both government participants and local communities dependent on them in the initial stages of the CGR. Due to the centralized governance structure the resource of power was also shared with the government participants, making the WWF dependent on their legitimization. This also meant that some of the procedural and institutional arrangements were partly predetermined by this specific setting and where rules and protocols for communication and decision-making created a frame for interaction and communication. Additional meeting spaces were then developed to enhance CGR capacity. Based on the findings in the final report, the sharing of resources between
some participant organisations in CarBi meant that efficiencies were gained and costs reduced. For example, CarBi staff was accommodated in the already existing WWF offices in Hue and Tam Ky, four ranger stations and two outposts for forest guards were built and base stations were improved. Protected Area Management Board offices in the Bach Ma National Park and the Saola Nature Reserves received equipment for forest rangers and field staff, such as motorbikes, cars, communication devices, portable weather stations, sleeping bags, hydro power generators and backpacks. The Saola Nature Reserves received budget support for patrol equipment and facilities. The Song-Kon described their material benefits from the project, for example the acquisition of allowances for expenses and accommodation as described below:

"The organisation has received the allowance of petrol and business fees, accommodations during project implementation process."

(Song-Kon, March 2019)

Since multiple participant organisations cooperated in carrying out patrols, this is another example of how sharing of resources contributed to improved project activities. Information gains were also attained through the sharing of capacity building material on how to work with protected areas. More effective technological monitoring tools were used for mapping of protected areas, its wildlife and human activities, known as Special Monitoring And Reporting Tool (SMART). Focused awareness raising among local communities was conducted with the aim to change any unsustainable behaviours and practices connected to forests. Capacity building efforts and workshops were held with government participants from provinces in Laos and Vietnam to prevent illegal logging between the countries and a Timber and Wildlife Trade action plan was developed by DARD. CarBi also supported workshops with Laotian and Vietnamese government actors to discuss and sign a memorandum of understanding (MoU) where they agreed to deepen their collaboration on forest protection. The Laotian provinces of Xekong and Salavan started to apply a tracking system for timber export to Vietnam in cooperation with Vietnamese agencies. This is because of the challenges in determining the origin and legal status of this timber when it is exported. About 33 000 individuals from local communities, private sector and government staff on all levels participated in various capacity building activities under CarBi.

The forest guard model also included local communities, who were presented with income
opportunities, by employment as forest guards or by receiving support to plant trees. Some informants stressed that local communities in the CarBi protected areas often possess an intimate knowledge of local forests and wildlife and that their participation was as a positive contribution to the project. Local communities assisted the WWF and government participants in patrolling the areas that they were assigned and received payments when they reported their patrolling. Through the increased number of patrolling staff and the local communities’ knowledge of the forest, this further improved the forest management and conservation. There were mainly two types of forest classifications in the CarBi protected areas; protected forest and special use forest. In the first category local communities were allowed to plant and harvest trees and received support to plant endemic tree species to increase forest cover and contribute to their livelihood income. Special use forest was the most strictly protected under Vietnamese law and prohibited forest activities such as planting or harvesting trees, hunting wildlife or collecting other types of forest products. One informant addressed the organisation’s received support in patrolling activities:

“With the support of CarBi Project, four forest protection patrol teams were established. Together with the forest protection staff contracted by the PFES source, patrolling is carried out continuously, ensuring that there is always a patrol officer in the Forest Reserve.“

(Saola Nature Reserve in Quang Nam, April 2019)

The collaboration and sharing of resources meant that CarBi activities could be carried out more efficiently since more hours could be spent monitoring and guarding the forest. The activities helped the WWF in attaining their organisational goals on conservation and strengthened the government’s influence through improved capacity for enforcing environmental laws in the protected areas. The costs were covered by donor money and contributions from the government, but the WWF also had to match funding towards the donors, which meant they needed to put in a share of the project money as a form of insurance. For local communities the higher protection classification of the areas meant reduced access to the forest. The final report also showed that local communities had attained a general knowledge of CarBi, its activities and purpose.

The adoption of the forest guard model, using multi-actor law enforcement patrols and local forest guards put in place during CarBi resulted in more effective forest protection. Protocols were put in place for forest patrolling and arrests. In the Saola Nature Reserves patrols had
been carried out for a total of 57,000 days, over 100,000 snares for wildlife trapping were removed, around 1,800 illegal hunting camps were destroyed and about 3,200 individuals practicing illegal hunting or logging were warned or fined. Several animal species such as grey-shanked douc, serow and ferret badger were found and rescued from traps. The forest guard model is now being adopted by other Vietnamese protected areas due to its effectiveness. The outcomes from the forest guard activities also became a step towards strengthened internal capacity of government participants’ in their forest management and law enforcement work but also contributed to the conservation capacity of local communities and the WWF’s conservation goals of preserving forests and wildlife. One achievement that the WWF highlighted was the photo taken of the endangered saola by one of the many camera traps set up under CarBi with support from the Leibniz Institute for Zoo and Wildlife Research (IZW). The IZW also conducted research in the area and the information and results were shared with CarBi participants, further contributing to the increased capacity of CarBi and its participants. Other research groups that assisted in this task were the Darwin Institute, the Saola Specialist Group, the IUCN lagomorph specialist group as well as the universities of East Anglia, Hanoi, Hue, Laos and Kunming. They assisted in monitoring of threatened Vietnamese endemic animal species, setting up camera traps and conducted biodiversity surveys. Five scientific publications, two master’s theses and two PhD theses in the field of natural science were conducted on CarBi, contributing to greater knowledge of biodiversity in the area. Local communities displayed increased awareness of sustainable forest management and gained skills in patrolling and planting trees for economic gain. An informant addressed some of the results from forest patrols:

“Through patrols, many rare and precious animals were discovered; trapping activities decreased significantly, logging activities reduced to the lowest level, law violations fell sharply.”

(Saola Nature Reserve in Quang Nam, April 2019)

Yet, the lack of transparency from the government participants risked hampering the communication and information sharing among participants. This indicated a low level of trust between CGR participant organisations, but there still appeared to be enough shared motivation to continue the project activities in the belief that there were gains to be made from the collaboration. Building this commitment was mainly the task of the WWF as the project initiator. Lack of transparency was however a challenge for the WWF, the CGR and
the fulfilment of the REDD+ safeguards since there were clear limitations to the dialogue with government participants. The demands from international donors and the interests of government participants created a form of balancing act for the WWF in this regard.

One of the more substantial efficiency gains for government participants, the WWF and local communities was the transition from the REDD+ mechanism to the Payment for Forest Ecosystem Services (PFES) mechanism. During the CarBi project, the WWF requested an independent consultancy firm to conduct a feasibility study of REDD+ and if this payment scheme could be applied in the project. It focused on technical aspects and evaluated the carbon stocks in the area as well as the legal, logistical and financial viability if REDD+ was to be implemented. The study concluded that the carbon credit sales from the protected areas would not be sufficient to fund conservation activities, since only minor emission reductions were expected from the protected areas. The informants confirmed the findings, stating that biodiversity ecosystem service protection was hard for carbon markets to value compared to carbon stocks. This meant that it would likely be more financially attractive to create plantations, but this strategy would risk hampering CarBi’s conservation activities and shift the focus from biodiversity to carbon sequestration. The challenges involved in the implementation of REDD+ were also addressed by informants:

“It takes too much time and maybe we know in five years or in ten years, but it is the uncertainty. [...] But it is very hard for developing countries and Vietnam to sell. If we could sell carbon credits we can have money, otherwise we don’t have it.”

(WWF Vietnam, March 2019)

Consequently, instead of incorporating the REDD+ mechanism in CarBi, the decision was made by the WWF and government participants to introduce the government initiated PFES scheme. The financial uncertainties as well as the technical and administrative difficulties identified in REDD+ were lessened through the transition to a PES mechanism adapted to national circumstances. Many informants saw PFES as a more sustainable funding mechanism than REDD+ and believed that it possessed a strong capacity to maintain project outcomes but also to contribute to the global mitigation of climate change. Government participants as well as the WWF also saw their own capacity increasing as well as the ability to find a balance or equilibrium between change and stability. This became a result of the transition, since the PFES funding enabled the stability and continuation of forest
management activities within CarBi. The CarBi protected areas are placed in the river basin that is affected by the hydropower dams and the dams were required under Vietnamese law to pay for their use of ecosystem services. This funding was collected by the Forest Protection and Development fund (PFDF), which then distributed payments to local communities living in the protected areas to incentivise their forest protection activities and compensate the environmental influence of the hydropower dams. One of the major advantages, according to the informants, was that the PFES made it easier for them to collaborate with local communities once they could promise payments and because the system was easier to understand for all participants. Informants agreed that the complexity of REDD+ and the fact that they did not know when or if they would receive payments contributed to the decision to change to PFES:

“Revenues from PFES policies have created stable and continuous revenues over the years, contributing to improving living standards and reducing pressure on forests, encouraging forested people to live on forest jobs.”

(Saola Nature Reserve in Quang Nam, April 2019)

5.3 The Collaborative Governance Regime

According to informants, the CarBi book and final report, CarBi’s vision was to conserve healthy ecosystem services and the rich biodiversity in the Annamites region through the overarching goal of developing and implementing sustainable forest management in the protected areas. Other target goals mentioned were enhancing biodiversity, restoring forests, reducing illegal logging between Laos and Vietnam and creating a sustainable funding mechanism for conservation. This was to be achieved by developing protected area management models through the use of technological solutions as well as developing strategies and guidelines to improve management effectiveness in the protected areas. The other central aspect in this theory of change were to spread awareness concerning protection of forest and species as well as to change behaviours of communities in and around the protected areas.

In order to strengthen the protection of the areas the WWF and the Saola Nature Reserve in Thua Thien Hue managed to expand the reserve from 12 000 to 15 000 hectares and convert it from the protected forest to the special use forest classification under Vietnamese law. This meant that the area received a higher protection status, which helped to achieve the forest
restoration goal since cutting trees then became illegal in the area. The decision is one example where measures were taken to achieve biodiversity and forest restoration target goals. The dialogue between Laos and Vietnam, facilitated by the CGR, to prevent illegal trade on timber and wildlife was another activity in line with achieving the target goal on reducing illegal logging. One informant described the differences in forest classification:

“Under the Vietnam law of the special use forest people can’t go into the special use forest illegally, but for the protected forest, the older one, local forest people can do something inside. The classification of forest as special use forest is the highest classification under Vietnam law […] Under the forest protection communities can more easily collect in forest but under special use forest classification it is not allowed.”

(WWF Vietnam, March 2019)

During CarBi, meeting spaces and processes were created for key participants to discuss and develop project activities and implementation. One central forum mentioned by informants was the Project Management Unit (PMU) meetings that were held on a quarterly basis to address plans for activities and their implementation. The CarBi staff reported on the previous quarter and provided recommendations for the coming quarter. Representatives from the provincial level agencies of DARD, FPD, Bach Ma National Park, the Forest Protection Management Board as well as the WWF took part in the meetings. There was a clear expectation from the WWF that the government should be able to operate forest management activities independently in the future, hence the inclusion of these participants. Another meeting space was the cross-border dialogue between the Laotian and Vietnamese governments to develop a common strategy on preventing illegal logging and increase forest protection, encouraged by the WWF. CarBi’s decision-making spaces were almost exclusively designated for the WWF and government participants, which meant that the process of developing principled engagement mainly occurred between these participants. The meetings were quite consistent and used to inform, follow up and adapt the CGR to challenges or changing conditions in order to develop project activities in line with CarBi’s target goals. Consequently, within these meeting forums there occurred some form of discovery of participants’ concerns and dialogue around defining the CGR challenges as well as deliberation on suitable measures to manage these. Finally, decisions were also made as the final element of the cycle of principled engagement, even though this was done within a rather limited group of participant organisations. Overall, the processes between the WWF
and government participants contributed to the CGR’s efficacy and capacity to achieve its target goals of improved forest management, enhanced biodiversity, restored natural forests and reduced illegal logging. The PMU meeting was explained by one informant:

“We have an objective to present what happened last quarter and what will happen next and highlight some problems or issues or challenge and propose a solution, and to promote partnerships with the other government agencies on how to speed up their project activities.”

(WWF Vietnam, March 2019)

The inclusion of local communities was stressed as an essential aspect of CarBi in the final report and the CarBi book but was less prominent in informant interviews. Instead, many strongly emphasized the importance of meetings between the WWF and government participants. The forums for local communities were described as consultation meetings in the implementation phase on a more ad hoc basis. Some WWF informants mentioned CarBi’s participatory approach with the purpose of ensuring incomes for local communities while also offering a chance to take part in decision making. For example, they were allowed to construct their own forest patrolling plan and decide on when and where to patrol in the protected areas. The patrollers were paid for the amount of time they spend patrolling, thereby securing an income. Consultations with communities were also held before an activity were implemented to collect ideas and comments to harmonize the implementation. Consequently, the configuration of the determining authorities holding the decision-making powers were the concentrated authorities of non-profit (the WWF) and public (the government participants) actors in CarBi. The local communities can be classified as more diffuse authorities because they did not have the same influence and decision-making power as the WWF and the government participants, showing the complexity of this policy challenge. The meetings with local communities were addressed by one informant:

“We just meet the non-government partners when we plan to do some activity. This is not normal, not always, just when we plan to cooperate. So, we come together to discuss about the activity and discuss about the plan to carry out the activity.”

(WWF Vietnam, March 2019)

The platforms where participants could meet and discuss management effectiveness were important strategies to achieve the CGR target goals. Other actions that were also in line with
the goals were the application of the forest guard model, the funds provided for material improvements such as new ranger stations and transportation vehicles, the use of SMART and the distribution of information material and guidelines. Apart from this, workshops were held to strengthen the awareness of and capacity for government participants and forest guards to implement forest management activities. Awareness spreading among the local communities on protection of forest and species was also stated as a strategy to attain the target goals by encouraging local communities to change unsustainable forest use practices. Through the sporadic consultation meetings CarBi sought to include local communities and inform them on the importance of forest ecosystems and biodiversity, how to preserve them and the gains to be made for the community in changing their forest use practices. Discussions centred around transitioning from planting and harvesting fast-growing foreign tree species such as acacia or rubber trees and replacing them with endemic species like rattan to secure a more diverse tree population in the area. The quick growth and higher value of acacia and rubber made them a traditionally more economically feasible alternative for local communities, according to one informant:

“We convinced the local community to do the native plants on the plantations, but they don’t want to plant the native tree, they want to plant acacia or rubber trees because of the higher value. So, we had a lot of meetings to convince the community and then get the agreement for the tree, to plant native trees for the biodiversity value.”

(WWF Vietnam, March 2019)

The efforts to spread awareness among local communities also focused on preventing them from hunting wildlife, since this has been a traditional practice for many generations and a way to secure food or income. However, the continued high demand for rare wildlife products originates from government officials’ and private actors’ desire to demonstrate their social status and wealth, according to the WWF informants. Despite improvements in forest management, biodiversity and law enforcement, one informant recognised that there are still powerful drivers threatening to diminish the project outcomes:

“[…] mainly government at district and commune level, because at the district and commune level they can hide their activity. They can easily hide their consumption of animal products and bush meat, but not much at the provincial or central level. At provincial or central level, they tend to use some parts of tiger or rhino or bear bile or something like that. But you know,
As previously mentioned, the feasibility study concluded that sustainable financing proved to be difficult with the REDD+ mechanism under the current conditions and it was replaced with the PFES scheme. Based on the fact that the PFES processes were already thoroughly established and functioning on a national level, that payments could be distributed and that the local communities received them quicker indicates that the transition from REDD+ to PFES was a decision in line with the overall CGR target goals. Attaining a high level of external legitimacy of the CGR can help to better achieve its target goals and secure its long-term sustainability. In the case of CarBi, the international donors as well as the Vietnamese government had a strong influence over the project in terms of legitimacy and financing. A continued project would require the political and financial support of the government and the financial support of international donors. Firstly, the final report stated that new donations from both government and international actors had been attained in order to sustain CarBi activities and also continue with a second phase CarBi, which is planned to be introduced in 2019. In total the donations amounted to around 5 million USD. There was also a wide variety of donors, which in its turn enhanced the legitimacy of the CGR. The donors listed in the final report were the Confederation of European Forest Owners (CEPF), International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Asian Development Bank (ADB), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Leibniz Institute for Zoo and Wildlife Research (IZW), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), IKEA, HSBC, Global Wood Corporation (GWC), Transparent Word, Singapore Zoo, Village Focus International (VFI), Birgit & Kloser (private donor) and various WWF offices. Attaining this substantial amount of money from a broad spectrum of donors could be an indicator that the project has generated a strong support and legitimacy among these actors.

In terms of media exposure, the informants and the final report brought up the consistently positive reporting on the project. This is to be expected since the informants might have an interest in presenting the project in a positive light. Still, the sheer amount of reported newspaper articles (80) and television and radio broadcasts (10) shows a general interest from the public in the project activities and outcomes and the informants claimed that there had been interest in CarBi from both domestic and international media. When it comes to media in
In the Vietnamese context, one has to bear in mind the strong influence that the government exerts over media outlets in the country, but even if the popular opinion might not be in line with the national media reports, it does say something about the governments interest in the project and consequently also the legitimization of the project from this influential actor. If the image of the project that the government wants to portray is a positive one, then the project stands a good chance of being sustained. All government informants also stated that CarBi had been a success in terms of improved forest management, biodiversity conservation and awareness raising among communities among other things.

The continuous meetings between the WWF and government participants has generated a foundation for CarBi participant organisations to anticipate needs and challenges that might arise in project implementation. The additional funding obtained from several donors and the fact that old donors seem committed to continuing to support the project, indicates that CarBi has attained a certain level of viability. Informants experienced increased operational and financial capacity of the project due to the transition from REDD+ to PFES funding but securing sustainable funds was still seen by many informants as one of the major challenges to sustaining CGR activities and outcomes. One informant suggested that expanding the PFES funding to include other areas in the project would be a good option.

“The challenge comes from the funding, how to maintain the forest guards when CarBi ends, for the long term, how to make a sustainable achievement of CarBi when CarBi no longer has the support of the government to the CarBi activities. It’s a big question for us.”

(WWF Vietnam, March 2019)

Another element that informants identified as challenging to the viability of project outcomes was the previously mentioned lack of transparency from government participants. Here, one informant stressed the difference between good management and good governance. Effective forest management could theoretically be achieved short term by the government participants without collaborating with other participants, but for the actions to be sustainable local communities need to be included and informed in a meaningful way. The communities also need to have a chance to support themselves through alternative livelihoods in order to relieve some pressure on the forest. The challenge of providing livelihoods was confirmed by government participants and addressed by one informant:
“For sustainable project outcomes like forest management I think this depends on a lot of things like forest governance, good governance, depend on whether the government agencies perform their tasks effectively, transparently [...] It also depends on local communities, if they have a good sort of livelihood they might not go into the forest or they less go into the forest to cut down the tree.”

(WWF Vietnam, March 2019)

5.4 The Target Goals
The varying interests and levels of influence in the CGR also relates to the aspect of equity. To begin with, apart from looking at the participant organisations’ perceptions as well as more objective distributions of benefits within the CGR, the ecosystem service itself should be taken into consideration in this dimension. The environmental benefits of the project were visible in the data presented in the final report. According to the report, the improved effectiveness in forest management lead to healthier forests in terms of biodiversity and forest cover in the protected areas, since the natural forest cover increased as well as sightings of wildlife. As a beneficiary of the project the protected ecosystem seems to generally have benefitted from the actions and outcomes generated under CarBi. The payments to local communities through the PFES scheme transferred wealth from the ecosystem service consumers (hydropower dams) to the ecosystem service preservers (local communities). In exchange for patrolling the forests and allowing hydropower operators in their area, local communities received payments every year that contributed to their livelihood, according to one informant:

“For PFES it is very easy. It depends on how many kilowatts of electricity hydropower plants sell out. [...] In Quang Nam province annually, some households could get 200 or 300 USD from PFES scheme and from this amount of money they can buy enough rice for four or five or six months and it is very much significant to their livelihood.”

(WWF Vietnam, March 2019)

There was however an equity challenge embedded in this conservation strategy. The amounts paid annually were determined by the economic revenue of the hydropower dams through decisions by the FPDF and therefore the payments would most likely vary between different communities. Yet, the environmental impact on the ground caused by the dams does not seem to be included in the payment calculations. The challenge lies in the fact that communities
could be paid different amounts from the hydropower plant revenue that might not correspond to the degree of environmental impact in the communities. Due to the new protection classification of the forests, the communities had less access to the forests and were not allowed to utilize the forests in the same way as previously, for example by cutting trees or hunting wildlife. This may be a gain for forest and wildlife conservation, but a cost for the communities, even though they were able to benefit from more well-functioning ecosystem services and payments from the hydropower dams. It is unclear whether the reduced income from communities’ current, and defined by the WWF as unsustainable, forest use practices is fully compensated for by the payments from PFES. What further displayed a disparity in CGR equity and power balances between participant organisations was the fact that government actors on all levels were involved in driving up the demand for wildlife, but the problem was framed by informants as coming from the unsustainable practices of local communities. Unequitable benefit distributions were also manifested in the relationship between the WWF, government participants and local communities. When discussing the meeting places for decisions regarding forest management, the informants mentioned meetings between the WWF and government participants as the primary forum where influence over project activities could be exerted. Local communities were not included in these meetings, but in a later phase when the planned activities were to be carried out. Apart from this, they were then engaged in a consultative role to provide input on project implementation. This was portrayed as more of a negotiation between participants with the WWF trying to persuade communities to change their practices. Local communities were generally involved in more practical details and predominantly in the implementation phase, rather than in the initial stages of decision-making. This form of interaction and collaboration was better equipped to achieve the conservation and law enforcement goals of the WWF and the government participants. Planting endemic tree species was in line with target goals of securing greater biodiversity and expanding the natural forest cover. In terms of forest conservation, this was considered as a positive development since less variation in tree species normally results in less biodiversity.

The final report and the CarBi book stated that the Saola Nature Reserves in Quang Nam and Thua Tien Hue as well as the Bach Ma National Park became more effectively managed during CarBi. The natural forests were also restored and forest fragmentation was reduced in the corridors connecting the protected areas, namely Nam Dong and A Luoi corridors in Thua Thien Hue and the Dong Giang and Tay Giang corridors in Quang Nam. The protected areas
attained the highest protection classification under Vietnamese law, which provided stronger legal support for increased forest protection. As mentioned, the forest ecosystem significantly improved because of the deepened collaboration and communication between participant organisations under CarBi, indicating that the goals of forest restoration, improved biodiversity and more efficient forest management were attained. On an intermediate and long-term level, the threats to the goal of forest conservation were managed through improved communication between the governments of Laos and Vietnam as well as between the participant organisations. When it comes to the prevention of illegal logging, provincial government actors in the Laotian Xekong and Salavan provinces cooperated with Vietnamese agencies to reduce the illegal trade by using tracking systems for timber exported from Laos to Vietnam. Workshops to harmonize timber and wildlife trade planning between the countries’ provinces were also held under CarBi and improvements were made in the transboundary cooperation on protected area management as a result of these actions. The efforts lead to significant decreases in illegal timber exports.

The conducted capacity building activities for Vietnamese government staff strengthened their ability to enforce the forest protection policies and hold people accountable for breaking these laws, for example through a developed strategy for arrests and greater collaboration between participant organisations in patrolling activities. When examining long-term effects of the project, the collaboration between the WWF and government participants was maintained and the key activities of the project, such as the forest guard model, were handed over to relevant government participants. Some activities were maintained by the WWF in cooperation with government participants and local communities, as told by an informant:

"The project results were handed over to local project partners for maintaining and following up with the technical support from WWF when/where necessary. Some CarBi models are continuously supported and co-managed by WWF and local project partners until now and will be supported by CarBi 2."

(WWF Vietnam, March 2019)

Government informants confirmed that the activities are continued by them and the WWF. The Bach Ma National Park however expressed that even though local communities were actively involved in forest and wildlife protection, there were still areas where the local government law enforcement was weak and where patrols had not been carried out as a result.
They saw the need for more law enforcement capacity building for forest guards, but also to training for themselves to communicate awareness of forest value to local communities. The Saola Nature Reserves and Song-Kon seemed to have fewer problems with patrolling activities, where regular monthly patrolling was reported. An informant said:

“[...] communities have been active involved on the forest protection as well as forest protection and wildlife protection. However, there are still some, part of local government loosening, people have not actively participated patrolled to protect the forest for a day of work.”

(Bach Ma National Park, April 2019)

In terms of finding a sustainable financing model, the PFES mechanism was in this case seen as relatively sustainable in comparison to REDD+, at least when it comes to the ease of delivering payments and the amount of administrative and technical work required. The safeguards incorporated in REDD+ however seem to have been lost in the transition to the PFES scheme. The positive environmental effects generated from PFES are so far persistent, but there is still the matter of the sustainability of the payment source and the secured rights for local communities through safeguards. In other words, the extent of the sustainability of PFES remains to be seen as it develops further.

The project activities have so far been maintained by participant organisations and will continue and develop during the second phase of CarBi, expected to commence in 2019. For example, the CarBi book stressed that CarBi will support implementation and protection to enhance the harmonization of timber and wildlife trade between Laos and Vietnam. The project plans and funding are in place and the Vietnamese government is in the final stages of approving the second phase. All informants saw upholding the collaboration as vital for the continued quality of forest conservation in the Central Annamites. In the end, government participants are expected to have the capacity to carry out activities without the WWF’s support and the informants stressed that this transition was underway, but that further collaboration with and support from the WWF was needed under current circumstances. One informant stressed that many activities had been maintained:

“Yes, (activities have been maintained), such as forest protection, communication,
Yet some challenges were acknowledged by both informants and project documents. International donors were the main sources of funding, but the informants all stressed the important role of PFES funding to sustain the project long-term. The PFES scheme was seen as a sustainable option, where a more constant and stable flow of funding could be upheld in comparison to REDD+ funding. Another benefit of PFES was that it was already put in place by the Vietnamese government and had been operating for several years, since 2010. REDD+ on the other hand required extensive planning and technical as well as administrative resources that were too costly and advanced. One informant said that PFES would also make Vietnam less dependent on governments in other countries and their will to buy carbon credits:

“And also, because in this problem our national government can decide themselves, not like the REDD+ with many parties and other countries. We cannot guarantee regarding that. I think that is the most advantageous with that policy.”

(WWF Vietnam, March 2019)

However, the feasibility study revealed that there were considerable negative environmental effects from the hydropower dams and that this might pose a risk to the livelihoods of local communities. Among other things, the study mentioned the threat to fresh water biodiversity, which goes against the general conservation goals of CarBi and the WWF. There was also an extensive risk that the dams would prevent natural flood cycles that support fisher and farmer communities along the rivers, endangering the livelihoods of local communities who depend on these ecosystem services for their income. At the same time, the study also concluded that expansion of hydropower is central for developing countries such as Vietnam for production of electricity and economic growth. The feasibility study’s advice was to adapt to the expansion of hydropower and attempt to mitigate the negative social and ecological impacts. The environmental challenges connected to the source of PFES funding were also addressed by WWF informants. The WWF is not unaware of the issues surrounding the dams, but reason that the energy is cleaner and cheaper than other energy sources. They argue that the dams would have been built regardless of the PFES scheme because of the economic benefits for the state and increasing demand for electricity in the country. In other words, economic
development seems to be of higher priority to the Vietnamese government than the environmental target goals of CarBi. The informants also agreed with the feasibility study on that mitigation of the negative effects of hydropower dams would be a suitable approach in this situation:

“Many hectares of forest have been destroyed to build roads for example to access through the forest, so it really affects the area surrounding the dam or the catchment. But demand for economic development in Vietnam, the demand for electricity is very high, so even though without PFES program dam would still be built, not because of PFES program.”

(WWF Vietnam, March 2019)

Despite the harmful effects on the environment, the WWF and government participants claimed that PFES was a useful and functioning scheme and if the dams are to be built the PFES payments from the hydropower dams can still be used to mitigate some of the negative environmental and social effects that they are responsible for causing. In comparison to REDD+, the PFES model was still seen as the more feasible option for participant organisations to uphold CarBi’s activities and outcomes. The protected areas in Laos were also recommended by the feasibility study to apply a similar PES mechanism as the one present in Vietnam. Three main reasons for the payment mechanism transition in CarBi were listed in the feasibility study and confirmed by informants. First, revenue from the REDD+ activities were estimated to be limited or non-existent and would therefore not be able to fund conservation of the areas. This was mainly due to the fact that the forested areas generally need to expand significantly in order to increase the carbon sinks, which CarBi had limited capacity to do. Even though the Saola NP in Thua Thien Hue expanded by a few hectares the expansion would have to be much greater in order for it to pay off in terms of carbon credits, since REDD+ is focused on the creation of carbon sinks and mainly looks at the amount of carbon absorbed by forests. Another aspect of this was that the REDD+ measurements were seen as extremely technical and requiring more resources and expertise to be carried out. Second, even if carbon sinks could be expanded and the measuring of carbon stocks carried out, informants claimed that it would still take too long between the implementation of activities and receiving of payments for these actions. The economic uncertainty was brought up by several informants as a major challenge to REDD+ implementation. Third, after getting through the abovementioned stages to attain REDD+ payments there would still be the matter of Vietnam being dependent on decisions made in the international arena and by other
governments. Even at this point, informants did not know if it would be possible to sell the generated carbon credits on the carbon market where REDD+ operates. If there is a low demand for carbon credits and states are less inclined to buy them, payments might never reach the protectors of forest and their ecosystem services. In the case of CarBi, REDD+ is also not adapted to this type of transboundary collaboration, since the credits will still be divided between the countries even though efforts and costs to generate forest protection activities have been shared. What seemed to be another motivation for transitioning from PFES to REDD+ was that PFES already operated in Vietnam and that it was government sanctioned. Because the PFES scheme was already running it was relatively easy for CarBi to include this scheme in the project instead. The challenges of REDD+ were summarised by one informant:

“REDD+ is good on paper, in theory.”

(WWF Vietnam, March 2019)

6 DISCUSSION

The purpose of the study was to assess REDD+ productivity performance in collaborative governance in the context of Vietnam. This has been achieved by assessing collaboration on forest governance in Vietnam, the CarBi project, using Emerson and Nabatchi’s three units of analysis - the participant organisations, the CGR and the target goals. The study began by identifying the CarBi project’s key participant organisations and how they had benefitted from participating in the CGR. As with other independently convened CGRs the CarBi project had a leadership organisation (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015), in this case the WWF. Being the CGR initiators and organisers, they were responsible for identifying and involving relevant participants in dialogue with government participants. The WWF informants stressed that their most important partners were government participants, partly because they were the main forest owner and their approval was necessary for the continuation of the CGR. They were also supposed to adopt and sustain project activities in a long-term perspective. Government participants were mainly agencies on provincial and district level, operating both a decision-making role and supervising role. They were included in planning meetings and delegated activities such as forest patrolling to their staff. In order to reduce costs and attain efficiencies in their own operating realm, the WWF and government actors collaborated in forest patrols and capacity building workshops were held for government actors to improve
their ability to enforce environmental laws in the protected areas. This strengthened both the WWF and government actors in their personal missions of enhanced environmental conservation and law enforcement. CarBi also supported the Vietnamese and Laotian governments to sign MoUs regarding cross-border collaboration on logging and forest conservation, creating favourable conditions for future conservation activities and law enforcement.

According to previous studies, one of the most important actors to involve for successful PES implementation in a CGR are local communities, for example in terms of cost reduction (Wells et al, 2017). This corresponds to REDD safeguards on inclusion of local actors. In the case of CarBi, local communities played a central role in forest patrolling and reforestation and were able to secure an income from these activities. Their support in implementing these activities increased the efficiency of the project due to shared resources and collaboration, in line with previous research. Through workshops, CarBi ensured the increased capacity of both government actors and local communities to carry out forest conservation activities.

Many informants identified uncertainties around funding as one of the biggest threats to achieving sustainable project outcomes and one of the target goals of CarBi was to find a sustainable source of funding. The study approached this case with the intention of examining the REDD+ implementation in a CGR, since the REDD+ was first intended to be a payment mechanism for CarBi. During the process of the study it was discovered that REDD+ had over time been replaced with PFES, a national PES scheme, because of the major structural challenges to implementing the REDD+ scheme in CarBi. The administrative and technical work of measuring carbon stocks was too costly and advanced and receiving payments might take several years, according to informants. Also, the protected areas were not suited for generating the carbon stocks needed in order for it to be financially feasible on the carbon market. One reason was because the project focused on conservation efforts rather than creating large plantations to absorb carbon. This structural challenge for REDD+ was addressed by Rosendal and Schei (2014), who criticised carbon markets for focusing almost entirely on enhancing forest carbon stocks which often lead to the promotion of more economically attractive plantations and production forestry. The system had an intrinsic incapacity to value biodiversity, protection and conservation of forests. Selling carbon credits would also make CarBi and the Vietnamese government dependent on other states’ willingness to buy their credits. This would result in great financial uncertainty for future
conservation activities under both CarBi and elsewhere in the country. The fact that the market is voluntary and mainly paid with development aid from wealthier countries (Angelsen et al., 2014) contributes to a vulnerable system since these governments can suddenly alter aid programs and funding. Because of the described challenged of REDD+, the CGR process was shaped to include the government initiated PFES scheme due to its ability to deliver quick and stable payments to local communities. Enforcing PFES also became easier since the processes and requirements to receive payments were easier for local communities to understand and easier for government participants to enforce (McElwee, 2014). The improved viability of PFES funding as a result of this transition meant that target goals on enhancing biodiversity and forest restoration could be maintained after the first phase of CarBi was completed. The next phase of CarBi is expected to incorporate efforts to uphold these outcomes, along with activities and outcomes focused on the target goals of preventing illegal logging.

Apart from the target goal to find a sustainable funding mechanism, the ambition was to create a sustainable management of forests under CarBi – target goals that were inextricably linked. To begin with, the PFES scheme surpassed the REDD+ mechanism in terms of productivity performance by merely producing funds where REDD+ could not. PFES enabled CarBi to better fulfil its target goals on biodiversity, forest restoration and illegal logging. The outcomes were likely to be sustained for a foreseeable future due to the reliance on payments from hydropower dams. Because of the general longevity of the dams along with the government’s commitment to PFES there was reason to believe that this payment mechanism could provide a certain stability for CarBi’s attained outcomes.

Its funding contributions aside, the sustainability of the payment mechanism should be questioned, because of the dependence on hydropower dams as source of payment. The dams could have a highly negative environmental impact in terms of deforestation and threatened fresh water biodiversity among other things. Since dams tend to disrupt flood cycles they were also a risk to the livelihoods of local communities who depend on these ecosystem services for fishing and farming along the rivers (Stanley et al., 2013). There were several dams placed around the protected forest in Quang Nam and Thua Thien Hue provinces. The payments that communities received were calculated from the revenue of the dam, which meant payments might differ even if the areas could experience similar negative effects from the dams.
The implementation of the PFES mechanism in the Vietnamese governance context meant that local communities’ participation in decision-making did not have the same prominent focus as should be expected under the REDD+ mechanism. Other studies found that this decision-making structure was also present within REDD+ in the Vietnamese context (Fujisaki, 2012), but points to the general underlying governance approach as an explanation. The configuration of mixed determining authorities meant that the WWF and government participants were the determining authorities and local communities more diffuse authorities (Emerson and Nabatchi, 2015). Along with the other prevailing condition of a complex policy challenge, namely sustainable forest management, created a path dependency for the independently convened CGR. It is not possible to conclude whether the gains for local communities from PFES compensated any negative environmental or social impacts generated by the hydropower dams. Measuring the experiences and perceptions of equity and benefits among local communities was beyond the scope of this study. This is therefore a recommendation for future research on PES or REDD+ productivity performance in collaborative governance in developing countries with an authoritarian governance structure. This could for example be done through household surveys.

Questions of adaptation and sustainability such as securing funding and delegating responsibilities are present in CGRs in various contexts and are not exclusive to developing countries (Davies and White, 2012; Fortier et al, 2013; Kretser et al, 2018; Takeshi and Ken, 2013). The transition from the international REDD+ mechanism, along with its safeguard requirements, to the nationally controlled PFES mechanism meant that the demands on the government to incorporate safeguard aspects such as transparency and local participation and rights were alleviated. Adapting a PES scheme to national settings or local contexts is in itself not essentially problematic and is in fact viewed by several studies as central to long term sustainability of PES schemes, including REDD+ (Kane et al, 2018; Duchelle et al, 2017; Makino and Masashiro, 2012). Yet, PES implementation risks becoming more problematic when the mechanism is placed in the particular governance context found in Vietnam. Therefore, the extent of the PFES mechanism’s ability to create a sustainable forest governance in CarBi’s protected areas will become evident when following its future development over time. In the end, the findings of the study still showed that international efforts to promote climate justice, democracy and equity were lost in this payment scheme transition from an international to a national payment mechanism.
Previous literature has identified the challenges of balancing social and ecological aspects in forest collaborations when implementing PES or REDD+ schemes in developing countries (Bee, 2017; Thompson et al, 2017; Wells et al, 2017). PES schemes often tended to overlook community interests to realize environmental goals, a feature which has also been prominent within REDD+. This study’s results generally supported these discoveries on how PES schemes managed this challenge and how it affected different participant organisations, especially local communities. This group had a central role in implementing activities under CarBi and mainly contributed to achieving the target goals of biodiversity and forest restoration through tree planting and forest patrol activities. This finding confirmed that local communities play a vital role in forest management collaborations and that their involvement and influence in a project determines its success and sustainability (Krause, Collen and Nicholas, 2013; von Hedemann and Osborne, 2016; Martinez de Anguita, Martín and Clare, 2014). The capacity building efforts and consultations conducted under CarBi focused on the local communities’ ability to carry out project activities in the later stages of implementation. Meetings involving these participant organisations tended to be more sporadic compared to the meetings between the WWF and government participants and encompassed different objectives. Low faith was placed in the local communities’ knowledge and awareness of environmental matters and sustainability by the other participant organisations. Informing local communities on their own gains from maintained and healthy ecosystem services, giving them a stronger connection to the forest, could be achieved through the application of environmental subsidiarity (Martinez de Anguita, Martín and Clare, 2014). This tended to strengthen the viability and sustainability of a CGR. In CarBi, the process of decision-making was instead characterized by centralization and consultations focused on education of local communities by decision-making participants. The unequitable distribution of power also became evident in the framing of the problem with hunting of wildlife, a serious challenge to the target goal of enhanced biodiversity in the protected areas under CarBi. The attention of workshops for local communities was on raising communities’ awareness on the importance of forest ecosystems and law enforcement activities were implemented to prevent them from hunting wildlife. However, government and private actors were the ones responsible for the persistently high demand for wildlife products. These were purchased for medicinal purposes or social status.

While unsustainable forest practices could derive from this stated lack of awareness of forest
ecosystem service benefits, it might also to be a question of economy. Tree species such as acacia provided higher and faster economic return compared to slow-growing endemic tree species, promoted under CarBi. Even if the latter had the potential to produce long-term income benefits, local communities’ economic situation might not allow them to wait for slower returns. Consequently, the shared theory of change was not built on common values on sustainable forest management but rather on economic incentives. This resulted in a fragile system, where the shared theory of change could be as easily lost as it was created. In order for the CGR outcomes to be sustained, the payments need to cover the costs or losses for local communities and must also be consistent, adjusted to changing economic conditions and maintained over time. It was also not clear whether the PFES payments had fully compensated the local communities, as was also discovered in previous research (Ganz et al, 2013). Therefore, there is a risk that local communities revert back to their former forest use practices if payments are not maintained. As shown by Shapiro-Garza (2013; 2013a), local communities have in some cases been able to shift PES schemes to focus more on social aspects through active participation. Because of the general conservation objectives of the project initiators, the CarBi target goals were closely related to the WWF’s goals, placing the emphasis on realising environmental goals. The CGR process was therefore shaped accordingly and contributed to positive environmental project outcomes as mentioned above. Local communities were not accommodated in the phases of the project where they would be able to exert the kind of influence to shift project focus. Hence, a similar social-ecological trade-off to that identified in other PES schemes was found in the CarBi project (Kane, 2018; Huynh and Keenan, 2017; Duchelle et al, 2017; Makino and Masashiro, 2012; Paudyal et al, 2018; Thompson et al, 2017). Considering the government’s support for hydropower dams, it was evident that the government highly values economic growth and meeting the demand for production of electricity. The centralized governance structures in the CGR and the country overall, along with the environmental and social effects of hydropower dams, also suggested a trade-off between a combination of social and environmental development on the one hand and economic development on the other.

7 CONCLUSIONS
Collaborations between a wide variety of actors are becoming increasingly important within public management in order to address global challenges such as climate change. Studying the extent to which these collaborations are able to produce long-term sustainable outcomes
therefore becomes a pressing question. The aim of the thesis was to assess the productivity performance of REDD+ in collaborative governance in the context of Vietnam. This was done by assessing a CGR, the CarBi project, based on the Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) theoretical framework on productivity performance. The study initially discovered that CarBi had transitioned from REDD+ to the national PFES scheme, due to the inability of REDD+ to deliver payments and its incapacity to include forest conservation issues and not only focus on the generating of carbon sinks. These aspects in combination with costly and bureaucratic processes meant that implementing a REDD+ payment component under CarBi was not financially feasible. The PFES scheme was in many ways better equipped to deliver CGR outcomes, not least in terms of more stable payments and simpler management processes. The CGR target goals were to achieve sustainable forest management, enhance biodiversity, restore forests, reduce illegal logging and create a sustainable funding mechanism for conservation. During the first phase of CarBi, actions such as the introduction of the forest guard model and planting endemic tree species in the protected areas helped to achieve the target goals of enhanced biodiversity and restored forests. The inclusion of payments for efforts to enhance biodiversity can also be advantageous in terms of carbon storage and climate benefits compared to carbon payments according to earlier studies (Busch, 2013). It is also shown that PES scheme implementation can lead to a decrease in deforestation and degradation compared to traditional land use practices (Capitani et al 2016). The CGR also delivered on the target goal of reducing illegal logging, where there was a significant decrease as a result of the facilitated dialogue and collaboration between the Laotian and Vietnamese governments. This demonstrates that nationally adapted payment mechanisms can present serious advantages in terms of productivity performance in forest conservation projects compared to international schemes such as REDD+.

Based on these conclusions, the theoretical framework was suited to systematically identify the CGR achievements along with the productivity performance of the REDD+ mechanism in Vietnam. It has also been useful when examining the outcomes from the PFES performance in the CGR. However, even though PFES delivered some results, more problematic aspects of this mechanism were found since the transition from REDD+ to PFES meant that the REDD safeguards were lost. Without securing the rights and participation of local communities, as required under REDD+, it is difficult to attain sustainable PES mechanisms for governance of forests or other ecosystems and the governance context plays a significant role in determining to what extent these rights are accommodated. An international mechanism such as REDD+
has the potential to attain environmental and social outcomes by incorporating its safeguards in collaborative projects and payment schemes. In the Vietnamese context however, REDD+ still has a long way to go until it is able to compete with better adapted PES schemes such as PFES. The CGR process was essentially shaped to address the WWF’s and government participants’ interests of improved conservation and law enforcement, whereas local communities received a more subordinate and implementing role. Local communities were mainly present in ad hoc consultations and in carrying out project activities, resulting in a social-ecological trade-off. Even though the results indicated that local communities could benefit economically from forest patrolling and tree planting, the reliance on mainly economic incentives through PFES to sustain the achieved outcomes of the target goals exposed the mechanism’s vulnerability. Also, the source of funding from hydropower dams presented challenges to the environment and local communities’ livelihoods. In the end, economic revenue from hydropower dams were generally considered to be of higher priority to the government than forest conservation or social development, which in its turn created a trade-off between a combination of social and ecological development on the one hand and economic development on the other. The sustainability of the target goal on biodiversity enhancement was also jeopardized because of the external driver of continued high demand from government actors for wildlife products. Still, local communities were depicted as the cause of this problem, further demonstrating the inequity in power between different participants in this context. The sustainability of PFES as a funding mechanism and consequently also the sustainability of forest management can be questioned, but whether the benefits of PFES in the end outweigh the costs will be determined as the mechanism continues to develop and run its course. The implementation of PES schemes still poses an important contribution to international climate change mitigation. Continued assessment of this mechanism, its achievements and its challenges, is therefore recommended as object of study for future research.
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APPENDIXES

Appendix 1: Interview manual (English)

Introduction
1. Please tell me about your organisation, its name and purpose.
2. What is your role at your organisation?
3. How important is the forest to you and why?
4. Please describe the area that CarBi (phase 1) operates in (for example: how many hectares, areas of forest, biodiversity values, threats to forest, local communities living there, etc.). a) Has the area changed in any way because of CarBi (for example: forest cover, forest related occupations, wildlife, etc.)? If yes, please specify. b) What do you think the forest means for the people living in the area (the CarBi area) that your organisation operates in?
5. What year was the protected areas that that CarBi operates in classified as protected areas and why? a) What changes has the protected area classification of the areas that CarBi operates in brought for forest protection in these areas from the time they were classified until present day (for example: forest protection or biodiversity conservation)? b) What do you think CarBi specifically has contributed with to forest management or biodiversity conservation?
6. What reasons do you think people have for engaging in unsustainable forest practices (for example: illegal logging or hunting wildlife)?

Theme 1: Stakeholder Participation
1. Please describe your organisation’s role in CarBi (for example: involvement in forest restoration or forest protection or protected area management).
2. How has your organisation cooperated with other organisation in this area in relation to CarBi (for example: Communities, Watershed Management boards, Protected Areas Management Boards, etc.)? a) Please describe how civil society and local communities were involved in CarBi.
3. Please explain how Payments for Forest Ecosystem Services (PFES) works in practice in the area. a) What kind of requirements are there for receiving payments? b) How long does it take for someone to receive payments? c) Who decides who receives the PFES funding in this area? d) Are there any differences compared to REDD+ funding?
4. Please describe CarBi’s transition from the REDD+ to PFES funding mechanism. Why
did this transition take place?
5. Has your organisation had to change (your normal work) in any way because of the changes that have been introduced due to REDD+ and PFES components in the area? If yes, please specify.

**Theme 2: The Collaborative Process**
1. Please describe what meeting places or forums with relation to the forest in this area that you take part in (for example: regular meeting, workshop, Project management Unit meeting, etc.). a) Who participate in these meetings and why? b) What is discussed in the meetings?
2. Do you know if any other participants have left CarBi 1 or PFES?
3. Do you see a need to include additional participants than the ones already involved for REDD+ and PFES to become more effective?
4. Has your organisation received any attention from media/state-actors/others for its participation in CarBi? Has this attention been positive or negative?
5. What have been the main sources of funding for the PFES component in CarBi? a) What have been the main sources of funding for the REDD+ component in CarBi? b) Has your organisation received any payments for your participation in CarBi? If yes, please specify.

**Theme 3: Project Outcomes**
1. Have you identified any potential risks and/or challenges for your organisation of joining or participating in CarBi in relation the REDD+ component? a) Have you identified any potential risks and/or challenges for your organisation of joining or participating in CarBi in relation the PFES component?
2. If you answered yes to question 1 or 1a, what can be done to overcome these risk and/or challenges?
3 Have there been any costs for your organisation’s participation in the REDD+ component in CarBi (for example: paying a part of salary to forest guards, matching funding, additional staff)? If yes, please specify. a) Have there been any costs for your organisation’s participation in the PFES component in CarBi (for example: paying a part of salary to forest guards, matching funding, additional staff)? If yes, please specify.
4. Has your organisation made any suggestions to change the REDD+ component in CarBi (for example: project activities or processes)? If yes, please specify what changes were suggested and why. a) Has your organisation made any suggestions to change the PFES component in CarBi (for example: project activities or processes)? If yes, please specify what
changes were suggested and why. b) If you answered yes to question 2 or 2a, were those changes accepted in CarBi? c) Who did your organisation turn to with these suggestions?

5. Who do you think has benefitted most from REDD+ (for example: a local community, an organisation, a state actor)? Why? a) Who do you think has benefitted most from PFES (for example: a local community, an organisation, a state actor)? Why?

6. Do you believe the REDD+ component is a successful mechanism to achieve CarBi goals, climate change mitigation goals or any other policy goal? Why? /Why not? a) Do you believe the PFES component is a successful mechanism to achieve CarBi goals, climate change mitigation goals or any other policy goal? Why? /Why not?

7. Have all the project results been maintained by project partners after the first phase of CarBi ended? Please specify.

8. Is there anything you would like to add or clarify?

Appendix 2: Interview manual (Vietnamese)

Giới thiệu

1. Vui lòng giới thiệu về cơ quan của bạn.

2. Vai trò của cơ quan trong cơ quan là gì?

3. Rừng quan trọng như thế nào?

4. Vui lòng mô tả vùng dự án CarBi giai đoạn 1 mà cơ quan/tổ chức của bạn đã thực hiện (ví dụ: tổng diện tích, diện tích rừng, giá trị đa dạng sinh học, các nguy cơ ảnh hưởng đến rừng, các cộng đồng dân cư sinh sống, etc). a) Khu vực đó có thay đổi gì do dự án CarBi giai đoạn 1 mang lại hay không? Nếu có, vui lòng nêu cụ thể. b) Bạn nghĩ rừng có ý nghĩa như thế nào đối với người dân sống trong khu vực (vùng dự án CarBi 1) mà cơ quan của bạn đang hoạt động?

5. Khu vực mà dự án CarBi hoạt động được xác định là khu bảo vệ vào năm nào và tại sao? a) Việc xếp hạng khu bảo vệ mà dự án CarBi hoạt động mang lại những thay đổi gì cho khu bảo vệ kể từ khi chúng được xếp hạng cho đến nay (ví dụ: bảo vệ rừng hoặc bảo tồn đa dạng sinh học)? b) Bạn nghĩ CarBi (giai đoạn 1) có những đóng góp cụ thể gì cho công tác quản lý rừng hoặc bảo tồn đa dạng sinh học?

6. Những lý do nào khiến bạn nghĩ mọi người đã và đang sử dụng rừng một cách không bền vững (ví dụ: săn bắn động vật hoang dã không hợp pháp)?

Chủ đề 1: Sự tham gia của các bên liên quan
1. Vui lòng mô tả vai trò của cơ quan bạn trong dự án Carbi (ví dụ: tham gia phục hồi hoặc bảo vệ rừng hoặc quản lý khu bảo vệ).

2. Cơ quan của bạn đã hợp tác như thế nào với các đối tác khác của dự án CarBi (ví dụ: cộng đồng, các ban quản lý rừng phòng hộ, ban quản lý khu bảo tồn, etc)? a) Bạn vui lòng mô tả cách mà mô thị công dân và người địa phương đã tham gia vào dự án CarBi.


4. Vui lòng mô tả quá trình chuyển đổi từ cơ chế tài trợ REDD+ sang PFES. Tại sao lại có sự chuyển đổi này?


Chú dè 2: Quá trình hợp tác

1. Vui lòng mô tả nơi diễn ra các cuộc họp hoặc diễn đàn liên quan đến rừng trong khu vực mà đã bạn tham gia (ví dụ: các cuộc họp định kỳ, hội thảo, họp ban quản lý dự án, etc).

2. Bạn có biết bất kỳ cơ quan/tổ chức nào khác đã ngừng hợp tác với dự án CarBi hoặc PFES?

3. Bạn có nhận ra rằng cần phải bổ sung thêm các đối tác thực hiện dự án cho CarBi (giai đoạn 1) để dự án hoạt động hiệu quả hơn không?


Chú dè 3: Kết quả dự án

1. Bạn có xác định được bất kỳ rủi ro hay thách thức tiềm ẩn nào đối với cơ quan của bạn tham gia vào dự án CarBi liên quan đến hợp phần REDD+ hay không? a). Bạn có thấy rủi ro và/hoặc thách thức nào cho cơ quan bạn khi tham gia dự án CarBi liên quan đến hợp phần PFES không?
2. Nếu có, bạn đã làm gì để vượt qua những rủi ro và/hoặc những thách thức đó?
3. Cơ quan của bạn có đóng góp kinh phí gì khi tham gia vào hợp phần REDD+ trong dự án CarBi (giai đoạn 1) hay không (ví dụ: kinh phí đối ứng, chi trả một phần lương cho đối bảo vệ rừng giả thu bảo tồn, bổ sung nhân sự etc)? Nếu có, vui lòng nói rõ. a) Cơ quan của bạn có đóng góp kinh phí gì khi tham gia vào hợp phần PFES trong dự án CarBi không (ví dụ: chi trả lương cho bảo vệ rừng, vốn đối ứng, bổ sung nhân lực) nếu có, vui lòng nói cụ thể.
4. Tổ chức bạn đã bao giờ ra bất kỳ đề xuất nào để thay đổi hợp phần REDD+ trong dự án CarBi hay không (ví dụ: các quy trình hay hoạt động của dự án)? Nếu có, vui lòng nói cụ thể thay đổi nào đã được đề xuất và tại sao? a) Tổ chức bạn đã bao giờ đưa ra bất kỳ đề xuất nào để thay đổi hợp phần PFES trong dự án CarBi hay không (ví dụ: các quy trình hay hoạt động của dự án)? Nếu có, vui lòng nói cụ thể thay đổi gì đã được đề xuất và tại sao? b) Nếu có, những thay đổi đó có được chấp nhận không? c) Cơ quan/ổ chức của bạn đã gửi đề xuất cho ai?
5. Bạn nghĩ ai là người hưởng lợi nhiều nhất từ REDD+ (ví dụ: cộng đồng địa phương, một cơ quan, một cán bộ nhà nước)? Tại sao? a) Bạn nghĩ ai là người hưởng lợi nhiều nhất từ PFES (ví dụ: cộng đồng địa phương, một cơ quan, một cán bộ nhà nước)? Tại sao?
6. Bạn có tin rằng hợp phần REDD+ là một cơ chế thành công để đạt được các mục tiêu của Carbi, giảm thiểu biến đổi khí hậu hoặc bất kỳ mục tiêu về mặt chính sách khác không? Tại sao có và tại sao không? a) Bạn có tin rằng hợp phần PFES là một cơ chế thành công để đạt được các mục tiêu của Carbi, giảm thiểu biến đổi khí hậu hoặc bất kỳ mục tiêu về mặt chính sách nào khác không? Tại sao có và tại sao không?
7. Tất cả thành quả dự án CarBi giai đoạn 1 có được duy trì bởi các đối tác địa phương sau khi kết thúc dự án hay không? Vui lòng nói cụ thể.
8. Nếu bạn có bất kỳ điều gì bạn muốn bổ sung hoặc làm rõ, vui lòng điền vào phần dưới đây.

Appendix 3: Information distributed to study participants (English)
For participant in the CarBi project (phase 1) – Information on and request to participate in a survey on REDD+ performance in collaborative governance

Forest management initiatives such as REDD+ and other types of payments for ecosystem services (PES or PFES) could play vital part in climate change mitigation efforts. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to assess REDD+ performance in the CarBi project.

To better understand different perspectives on the project and its REDD+ and PFES
components this survey is sent to participants in the CarBi project (phase 1, 2011-2017. The reason you have been asked to participate in this study is because you are considered to possess relevant knowledge and experience or have other information that can be valuable to the study. Please answer the questions as thoroughly as possible. If you don’t have the answer to a question, please write this in your answer.

All participants in the study have the right to be anonymous if they choose and your participation is completely voluntary. The collected information will be treated as confidential and only the researcher and the supervisor will have access to the answers. Individuals or organisations will not be possible to identify in the final result. Results will only be used for scientific purposes.

This survey was created to collect information for my master’s thesis in political science at Umeå University, Sweden. The thesis is a part of my master’s programme. If you have any questions regarding the study, you are welcome to contact me (+46703673601, molly.gronlund_muller@hotmail.com) or my supervisor Professor Camilla Sandström (+4690-786 64 50, camilla.sandstrom@umu.se) for more information.

Kind regards
Molly Grönlund Müller

Appendix 4: Information distributed to study participants (Vietnamese)
Dành cho người tham gia dự án Carbi (giai đoạn 1) – Bảng khảo sát về thông tin và yêu cầu dành cho những người tham gia dự án REDD+ sự hợp tác của cơ quan tổ chức.

Các sáng kiến quản lý rừng như REDD+ và các hình thức thanh toán khác được sử dụng trong công tác quản lý rừng (PES hoặc PFES) có thể đóng vai trò quan trọng trong nỗ lực giảm thiểu biến đổi khí hậu. Do đó, mục đích của cuộc nghiên cứu này là đánh giá tính hiệu quả của REDD+ hoạt động của ban quản lý dự án Carbi.

Để hiểu rõ hơn về sự khác nhau của các quan điểm trong việc bảo vệ dự án và các nguyên lý của chính bản thân REDD+ và PFES, cuộc khảo sát này được gọi cho những người tham gia dự án Carbi (giai đoạn 1, 2011-2017). Lấy độ bền được yêu cầu tham gia dự án này là bởi vì bạn đã có kinh nghiệm cung như kiến thức và sự hiểu biết rất quan trọng có thể đóng
gồm cho sự tìm tòi nghiên cứu. Vui lòng trả lời các câu hỏi này càng rõ ràng cụ thể càng tốt.
Nếu bạn biết câu trả lời, bạn cũng vui lòng viết vào phần trả lời của bạn là không biết.

Tác giả những người tham gia tìm hiểu nghiên cứu dự án này đều được an danh nếu bạn yêu cầu tham gia và hoàn toàn tình nguyện tham gia. Các thông tin sẽ được thu thập và được giữ kín và chỉ có mục đích được sử dụng cho việc nghiên cứu và chỉ có người giám sát mới đọc được câu trả lời. Các cá nhân hay tổ chức, cơ quan sẽ không được nếu tên trong kết quả nghiên cứu dự án. Kết quả nghiên cứu dự án sẽ chỉ được sử dụng duy nhất cho mục đích khoa học.

Khảo sát này được tạo ra để thu thập các thông tin cho việc nghiên cứu cho luận án thạc sĩ của tôi về bộ môn Khoa Học Chính Trị của tôi tại trường Đại Học Umeå, Thụy Điển. Luận án này là một phần trong chương trình Thạc Sĩ của tôi. Nếu bạn có bất kỳ câu hỏi nào liên quan đến việc nghiên cứu này, vui lòng liên lạc với tôi qua số điện thoại (+46703673601, molly.gronlund_muller@hotmail.com) hoặc giáo viên giám sát của tôi, Giáo Sư Camilla Sandström (+4690-786 64 50, camilla.sandstrom@umu.se) để biết thêm thông tin chi tiết.

Thân Ái
Molly Grönlund Müller