MY PEOPLE RIGHT OR WRONG?

A Comparative Analysis of National Sentiments and their Meaning

Mikael Hjerm

Doctoral theses at the Department of Sociology
Umeå University
No 13 2000

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ABSTRACT

In a world of presumed nation-states, nation has been, and still is, an intrinsic part of political legitimization and identity formation. Thus, it is clear that the understanding of nationality and people's relationship too it is of great importance for our understanding of how a stable society, partly built on nationality, can prevail in a world of migration consisting of individuals with diverging moral, religious and cultural conceptions. This thesis examines national sentiments in a cross-country comparative perspective. It consists of an introductory chapter and five articles.

The first objective is to study the relationship between policy regimes and supposedly related national sentiments. The question is whether there are differences in national sentiments that can be derived from differences in policy regimes or whether there are more universal features to be found. In examining this we have the possibility to further understand what factors that help to create and sustain national sentiments. The second objective is to study the relation between different national sentiments and other complex attitudes such as xenophobia and protectionism. This includes the study of national identities as well as of nationalism.

The following conclusions are drawn. First, it appears that we need to reconsider the almost taken for granted assumption of a correspondence between regime types prevalent in a certain society and people's sentiments towards such a society. Second, there exist substantial cross-country similarities in the effect that different national sentiments have. It is shown that people who have more civic forms of national sentiments are clearly less inclined to hold derogatory preconceptions about people perceived as not belonging to the group, compared the ideas held by those who have more ethnic national sentiments. Moreover, the findings also supply empirical evidence supporting the notion that a clear-cut positive nationalism can never exist.

All in all, it is shown that multicultural ideas are something worth striving for on an individual level. Moreover, the results seem to indicate that a liberal form of multiculturalism is preferable to a more communitarian version, which is explored and supported in the normative exposé of the two forms of multiculturalism.

Keywords: national sentiment, national identity, nationalism, attitudes, multiculturalism, nation, xenophobia, comparative research.

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The following conclusions are drawn. First, it appears that we need to reconsider the almost taken for granted assumption of a correspondence between regime types prevalent in a certain society and people's sentiments towards such a society. Second, there exist substantial cross-country similarities in the effect that different national sentiments have. It is shown that people who have more civic forms of national sentiments are clearly less inclined to hold derogatory preconceptions about people perceived as not belonging to the group, compared the ideas held by those who have more ethnic national sentiments. Moreover, the findings also supply empirical evidence supporting the notion that a clear-cut positive nationalism can never exist.

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Preface

I began to write this thesis in the fall of 1996. Very soon I realized that I could not focus long enough on one subject long enough in order to write a monograph. So, I chose to write a collection of articles in order to be able to put aside a work that was completed and start on something somewhat different. The negative side is evidently that one has to renounce coherence to some degree. Another evident problem with my collection of articles is that I have been forced to repeat myself in order to make each article standing on its own. For example, the discussion of method included in all the five articles was not possible to leave out anywhere. However, since this is beyond my control I hope I am somewhat excused by the readers of this thesis. Moreover, I chose to include five articles in this thesis due to the fact that Article I was used as a starting point in my further work with Article II and IV. Still, I hope that the reader will find that my thesis covers different aspects within the research field and that it will inspire new ideas and ways of thinking about various issues previously taken for granted.

The Swedish Council for Social Research (SFR) is the main sponsor of this project. The Swedish Council for Research in the Social Sciences and Humanities (HSFR) as well as the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation have both contributed financially.

A lot of people have helped and inspired me in writing this thesis. However, I am solely responsible for the content of it and no one else can be blamed for errors, contradictions or misunderstandings that may have found their way into my writing (even though some of the changes made from prior versions have been undertaken with great resistance on my behalf).

First and foremost I want to thank Stefan Svallfors for having been the best mentor I could have wished for in spite of our slightly different areas of research. So, Stefan, thanks for interesting discussions on film and for making this work tremendously easier. I would also like to thank Ian Jarvie, Doug Nord, Nora Räthzel and Carl-Ulrik Schierup for their very helpful comments on different article and 'kappa' drafts. Also, thanks to Charlott Nyman who has helped making my English more readable and to Maritha Lundgren who has transformed paper copies and computer files into this book. There are many more persons, especially at my department, that have contributed with helpful comments. Thanks to all of you. Thanks also to all my friends at the Department; you know who you are. You have made working here so much more enjoyable. Finally, thanks Lena for being you.

Mikael Hjerm

Canberra, November 1999

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Article IV
Hjerm, Mikael (2000) 'Multiculturalism Reassessed'. *Citizenship Studies,* Vol. 4 (3) Forthcoming.

Article V
Hjerm, Mikael (1999) 'Education, Xenophobia and Nationalism: A Comparative Analysis. Submitted for review.

My People Right or Wrong? A comparative analysis of national sentiments and their meaning

Stare across the crowd, the fear and love in their faces
The children of the tribes, prisoners of the flags unfurling
Protect us in these changing times
The warm embrace, the killing price
My people right or wrong.
(Sullivan)

In a world of presumed nation-states nation has been, and still is, an intrinsic part of political legitimization. The claim of nationality has played an important role in such legitimization for the last two centuries. More than this it has also constituted a fundamental collective entity for an individual's understanding of whom she is in relation to those that are perceived as not sharing the nationality.[1] As we are witnessing the dawn of this new millennium we have seen the death of the nation-state, nationalism and nationality, both as political principals of legitimization as well as the fundaments for identity formation, being proclaimed over and over again. Still, there is little real evidence that we should write the obituary on nationality right now. Especially considering the situation in the Balkans and East Timor. Thus, it is clear that the understanding of nationality and people's relation too it is of great importance for our understanding of how a stable society, partly built on nationality, can prevail in a world of migration consisting of individuals with diverging moral, religious and cultural conceptions.

Thus, it comes as no surprise that the research field on national sentiments and related issues is expanding fast. It is of course impossible to foresee what is yet to emerge out of this field, but it is at present possible to focus the light of investigation on areas within this field of research that thus far have been grossly neglected. Therefore, this thesis focuses the light of investigation on national sentiments and their meaning in a comparative

perspective. It sets out to examine people's sentiments towards the nation or nation-state in which they are residing compared with national sentiments that people from other nation-states have.

The choice has been to use the notion of national sentiments, since this thesis focuses on similar yet different attachments to the nation-state, for instance national identity, national pride and nationalism. The notion of national sentiments is used differently by different authors. For example, Gellner (1983) uses the notion of nationalist sentiment to distinguish the feeling of nationalism that people get from nationalist movements. However, since I am examining individual's relation to and apprehensions of their nation-state national sentiments seem to be the most conclusive notion covering the different relationships under scrutiny. National sentiments will be defined as attitudes of individual apprehension or attachments to and understanding of one's nation or nation-state.[2]

There are especially two important aspects within this field that have been overlooked in previous research. First, the almost total lack of empirical research, especially quantitative research, is striking. There have been tremendous efforts made in developing an understanding of the nation building processes, nationalism, national identity, and so on, using various approaches. Even though we could criticize all these approaches for various reasons, they have together contributed to developing our understanding. However, very few of the emerging theories have been grounded in empirical research, which is clearly problematic. The focus has instead been on historical/philosophical retrospection in order to uncover the story of national sentiments. Scholars like Anderson (1983), Gellner (1983; 1994), Smith (1986; 1991; 1994; 1995), and many others, have helped increase our understanding of national sentiments by delivering the necessary tools that enable further development of this field of research. One way to do this is evidently to bring empirical data into the somewhat over-theoreticized field.

Second, this field of research suffers from a lack of comparative research (Ginsburg, 1992; Schirmer, 1998). Some of the more theoretical work does have some form of comparative angle (e.g. Gellner, 1983; Hettne et al., 1998; Hobsbawm, 1990), but on the whole such an approach is next to non-existent within this field of research. Moreover, much of the comparative approach within the field today revolves around studies of nation based on case-oriented historical studies (e.g. Brubaker, 1992; Finzsch and Schirmer, 1998; Kedourie, 1993; Silverman, 1992). A comparative perspective is important not only when dealing with this field of research, or as Alain

Touraine writes, 'Comparative studies are indispensable and should be developed. Comparative analysis is then necessary to separate various elements which are generally lumped together by intellectual cultures which consider themselves as universalistic' (1998:11).[3] A comparative approach is also necessary in order to reveal whether a certain phenomenon is universal or country specific. It is for example easy to come to the faulty conclusion that a certain phenomenon is universal when it is in fact only applicable to a certain country. This is a weakness that this study aims to remedy.

In other words, a genuine comparative approach to the field of national sentiments combined with the incorporation of empirical data has the possibility to further advance our understanding of national sentiments on, to my mind, two overarching accounts. These accounts are also the common denominators that run through all the five articles more or less explicitly.

First, there is the possibility to shed some light on the relation between policy regimes and supposedly related sentiments. Such an approach has been utilized a long time in other areas, but has thus far been lacking in the area of national sentiments. The focus has instead been solely on regime types in different countries or on the historical circumstances that have helped form these regimes and institutions (e.g. Baldwin-Edwards, 1991; Brubaker, 1992). However, it is not self-evident that such regimes correspond to people's attitudes. For example, Germany is commonly being referred to as an ethnic country with reference to the historical formation of its institutions and today's political rhetoric. Or to use another example, nationalism and national identities have often been claimed to grow out of different ideologies in Eastern- compared to Western Europe (Kohn, 1944; Smith, 1991). Does this imply that Germans foremost have an ethnic understanding of their national belonging or that national sentiments are different in Eastern compared to Western Europe? It may be reasonable to assume this, but we must not forget that adopting liberal democracy and certain core values that go with it could possibly be of such importance that differences in policy regimes or other cross country differences not studied here are of less importance when it comes to determining national sentiments. It is clear that sentiments do differ between people from different countries on a specific level. However, in utilizing this cross-country comparative study there is a possibility to examine whether there are differences or similarities to be found on a more general level. So the question is whether there are differences in national sentiments that can be derived from differences in policy regimes. Or perhaps more generally, we

can ask whether there are more universal features to be found. In examining this we have the possibility to further understand what factors that help to create and sustain national sentiments.

Second, it is often claimed that different forms of national sentiments are positive while others are negative. This means, among other things, that different national sentiments should be expected to relate differently to phenomena like racism, xenophobia and protectionism. More specifically, it is claimed that national identities relating to the civic side of society are more positive than ones relating to more cultural or national aspects of society. This claim may seem reasonable, but has nonetheless not been empirically supported. We must not forget that the civic side of society is often so colored by national or cultural practices that it may be of very little consequence what entity people's national sentiments are primarily aimed at or whether it is possible to separate them from each other at all. When it comes to nationalism some scholars deny the existence of any positive forms of nationalism; however most recognize that there are positive as well as negative forms of it. An example of the former could be the uniting of a group of people fighting for democracy and self-government, whereas ethnic cleansing in the name of nationality could exemplify the latter. This thesis does not set out to examine the role that nationalism has played in the creation of democracy and the modern nation-state. It will instead take a closer look at nationalistic attitudes or sentiments and their implications in today's society. In applying a comparative perspective it is also possible to examine whether the claims of positive and negative forms of both national identity as well as of nationalism have some form of universal applicability or if different forms of national sentiments in fact have different meanings for different people in different countries.

It is clear that there are certain questions that need both a comparative approach as well as survey data in order to be answered. This is not to say that other forms of research are not needed; they clearly are. However, my chosen field of research obviously suffers from the lack of comparative survey studies, which is why I set out to remedy this.

I will start out by discussing some methodological issues before presenting and expanding on the results presented in the five articles. After this, I will try to expand and elaborate the results depicted in the five articles as a whole. It is clear to me that they together point at something important not to be dismissed. This is, at the issues of multiculturalism and perhaps at the larger question of how a society consisting of diverging individual

perceptions of the good life ought to be constructed. Therefore, I will conclude with a discussion of multiculturalism as seen in the light of my research.

Methodological problems

This thesis uses data from the International Social Survey Programme 1995 (henceforth ISSP). In short, ISSP is a program for international comparative attitude surveys. One topic is examined each year in the same way in all the participant countries. Since the start in 1985, different topics such as the role of government, environment, religion and social inequality have been surveyed. In the 1995 study, 'Aspects of National Identity' topics like national identity, nationalism, national pride, globalism and xenophobia were surveyed. In addition to these areas, a set of so-called background variables is also included in every survey. This includes variables such as sex, age, education, marital status, occupation and so on.

A comparative approach using survey data makes it possible to give some answers to the aforementioned questions, something other research methods cannot fully accomplish. However, this is not to say that comparative attitude research using survey methods is itself without problems. This is definitely not the case and it is perhaps especially clear that it is not if it is assumed that we are measuring attitudes that people in fact do not have, or at least not aware of until surveyed about them.[4] In other words, there always exists the risk that the answers given in the ISSP survey do not display real attitudes. This poses only a small problem if the number of people who do not have the examined attitudes are small and if they are randomized within the samples. However, it must be considered a larger problem if this is not the case. I am analyzing data on an aggregate national level, which means that a limited number of people who lack the examined attitudes and are randomly distributed will have little impact on the results. The problem is that the survey that this thesis relies on is not a panel study, which means that I cannot completely rule out the risk that the proportion of people without the examined attitudes is large and not randomized. However, one must remember that this survey deals with people's sentiments to their nation and society, towards immigrants and so forth. Taken in combination with the claim that the nation is one of the most fundamental entities for identity formation, it seems very unlikely that people do not have attitudes about these things prior to being surveyed

about them. I have mainly tried to clear myself of this reliability problem by using compound indexes in the different analyses, which according to Inglehart (1990) severely reduces this problem. Attitudes towards one single item may change and be unstable, but it is less likely that attitudes towards a whole set of well-structured items are as unstable.

This leads us to the question of whether we should conduct surveys on national sentiments and attitudes towards immigrants at all. Can it be the case that we in fact help to create and sustain an 'us versus them' opposition by conducting surveys like this one (see Hansen, 1995)? This is by no means an innocent problem. However, the truly comparative art of the ISSP survey, with researchers from all of the member countries, has helped to create a survey that at least does not include derogatory items. The questions about immigrants are also posed in both positive as well as in negative terms. This does not fully solve the problem since the polarization between us and them cannot be avoided when for example, asking about people's attitudes towards immigrants. However, those who constructed this survey by no means invented the notion of immigrants and it can hardly be claimed that it is a category that people were unaware of prior to the survey. Still, it is possible that the survey in fact made the respondents awareness of immigrants more profound and at worst, made them distance themselves from the people understood as being included in this category. It is also true that the category 'immigrants' consists of individuals with very diverse backgrounds. This means that one could accuse surveys like this of lumping individuals together in categories that have little meaning. However to do this in any other way than by the use of categories, regardless of the method used, would not be feasible. Moreover, the rationale behind racism and xenophobia is based on such categorizations and seldom on viewing single individuals as having less worth than oneself. Therefore it is of extreme worth to examine people's attitudes towards such categories. The alternative is to avoid 'sensitive' research projects, but this is not really an alternative, as pointed out by Svallfors who asked, 'Who is to determine where this self-censorship should begin and where it should end?' (1996a: p.132). The answer is of course that we cannot draw this line without ending up in real trouble.[5] This means that the only thing we can do is to continue to study xenophobia and other issues. These endeavors however should include no small amount of self-reflexivity about what we are actually doing in order to avoid creating and sustaining things that we only want to study.

I claimed in the introduction that one advantage of comparative studies is that they increase the possibility to generalize the results. However the first four articles included in this thesis draw on data from a limited selection of countries. This means that the results could initially be seen as not fulfilling the pretences set out in the introduction. It could also mean that it might be difficult to generalize outside the countries that I have chosen to focus on. However, the countries were chosen through what Van den Vijer and Leung (1997) call systematic sampling.[6] This method aims at choosing cultures[7] in a systematic or theory-guided fashion, in combination with a maximization of theoretical difference. I have seized upon this in choosing countries that represent fundamental differences regarding their policy regimes. This is not to say that the method of choosing what countries to include in the different studies is without problems. Ragin (1987) criticizes the method of selecting extreme cases because of the risk that the represented cases are very rare. However, Ragin's critique does not seem all that appropriate regarding my approach since the countries were chosen not only to represent extreme cases, but also to represent certain types of citizenship and immigration regimes. So, even though the chosen countries could be said to represent ideal types they are not extreme to the extent that there are no other countries that display extensive similarities with the ones studied. Van den Vijer and Leung also claim that it is preferable to include at least three cultures, or in this case countries, in order to decrease the possibility of alternative interpretations. This is something that I have taken into account in the different articles.[8]

I have so far been talking about countries, but it is important to note that it is actually attitudes between groups of individuals belonging to different countries that are compared. This means that it is not really countries that are in focus. The approach is clearly more variable-oriented than case-oriented in trying to reveal whether it is possible to study attitudes derived not from country belonging itself, but from different regime types of the different countries. Ragin (1987; 1997) has criticized the variable-oriented approach for being afflicted with a number of problems. However, his position is strongly attacked by Goldthorpe (1997a; 1997b) who argues that the problems inherent in comparative macrosociology are not problems that afflict only the variable-oriented approach, but are just as problematic for the case-oriented approach. In fact Goldthorpe advances the position that the variable-oriented approach is superior to the case-oriented approach in most cases. This may be too strong a position, but it is clear that the variable-oriented approach can contribute knowledge that the case-oriented approach would have trouble revealing. For example, the cross-country similarities in

different attitudes and their effect, which has been shown in the articles, would be difficult to detect with a case-oriented approach. This does not mean that the case-oriented approach cannot reveal results that would be difficult to uncover with a variable-oriented approach It only means that the latter approach cannot be dismissed on the basis that it cannot explain everything.

Another problem that has been briefly discussed in primarily Article V, is the problem with non-responses. The countries included in the different articles utilize different sampling procedures and they display substantial differences in response rates. The low response rates are problematic regardless of the fact that the samples can be considered to correspond to national census data on important variables such as age, gender and education. Nor does this solve the problem associated with the fact that some countries use methods of data collection that come close to self-selection in order to fill their samples when a sampled individual cannot be found. These points are problematic, but it still seems to be the case that the actual respondents do not deviate substantially from national census data. Moreover, data from countries where there may be problems with the collection of such data are only used in Article V and the aim in this article is to identify patterns, not absolute levels of one single attitude.

Moreover, I cannot rule out the risk that people that have chosen not to respond have done so because of some specific reason. This could be because these individuals feel that their attitudes are not socially acceptable, e.g. very xenophobic. The opposite is also possible: that the non-respondents are those who are least xenophobic. Regardless of which, this is something that clearly constitutes a problem. However, we must keep in mind the comparative perspective of the articles. I do not focus on absolute levels of different forms of national sentiments, xenophobia or anything else, but on levels in one country compared to levels in other countries. This means that as long as the figures are over- or underestimated in the same direction the results are valid. The problem is if this is not the case. In other words, there is a problem if people with certain attitudes are overrepresented in the non-response group in one country and a group with opposing attitudes is overrepresented among the non-respondents in another country. This is something that I clearly can do little to control for, but this situation does not seem very likely, since the results suggest that similarities between countries are very important. This implies that there is little reason to suspect that the non-respondents should diverge substantially between countries, even though this is impossible to rule out completely. So, two

things will be assumed. First, I assume that the non-respondents do not have significantly different attitudes from the respondents, but are in fact randomized. Second, if this is not the case there is little reason to suspect that the non-respondents in one country deviate differently from the respondents in the other countries.

However, this does not solve the problem that this survey, and many others, cannot measure more subtle forms of racism, nationalism and xenophobia. Let us have a look at xenophobia, since it is included in all five of the articles (though it plays a marginal role in two of them). Xenophobia has been defined as a negative attitude towards, or fear of individuals or groups of individuals, that are in some sense different (real or imagined) from oneself or the group(s), one belongs to. This research has limited itself to covering only attitudes towards immigrants. Making an index of the following items has then operationalized xenophobia.

There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in Australia/ Germany/Britain and Sweden. (By 'immigrants' we mean people who come to settle in [country].) How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

Immigrants increase crime rates.

Immigrants are generally good for [country] economy.

Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [country].

Immigrants make [country] more open to new ideas and cultures.

The items have also been empirically tested with a factor analysis and an internal reliability analysis, which showed without doubt that they measure the same dimension in all the countries included in the different analyses. This suggests that, even though there may be problems with single items, they are interpreted similarly by people in all the examined countries. It is clear that I am measuring a very overt form of xenophobia. However, the manifest correlations between the proportion of people who want to decrease immigration and the proportion who are, as measured here, xenophobic indicate that the xenophobia measure cannot easily be dismissed. Moreover, I do not believe that the way I am measuring

xenophobia, or any of the national sentiments, could be claimed to be subjected to group based lies due to the presumed higher reluctance for people from certain groups in society to give answers that could be considered to be less socially acceptable. This means that the results will only be marginally affected. This is not to say that there may not be better ways to quantitatively measure xenophobia; nor does it rule out the complementary use of qualitative studies. However, in spite of its drawbacks I still believe that this survey constitutes a very good first attempt to conduct quantitative studies within this field.

Summary and Findings

Let me now present the results from the different articles. The choice has been not only to present the results, but to advance some positions that I feel are not fully elaborated in the different articles due to the limitation of space inherent to articles.

Article I

This article embarks on a comparison of Australia, Germany and Sweden regarding their national identity. These countries were chosen since they could be claimed to represent different ideal types of different regimes in the areas of citizenship and immigration. Australia and Sweden are often referred to as multicultural, whereas Germany is referred to as ethnic. The first two classifications are not new and were once again shown to be valid. Sweden is commonly referred to as multicultural, but as shown in the article it is a notion that in a comparative sense is not appropriate. Hence, the choice was to use the notion of semi-multicultural instead. This suggests that Sweden, though in some sense multicultural, differs from Australia. This means that we are dealing with three countries that have implemented different policies that constitute different regimes in the areas of citizenship and immigration. The underlying assumption was that the differences regarding regime types in effect in the three countries would be reflected in people's national identities. The rationale behind such an assumption was not only that different regime types affect people's national identities differently, but that that the regime types signify something more than the policies themselves namely, the institutionalization of the three nation-states' histories.

I set out to examine if there indeed were differences in national identity to be found between the three countries that could be derived from the differences in policy regimes. National identity is here viewed as an awareness of affiliation to the nation (state) which gives people a sense of who they are in relation to others, or infuses them with a sense of purpose that makes them feel at home. Anthony Smith's (1991) understanding of the division of national identity into civic and ethnic national identity was my point of departure. The former includes a well defined territory, a community of laws and institutions, a single political will, equal rights for members of the nation and a minimum of common values, traditions or a sentiment that binds people together. The ethnic model is characterized by common descent or perceived common descent where the people are one *volk*. However, it was found that this division was not enough to cover the complexity of national identity and two more ideal types were therefore added, namely multiple national identity, i.e. identification with both civic and ethnic conceptions, and the pluralists, those with a weak sense of national identity. This gave me a set of four different ideal types of national identity. In order to operationalize this understanding of national identity, people's perception of how important different factors are for being truly Australian, German or Swedish were used. This seems to presuppose an awareness of what constitutes being a national in relation to others, which is what Smith (compare Keane, 1994) emphasizes. The question and items used to operationalize national identity was phrased as follows.

Some people say the following things are important for being truly [country]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?

To have been born in Australia/Germany/Sweden.

To have lived in [country] for most of one's life.

To be able to speak [country language].

To have [country] citizenship.

To respect [country] political institutions and laws.

To feel [nationality].

The first two factors were then used to operationalize ethnic national identity and the last four to capture civic national identity, whereas people having a multiple national identity are those that have both an ethnic and a

civic one. Thus, the pluralists are those who do not have neither an ethnic nor a civic national identity.[9] It is clear that the classification of the items into different types of national identity is problematic.[10] However, this classification seems to correspond to Smith's understanding of the two ideal types fairly well. This does of course not indicate that it is void of problems. Some of the problems, such as how to classify language have been discussed in the first two articles and will therefore not be repeated.

It was expected that ethnic national identity would be more prevalent in Germany and civic national identity more so in Australia, with Sweden coming closer to Australia than to Germany due to the differences in citizenship and immigration regimes. Instead, it was found that the differences between the three countries did not support such a hypothesis. In fact, a clear-cut ethnic national identity was not found at all and the difference in civic national identity that was found could not be shown to correspond to differences in regime types[11] prevalent in the three countries. Thus, the article questions the often-assumed correspondence between regime types and national identity.[12] This also seemed to be the case with the separation of civic and ethnic that may be helpful when classifying policies and historical contexts, but seems more dubious when dealing with actual national identities. I have drawn this conclusion on a limited selection of countries, but the ideal type approach makes these results more valid. Moreover, Jones and Martin (1999) use ISSP data to analyze national identities in 23 different countries and find that there are fundamental commonalities in the way people think about their national belonging, which further strengthens the idea of cross-country similarities.

Article I also probes into the relationship between the different national identity types and xenophobia and finds that having a civic national identity or being a pluralist reduces the risk of displaying xenophobic attitudes whereas having a multiple national identity increases this risk. This will be further elaborated in Article II.

Article II

This article sets out to compare national sentiments between the same countries analyzed in Article I with the inclusion of Great Britain. The focus in this article is not on the relation between national sentiments and policy regimes, but on the meaning of different forms of national sentiments. Still, the comparison between countries with different regime types enhances the possibility to see whether the findings are country specific or if they are of a

more universal character. The article sets out to test the often assumed, but not empirically tested, hypothesis that civic national sentiments are something positive while ethnic sentiments are something negative. In order to be able to test this hypothesis I started in the same analysis that concluded Article I, that is, in an analysis of the relation between different ideal types of national identity and xenophobia. As indicated above, it was found that national identity based on a non-civic conception increased the risk for xenophobia whereas a clear-cut civic national identity decreased this risk in the examined countries.

In order to elaborate on the analysis of positive and negative national sentiments, I set out to analyze national pride[13] as well. The latter is understood as individual sentiments of pride towards the nation-state. Or more simply, what part or aspect of their nation-state are people proud of. I argued that national pride differs from nationalism in that the former is not ideologically based and that it can be expected to have both positive as well as negative connotations. National pride was divided into two dimensions that were named political and natio-cultural national pride. These two dimensions were argued to correspond to the civic and ethnic division of national identity. However, since the latter two are much more extensive categories the choice was to use other notions when analyzing national pride in order to avoid conceptual vagueness. It was argued that political national pride constituted one part of the more comprehensive category of civic national identity. Correspondingly, the natio-cultural national pride was argued to be a constituent part of an ethnic identity since the included variables pertain to the people of the examined societies more than to the state. In order to operationalize national pride the following items were used.

How proud are you of [country] in each of the following?

The way democracy works.	*Its scientific and technological achievements.*
Its political influence in the world.	*Its achievements in sports.*
[Country's] economic achievements.	*Its achievements in the arts and literature.*
Its social security system.	*[Country's] armed forces.*
Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society.	*Its history.*

The five items on the left-hand side were classified as political national pride and the items on the right-hand side as natio-cultural national pride. It is, as in the case with national identity, clear that this classification is not free of problems. Especially when we consider the possibility that these items may have different meanings in the different countries. However, these items were also empirically tested with a factor analysis. The result from this analysis suggests that the initial classification could be considered to be valid in the examined countries. The items included in the two dimensions of national pride were then added into two indexes.

When the two national pride indexes were correlated with xenophobia it was found that political national pride correlates negatively with xenophobia in Australia and Sweden but not at all in Germany and Britain whereas natio-cultural national pride correlates positively with xenophobia in all countries with the exception of Sweden. So, if we consider these findings together with the analysis of national identity and xenophobia it seems that the relationship people have with the nation-state is decisive in forming their conception of other people. That is, with civic sentiments the conception of 'us' can include people regardless of their ethnic belonging whereas ethnic sentiments exclude people who are viewed as belonging to different ethnic groups, which was shown to lead to depreciation of individuals belonging to such groups.

The way in which ethnic national identity is operationalized requires a comment. It could be seen as a more or less racist definition at the outset, which would mean that the results are more or less tautological. In saying this we must remember that the way in which national prides was

operationalized covers items that are far less racialized and the correlation between those items and xenophobia are clearly existent. This suggests that there is more to be found than a tautology. Moreover, even though the operationalized version of ethnic national identity may be racialized it could still be expected that adhering to the more civic forms of national sentiments would lead to xenophobia and protectionism to a higher degree, since the civic side of society is supposedly intertwined with ethnicity. However, this does not seem to be the case.

Article III

In Article III the focus is on nationalism in the two neighboring countries, Sweden and Norway. Nationalism is here understood, as has been argued in the article, in a Gellnerian sense. That is, as the wish for congruity between state and nation. In extending the discussion on nationalism, two different types of nationalism were identified, namely nationalism as evaluation and nationalism as a project. The former is understood in terms of ideologies that strive towards political and cultural superiority, which includes both a unified morality of the members of the nation as well as the coinciding of state and nation. The latter is understood as social movements and state policies that strive towards independence and self-determination. Nationalism as evaluation could be described in terms of exclusion, or a desire expressed by the ethnic majority in order to differentiate themselves from the ethnic minorities. Correspondingly nationalism as a project could be described in terms of inclusion, or the will to include as many members as possible in the nation against other nations or states.

I then showed that Norway has commonly been used as the prime example of the positive project form of nationalism whereas Sweden has instead illustrated a negative, evaluative, nationalism, due to the historical structuration of the two nation-states. If a clear-cut positive nationalism[14] was to be found anywhere, differences between the two countries regarding the implications of having nationalist sentiments was expected.

Nationalism as a sentiment was argued to be a form of national pride and national belonging based in both political and ethno-cultural aspects, combined with a belief of superiority of one's own nation. It was also argued that it is possible that such nationalist sentiments are based on different forms of nationalism in different countries. The following items were used to operationalize the nationalist sentiment.

How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

I would rather be a citizen of [country] than of any other country in the world.

The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the [country].

Generally speaking, [country] is a better country than most other countries.

People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong.

When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be [country].

These items were empirically tested in a factor analysis as well as with an internal reliability analysis and were found to measure the same dimension in the examined countries. The items were then added into an index that measures nationalist sentiment.

The following analysis presents an examination of whether having a nationalist sentiment had different implications in the two countries. This was conducted by correlating the nationalist sentiment with xenophobia as well as with protectionism[15]. It was found that the nationalist sentiment was associated with both xenophobia as well as protectionism in both Norway and Sweden. Moreover, the magnitude of the correlations between nationalist sentiments and xenophobia in the two examined countries indicate a rather strong relationship. Not only do nationalist attitudes have similar effects in the two countries, but also the extent to which such sentiments are spread in the two countries was found to be similar. This does of course not indicate that this level of nationalist sentiment is universal. It only suggests that the widespread 'common sense' understanding that Norwegians have a fundamentally stronger nationalist sentiment than Swedes needs to be reconsidered.

In addition to the similarities between both extent as well as the relation between nationalist sentiments and other attitudes in the two examined countries, it was also shown that there are substantial differences *within* the two countries regarding to what extent different groups display nationalist sentiments. At the same time there are extensive similarities *between* the countries regarding the relation between the groups. It was shown that

elderly people from the working classes with low education, and without an immigrant background are most likely to display strong nationalist sentiments. Gender did have a marginal effect in Sweden, in that women are less likely to display strong nationalist sentiments, which was not the case in Norway.

Many are those that have failed to see that nationalism can never be clear-cut positive as long as we understand it in terms of an intrinsic relation with both state and nation. The only way nationalism could ever have a clear-cut positive side is if we could attain a separation of civic and ethnic in society were nationalism would be directed towards an ethnically and culturally neutral state. However, if this would be the case then we are no longer dealing with nationalism, but with something that would better be termed statism.

Nonetheless, the Janus face of nationalism is often proclaimed (Calhoun, 1997; Cardús and Estruch, 1995; Delanty, 1996; Nodia, 1994). There seems to be two main reasons for this misconception. First, there is the lack of theoretical agreement about what nationalism should and should not be seen as. The arguments in favor of positive nationalism are commonly based on a very broad understanding of nationalism. This is an understanding that includes other forms of national sentiments, which is problematic because everything and nothing could be chosen to be included under the umbrella of nationalism, which is not fruitful. Sartori (1991) calls this problem 'concept stretching' and argues that we are then depriving our concept not only of heuristic validity, but of all forms of testability, which means that we will end up with a concept that has no or little analytical meaning. This concept stretching of nationalism has resulted in an obvious problem: the separation of state and nation. Most arguments of positive nationalism are based on the division of state and nation or between civic and ethnic. Positive nationalism is then being attributed to the state and the negative sides to the nation. However, the state and the nation have been shown to be inseparable entities in the nationalist's conception of the world (Brubaker, 1996; Gellner, 1983; Kedourie, 1993; Smith, 1991). This is not to claim that the state is inseparable from the nation or that it is impossible that people belonging to different collective entities, or nations sharing the same political territory, cannot feel more strongly attached to a neutral state. Far from it, but then we are not dealing with nationalism anymore.

Second, the argumentation in favor of positive nationalism does not preclude the negative sides of nationalism. I fully agree that nationalism has

negative as well as positive sides. The positive sides can be a sense of belonging and maintenance of one's identities. However, it is yet to be seen that such positive sides of nationalism could be found without its negative side effects of degrading others who are perceived as not belonging to the nation. It has also been argued that nationalism was an important factor in the creation of the modern nation-state, but for this to be something positive it must rest on an *a priori* assumption that the attainment of such is an ultimate goal. Moreover, it is has also been put into question whether nationalism actually was an important factor in the creation of the modern nation-state (Farrar, et al. 1998). Ghia Nodia (1994) moves beyond this in a very intriguing article and argues that democracy and nationalism always have moved hand in hand and that the latter is in fact a prerequisite for the former. However, when he argues that the nation and ultimately nationalism has paved the way for democracy in establishing the relation between individuals as 'we the People' he forgets one important aspect. This is that democratic principles have been, and still are, emerging in places were Nodia's so-called nations consist of very heterogeneous ethnic groups of people, like in the USA and Malaysia, to take two examples. Since ethnicity is one important aspect of a nation Nodia's argument seems to be based on a circle argument. This is that all groups of people who are in some ways united and who make demands, in this case democracy, is a nation.[16] This may not be a circle if we approve of a subjective definition of the nation, stating that all people who claim to belong to a nation do so. However, adopting only a subjective definition of national belonging does not really make sense, since this would mean that people belonging to a certain nation could not differentiate themselves from other nations, which is arguably one of the more important aspects of national belonging. This means that no ethnic group or nation could exist based solely on a subjective definition of themselves. Therefore, Gellner's (1983) two-sided definition of the nation, cultural and voluntaristic, makes more sense. These are also included in for example Smith's (1986; 1991) and Hylland-Eriksen's (1993) approaches to ethnicity. Thus, we are back to the first reason for people arguing in favor of positive nationalism.[17] Moreover, when the people of USA wrote the declaration of independence 'we the People', they actually only included white males. This means that even though it may be possible to consider them a nation it was a nation that excluded and belittled other groups of people living within the territory.

So, given this, it came as no surprise that nationalism in the two examined countries had similarly negative connotations.

Article IV

This article takes yet another perspective in focusing on multiculturalism from two different angles. First, it examines whether multiculturalism as implemented in practical politics in Australia and Canada receive support from the people living in these two countries. Second, it examines whether the politics of multiculturalism has succeeded in its ideological pretences of both separating civic and ethnic in society and through this, creating a civic base for national sentiments as well as decreasing degrading views of those perceived as others.

The two self-proclaimed multicultural countries of Australia and Canada were contrasted with the two so-called ethnic countries of Austria and Germany in order to conduct this analysis. It was expected that people in the former two countries would support multicultural politics to a greater extent than in the two latter countries and that such politics had succeeded, at least to some extent, in its aims.

In trying to come to terms with people's attitudes towards the political program of multiculturalism I examined attitudes towards immigration, refugees, assimilation and integration as well as attitudes towards monetary support to ethnic minorities. Contrary to expectations it was found that important aspects of multicultural politics, as implemented in Australia and Canada, was not supported to any larger extent than in Austria and Germany. Differences were found between the four countries, but such differences were not structured in a way that would make it possible to claim that multicultural policies have more supporters in Australia and Canada than in Austria and Germany.

Moreover, the goal of multiculturalism was also examined. Behind the political rhetoric and implemented programs lies a belief that such policies will lead to something that coincides with most ideological multicultural positions, that being the separation of civic and ethnic in society, or the unification under an ethnically neutral civic sphere of society that leaves room for people to practice whatever culture they see fit in the private sphere as long as it does not encroach upon the agreed civic system. It is also assumed that such policies will reduce degrading views of people based on their ethnic belonging. However, in the analysis of national pride it was not found that people took more pride in the civic or political side in Australia and Canada than was the case in Austria and Germany. Even though it was found that Australians and Canadians are substantially less

xenophobic than their counterparts in Austria and Germany, there was little overall evidence that the goals of multiculturalism have been fulfilled to any greater extent in the former countries than in the latter.

Interestingly enough it was found that people who supported practical multicultural policies and had a stronger sense of political national pride were clearly less xenophobic than people who did not support such policies. This means that even though the support for such policies are similarly low in the four examined countries it clear that the support for such policies on an individual level goes together with a less negative idea of immigrants.

Regardless of the former, the lack of stronger support for multiculturalism could pose a serious problem for the future of multicultural politics. It is difficult to speculate about the future, but we must acknowledge the fact that policies that are implemented in order to strengthen multiculturalism do not have larger support in countries where such policies are quite widespread than in countries where such policies are not, and this is a potential problem. It is of course possible to have policies that are not supported by the public, but for how long? There is also an inertia build into every political system that increases over time when certain policies are increasingly institutionalized. This makes it difficult to change already implemented policies as well as to instigate new policies in line with multiculturalism. Still, if the public repudiation of certain policies is strong enough they can be changed.

We may be seeing signs of this in primarily Australia but even in Canada. Critical voices have been raised towards multiculturalism in both countries, voices that have not been limited to right-wing extremism. It may even be more troublesome in Canada than in Australia due to the strain between multiculturalism and bi-culturalism, where the former has been seen as a threat to the French speaking Canadians' position. The fact that critical voices have been raised may not be troublesome per se, since a critical debate should be a part of every democratic society. We must also bear in mind that even though there has been discussion in Australia about reducing their immigration quotas, there have so far been no, or only minor changes in that direction. The actual immigration intake has instead increased lately. Still, there have been cutbacks, such as a limitation of the possibility for immigrants to appeal denials of residency in Australia. The change in the citizenship examination in Canada is another example, where immigrants now have to pass this test without an interpreter, which could clearly be troublesome for immigrants with different native tongues.

The critique against multiculturalism has not been restricted to right wing extremism, but this movement should not be underestimated.. Pauline Hanson's One Nation Party, with its clearly racist imagery, received an astonishing 23 percent of the votes in the Queensland local election in 1998. The One Nation Party received eight percent of the votes in the national elections the same year. This figure turned out to be substantially lower than the polls but it still indicates that the influence of the party cannot be ignored. The party may play a marginal role in parliament, but it still affects the political agenda. For example, the Australian government restricted Aboriginal land claims prior to the 1998 election in *claimed* fear of the high polls the One Nation Party was receiving prior to the election.[18] The Canadian Reform Party may not be fully comparable to Australia's One Nation Party, but it is clearly opposed to the way in which immigration is handled in the country and it repeat its mantra demand to reduce Canadian immigration Quotas from 250.000 to 150.000. However, they have thus far not been very successful in their critique in spite of being the leader of the opposition. There are also political parties included in the Bloc Quebecois that see multiculturalism as threatening Quebec's position, which means that one cannot dismiss the political threat to multiculturalism even in Canada. However, even if there have been economic cutbacks in Australia and Canada there have also been changes in the other direction and thus, there are few signs that the two countries are diverging substantially from the multicultural path at present.

There are two possible explanations for the low correspondence between public attitudes and the actual political agenda of multiculturalism in Australia and Canada. First, we have the situation that people do not support such policies per se, but this situation could of course be derived from the fact that multicultural politics are new in both the countries. Such politics have only been in effect since the early 1970s, which means that we cannot rule out the possibility that such policies will win more supporters over time. Especially if we consider that people's national sentiments are not likely to change overnight. There is little possibility to study this at present, so I only hope that this is the case and that such changes will take place before it becomes politically impossible to implement multicultural politics. Second, we must not forget that it may be possible that the politics of multiculturalism in Australia and Canada suffer from the implementation of a specific kind of multiculturalism, namely communitarian multiculturalism. By trying to increase equality in society through the politics of difference they are in fact reinforcing the tie between civic and ethnic, and the importance of the latter on the national level. Thus, the small difference

between Australia and Canada on the one hand and Austria and Germany on the other hand when it comes to the effect of multiculturalism may be natural considering the form of multiculturalism practiced in the former two countries. Thus, it is possible to hypothesize that it is not multiculturalism per se that is not strongly supported but the actual implemented form of it.

The fact that the public in Austria and Germany does not repudiate multicultural policies more than their counterparts in Australia and Canada means that if multiculturalism could be upheld in the latter countries there is little that suggests that such policies could not be implemented in the former two countries. This may be something that we are currently witnessing in today's Germany. The SPD-Green coalition has enacted a new citizenship act from the first of January 2000 that will reduce the residency requirements in order to naturalize to eight years. Moreover, citizenship will be given to all individuals born in Germany of a foreigner who legally arrived in the country before the age of 14. The most controversial of this new citizenship act, however, was the proposal to permit dual citizenship, which was strongly opposed by the CDU-CSU.[19] It is clear that things are changing in Germany; it is just a question of how fast and to what extent. It will clearly be interesting to see whether xenophobia will diminish over time amongst Austrians and Germans and approach Australian and Canadian levels in the future. Given these developments at least Germany may slowly be embarking on the road towards multiculturalism (see also Kvistad, 1998). However, one clearly has to be pessimistic about the situation in Austria given that Joerg Haider's clearly racist Freedom Party received an almost unimaginable 27 per cent of the votes in the 1999 election, becoming the second largest political party in Austria.

The issue of multiculturalism is not restricted to the examined countries. Given this, we definitely need to consider not only how multicultural policies could be applied in different countries but also how the societal contract could be redefined in favor of an emphasis on the civic side of society. One way to accomplish this seems to go through education, which brings us to Article V.

Article V

This article focuses primarily on the importance of education as a determinant of nationalist and xenophobic value systems. It puts two different perspectives on the educational system in focus. The educational system has, on the one hand, been claimed to mediate values from the

dominating group in society and, thus, to help create and sustain both the myth of the homogenous nation-state as well as institutional discrimination. On the other hand the educational system is, in democratic societies, expected to teach democratic principles, human rights and even multicultural thinking. In other words there seems to be a tension between the roles of the educational system. Therefore, Article V sets out to examine whether education promotes nationalist sentiments and/or xenophobic values or if it is the other way around. This could of course be context dependent. That is, the effect of education on the examined values could very well differ between countries depending on the values that are promoted and hidden in the educational discourse. In order to control for such context dependency ten different countries were compared: Australia, Canada, Austria, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Czech Republic, and Hungary. The rationale behind the choice of these ten countries was the assumption that they represent dual differences on account of how the nation-state is conceptualized in the ten countries. Australia and Canada make up one pair, Austria and Germany another one. Sweden and the Netherlands make up the third pair and Italy and Spain the fourth pair, and, finally, the Czech Republic and Hungary make up the fifth and last pair. By comparing these five pair of countries there was a possibility to assess whether the effect of education on nationalist sentiments and xenophobic values are country specific or if there are in fact some universal trends to unravel.

The result of this examination was very clear. The risk of having both nationalist as well as xenophobic values clearly decreases with increased levels of education in all ten countries. Nationalist as well as xenophobic values diminish with increased education, but the largest difference displayed was found between those who had attended university and those who had not. Moreover, since there may be other factors than education that explain the prevalence of nationalist and xenophobic values a multivariate analysis was conducted including variables such as gender, class, citizenship, age, and whether the respondents had lived abroad. The effect of education on the examined values did diminish somewhat, but not much. Regardless of the inclusion of other structural cleavages the effect of education on the examined attitudes remained prevalent, indicating the educational system's importance in teaching people democracy and pluralism.

Differences in the extent to which nationalist sentiments and xenophobic values were displayed in different countries were found, but it does not rule

out the possibility that the educational system does play an important role in diminishing such values. All in all, this suggests that there is little support for the allegations against the educational systems as mediators of racist and nationalist values anywhere.

Since university education seems to be most important in diminishing the examined values, it may be troublesome that the majority of the people in the examined countries do not attend universities, even though the proportion that do is substantial in some of them.. This is interesting since the tendency goes towards increasing levels of education. Given this one has to ask what will happen if the vast majority of the people in a country have attended universities? Will aggregate levels of nationalist sentiments and xenophobic values be substantially lower than today, or could there be some form of threshold that the levels of nationalist and xenophobic values can hardly fall below? This is of course not the case in theory, but considering that the levels of nationalist sentiment and xenophobia vary substantially between the examined countries one has to realize that increasing a population's education can only diminish the examined values to a certain degree. Other measures need to be taken into account. However, it cannot be dismissed that higher education can be and is playing an important role in the multicultural society.

This is not to say that there are not differences between educational systems or that any such system is perfect. All educational systems are colored with values, experiences and practices from the national majority. So, there is still a lot that can be improved in order to, as far as possible, make minorities visible and encourage their participation in the different educational systems. I do not claim to have the answer to how this ought to be done, and this will be left to others to figure out. However, it is clear that the educational system can be no different from the liberal multicultural society that recognizes minorities.

Two forms of multiculturalism

The summarized results have some important implications. First, we have to question the almost taken for granted view that there is always a correlation between the institutions of a country and the attitudes found in it. Gallie (1983), for example, claims that institutional difference can help explain cross-country attitudinal differences. This is also claimed by Svallfors (1993; 1996b) who shows that different 'welfare regimes' produce different

attitudes towards for example redistribution and income differences. However, such correspondence has not been found in my research. One reason for the lack of such correspondence could be related to the possibility that people simply are not aware of immigration/citizenship regimes, and the policies related to them, to the same extent as to welfare polices since they are less directly affected by them. This means that the regime types that exist in different countries have little impact on how people live their lives. Regardless of public policies, the commemoration of national symbols and national historical myths are so interwoven in the fabric of society that the alteration of certain policies have little effect on the perception of the nation-state or people's sentiments towards it. The evidence I have provided is not extensive enough to draw this conclusion, especially considering the fact that we cannot draw inferential conclusions about regimes that have not been examined. Nevertheless, it is worth pondering.

Second, and most important, it seems that certain ways of identifying and relating to one's nation-state are more desirable than other ways, given that xenophobia and protectionism are not considered desirable. It has been shown that it is preferable to have civic national sentiments compared to ethnic ones, in that the former does not increase the risk of being xenophobic whereas this is the case for the latter. It was also shown that nationalism, as expected, was equally as negative as ethnic sentiments in that it combines both civic and ethnic apprehensions of one's nation-state. Remember also that Article IV showed that having multicultural values on an individual level substantially reduce the risk of being xenophobic.

Taken together it seems that multicultural ideas are something worth striving for on an individual level in that xenophobia and protectionism is not included to the same extent in such a belief system.

The question is whether multicultural conceptions of the society may be achieved by institutional design? Or more generally, we can ask whether institutions can be formed so that they promote practices that are viewed as normatively good or just? Rothstein (1994) claims that this is possible as long as individuals feel that the institutions are substantially just, and that they are convinced that the burdens are divided equally, and, finally, that polices can be implemented in a procedurally just way (see also Levi 1990). As long as these prerequisites are fulfilled institutions that will affect societal norms and ways of behaving could be designed. This gives rise to the next question. How should such institutions be designed so that they will promote civic values in polyethnic societies, which I have shown is

something worth striving towards? Rawls phrases this question brilliantly in asking: 'How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?' (1996: p. xx)?

I have stated that multicultural values are something desirable, at least on the individual level. This is one thing, but it is another thing to find a multiculturalism that could promote such values. The battle seems to be raging between liberal communitarians[20] (e.g. Kymlicka, 1995; Taylor, 1994; Waltzer, 1994; Young, 1990) and liberals (e.g. Modood, 1997; Rawls, 1996; Rex, 1996).

The former recognizes that there are groups and even proposes differentiation of rights between individuals belonging to different groups, whereas the latter form of liberalism claims to be blind to group differences. Rights are primarily connected to individuals in both cases, and not to groups, and the state is expected to be neutral towards an individual's choice of the life she wants to pursue in both cases. There are of course differences within the two forms of multiculturalism. Even so, there is a quite clear demarcation line between liberal communitarians and liberals. The former want the state to not only recognize that there are different ethnic and cultural groups in every society but that individuals in such groups need differentiated rights based on their group belonging in order to help people to choose the life they want to pursue.

It has been shown throughout my work that civic identification is something positive compared to ethnic identification and that nationalism is something that should be avoided in that it combines the two. The negative sides of nationalism are clearly evident in the relation between nationalist sentiments and xenophobia in all the examined countries. Thus, it seems clear that stability and justice can never be achieved within a country constructed on the premises of congruency between state and nation and the promotion of one culture over another. One of the problems with liberal communitarianism is that it touches upon nationalism in claiming that the preservation of the distinctiveness of national cultures, be they in majority or minority, is of importance (Miller, 1995b).[21] In fact, it presupposes nationalism in making such a claim. Miller even claims that nationalism is needed (compare Raz, 1994). That is not primarily nationalism in the sense of a congruity between nation and state or the will to achieve a 'one nation state'. It is what is commonly referred to as cultural nationalism, which is taken to be the promotion of certain national cultures (often by the state)

over others. The cultural nationalist argument, as well as part of the liberal communitarian argument, rests on the assumption that individuals need their culture in order to have a set of options and values enabling them to choose the good life, which the individual's culture provides for her (Raz, 1994; Tamir, 1993). No individual can be free if she is deprived of the things that are essential to her in making her own decisions about the good life.

However, the proponents of nationalism underestimate the notion of superiority which is more or less concealed in every effort towards national self-determination and promotion of distinctiveness. I have shown, mainly in Article III and V, that nationalism is not something that should be promoted unless you are willing to pay the price of xenophobia and protectionism.[22] It is true that Article III and IV primarily focus on what has been called political nationalism, [23] but it is yet to be shown that there can ever be a separation between cultural and political nationalism in practice regardless of the commonality of doing so for analytical purposes. For example, is it not the case that the best ways of ensuring the survival and distinctiveness of one's culture is to be governed by one's own? Thus, the cultural nationalist will also be a political nationalist. The same goes for the political nationalist who will also be a cultural nationalist in that political nationalism in itself is an attempt to benefit one's culture. If we consider fighting for independence from an abusive ruler it may be possible to see that the promotion of one's culture is not included in this, but there are few cases were this does not follow in the steps of such nationalistic liberation movements. Another serious problem for any liberal nationalist defending cultural nationalism or communitarianism arises from this interconnection between cultural and political nationalism. It is assumed that groups of people that can be considered national minorities have a just claim to have their own state because they are being maltreated as a result of the emphasis on the majority national culture. This implies that all minorities living within any state boundary will be subjected to such unjust treatment and suppression of their culture. No liberal could ever propose that the promotion of a certain national culture could ever be allowed to be oppressive against minorities. However, it is difficult to see how this can be avoided considering that the right to self-government in the name of political nationalism is partly based on the impossibility of such avoidance. Thus, there seems to be something fundamentally wrong with this argument. It does not seem plausible to defend the right to statehood or self-government in the name of avoiding cultural oppression, since it will only change who is being oppressed, given that the liberal nationalist starting point is correct.

In other words, the problem of nationalism remains, which is no small problem for the liberal communitarians. However, there may be a problem with not promoting nationalism and liberal communitarianism if those who do so are correct in claiming that the promotion of national cultures is a prerequisite for the existence of 'free', in the liberal sense, individuals. If this is the case then is does not matter whether nationalism could be considered something negative, since the alternative is perhaps not preferable. I doubt that this is the case and I agree with Alan Patten (1999) who has shown that the defense of nationalism with liberal rhetoric will end up in serious trouble. We must also remember that every promotion of any national culture will ultimately diminish possibilities for other, within the political territory, coexisting national cultures or cultural expressions.

Not only do the liberal communitarian approach run into trouble with nationalism, but it also affects the supposed ends of multiculturalism in that it works against the neutral state. This can clearly lead to a continuation of unity based on ethnically colored national sentiments. Thus, the problem of ethnicized politics in the public sphere, and through this the way people will identify themselves as members of that society, would persist. I have clearly shown that the latter is not desirable.

It appears that the result show that a liberal communitarian approach towards multiculturalism is not something to be sought after in that it promotes, or at least presupposes, nationalism or other ethnically colored national sentiments. This would indicate that liberal multiculturalism is preferable since it does not presuppose such a thing.

It seems to be somewhat problematic that people do not support multicultural policies to any great extent, even in the countries that have this on the agenda. The crux is that multiculturalism has not to date been implemented in the liberal sense, nor have people been asked about their apprehension of a more liberal multicultural distribution of justice in my research. Especially article IV suggests that the relative lack of support for multicultural measures in Australia and Canada could be due to the fact that people do not support more communitarian measures of multiculturalism and not due to the fact that they would refute multiculturalism per se.

The United States is sometimes claimed to be implementing more liberal than communitarian multicultural politics, but I strongly doubt that this is the case. The history of the 'melting pot' clearly refutes this. Even though the 'melting pot' may have played out its role it has not been replaced with a

liberal multiculturalism, but with a more communitarian approach invoking group differentiated rights, like the positive affirmative action programs. Hence, it is perfectly possible that the lack of support for multiculturalism is derived from the lack of support for more communitarian measures. Thus, in order to come to the conclusion that there is a real lack of convergence between the liberal form of multiculturalism advocated here and people's conception of multiculturalism we need more research. Until then, I cannot see any reasons to not continue to advocate a liberal form of multiculturalism that recognizes difference and is open to change in order to meet new demands.

The problem is that it is not enough that my research hints at a shift towards liberal multiculturalism. Not only do we need a form of multiculturalism that has the possibility to promote non-nationalism and non-ethnic national sentiments. Any change in policy implications must be implemented in a procedurally and substantially just way in order to facilitate public acceptance. Therefore, we need to take another step and examine the more normative side of the two different forms of multiculturalism.

Normative implications of the two forms of multiculturalism

Will Kymlicka (1995) proposed a solution to multiculturalism that takes us beyond the classical dichotomy of a neutral state and non-neutral private sphere that allows for all people to practice whatever culture they like as long as it is private. Kymlicka's point of departure is arguing against the possibility of a neutral state by claiming that this is not the case anywhere in the world. He argues also, as other liberal communitarians, in favor of group differentiated rights. Such rights are viewed as the way to come to terms with the intrinsically unequal society. Other liberal communitarians start in a neutral state and claim that group differentiated rights should be used in order to increase inequality in transition. However, the effect is the same, namely that the state will not remain neutral.[24] So, even though there are differences within the multicultural communitarian camp, Kymlicka is a noteworthy representative of this school and can, thus, be used to signify it.

Kymlicka distinguishes between national minorities and ethnic groups. The former is seen as a distinct and potentially self-governed society that has been included in a larger state, e.g. the French Canadians, whereas the latter are immigrants that have left one national community in favor of another, e.g. the Turkish population in Germany. He claims that there are for both of these groups group differentiated rights that can be granted in line with

liberalism.[25] Kymlicka argues, in fact, that such group-differentiated rights promote the liberal ideas of freedom, justice and equality. There are, according to Kymlicka, three forms of group differentiated rights that can be granted. The first is the *right to specific representation* for groups, which will diminish the risk that the political institutions run by the dominating ethnic majority, will overlook national and ethnic minorities' interests. The second is the *right to self-government* for national minorities in order to diminish the risk that decisions made on the national level neglect important aspects connected to the national minority, which is basically a political nationalist claim. This could be exemplified by the French Canadians. *Polytechnic rights* aim at protecting certain religious and cultural practices that are not supported by the market, for example, monetary contributions to ethnic minorities to support the practice of certain cultural features or exception from certain laws that are in opposition to religious or cultural beliefs. It is important to note that he emphasizes that group differentiated rights can only be granted to national or ethnic minorities for outer protection and not for inner protection, since the latter would be in opposition to basic liberal ideas. That is, their aim is to for protect against the majority and never for protection against members of the group that deviate from the group.

Kymlicka is of course right in claiming that the state advances expressions of the cultural majority in for instance promoting national holidays that, in the case of Sweden, are based on Christianity. This clearly diminishes individuals with other religious denominations ability to celebrate the feasts that they would prefer. However, the fact that the state does advance phenomena that are not neutral towards the possible lives that individuals want to pursue does not rule out the possibility of attaining a more neutral state, only that it is highly problematic.

In fact the liberal communitarian approach is mistaken on a number of accounts. The definition of the problem as the non-neutrality of any state is correct, but the differentiated rights solution is problematic.

The right to self-government may seem reasonable at first, but is in fact afflicted with major problems. First, how do we, in practice, draw the line between national and ethnic minorities? This is fundamental, at least to Kymlicka, since the right to self-government should only be granted national minorities. People belonging to ethnic minorities have made the decision to immigrate to a certain country and by doing so they have given up their right to self-government and must thereby be seen as actors on the

national arena. National minorities, on the other hand, have been included in a larger society and should thus be granted the right to self-government (compare Raz, 1994). The problem is that we have no tool that will work in all cases, by which we can assess whether a certain group is a national or an ethnic minority. It is of course possible to be pragmatic about it and assess each case separately. This may be possible, but it leaves us with another problem. What about ethnic minorities that live in the same territory as a national minority? For example, the English speaking Canadians living in Quebec. Should they be forced to adhere to laws made by the local government that are not applicable to them? The answer must of course be no to this question. If we have no right to impose political decisions that contradict a national minority's desires, then national minorities cannot be allowed to impose such political decisions on minorities living in the territories governed by them, which clearly is the case in Quebec. So, in proposing self-governmental rights for national minorities the problem of the non-neutral state is just moved down one level, which brings us no closer to a solution. Another serious problem with this political nationalist proposition is that it is often made in the name of political trust (e.g. Miler, 1995). Trust is evidently an important factor for a functional democracy and it can possibly be assumed that people would put more trust in democracy if the political powerholders are from the same nation, i.e. share the same cultural background. This assumption may be true or it may be false. That is not the problem, the problem is that is it based on a clearly racist conception of the world and would never even be considered elsewhere as a feasible argument. For example, many countries do have laws that aim to prevent ethnic discrimination in the labor market. Whether that is through positive affirmative action programs or other measures are of less importance. However, if we are to take the political nationalist trust argument and apply it on the labor market it would imply that any employer would be entitled to hire only employees that are seen as fellow nationals, since it may be the case that the company will enhance its performance with such a hiring policy. The latter is not and should not be permissible, but then one has to ask whether a similar proposition can be used to defend political nationalism or the right to self-government.

The right to specific representation has been debated in many countries in different forms, from affirmative action programs to guaranteeing different groups representation in the parliament. Kymlicka tries to argue that group representation is something that will promote liberalism in a society, but he is very vague in coming to terms with the problems associated with such representation. The problems with mirror representation in a parliament are

apparent, but there are few suggestions for how to overcome them other than pragmatically claiming that these things could be solved in an open democratic discussion. So be it. However, then it becomes impossible to see why we could not solve the problem of striving towards a more neutral state based on universality through open democratic discussions as proposed by Habermas (e.g. 1994).

The largest fallacy of the liberal communitarian approach to multi-culturalism lies in the differentiated polyethnic rights for ethnic minorities. It is clear that different ethnic minorities are discriminated by the majority, but it is a mistake to assume that the solution is to be found in granting differentiated rights based on group belonging to such minorities. For example, the law, implemented in certain countries, that prohibits stores to be open on Sundays discriminate against Jewish people since they do not mind having open on Sundays, but would like stores to be closed on Fridays instead. Therefore, Kymlicka proposes that individuals belonging to such groups should be exempt from this and be allowed to have stores open on Sundays. A problem is defined, but the solution is a mistake. If we grant such a group differentiated rights, how do we decide who belongs and who does not belong to the groups that this exception would apply to? This is of course not feasible by external means. The only way this could be done is by self-definition, but this will result in a situation where all those who want to circumvent such a law has the possibility to do so, which means that the law becomes deprived of all sense. So, the solution should instead be to try to approach a more neutral state by uncovering these injustices. Hence, we let everyone have their stores open on Sundays regardless of group belonging, which means that we will end up with the same outcome as in the group-differentiated rights proposition without having to deviate from equal rights.[26] Take another example; many societies grant economic support to different ethnic minorities in order to help preserve their culture. This is perfectly in line with an egalitarian, liberal society if we adopt the weak principle of neutrality. In other words, that the state must have a reason based on liberal preservation to perform an act that will not benefit all members of a specific society. Most societies also contribute to different cultural arrangements that cannot survive relying solely on market principals, like the opera. However, if we have democratically decided to give economic support to such expression, the money that can be distributed should not be given on the basis of ethnic or national belonging per se. There will of course be problems in deciding to whom and to what economic support should be granted, but this can be solved within the political process.

I cannot go over and discuss all group-differentiated rights that are applicable in every society or that are possible to be implemented. However, there will, as we have seen examples of, be problems associated with all such group differentiated rights that are no more easily solved than the separation of civic and ethnic in society, or the promotion of a neutral state based on universal rights. Another important aspect, which is often neglected by liberal communitarians, is that behind every group differentiated right rests two assumptions that are very troublesome.

The first assumption is that, in order to be able to implement group differentiated rights, we have to be able to classify ethnic groups externally, which is clearly not in line with modern understandings of ethnicity as being voluntaristic with unclear boundaries that are constantly changing (e.g. Smith 1991). This means that we cannot externally classify people as belonging to different ethnic groups, nor can any such attempt be valid in the long run. Such external classifications of people based on their ethnic belonging are in practice no different from previous attempts to classify different races. This is of course not what liberal communitarians are proposing but is nevertheless implicit in any external classification. Regardless of the good intentions of the liberal communitarians it is clear that the ends do not justify the means. It is true that we can in practice use self-definition, like in the USA and Great Britain. However, I cannot see how this takes us away from the dilemma. That is, what happens if an individual feels that her ethnic belonging has changed over time? Is she allowed to change it freely? Or, what happens if a 'white' British individual tries to pass as 'black'? Is this feasible or would someone else redefine that individual? Moreover, these so-called self-definitions of belonging could be accused of actually strengthening classical racist views of people, for example, the pre-set choices offered in the USA such as African-American, Hispanic, Caucasian and so on. Even if the choices were not settled beforehand[27] it will make no difference since state or federal grants to e.g. universities aimed at helping minorities have nothing to do with self-definition since the alternative to not belong to a predefined ethnic minority will get you nowhere. In fact, there can never be any totally subjective self-definition of ethnicity, since it will always per definition rely on pre-existing definitions made by others. Such definitions are not only problematic in themselves, but they tend to become racialized and the use of self-definition is not excepted. This means that the use of self-definitions do not take us out of the dilemma of how to separate individuals along the lines of ethnic belonging.

Second, there must exist an assumption that the classified ethnic groups that are to receive group-differentiated rights are underprivileged. It may be the case that most individuals in certain ethnic groups are underprivileged, but it is certainly not always the case. So, one has to ask whether the introduction of group differentiated rights can be free of a stigmatizing effect that may be difficult for individuals belonging to a certain ethnic group to rid themselves of.

Thus, even if it may be correct to claim that group differentiated rights, the right to self-government and so on are in line with liberalism it is a mistake to claim that it is necessary for the liberal multicultural society to have such rights. However, as suggested, I believe that liberal communitarianism or liberal nationalism are both a contradiction in terms. For example, Pattern (1999) shows that cultural assimilation, which liberal communitarians are so strongly trying to prevent, is not necessarily a threat to individual freedom and by doing so he is suggesting that liberalism is not easily combined with the defense of cultural distinctiveness or in other words, cultural nationalism. Moreover, I have shown that the more political nationalist self-government claim of the liberal communitarians also seems to be highly problematic.

I am not sure whether one can claim that there is a coherent theory that can be called liberal multiculturalism. However, I have chosen to call liberal theories that deal with issues of polyethnic societies liberal multiculturalism though such theories or attempts often lack the notion of multiculturalism. Unlike the liberal communitarian side, liberal multiculturalism does not allow for group differentiated rights, regardless of such rights being proposed in order to come to terms with group based inequality. The state should promote the separation of civic and ethnic and strive towards neutrality within the public sphere. Within such a view lies a difference of degree. In the classical liberal view the question of ethnicity and ethnic groups cannot even be discussed within the public sphere.[28] However, a somewhat milder version allows for the existence of anti-discrimination laws, which indirect is recognition of the existence of ethnic groups. Thus, such a version of liberal multiculturalism does not restrict the public space in a way that restricts a discussion of the existence of ethnic groups. However, the existence of group differentiated rights is not permissible according to this view.

The main critique aimed at liberals is that this position of ethnic and cultural group blindness is ultimately homogenizing (e.g. Taylor 1994). It implies

that the supposed neutrality of the state and equal treatment ultimately will lead to oppression of people based on their group belonging. The state is not and can never be neutral, which suggests that the values and norms of the dominant national majority will prevail and continue to influence the agenda within the civic sphere. This in turn will diminish the sphere of action possible for individuals not belonging to the national majority. Take the commemoration of national holidays as an example again. It is clear that all people are being treated equally in the promotion of certain holidays. It is likewise clear that the effect of such supposed equal treatment is that some people are being treated unjustly due to their desire to commemorate other holidays. Silverman (1992) shows, in his study of France, how this has turned out in practice. The classical universalistic state has in fact contributed to creating a situation of marginalization, racialization and 'blame the victim' mentality due to its supposed cultural blindness. In spite of the proclaimed liberal state of France, the state is so colored with ethnic practices that people belonging to ethnic minorities have small chances of avoiding subordination based on their group belonging. Goldberg (1994) claims that multiculturalism as practiced today, under the banner of liberal universalism, represents the interests of the dominating ethnic majority more than it benefits all individuals and groups of individuals. This is a very serious accusation, one to which liberal multiculturalism seems to offer little or no answers. We must also remember that liberalism is in itself a non-neutral expression of the dominant group, which suggests that it can never be the meeting ground that unifies different conceptions. Thus, it will in the end oppress groups of people not belonging to the majority in the name of universalistic humanism (McLaren, 1994).

Moreover, I have shown that liberal communitarians will end up in trouble trying to identify different ethnic groups. Liberal multiculturalism will not end up with these demarcation problems, since the separation of ethnic groups is not sought after. However, it will end up with another, and perhaps just as serious, demarcation problem. That is the problem of how to separate the public sphere from the private sphere. It is essential for such a position to find a minimum of common ‚neutral values that can be agreed upon while making it possible for people to practice different cultures in the private sphere. I have used language as an example before (see Article IV) to show that this is highly problematic. On the one hand all societies need a common means of communication in order for its members to be able to articulate wills within the public sphere. On the other hand, language is the means by which to articulate culture and religion. The latter function of language could be threatened in a situation of promotion of one (or more) official

languages. On the other hand, if no such promotion is taken under consideration it could water down the state of democracy. This is something that is not easily solved.

I have shown that a liberal communitarian version of multiculturalism will run into serious problems, but this also seems to be the case for a more liberal version of multiculturalism. However, I believe that the problems of the liberal version of multiculturalism are somewhat less severe than the problems encountered by the liberal communitarian side. Let us have a look at this.

Towards a viable multiculturalism?

One important issue to remember is that the accusations made against liberal multiculturalism often starts in the present situation without taking into account the fact that liberal multiculturalism and the promotion of neutral universalism as practiced today are in fact not very neutral. The critique may be warranted but it is doubtful that liberal multiculturalism is the culprit. For example, Silverman is probably accurate in his analysis of France, but it seems to me difficult to call France a liberal universalistic state. Advocating cultural nationalism in promoting the so-called French culture over other cultural expressions is clearly not in line with liberal multiculturalism. Alternatively, the critique is formulated in opposition to classical liberalism more than liberal multiculturalism or a more egalitarian liberalism. It is true that if one cannot raise the issue of how ethnic groups are being marginalized in spite of supposed equal opportunities, then liberalism is indeed color blind and homogenizing. However, this does not have to be the case.

The question is whether cultural blindness and homogenization can be avoided in a liberal multicultural society? I believe that Habermas (1994) makes a very strong argument in pointing out that it was only with the introduction of liberalism and official legal equality that it became evident that different groups in society were discriminated in the first place. It is first when such discrimination is on the agenda that we can work towards remedying it. Davidson (1997) shows this emphatically, not only in theory but also in practice, in his study of Australia's history of citizenship and identity. He claims '...that the communitarian view of national identity worked against democratic citizenship solutions as it closed down both debate on the good and excluded too many people from participation in law-

making. Contrarily, the procedural view facilitated the opposite as it allowed negotiation about reshaping the public sphere' (p. 258).

However, a proposition in favor of liberalism depends of course on what type of liberalism that we are dealing with. Even the notion of liberal multiculturalism is to some not liberal. It is seen as a contradiction in terms, since multiculturalism cannot and should not even be discussed within the public sphere due to cultural practices being seen as purely collective. An extension of this classical liberalism is a liberal multiculturalism that adds rights of protection against discrimination based on ethnic belonging to the fundamental rights of the liberal democratic society. This may not be enough, however since it can be accused of being administered by the dominating national majority and thereby fail to take into account wants and needs of individuals belonging to minority groups. So, if this is not enough, what is? There are no easy solutions, but it is clear that societies change through political articulation and communication of the problems within that society. We need to create a political climate that encourages individuals from different groups in society to participate in the debate and in working for the change of the society that we want to achieve. In other words, we need two simultaneous processes in order to avoid cultural blindness and homogenization.

First, we need to, as Rawls (1996) argues, work towards a more neutral civic sphere of society that is applicable to all individuals living in it. A society that people can identify with that is not discriminatory towards the life that individuals want to pursue regardless of their ethnic belonging. This seems to be the only way that the people who are affected by it could support such policies. This is not to say that I agree with Rawls' political liberalism's claim that there can exist a conception of justice that is neutral to all regardless of moral, religious or other convictions. Sandel (1998) aims devastating critique towards Rawls for this misconception that there can be neutrality when it comes to justice, but not when it comes to the good life, which means that the latter should not only be absent in politics, but that it cannot even be discussed.[29] Therefore, we need the second part of the process.

Second, different groups in society need to be a part of this in order to articulate and identify what could be considered as discriminatory policies. However, the only way they can be a part of this is if they are not discriminated against and thereby prevented from doing so in the first place. This is of course a catch 22 situation, but there may be a way out of it. This

could perhaps be found in a variant of Taylor's (1994) politics of recognition. However, we should as far as possible stay clear of the liberal communitarian claim of politics of difference so often proposed (e.g. Ben-Tovim, 1997; Kymlicka, 1995). This states that every society has to recognize that there are ethnic groups within it, but does not mean that any society should impose differentiated rights for such groups. It only implies that the liberal multicultural society needs to rethink policies that contradict and obstruct individuals from trying to pursue their conception of the good life. In other words it requires society to change in order to meet new demands. This recognition is also needed since it is clear that it is more difficult to articulate unjust policies when they have to be publicly discussed and defended (Rothstein, 1994).

An important aspect of this is to increase the levels of education in society. We have seen in Article V that this clearly diminishes the risks for people to be xenophobic and nationalistic. It is reasonable to assume that this is derived through increased knowledge and awareness and acceptance of actual or perceived differences. Moreover, the more people who are aware of the discriminatory society that they live in, the more the possibilities will increase to change it. Increased levels of education do not only increase acceptance of cultural pluralism, but serve the purpose of diminishing the risk of subordination of groups of people, along ethnic lines, due to lack of education.[30] Silverman (1992) showed by using as an example the French case, that a color blind universalism seems outdated, since it does not have the possibility to adapt to changes in accordance with the increased existence of polyethnic societies. We have to be able to politically address the issues of ethnically based conceptions of the good life in order to be able to intrinsically change racist politics designed and implemented by the dominant ethnic majority. This does, of course, not imply that anti discrimination laws, for instance, are not needed. They clearly are, but they are not enough by themselves. 'All' legislation and policies must to be scrutinized in the light of the injustices they run the risk of creating and sustaining in spite of their proclaimed neutrality. It is clear that there are few universal solutions to increase minority participation in shaping the society that we want to have without falling into the trap of communitarian policies. For example, in a country that has a large ethnic minority, an idea could be to educate people in bilingual schools, whereas such a proposition may not be applicable in all societies since the ethnic minorities are too diverse.

I have suggested that Taylor (1994) correctly assumes that it is necessary for a society to recognize all minorities and the individuals' belonging to those minorities, right to pursue their own identities. However, I cannot agree that the right to survival of certain national or ethnic minorities sometimes can overrule universal rights of individuals. The latter clearly is the case with the French Canadians in Quebec. Quebec is a state in a federal country that enjoys, like other states in Canada, certain legal rights. This means that it is perfectly feasible that Quebec does have French speaking schools and so on, since a majority of the people in Quebec are French speaking. However, a liberal society demands that the individuals are free to choose what life they want to pursue, and in the more egalitarian version have the possibility to do so. This is something that the state of Quebec clearly restricts by preventing French speaking parents to put their children in English speaking schools.[31] It seems in fact that there lies a hidden assumption of unequal worth of the different cultures within such a legal system. This is not necessarily the case, but it clearly comes to mind. Private schools are legal in Sweden, which means that it is possible to educate individuals using different languages than Swedish. This is something clearly positive.[32] However, if we compare this with the case of Quebec it would mean that the Finnish speaking minority in Sweden would be forced to attend Finnish speaking schools, which is not desirable, regardless of any existent collective goal of cultural survival, since it would overrule individual decisions.

It is a fact that ethnic minorities, and often also national minorities, are discriminated and marginalized in every society to varying degrees. This is not something that is likely to change overnight, but there is little evidence that this would change with the implementation of group differentiated rights. However, that is not to say that a laissez-faire politics should be emphasized, since this will inevitably strengthen the ethnic majority's dominance in society. Nor is it to say that differentiated collective goals of what a good life is cannot exist. They do and must also be allowed to do so and be recognized as such, though not without restrictions. One restriction is that such collective goals can never be allowed to be oppressive against people within the group, or, of course, towards individuals not belonging to the group; nor can fundamental democratic rights like the freedom of speech and religious freedom be set aside (compare Waltzer, 1994).

In addition to being void of many of the problems associated with the more communitarian approaches, liberal multiculturalism has the merit of being both easier to get public support for, due to it being more procedurally just, as well as having the possibility to strengthen people's sentiments towards a

neutral state[33] that is not discursively as well as officially mixed with ethnicity.

The problem is of course if people do not support such liberal multicultural politics, since any normative theory of justice must be based on what is politically possible to implement in order to be meaningful (Levi; 1990; Miller, 1992; 1995a; Rawls, 1996). However, the disheartening results that multicultural policies and the supposed effects of them have in some sense failed in Australia and Canada, but this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that multiculturalism *per se* cannot gain public adherence. It only means that the more communitarian form of it has trouble doing so. This opens up for the implementation of a more liberal approach towards multiculturalism.

Conclusion

I set out in the introduction with claiming that a comparative empirical approach had the advantage of being able to help us to advance our understanding of national sentiments in several ways. So, has this been the case?

First, I have shown that we need to reconsider the almost taken for granted view of a correspondence between regime types[34] prevalent in a certain society and people's sentiments towards such a society. There are differences between people from different countries, but those differences are not structured in a way that supports the expected correspondence. This is to suggest that official politics might be one thing and practices another, at least when it comes to immigration/citizenship regimes. There are differences in the strength of different national sentiments between people from different countries. However, I have also shown that those national sentiments are structured similarly in the examined countries. This suggests that there may be more fundamental cross-country similarities than previously has been expected. This conclusion is based on a limited selection of countries, but the ideal type approach makes these results more valid.

Second, there exist substantial cross-country similarities in the effect that different national sentiments have. This is something that has often been taken for granted, but not empirically proven. It has been shown that people who have more civic forms of national sentiments are clearly less inclined

to hold derogatory preconceptions about people perceived as not belonging to the group, compared the ideas held by those that have more ethnic national sentiments. Moreover, the findings also supply empirical evidence for my theoretical argument that a clear-cut positive nationalism can never exist, in that nationalism tends to correlate strongly with both xenophobia and protectionism.

The first result seems to highlight an important aspect. Regardless of policy regimes in the examined areas there are more fundamental similarities that run through the examined societies. They are all more or less democratic, but more importantly, the idea of 'one nation one state' runs so deep in all countries that it is bound to affect people's sentiments. There are, of course, differences in the nation building process between the examined countries. For example, Germany could, at the time of the creation of the unified Germany, hardly be seen as one nation as in the case of Sweden. However, the idea of one nation was slowly incorporated in 'German' thinking (Finzsch and Schirmer, 1998). Regardless of whether the states as we see them today were based on existing nations, like in Sweden, or if it was a unifying project, like in Italy and Germany, the end product remains the same. Namely, state boundaries more or less coincide with national ones where national ideas are intertwined in the discourse of society. This has not changed over time, since the more or less open commemoration of the nation continues to be an important aspect of every day life. There are differences between societies on account of nationality and so on, but the foundation of the nation-state seems to lead to some fundamental similarities in the intrinsic relationship between state and nation. This relation is not fixed forever, but constantly in flux even though the process of change is slow. This inertia could clearly explain the lack of difference between the so-called multicultural countries compared to other countries. However, it could also be explained by the fact that today's multicultural politics is performed with the wrong means that in the end turn out to be little different from previous policies. That is, in the forms of multi-culturalism practiced today, ethnic minorities run the risk of being marginalized. They are given the right to practice their culture in private, but have few possibilities to exercise their wants in public, since the national culture is still intertwined with the rest of society and works as an oppressive force against minority participation. So, in order to increase participation and decrease marginalization we need to rethink the ways in which nationality should or should not influence the civic sphere.

Moreover, I also suggested that the adoption of liberal communitarian politics could increase the risk for an increased prevalence of ethnic sentiments and nationalism since liberal communitarianism presupposes nationalism. This can never be the cement that holds society together unless we are willing to accept that people hold derogatory values towards those perceived as not being included in the group. Even if that is the case, it is clear that it is not enough that liberal multiculturalism possibly can reduce the prevalence of ethnic sentiments. It also has to be normatively possible to implement. Even if both forms of multiculturalism scrutinized here have their drawbacks, it was suggested that they are less severe within liberal multiculturalism. It seems to be the only way that people can be treated justly and equally, and at the same time have the possibility to reach public consensus.

In striving towards a society using democratic principles articulating unequal treatment based on ethnic group belonging, one can only hope that we can form a consensus about the neutral conceptions that needs to be emphasized in the public sphere and that this will open up for changes in order to meet new demands. This is necessary in order for us to create a society that people feel at home in and attached to, regardless of ethnic belonging and religious, philosophical or moral conceptions.

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Endnotes

[1] This is an ongoing ever-changing reciprocal process.

[2] In practice, this relation is examined as people's attitudes towards the nation-state that they reside in.

[3] This is not to say that there are not problems with comparative analyses, but I will consider some of these problems when discussing issues of method.

[4] See Edlund (1999) for a discussion of this.

[5] There must of course be some form of self-censorship determined by the researcher/s, since it is clear that not everything goes.

[6] The notion of systematic sampling may seem misleading since this has little to do with random sampling procedures.

[7] Culture is used by Van den Vijer and Leung in a very broad way and implies everything from small groups of people sharing some specific traits, to entire countries. Or in other words, it can mean some form of collective subject that we aim to study.

[8]Only two countries are compared in Article III, Norway and Sweden, which could initially be seen as problematic, since it is claimed that the non-existence of any clear-cut positive nationalism has universal applicability. However, there are two reasons for this claim. First, the empirical results are strongly supported by my theoretical argumentation, which holds universal features. Second, the results in Article III have now been corroborated in Article V, even though that was not the main aim of the latter article.

[9] The individual items can vary between zero and four, where four is agreeing strongly. In order to create the different ideal types, the two items that measure ethnic identity were added and the four that are supposed to measure civic identity were added into two indexes that can vary between zero and six, respectively zero and 12. After this the two scales were dichotomized so that scores between 4 to six on the ethnic index and between 8-12 on the civic index were considered to indicate high scoring on the two indexes. Scoring high on the ethnic index and low on the civic index indicated ethnic national identity. A low score on the ethnic index and a high one on the civic index defined civic national identity. The pluralist model is defined with low scores on both indexes. High scores on both indexes indicate multiple national identity.

[10] The items were tested empirically using a cluster analysis that shows that the items cluster together as indicated.

[11] It is true that regime types could be taken to imply more than the policies and, to some extent, the outcome of such policies, which is the way the notion of regime has been used in this case. Still, I have chosen to stay with the notion of regimes, since it has been commonly used to denote legislation and outcome of such legislation more than discourse and the structuration of people. Moreover, in order to perform an all-encompassing regime type comparison one ultimately has to renounce any possibility of generalization. Sadly enough it is the case that one

cannot perform grand multivariate cross-subject comparisons at the same time as one accounts for every vertical detail.

[12] In the article, I provide a number of additional possible scenarios that can help explain the results. A remark needs to be made in relation to the explanation that Germans score low on the ethnic identity index due to their being unwilling to exclude so-called ethnic Germans. It does not seem very probable due to the fact that the ethnic Germans are in a way being viewed as secondary citizens as well as displaying similar unemployment rates as other immigrants and so on.

[13] I chose to use the notion of national pride instead of the perhaps more commonly used patriotism, due to the latter being much more connoted with values, and I wanted to stay clear of that.

[14] Positive nationalism is taken to mean that having negative values and ideas of others, like xenophobia, does not follow in the footsteps of nationalism and negative nationalism is taken to mean a case were such values follow in its path.

[15] Here I mean economic and cultural protectionism. An example is the fear that economically strong foreigners will buy land in preferred places in Sweden and thereby prevent Swedes from accessing such land.

[16] This would imply that a trade union could be seen as a nation, which of course is not the case.

[17] It is true that Nodia claims that he is not making value statements about nationalism, only theoreticizing about the relation between democracy and nationalism. However, given his view on democracy as the best available system, the value connotation of nationalism is still very much present.

[18] In 1999 it seems like the One Nation Party, much like the Front National, is dissolving due to internal problems. However, this does not change the fact that the party has had a more long-term effect on Australian politics.

[19] Dual citizenship will now only be allowed for individuals below the age of 23. After this an individual will lose her German citizenship unless she proves that she has given up, or at least tried to give up, her non-German citizenship.

[20] It is clear that the more strict form of communitarianism is fading away, if it ever have had any position in the first place, in favor of a more liberal communitarian version. The simple reason for this is that the more strict form of communitarianism seems to be a mistake. The political and democratic basis and the starting point of rights in a communitarian society is groups, not individuals. By beginning in groups instead of individuals, one cannot help wondering how totalitarianism can be avoided. The answer to this question is that it seems impossible. Certain individuals will, in the case that they do not share all the characteristics of the group that they belong to, always be oppressed in order to preserve the group. It is true that people are oppressed regardless of the existence of communitarianism or not, but communitarianism has small means to come to terms with such oppression.

[21] See Smith (1998) for a discussion of nationalism and the emphasis on distinctiveness.

[22] It is true that protectionism may not always be considered to be negative. For example, if we consider protectionism in third world countries as opposition to

exploitation from the core it may have positive connotations. However, this is hardly the case in the countries that have been studied here.

[23] Cultural nationalism is comparable to nationalism as evaluation (see Article III) which was shown to have as negative implications as nationalism as a project does.

[24] Not that it has ever been or ever can be totally neutral.

[25] It seems very important for liberal communitarian to claim that their position is fundamentally liberal.

[26] If this will encounter problems regarding worker's rights and so on, we can allow them to stay closed one day of their own choosing. .

[27] One also has the option of choosing an open alternative.

[28] This view seems outdated to me, since it is clear that there exist groups in society and that all people do belong to such groups and are treated by others as members of such.

[29] Here lies of course a serious problem. If there can be no value free conception of justice then how are we to judge between different cultural conceptions of justice? Or in the extension, how can we judge the worth of different cultures. The answer is of course that we cannot and should not, since there is no worth to be judged. However, there are *cultural practices* that definitely can be considered as having less worth than others or being normatively wrong.

[30] This does of course not help immigrants get jobs, since they are so often excluded from the labor market regardless of educational level. However, at least it serves the purpose of placing such treatment of individuals based on their group belonging on the agenda. The latter is clearly positive since discriminatory treatment seems much more difficult to defend and neglect than what is the case with individuals who lack education, where discrimination against them always can be defended by referring to their level of education.

[31] (See Charter of the French Language (Bill 101) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms). There are exceptions to this law that can be pleaded, but the requirements are not easily met. Moreover, this bill clearly has ethnic implications in singling out people as being non-ethnic French, based on the individual's and their parents' spoken language, and giving them the right to attend non-French speaking schools.

[32] Such private schools are, at least partly, state funded. Moreover, there is nothing that states that non-private schools could not be bilingual as long as all people have the same rights to attend such schools.

[33] I am not saying that the distribution of rights and so forth has to be based on the traditional nation-state. It is perfectly possible and to my mind preferable, to initiate policies that do not favor the dominating ethnic groups on an international level, e.g. the EU, for example more liberal immigration policies, citizenship laws based on residency and so on. However, since I do not believe that the nation-state will disappear in the near future, I have chosen to focus on possible changes on a national level.

[34] See footnote 11.