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Sharp disagreements about social issues have raised concerns about increasing societal polarization in democracies worldwide. While diversity of opinion is vital for democratic engagement and can promote innovative solutions, social science research shows that such disagreements can undermine social cohesion and erode social trust if they turn into identity-based conflicts. The present research examines the potential importance of social norms that promote equality-based respect, dialogue, and unity (inclusivity norms) in mitigating these negative outcomes. In a preregistered, large-scale survey of 12,041 individuals in 12 European countries, we find that perceived inclusivity norms are associated with increased tolerance, greater willingness to collaborate, and lower tendencies to avoid people who hold opposing opinions. In most countries studied, this pattern holds among respondents who strongly disapprove of the opposing viewpoint, endorse antipluralist opinions, hold anti-egalitarian preferences, and identify more strongly with their opinion-based group relative to society. These findings support the potential of inclusivity norms to preserve social trust and cohesion amid opinion diversity.

The relationship between economic development and emotional well-being is less well understood than the corresponding relationship with life satisfaction, partly because prior cross-national studies have often relied on brief dichotomous affect measures. Using four waves of the European Social Survey (2006, 2012, 2014, and 2023), we aggregated responses from 177,948 respondents in 33 countries to 97 country-round observations and linked these observations to real GDP per capita. We found strong positive associations between GDP and both emotional well-being and life satisfaction across countries. Longitudinal mixed models showed positive associations between GDP and both well-being components over time. Supplementary checks using separate affect components, quadratic GDP specifications, demographic-composition controls, contextual adjustment for social trust and income inequality, attenuation models with perceived income adequacy and unemployment, and growth-versus-decline tests broadly supported this pattern. Overall, the findings challenge previous conclusions that economic development is only weakly related to affect. When emotional well-being is measured with graded content-valid affect items, it shows a clear positive relationship with both GDP levels and changes in GDP.

Family as the main socialization environment involves mainly parents and siblings. The importance of parents for attitudinal development in adolescence is well-researched. Theoretically, other family members like siblings are also expected to play a role in attitudinal formation. Still, and primarily due to data limitations, siblings are rarely accounted for in empirical studies. In this study, we examine the role of siblings in the development of anti-immigrant attitudes in adolescence (10–17 years), with a particular focus on how sibling effects vary depending on family environment. Using three waves of data from the Czech Household Panel Survey (2016–2018), and mixed multilevel repeated measurement models, we find that siblings’ attitudes towards immigrants are related over time. Moderation effects show that younger siblings are particularly influential under less optimal family conditions. More specifically, we find that younger siblings’ anti-immigrant attitudes influence their older siblings primarily when the family economy is strained and when parents rarely engage in political discussions with their children. Older siblings on the other hand affect their younger siblings’ anti-immigrant attitudes to a similar extent regardless of the family environment.

This study investigates public expectations regarding the likelihood and timing of major artificial intelligence (AI) developments among Swedes. Through a survey of 1026 respondents, we examined expectations across six key scenarios: medical breakthroughs, mass unemployment, democratic deterioration, living standard improvements, artificial general intelligence (AGI), and uncontrollable superintelligent AI. Findings reveal strong consensus on AI-driven medical breakthroughs (82.6%), while expectations for other major developments are significantly lower, ranging from 40.9% for mass unemployment down to 28.4% for AGI. Timeline expectations varied markedly across scenarios, with medical breakthroughs most often expected within 6–10 years, while the modal response for AGI and uncontrollable superintelligent AI was that these developments would never occur. Latent class analysis identified three distinct groups: optimists (46.7%), ambivalents (42.2%), and skeptics (11.2%). The optimist group showed higher levels of self-rated AI knowledge and education. The study addresses a critical gap in understanding temporal expectations of AI development among the general public, offering insights for policymakers and stakeholders.

This study examines whether public attitudes of national belonging influence levels of democracy. We investigate how non-voluntary perceptions of national belonging–requirements of ancestral ties–affect the development across 63 countries over three decades. We analyze both the bottom-up effects of public attitudes and the top-down influence of political elites’ nationalist articulation. Our results show that countries where the majority holds a non-voluntary national identity tend to have lower levels of democracy. Furthermore, these challenges to democratic governance are amplified when non-voluntary national identity interacts with nationalist political articulation by elites. Longitudinal analyses reveal that countries with a stronger emphasis on non-voluntary identity experience a greater decline in formal democracy over time, suggesting an inherent incompatibility between non-voluntary national identity and democratic principles. By explicitly linking majority public attitudes about national belonging to democratic outcomes, our study offers new empirical insights into the relationship between national identity and democracy.

This article explores the social mechanisms connecting national identity and support for democracy. Our investigation centers on the mediating role of civic beliefs and participation, employing data sourced from the European Value Survey (EVS 2017), which encompasses a total of 36 countries. First, our findings reveal a positive effect of voluntary (civic) national identity and support for democracy and a negative effect of non-voluntary (ethnic) national identity on support for democracy. Second, mediation analysis shows that individuals with higher levels of voluntary national identity exhibit stronger civic beliefs and participation, contributing to pro-democracy attitudes. In contrast, we find that non-voluntary national identity is inversely associated with civic beliefs and participation, largely explaining the negative effect on support for democracy. Although the mediators do not entirely account for the relationship between national identity and pro-democracy attitudes, they are important in shaping the relationship.

After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Sweden changed its historic position of non-alignment and applied for membership in the NATO military alliance. This decision coincided with a shift in public opinion in favor of NATO membership, in what has been described as the largest and fastest shift in public opinion that has ever been measured in Swedish history. We examine two aspects of this “rally around the flag effect” to explain this change, the effect of the crisis event itself and the effect of political elite influence by analyzing within-individual changes of a Swedish university student population at three different time points. We find that after the Russian invasion but before the decision was made to join NATO, public opinion was still split with roughly 40% still opposed. However, after the decision was made to apply for membership to the alliance many people changed their position (32%), either making up their minds or switching position entirely. We show that these changes were likely in response to the decision to join, and that they were moderated by individuals’ previously established political preferences.

This study investigates researcher variability in computational reproduction, an activity for which it is least expected. Eighty-five independent teams attempted numerical replication of results from an original study of policy preferences and immigration. Reproduction teams were randomly grouped into a 'transparent group' receiving original study and code or 'opaque group' receiving only a method and results description and no code. The transparent group mostly verified original results (95.7% same sign and p-value cutoff), while the opaque group had less success (89.3%). Second-decimal place exact numerical reproductions were less common (76.9 and 48.1%). Qualitative investigation of the workflows revealed many causes of error, including mistakes and procedural variations. When curating mistakes, we still find that only the transparent group was reliably successful. Our findings imply a need for transparency, but also more. Institutional checks and less subjective difficulty for researchers 'doing reproduction' would help, implying a need for better training. We also urge increased awareness of complexity in the research process and in 'push button' replications.

The link between educational attainment and attitudes towards out‐groups stands out as one of the most consistent statistical associations in the social and political sciences. However, a recent analysis of survey data from the United States finds that the relationship between higher education and out‐group prejudice depends on the content of education. In this Research Note, we replicate that study's analysis of tertiary‐level academic majors within a European context and extend it to include academic specializations below the tertiary level. Our analyses of European Social Survey (ESS) data, spanning 32 countries and over 120,000 respondents, reveal substantial variation in the association between field of study and anti‐immigrant prejudice. Specifically, we find that individuals with degrees in arts, humanities, and social sciences express more positive views towards immigrants than those with degrees in other fields. A similar, though less pronounced, pattern emerges among individuals with lower levels of educational attainment. These findings challenge simplistic and politicized notions of the impact of higher education, offering a more nuanced understanding of educational attainment and its so‐called “liberalizing effect.”

In this article, we analyse the level of and development in students’ academic stress due to the COVID-19 pandemic. We devote particular attention to students that first entered university in 2020, ‘the COVID cohort’, who had fewer opportunities to integrate in ways that theoretically should mitigate the impact of pandemic-induced disruption to their studies. Using four waves of data, collected 2020–2022, we find evidence of both pandemic and cohort effects among Swedish university students (N = 3138). During the pandemic’s first year academic stress due to COVID-19 increased regardless of pre-pandemic university experience. The stress, in turn, negatively impacted students’ life satisfaction, a factor theoretically linked to key student outcomes like persistence and academic performance but had limited effect on students’ long-term optimism. The COVID cohort expressed higher levels of academic stress and experienced a greater drop in life satisfaction compared to the most senior students (3 years or more), but largely overlapped with students with some university experience (1–2 years). These group differences persisted in spring 2022. Finally, we found that the higher levels of pandemic-induced academic stress in the COVID cohort were mitigated by experiences that foster academic and social integration, specifically by teacher support and social cohesion.