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This study examines whether public attitudes of national belonging influence levels of democracy. We investigate how non-voluntary perceptions of national belonging–requirements of ancestral ties–affect the development across 63 countries over three decades. We analyze both the bottom-up effects of public attitudes and the top-down influence of political elites’ nationalist articulation. Our results show that countries where the majority holds a non-voluntary national identity tend to have lower levels of democracy. Furthermore, these challenges to democratic governance are amplified when non-voluntary national identity interacts with nationalist political articulation by elites. Longitudinal analyses reveal that countries with a stronger emphasis on non-voluntary identity experience a greater decline in formal democracy over time, suggesting an inherent incompatibility between non-voluntary national identity and democratic principles. By explicitly linking majority public attitudes about national belonging to democratic outcomes, our study offers new empirical insights into the relationship between national identity and democracy.

This study investigates researcher variability in computational reproduction, a place where it is least expected. Eighty-five independent teams attempted computational replicationof results from an original study of policy preferences and immigration. Replication teams were randomly grouped into a ‘transparent group’ receiving original study and code, or ‘opaque group’ receiving only a method and results description, and no code. The transparent group mostly verified original results (95.7% same sign and p-value cutoff), while the opaque group had less success (89.3%). Second-decimal place exact numerical reproductions were less common (76.9% and 48.1%). Qualitative investigation of the workflows revealed many causes of error, including mistakes and procedural variations. When curating mistakes, we still find that only the transparent group were reliably successful. Our findings imply a need for transparency, but also more. Institutional checks and less subjective difficulty for researchers “doing reproduction” would help, implying a need for better training. We also suggest increased awareness of complexity in the research process and ‘push button’ replications.

This study investigates researcher variability in computational reproduction, an activity for which it is least expected. Eighty-five independent teams attempted numerical replication of results from an original study of policy preferences and immigration. Reproduction teams were randomly grouped into a 'transparent group' receiving original study and code or 'opaque group' receiving only a method and results description and no code. The transparent group mostly verified original results (95.7% same sign and p-value cutoff), while the opaque group had less success (89.3%). Second-decimal place exact numerical reproductions were less common (76.9 and 48.1%). Qualitative investigation of the workflows revealed many causes of error, including mistakes and procedural variations. When curating mistakes, we still find that only the transparent group was reliably successful. Our findings imply a need for transparency, but also more. Institutional checks and less subjective difficulty for researchers 'doing reproduction' would help, implying a need for better training. We also urge increased awareness of complexity in the research process and in 'push button' replications.

In this article, we analyse the level of and development in students’ academic stress due to the COVID-19 pandemic. We devote particular attention to students that first entered university in 2020, ‘the COVID cohort’, who had fewer opportunities to integrate in ways that theoretically should mitigate the impact of pandemic-induced disruption to their studies. Using four waves of data, collected 2020–2022, we find evidence of both pandemic and cohort effects among Swedish university students (N = 3138). During the pandemic’s first year academic stress due to COVID-19 increased regardless of pre-pandemic university experience. The stress, in turn, negatively impacted students’ life satisfaction, a factor theoretically linked to key student outcomes like persistence and academic performance but had limited effect on students’ long-term optimism. The COVID cohort expressed higher levels of academic stress and experienced a greater drop in life satisfaction compared to the most senior students (3 years or more), but largely overlapped with students with some university experience (1–2 years). These group differences persisted in spring 2022. Finally, we found that the higher levels of pandemic-induced academic stress in the COVID cohort were mitigated by experiences that foster academic and social integration, specifically by teacher support and social cohesion.

This study investigates the impact of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic on the reduction of frequency of out-of-home activities among Swedes, and its relationship with Subjective Well-Being (SWB), including Life Satisfaction (LS) and Emotional Well-Being (EWB). A considerable decrease in attending cultural events, dining out, shopping, and social activities was observed and to a lesser extent walking and exercise. Reduction in walking and exercise, but none of the other activities, correlated negatively with both LS and EWB. Our study suggests that activity reductions may have similar effects on both dimensions of SWB, rather than the typical finding in previous studies suggesting a stronger influence on EWB. Age moderated the impact of physical activities, indicating that reductions in physical activities were primarily detrimental for older individuals. High Neuroticism was found to moderate the relationship between social activities and SWB, suggesting that decreases in social activities had a slightly negative effect on SWB for people high in Neuroticism.

After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Sweden changed its historic position of non-alignment and applied for membership in the NATO military alliance. This decision coincided with a shift in public opinion in favor of NATO membership, in what has been described as the largest and fastest shift in public opinion that has ever been measured in Swedish history. We examine two aspects of this “rally around the flag effect” to explain this change, the effect of the crisis event itself and the effect of political elite influence by analyzing within-individual changes of a Swedish university student population at three different time points. We find that after the Russian invasion but before the decision was made to join NATO, public opinion was still split with roughly 40% still opposed. However, after the decision was made to apply for membership to the alliance many people changed their position (32%), either making up their minds or switching position entirely. We show that these changes were likely in response to the decision to join, and that they were moderated by individuals’ previously established political preferences.

According to scapegoat theory, individuals tend to attribute personal or social problems to an out-group (real or imagined). This self-serving bias protects the ego or social identity from responsibility while increasing prejudice towards the out-group blamed for feelings of frustration. In this research note, we test this theory using five waves of the Czech Household Panel Study (CHPS 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020), which captures the tail end of the 2015–2016 refugee crisis in Europe through the lockdown in response to COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. We focus attention on both personal and professional domains, asking if factors like subjective health, work stress, relationship dissatisfaction, life dissatisfaction, and unhappiness contribute to attitudes towards immigrants over time. We also ask whether socio-political attitudes such as distrust in the government, social distrust, and political disinterest are associated with changes in anti-immigrant sentiment. Results show that personal and professional domains help explain between-individual differences in attitudes towards immigrants, while trust in the government and society are related to both within-individual change and between-individual differences in anti-immigrant sentiment.

In recent years, policymakers and researchers have shown increased interest in subjective well-being across countries. While previous research primarily focused on country averages, measuring the distribution of subjective well-being through standard deviation has become more frequent. This article introduces a new approach to assess subjective well-being: focusing on the “worst off," or the group with the lowest levels of well-being. Based on several ethical and political theories, this measure is deemed the most relevant when assessing well-being levels in society. The study constructs new measures of low subjective well-being (the bottom 10%) to evaluate differences across countries, changes over time, and associations with economic growth, using data from 33 European countries from 2002 to 2018. The findings indicate significant variations in well-being for the worst off across countries, with improvements observed in almost all countries studied, particularly in Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic. Improvements are generally larger for the worst off compared to the general population. Furthermore, both GDP per capita and financial satisfaction are positively associated with the subjective well-being of the worst off, both over time and when countries are compared cross-sectionally. The implications of these findings for future research and benchmarking quality of life are discussed.

In this article, we challenge the prevailing assumption about the impact of higher education on attitudes toward racial and ethnic minorities by examining whether educational effects are monolithic or manifold instead. Using data from the General Social Survey (1972-2021), we use a variety of measures of education (years, levels, sectors, and majors) to unpack the relationship between higher education and intergroup attitudes, specifically anti-immigration attitudes among native-born Americans and anti-Black attitudes among non-African Americans. Results show that some higher education graduates hold out-group attitudes that are not much different from those without any higher education. Narrowing our focus to respondents only with higher education, we find significant variation in out-group attitudes across educational sectors and academic majors. These results have implications for how we understand previous scholarship on prejudice and higher education, which may have overestimated the impact higher education has, in general, on prejudice.

Our reply to Bonikowski and DiMaggio (2021) is in three parts. First, we clarify the aim of our research note (Eger & Hjerm, 2021). Our original critique was based on a replication of their inductive analysis, and we evaluated their work using best practices for the methodology that they chose. Our argument is straightforward: If one is going to use inductive methods to say something meaningful about the real world, one needs to make sure that the model being advanced fits the data. We present additional evidence supporting our original critique. Second, we discuss whether their new analyses bolster their original results and conclusions. Third, because their own results actually suggest that different levels of American nationalism exist rather than qualitatively different types, we question their claim of convergent validity. In short, we stand by our original critique.