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Most people are concerned about climate change and want policymakers to address it. But how? To investigate which policy options are more versus less popular, with whom, and why, we collected data in four European countries on attitudes toward 16 policies: taxes, bans, regulations, and subsidies/spending. We argue that support for different policies should reflect perceptions of policies’ net costs, and that such perceptions are likely influenced by people’s political trust. We tested this expectation by randomly assigning survey respondents to read different versions of given policies and confirmed that individuals with low political trust, who are less supportive overall of most policies, are most sensitive to variation in implied costs. We argue this interaction effect is a previously untested implication of the influential theory that political trust operates as a heuristic, and it helps explain policies’ varying popularity, including the puzzle of why carbon taxes are highly unpopular.

Environmental problems such as climate change, air and water pollution, and biodiversity loss affect humans globally. The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) recently released its 4th survey on environmental behavior and attitudes, measuring individuals’ views on various environmental topics. The most recent data were collected between 2020 and 2023 in 28 countries worldwide. This introduction offers an overview of the development of the questionnaire, its content, and the data collection process. It also includes some descriptive results on attitudes toward climate change, behaviors that directly impact climate change, trust in various social and political institutions, the appreciation of nature, as well as nationalism and environmentalism. It concludes with an outlook on the substantive papers in this special issue, which address different relevant environmental topics and analyze the individual and national factors influencing specific environmental views and behaviors.

This study examined how satisfaction with aspects of running the business as well as satisfaction with aspects of the private life are related to small-business owners' subjective well-being (SWB). Measures were obtained of both life satisfaction (LS) and emotional well-being (EWB) to investigate possible differences. Questionnaire data from a survey of small-business owners (n=614) showed that in the business domain LS is associated with satisfaction with revenues, EWB with satisfaction with customer and employee contacts, and both LS and EWB with satisfaction with working time. In the private life domain, LS is associated with satisfaction with family and economy and EWB with satisfaction with leisure. Overall, LS has a stronger association than EWB with satisfaction with aspects of private life, while the associations with satisfaction with business aspects are equally strong.

This study investigates the impact of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic on the reduction of frequency of out-of-home activities among Swedes, and its relationship with Subjective Well-Being (SWB), including Life Satisfaction (LS) and Emotional Well-Being (EWB). A considerable decrease in attending cultural events, dining out, shopping, and social activities was observed and to a lesser extent walking and exercise. Reduction in walking and exercise, but none of the other activities, correlated negatively with both LS and EWB. Our study suggests that activity reductions may have similar effects on both dimensions of SWB, rather than the typical finding in previous studies suggesting a stronger influence on EWB. Age moderated the impact of physical activities, indicating that reductions in physical activities were primarily detrimental for older individuals. High Neuroticism was found to moderate the relationship between social activities and SWB, suggesting that decreases in social activities had a slightly negative effect on SWB for people high in Neuroticism.

In view of increased support for a rightwing populist (RWP) party and marketization of the Swedish welfare state, here we study local politicians’ and voters’ perceptions of welfare service privatization. We specifically ask whether such perceptions form coherent attitudinal profiles, linked to partisanship and left-right ideology. Using survey data focusing on the views of local politicians and voters in Sweden, we analyze perceptions of potential consequences of privatization and apply cluster analysis to examine whether and how such perceptions are interlinked. The results show that two distinct and contrasting latent profiles can be identified based on the underlying pattern across eight indicators. A large majority displays these profiles, which are closely connected to partisanship and ideology. Moreover, an ambivalent profile is identified. Contrary to expectations, views expressed by RWP politicians and voters are mainly aligned with the coherent profile associated with social democrats but also to a lesser extent the ambivalent profile. Thus, there appears to be a duality in RWP politicians’ and voters’ perceptions of welfare service privatization, suggesting that the potential impact of increased support for an RWP party on the future development of welfare service delivery in Sweden is not clear-cut.

While previous studies on the relationship between political trust and support for climate policy have focused on the evaluative component of trust, namely whether politicians and the political system can be trusted or not, less is known about the role of different dimensions of trustworthiness that underlie such evaluations. In this study, we examine how perceptions about politicians' competence and integrity, two central dimensions of trustworthiness, are related to public support for climate policies. Using survey data from four European countries (Sweden, Germany, Spain, and Poland), we find that people who think that politicians are competent are generally more likely to support climate policy. In contrast, we do not find such a relationship between integrity perceptions (e.g., corruption) and policy attitudes. These findings are consistent across national contexts and hold even when alternating the measures capturing competence and integrity perceptions. To bolster public support for climate policies, climate communication should prioritize addressing public concerns regarding politicians' competence in designing sound climate policies, rather than alleviating concerns about their integrity, such as fears of corruption.

During the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Swedish government did not implement the hard lockdowns and coercive measures found in many countries and instead relied on voluntary social distancing measures and work-from-home initiatives. Unlike its international counterparts in most countries, the rightwing populist party in Sweden early on took a critical approach toward the government's handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, calling for stricter government measures to curb virus transmission. Based on theories about strategic party positioning, and theories about political elite cues and framing effects, we use Swedish survey data from the early stages of the pandemic to show that the views of rightwing populist party supporters aligned with the rhetoric of the Swedish rightwing populist party in demanding more (rather than less) government intervention to curb the spread of SARS-COV-2. Our results suggest that they did so by drawing on core rightwing populist themes of anti-elitism and nationalism. Hence, our results speak to the role of elite cues and framing in public opinion formation during times of crisis, particularly among rightwing populists, who generally opposed stricter government measures to fight the Covid-19 pandemic.

In Western Europe, rightwing populist parties and their supporters frequently deny the realities of climate change and oppose climate policies. Meanwhile, public opinion research has tied ideological orientations associated with rightwing populism to climate change denial/ skepticism and climate policy opposition. Yet, comprehensive studies assessing the relative importance of various rightwing populist orientations across national contexts are lacking. Using European Social Survey data (Round 8) from 15 Western European countries, we systematically investigate the relationships between a large set of orientations related to rightwing populism and public views about climate change. The results show that nationalism and nativism, that is, orientations associated with the thick ideology of rightwing populism, appear to be comparably strong and consistent predictors, especially regarding opposition to climate change mitigation policies. However, the relative importance of different orientations varies across Western European countries, and depend on whether the focus is on policy attitudes or climate change beliefs. Researchers studying single countries and/or specific attitudinal outcomes should therefore be cautious when generalizing about these relationships cross-nationally.

We examine inclusion and status as potential mediators in the relationships between extraversion and agreeableness, on the one hand, and life satisfaction, on the other hand. Previous research has shown that agreeableness is less strongly related to life satisfaction compared to extraversion. We argue that the relatively weak association between agreeableness and life satisfaction is due to the fact that, even though this personality trait is positively related to inclusion, it is only weakly related to status. Using structural equation modeling (SEM) and survey data from Australia, Denmark and Sweden, we test five hypotheses about the linkages between these personality traits, inclusion, status and life satisfaction. Our results show that both extraversion and agreeableness are positively associated with life satisfaction and that this association is much stronger for extraversion. Furthermore, our results show that extraversion is reliably associated with both inclusion and status, whereas agreeableness is a reliable predictor of inclusion but not of status. Turning to our mediation analysis, our main results demonstrate that the relationship between extraversion and life satisfaction is fully mediated by both inclusion and status, whereas the relationship between agreeableness and life satisfaction is partially mediated by inclusion. Our mediation analysis further shows that agreeableness has a negative direct effect on life satisfaction over and above the positive indirect effect through inclusion. Our findings highlight the role of both inclusion and status as important mediators in the relationships between extraversion and agreeableness, on the one hand, and life satisfaction, on the other hand.

Rising rightwing populism (RWP) potentially constitutes an obstacle to climate change mitigation, as European RWP parties and politicians often espouse climate change skepticism and oppose climate policies. Meanwhile, their party positions and issue stances have also become increasingly characterized by nationalism. Using European Social Survey data from 2016, we show that public attitudes consistent with nationalist ideology are clearly linked to voting for RWP parties and that people who hold these attitudes are more likely to be skeptical about climate change and to oppose policies that increase taxes on fossil fuels. With regard to policy attitudes, we find that nationalist ideology is more influential than traditional left-right political ideology, environmental values and political trust. The results also reveal substantial cross-national differences, as nationalist ideology is linked more closely to public views about climate change in Western European countries, where RWP parties with a nationalist rhetoric have had recent electoral successes.