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Discourses of climate delay increasingly permeate debates on climate action, yet studies examining the prevalence of public beliefs aligning with climate delay discourses – and their potential consequences for attitudes toward government climate action – are currently lacking. Past research has identified twelve discourses that acknowledge the existence of climate change yet justify inaction or inadequate responses. We design 48 survey items to measure the prevalence of beliefs consistent with these discourses via a representative web-based survey in the United States (n = 1,580). We then analyze the statistical relationship between these beliefs and public demand for government climate action as well as support for climate policies. Our results show that while beliefs consistent with most climate delay discourses are widespread in the U.S. some are more closely related to policy preferences. Our findings may therefore guide targeted counter-narratives to more effectively increase public demand andsupport for urgent climate policymaking.

In the evolving discourse on climate change, the phenomenon of ‘whataboutism’ has emerged as a pervasive rhetorical strategy to deflect responsibility for the emissions of one’s own country by shifting blame to other nations. Given its nature, it is argued here that whataboutism may resonate particularly with nationalists, who exalt the concerns and priorities of their own country while downplaying those of other nations. Analyzing survey data from four European countries – Sweden, Germany, Spain, and Poland – this study demonstrates a strong and consistent relationship between nationalist attitudes and the extent to which people think that their own country should not act on climate change unless others do. The findings also show that climate whataboutism mediates the relationship between nationalist attitudes and opposition to climate policies. Hence, the results support the supposition that climate whataboutism discourses, driven by nationalist sentiments, permeates rightwing populist discourses to justify climate inaction.

Most people are concerned about climate change and want policymakers to address it. But how? To investigate which policy options are more versus less popular, with whom, and why, we collected data in four European countries on attitudes toward 16 policies: taxes, bans, regulations, and subsidies/spending. We argue that support for different policies should reflect perceptions of policies’ net costs, and that such perceptions are likely influenced by people’s political trust. We tested this expectation by randomly assigning survey respondents to read different versions of given policies and confirmed that individuals with low political trust, who are less supportive overall of most policies, are most sensitive to variation in implied costs. We argue this interaction effect is a previously untested implication of the influential theory that political trust operates as a heuristic, and it helps explain policies’ varying popularity, including the puzzle of why carbon taxes are highly unpopular.

This study investigates the impact of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic on the reduction of frequency of out-of-home activities among Swedes, and its relationship with Subjective Well-Being (SWB), including Life Satisfaction (LS) and Emotional Well-Being (EWB). A considerable decrease in attending cultural events, dining out, shopping, and social activities was observed and to a lesser extent walking and exercise. Reduction in walking and exercise, but none of the other activities, correlated negatively with both LS and EWB. Our study suggests that activity reductions may have similar effects on both dimensions of SWB, rather than the typical finding in previous studies suggesting a stronger influence on EWB. Age moderated the impact of physical activities, indicating that reductions in physical activities were primarily detrimental for older individuals. High Neuroticism was found to moderate the relationship between social activities and SWB, suggesting that decreases in social activities had a slightly negative effect on SWB for people high in Neuroticism.

While previous studies on the relationship between political trust and support for climate policy have focused on the evaluative component of trust, namely whether politicians and the political system can be trusted or not, less is known about the role of different dimensions of trustworthiness that underlie such evaluations. In this study, we examine how perceptions about politicians' competence and integrity, two central dimensions of trustworthiness, are related to public support for climate policies. Using survey data from four European countries (Sweden, Germany, Spain, and Poland), we find that people who think that politicians are competent are generally more likely to support climate policy. In contrast, we do not find such a relationship between integrity perceptions (e.g., corruption) and policy attitudes. These findings are consistent across national contexts and hold even when alternating the measures capturing competence and integrity perceptions. To bolster public support for climate policies, climate communication should prioritize addressing public concerns regarding politicians' competence in designing sound climate policies, rather than alleviating concerns about their integrity, such as fears of corruption.

During the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Swedish government did not implement the hard lockdowns and coercive measures found in many countries and instead relied on voluntary social distancing measures and work-from-home initiatives. Unlike its international counterparts in most countries, the rightwing populist party in Sweden early on took a critical approach toward the government's handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, calling for stricter government measures to curb virus transmission. Based on theories about strategic party positioning, and theories about political elite cues and framing effects, we use Swedish survey data from the early stages of the pandemic to show that the views of rightwing populist party supporters aligned with the rhetoric of the Swedish rightwing populist party in demanding more (rather than less) government intervention to curb the spread of SARS-COV-2. Our results suggest that they did so by drawing on core rightwing populist themes of anti-elitism and nationalism. Hence, our results speak to the role of elite cues and framing in public opinion formation during times of crisis, particularly among rightwing populists, who generally opposed stricter government measures to fight the Covid-19 pandemic.

In Western Europe, rightwing populist parties and their supporters frequently deny the realities of climate change and oppose climate policies. Meanwhile, public opinion research has tied ideological orientations associated with rightwing populism to climate change denial/ skepticism and climate policy opposition. Yet, comprehensive studies assessing the relative importance of various rightwing populist orientations across national contexts are lacking. Using European Social Survey data (Round 8) from 15 Western European countries, we systematically investigate the relationships between a large set of orientations related to rightwing populism and public views about climate change. The results show that nationalism and nativism, that is, orientations associated with the thick ideology of rightwing populism, appear to be comparably strong and consistent predictors, especially regarding opposition to climate change mitigation policies. However, the relative importance of different orientations varies across Western European countries, and depend on whether the focus is on policy attitudes or climate change beliefs. Researchers studying single countries and/or specific attitudinal outcomes should therefore be cautious when generalizing about these relationships cross-nationally.

According to the progressive's dilemma, diversity and solidarity are not easily combined, and this tension poses a political challenge for left-wing parties that embrace both. In this chapter, we measure the relationship among different configurations of immigration-welfare attitudes and support for political parties and candidates (far right, center-right, center-left, and far left). We focus on Sweden, Germany, and the United States—three major immigrant destinations that are also often regarded as the as the prototypical social democratic, conservative, and liberal welfare states. Using pooled cross-sectional data from the European Social Survey (ESS) and General Social Survey (GSS), we find that attitudes consistent with the progressive's dilemma have long existed. Results from multinomial logistic regression models reveal that anything but the most progressive attitudes make support for left-wing parties unlikely. Yet longitudinal trends suggest that the progressive's dilemma, while certainly a challenge for the political left, is not insurmountable.

Rising rightwing populism (RWP) potentially constitutes an obstacle to climate change mitigation, as European RWP parties and politicians often espouse climate change skepticism and oppose climate policies. Meanwhile, their party positions and issue stances have also become increasingly characterized by nationalism. Using European Social Survey data from 2016, we show that public attitudes consistent with nationalist ideology are clearly linked to voting for RWP parties and that people who hold these attitudes are more likely to be skeptical about climate change and to oppose policies that increase taxes on fossil fuels. With regard to policy attitudes, we find that nationalist ideology is more influential than traditional left-right political ideology, environmental values and political trust. The results also reveal substantial cross-national differences, as nationalist ideology is linked more closely to public views about climate change in Western European countries, where RWP parties with a nationalist rhetoric have had recent electoral successes.

Syftet med denna studie är att öka kunskapen om människors oro över coronapandemin i Sverige. Vi använder enkätdata (n=3 040) för att studera 1) hur utbredd oron är, 2) vad den mer konkret består i, 3) hur den varierar mellan olika demografiska och socioekonomiska grupper, 4) huruvida oron kan förklaras av faktorer som personlighet, livsåskådning, tillit och riskuppfattningar, samt 5) vilka konsekvenser oron får för människors sociala kontakter, livskvalitet, beteenden och åsikter om samhällets åtgärder för att minska smittspridningen. Resultaten visar att det finns en utbredd oro över coronapandemin i Sverige och att denna främst bottnar i en oro för den egna eller familjemedlemmars hälsa. Dessutom varierar oron mellan grupper: framför allt äldre personer men även kvinnor och låginkomsttagare uppvisar jämförelsevis en högre grad av oro. Det finns ett flertal faktorer som förklarar den upplevda oron, men särskilt riskuppfattningar förklarar en stor andel av variationen mellan individer samt skillnader mellan olika grupper. De som oroar sig mer uppger också att de i större utsträckning följer myndigheternas rekommendationer och har minskat sina sociala aktiviteter samt upplever en försämrad livskvalitet under coronapandemin.

The purpose of this study is to provide insight into individuals' degree of worrying about the corona pandemic in Sweden. Using survey data (n=3,040), we study: 1) how widespread worrying about the corona pandemic is; 2) what aspects of the pandemic people worry about; 3) differences in the level of worrying among demographic and socio-economic groups; 4) the extent to which worries are related to factors such as personality, religiosity, political orientation, trust, and risk perceptions; and 5) consequences of worrying for social contacts and quality of life, as well as for behaviours and opinions in relation to government recommendations. Results show that worrying about the coronavirus pandemic in Sweden is widespread and primarily about one’s own or relatives' health. Moreover, we find evidence of group differences, where elderly, women, and those with lower incomes articulate higher levels of worry. Several explanatory factors are linked to worrying about the pandemic. In particular, risk perceptions explain a large share of variation between individuals and groups. While those who worry more report greater compliance with authorities' recommendations and reduced social activities, they also report a lower quality of life during the pandemic.