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Secondo Antonio Rosmini-Serbati, l’idea dell’essere è unicamente innata e forma fondamentale dell’esperienza. Provando a dimostrare l’origine dell’idea di similitudine nel rapporto tra cose reali e loro rappresentazioni mentali, Rosmini involontariamente lascia pensare che forse anche quest’idea sia innata. In modo platonico respinge “il terzo uomo” (regresso infinito), cioè la nota critica di Aristotele per quanto riguarda l’idea di similitudine. Il suo è un ragionamento circolare. Perciò in questa analisi concludiamo che l’idea di similitudine dovrebbe essere considerata innata e forma epistemologica nella stessa misura dell’idea di essere.

According to Huemer (2019), existence is evidence of immortality, provided past time is infinite. The argument is based on, inter alia, an alleged contradiction between the fact of one’s existence now and its improbability. I suggest that Huemer’s argument is flawed in equating the infinitesimally small with its limit value, and in assuming a philosophically significant difference between the a priori probability of the occurrence of a unique incarnation and that of anyone among an infinite number.

According to the Italian philosopher Antonio Rosmini (1797-1855), being is an innate idea that is requisite for contemplating anything. He emphatically claims that it is the one and only innate idea. Rosmini makes a sharp distinction between sensations and perceptions. Perceptions are thought to arise when the undetermined idea of being (tantamount to possibility) is combined with sensations, universals when being is combined with perceptions. It is argued here that Rosmini’s explanation of the origin of universals does not work. If the idea of being is regarded as innate, then several others should be similarly regarded, notably the idea of qualitative identity which is an idea necessary for deriving universals.  Although Rosmini holds that certain properties are necessarily present in real objects and therefore implicit in the idea of being, the property of being qualitatively identical with something else is not among those properties. Theological motives may have encouraged  Rosmini to emphasize being as a peculiarly fundamental idea. However, if the idea of being is more fundamental than other universals, it may be regarded so in virtue of its generality,  not because it has a uniquely innate character.

Berkeley’s ‘esse is percipi’ has been criticized for implying epistemological solipsism, the main argument being that different minds cannot harbor numerically one and the same idea. Similarly, C. J. Boström, the dominating Swedish philosopher in the nineteenth century, was early scorned because his principle of esse est percipi allegedly contradicts the simultaneous claim that two spirits (God and a human, or two humans) can perceive the same thing under qualitatively different appearances. Whereas the criticism against Berkeley is here regarded as valid, it is argued that Boström successfully defended himself by employing a dual concept of meaning, resembling Frege’s Sinn and Bedeutung some thirty years later, and by postulating an ontology that permits human minds to share in the divine ideas that constitute reality.

In 1859–1860, Johan Jacob Borelius published two diatribes against Christopher Jacob Boström, the then dominating philosopher in Sweden. Boström was accused of inconsistency, because he asserted the principle of esse est percipi while at the same time maintaining that different agents can perceive one and the same thing differently. It is suggested that Borelius misunderstood Boström’s intention. In his printed defence, in 1860, Boström clarifies his use of a dual conception of meaning, resembling Frege’s distinction between Sinn (sense) and Bedeutung (reference) some thirty years later. Boström appears to equate the reference of esse with that of percipi, whereas Borelius argued as if the principle concerned the senses of the two expressions. According to Borelius, two observers cannot possibly have different perceptions of the same object, if “to be” means “to be perceived”. In Boström’s view, as reconstructed here, two different phenomenal perceptions may well refer to one and the same true object, of which the phenomena are aspects. The true object exists in virtue of its being determined by God’s perfect ideas.

Berkeley's 'esse is percipi' has been criticized for implying epistemological solipsism, the main argument being that different minds cannot harbor numerically one and the same idea. Similarly, C. J. Boström, the dominating Swedish philosopher in the 19th century, was early scorned because his principle of esse est percipi allegedly contradicts the simultaneous claim that two spirits (God and a human, or two humans) can perceive the same thing under qualitatively different appearances. Whereas the criticism against Berkeley is here regarded as valid, it is argued that Boström successfully defended himself by employing a dual concept of meaning, resembling Frege's Sinn and Bedeutung some thirty years later, and by postulating an ontology that permits human minds to share in the divine ideas that constitute reality.

This chapter argues that conscientious authorship is fundamental to academic culture. By going public in words, one demands recognition for the merits of one’s research and accepts being the legitimate target for justified criticisms. The writing of a scientific text is thus an intellectually and morally committing undertaking. However, there are signs to indicate that this traditional view of science is no longer self-evident. This present chapter expresses concern over the threat to intellectual standards that is represented by a growing acceptance of phenomena such as collective authorship, honorary or gift authorship, ghostwriting and commercially inspired subterfuge and deviousness, most spectacularly exemplified by phony authorships in the trials of new drugs. It is suggested that a widespread and complacent tolerance for a certain amount of phony authorship in every corner of the medical world contributes to making it tempting for the industry to put this kind of deviance into systematic use for commercial gain.