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Jeppsson, Sofia, DocentORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0001-7425-3041
Alternative names
Publications (10 of 32) Show all publications
Jeppsson, S. (2024). Allegedly impossible experiences. Philosophical Psychology
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Allegedly impossible experiences
2024 (English)In: Philosophical Psychology, ISSN 0951-5089, E-ISSN 1465-394XArticle in journal (Refereed) Epub ahead of print
Abstract [en]

In this paper, I will argue for two interrelated theses. First, if we take phenomenological psychopathology seriously, and want to understand what it is like to undergo various psychopathological experiences, we cannot treat madpeople’s testimony as mere data for sane clinicians, philosophers, and other scholars to analyze and interpret. Madpeople must be involved with analysis an interpretation too. Second, sane clinicians and scholars must open their minds to the possibility that there may be experiences that other people have, which they nevertheless cannot conceive of. 

I look at influential texts in which philosophers attempt to analyze and understand depersonalization and thought insertion. They go astray because they keep using their own powers of conceivability as a guide to what is or is not humanly possible to experience. Several experiences labelled inconceivable and therefore impossible by these philosophers, are experiences I have had myself. 

Philosophers and others would be less likely to make this mistake if they would converse and collaborate more with the madpeople concerned. When this is not feasible, they should nevertheless strive to keep an open mind. Fantastical fiction may have a role to play here, by showing how bizarre experiences may nevertheless be prima facie conceivable. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Abingdon: Routledge, 2024
Keywords
Conceivability, understanding, madness, impossible experiences, depersonalization, thought insertion
National Category
Philosophy Psychology
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-220347 (URN)10.1080/09515089.2024.2310628 (DOI)001150714900001 ()2-s2.0-85183835055 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2024-02-01 Created: 2024-02-01 Last updated: 2024-03-06
Jeppsson, S. (2024). Culpability. In: Thomas Schramme; Mary Walker (Ed.), Handbook of the philosophy of medicine: . Dordrecht: Springer
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Culpability
2024 (English)In: Handbook of the philosophy of medicine / [ed] Thomas Schramme; Mary Walker, Dordrecht: Springer, 2024Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

People are morally responsible agents when they are sufficiently rational and in control of themselves. Morally responsible agents may or may not be morally responsible for particular actions, depending on whether they had sufficient control and the information needed in the situation at hand. We can be morally responsible for good, bad, or morally neutral actions. This chapter focuses on culpability – responsibility for bad actions. In cases of mental disorder, rationality and/or control may be diminished, and people might be unable to avail themselves of important information. Nevertheless, the exact difficulties that people struggle with vary, not only between diagnostic categories but within them as well. Culpability assessments are therefore complicated, and must ultimately be done on a case-by-case basis. Psychiatric patients who are exempted from culpability altogether, considered too irrational or out of control to be morally responsible agents at all, may feel dismissed and isolated. Moreover, culpability judgments in clinician-patient relationships are naturally quite fraught. Hierarchical relationships often result in one-sided responsibility practices. In these cases, a person in power holds another person culpable and, at the same time, dismisses attempts to be held culpable by others, most notably people subjected to their power. Finally, it is important to recognize that actions that seem strange and disturbing need not be culpable; they may be excused or even justified. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Dordrecht: Springer, 2024
Keywords
moral responsibility, blame, mental disorders, psychiatry, exemption, excuse, justification
National Category
Ethics Philosophy Nursing
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-220345 (URN)
Available from: 2024-02-01 Created: 2024-02-01 Last updated: 2024-02-01
Jeppsson, S. (2024). Retributivism and the objective attitude. Diametros : An Online Journal of Philosophy, 21(79), 56-73
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Retributivism and the objective attitude
2024 (English)In: Diametros : An Online Journal of Philosophy, E-ISSN 1733-5566, Vol. 21, no 79, p. 56-73Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

It has been argued that a retributivist criminal justice system treats offenders with a respectlacking in alternative criminal justice systems; retributivism presumably recognizes that offenders are fellow members of the moral community who can be held responsible for their actions. One version of the respect argument builds on P.F. Strawson’s moral responsibility theory. According to Strawson, we may take either a participant or objective attitude toward other people. The former is the default attitude when interacting with other adults, whereas the latter is fit for children and the mentally disabled or ill, whom we merely try to manage and handle as best we can. The participant attitude also involves holding people responsible when they do wrong. Supposedly, a retributivist criminal justice system functions as a natural continuation of our everyday, participant, and responsibility-holding practices, unlike alternative systems that adopt an objective attitude toward offenders. I argue that this is wrong. The participant atti-tude requires reciprocity and, usually, some level of equality too. Even an idealized retributivist system has little room for this, not to mention the flawed versions of this system we see in reality. 

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Krakow: Jagiellonian University, 2024
Keywords
retributivism, participant attitude, objective attitude, P.F. Strawson, Michelle Ciurria, oppression, equality, moral responsibility
National Category
Ethics Political Science Law
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-223936 (URN)10.33392/diam.1906 (DOI)2-s2.0-85192381255 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2024-05-02 Created: 2024-05-02 Last updated: 2024-05-16Bibliographically approved
Jeppsson, S. & Lodge, P. (2024). Strategy, pyrrhonian scepticism and the allure of madness. European journal of analytic philosophy
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Strategy, pyrrhonian scepticism and the allure of madness
2024 (English)In: European journal of analytic philosophy, ISSN 1849-0514Article in journal (Refereed) Accepted
Abstract [en]

Justin Garson introduces the distinction between two views on Madness we encounter again and again throughout history: Madness as dysfunction, and Madness as strategy. On the latter view, Madness serves some purpose for the person experiencing it, even if it’s simultaneously harmful. The strategy view makes intelligible why Madness often holds a certain allure – even when it’s prima facie terrifying. Moreover, if Madness is a strategy in Garson’s metaphorical sense – if it serves a purpose – it makes sense to use consciously chosen strategies for living with Madness that doesn’t necessarily aim to annihilate or repress it as far as possible. In this paper, we use our own respective stories as case studies. We have both struggled to resist the allure of Madness, and both ended up embracing a kind of Pyrrhonian scepticism about reality instead of clinging to sane reality.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Rijeka: University of Rijeka, 2024
Keywords
madness; Pyrrhonian scepticism; mania; psychosis; psychiatry
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-220346 (URN)
Available from: 2024-02-01 Created: 2024-02-01 Last updated: 2024-04-10
Jeppsson, S. (2023). A wide-enough range of 'test environments' for psychiatric disabilities. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 94, 39-53
Open this publication in new window or tab >>A wide-enough range of 'test environments' for psychiatric disabilities
2023 (English)In: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, ISSN 1358-2461, Vol. 94, p. 39-53Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The medical and social model of disability is discussed and debated among researchers, scholars, activists, and people in general. It is common to hold a mixed view, and believe that some disabled people suffer more from social obstacles and others from medical problems inherent in their bodies or minds. Rachel Cooper discusses possible 'test environments', making explicit an idea which likely plays an implicit part in many disability discussions. We place or imagine placing the disabled person in a range of different environments; if there is a relevant test environment in which they do fine, their problem was societal/external, if there is not, it was medical/internal. Cooper admits that deciding on the appropriate range of test environments is an ethical and political question. In this chapter, I argue that we often ought to widen our scope when discussing psychiatric disabilities.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023
National Category
Ethics Psychiatry Sociology (excluding Social Work, Social Psychology and Social Anthropology)
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-214905 (URN)10.1017/s1358246123000206 (DOI)
Available from: 2023-10-03 Created: 2023-10-03 Last updated: 2023-10-03Bibliographically approved
Jeppsson, S. (2023). Agency and responsibility: the personal and the political. Philosophical Issues, 33(1), 70-82
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Agency and responsibility: the personal and the political
2023 (English)In: Philosophical Issues, ISSN 1533-6077, E-ISSN 1758-2237, Vol. 33, no 1, p. 70-82Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In this paper, I review arguments according to which harsh criminal punishments and poverty are undeserved and therefore unjust. Such arguments come in different forms. First, one may argue that no one deserves to be poor or be punished, because there is no such thing as desert-entailing moral responsibility. Second, one may argue that poor people in particular do not deserve to remain in poverty or to be punished if they commit crimes, because poor people suffer from psychological problems that undermine their agency and moral responsibility. Third, one may argue that poor and otherwise marginalized people frequently face external obstacles that prevent them from taking alternative courses of action. The first kind of argument has its place in the philosophy seminar. Psychological difficulties may be important to attend to both in personal relationships and when holding ourselves responsible. Nevertheless, I argue that neither type of argument belongs in political contexts. Moral responsibility scepticism ultimately rests on contested intuitions. Labelling certain groups of people particularly irrational, weak-willed, or similar is belittling and disrespectful; such claims are also hard to prove, and may have the opposite effect to the intended one on people's attitudes. Arguments from external obstacles have none of these problems. Such arguments may not take us all the way to criminal justice reform, but in this context, we can supplement them with epistemic arguments and crime prevention arguments.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
John Wiley & Sons, 2023
Keywords
Criminal justice, distributive justice, poverty, moral responsibility, Bruce Waller
National Category
Ethics Philosophy
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-213760 (URN)10.1111/phis.12243 (DOI)001049710800001 ()2-s2.0-85168261103 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2023-08-28 Created: 2023-08-28 Last updated: 2023-12-19Bibliographically approved
Jeppsson, S. (2023). My strategies for dealing with radical psychotic doubt: a schizo-something philosopher’s tale [Letter to the editor]. Schizophrenia Bulletin, 49(5), 1097-1098
Open this publication in new window or tab >>My strategies for dealing with radical psychotic doubt: a schizo-something philosopher’s tale
2023 (English)In: Schizophrenia Bulletin, ISSN 0586-7614, E-ISSN 1745-1701, Vol. 49, no 5, p. 1097-1098Article in journal, Letter (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

A short autobiographical piece on different coping strategies for handling psychosis symptoms.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023
Keywords
madness, psychosis, lived experience, coping strategies
National Category
Philosophy Psychiatry
Research subject
Practical Philosophy; Psychiatry
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-198195 (URN)10.1093/schbul/sbac074 (DOI)000818974000001 ()35771233 (PubMedID)2-s2.0-85170110059 (Scopus ID)
Note

Issue Section: First Person Account

Available from: 2022-07-19 Created: 2022-07-19 Last updated: 2023-10-13Bibliographically approved
Jeppsson, S. (2023). Radical psychotic doubt and epistemology. Philosophical Psychology, 36(8), 1482-1506
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Radical psychotic doubt and epistemology
2023 (English)In: Philosophical Psychology, ISSN 0951-5089, E-ISSN 1465-394X, Vol. 36, no 8, p. 1482-1506Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

Wouter Kusters argues that madness has much to offer philosophy, as does philosophy to madness. In this paper, i support both claims by drawing on a mad phenomenon which I label Radical Psychotic Doubt, or RPD. First, although skepticism is a minority position in epistemology, it has been claimed that anti-skeptical arguments remain unsatisfying. I argue that this complaint can be clarified and strengthened by showing that anti-skeptical arguments are irrelevant to RPD sufferers. Second, there's a debate about whether so-called hinge commitments are beliefs or not. I argue that RPD can be used to strengthen the case that they are. Moreover, if hinges are beliefs, some madpeople are more epistemically rational than some sane philosophers. Third, drawing on my own mad experiences, I challenge evidentialism by presenting a better candidate for a truly forced cchoice about what to believe than William James' traditional religious example. I further show that in certain psychiatric contexts, evidentialism has more radical implications than Jamesian pragmatism, which comes out as more conservative. Finally, I discuss how philosophical theories like pragmatism and Pyrrhonism can provide inspiration for new and much-needed coping strategies for RPD sufferers.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Routledge, 2023
Keywords
Psychosis, madness, epistemology, skepticism, pragmatism, evidentialism
National Category
Philosophy
Research subject
Theoretical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-201164 (URN)10.1080/09515089.2022.2147815 (DOI)000888490900001 ()2-s2.0-85142227500 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2022-11-22 Created: 2022-11-22 Last updated: 2024-01-03Bibliographically approved
Chappell, Z. & Jeppsson, S. M. I. (2023). Recovery without normalisation: It's not necessary to be normal, not even in psychiatry. Clinical Ethics, 18(3), 298-305
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Recovery without normalisation: It's not necessary to be normal, not even in psychiatry
2023 (English)In: Clinical Ethics, ISSN 1477-7509, E-ISSN 1758-101X, Vol. 18, no 3, p. 298-305Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

In this paper, we argue that there are reasons to believe that an implicit bias for normalcy influences what are considered medically necessary treatments in psychiatry. First, we outline two prima facie reasons to suspect that this is the case. A bias for "the normal" is already documented in disability studies; it is reasonable to suspect that it affects psychiatry too, since psychiatric patients, like disabled people, are often perceived as "weird" by others. Secondly, psychiatry's explicitly endorsed values of well-being and function are hard to measure directly, which is why we see simpler box-ticking conceptions of recovery used in large research studies. This need not be problematic, but might lead to researchers and clinicians focusing too much on treatments that promote easy-to-measure proxies for recovery, instead of what actually matters to psychiatric patients themselves. Next, we provide examples of treatments and treatment decisions within two areas - self-injury and psychosis - which are hard to explain unless we assume that an implicit and harmful normalcy bias is at work. We conclude with some suggestions for clinicians and future research.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
New York: Sage Publications, 2023
Keywords
recovery, mental illness, normalcy, psychiatry, value neutrality
National Category
Ethics Psychiatry
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-206738 (URN)10.1177/14777509231165880 (DOI)2-s2.0-85152254624 (Scopus ID)
Available from: 2023-04-16 Created: 2023-04-16 Last updated: 2023-12-06Bibliographically approved
Jeppsson, S. (2022). Accountability, answerability and attributability: on different kinds of moral responsibility. In: Dana Kay Nelkin; Derk Pereboom (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of moral responsibility: (pp. 73-88). New York: Oxford University Press
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Accountability, answerability and attributability: on different kinds of moral responsibility
2022 (English)In: The Oxford handbook of moral responsibility / [ed] Dana Kay Nelkin; Derk Pereboom, New York: Oxford University Press, 2022, p. 73-88Chapter in book (Refereed)
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
New York: Oxford University Press, 2022
Series
Oxford handbooks
Keywords
moral responsibility, accountability, answerability, attributability, scepticism
National Category
Ethics Philosophy
Research subject
Practical Philosophy
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-194489 (URN)2-s2.0-85137487669 (Scopus ID)9780190679309 (ISBN)9780190679316 (ISBN)
Available from: 2022-05-06 Created: 2022-05-06 Last updated: 2024-03-11Bibliographically approved
Projects
Responsibility and disability [2018-01584_VR]; Umeå University; Publications
Jeppsson, S. (2022). Can we define mental health?. Jeppsson, S. (2022). Ciurria and Strawson: how deep is the divide. Syndicate NetworkJeppsson, S. (2022). Solving the self-illness ambiguity: the case for construction over discovery. Philosophical Explorations, 25(3), 294-313Jeppsson, S. (2021). Moraliskt ansvar och mentala svårigheter.
Organisations
Identifiers
ORCID iD: ORCID iD iconorcid.org/0000-0001-7425-3041

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