Open this publication in new window or tab >>2010 (English)In: Resources and Energy Economics, ISSN 0928-7655, E-ISSN 1873-0221, Vol. 32, no 3, p. 292-309Article in journal (Other academic) Published
Abstract [en]
This paper analyses the potential welfare gains of introducing a technology transfer from Annex I to non-Annex I in order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Our analysis is based on a numerical general equilibrium model for a world-economy comprising two regions; North (Annex I) and South (non-Annex I). In a cooperative equilibrium, a technology transfer from the North to the South is clearly desirable from the perspective of a ‘global social planner’, since the welfare gain for the South outweighs the welfare loss for the North. However, if the regions do not cooperate, then the incentives to introduce the technology transfer appear to be relatively weak from the perspective of the North; at least if we allow for Southern abatement in the pre-transfer Nash equilibrium. Finally, by adding the emission reductions associated with the Kyoto agreement, our results show that the technology transfer leads to higher welfare in both regions.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Elsevier, 2010
Keywords
Climate policy, Technology transfer, Kyoto protocol, General equilibrium, Clean development mechanism
National Category
Economics
Research subject
Economics
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-3729 (URN)10.1016/j.reseneeco.2009.12.001 (DOI)000278662600002 ()2-s2.0-77952880535 (Scopus ID)
2009-01-082009-01-082023-03-24Bibliographically approved