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This study investigates the impact of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic on the reduction of frequency of out-of-home activities among Swedes, and its relationship with Subjective Well-Being (SWB), including Life Satisfaction (LS) and Emotional Well-Being (EWB). A considerable decrease in attending cultural events, dining out, shopping, and social activities was observed and to a lesser extent walking and exercise. Reduction in walking and exercise, but none of the other activities, correlated negatively with both LS and EWB. Our study suggests that activity reductions may have similar effects on both dimensions of SWB, rather than the typical finding in previous studies suggesting a stronger influence on EWB. Age moderated the impact of physical activities, indicating that reductions in physical activities were primarily detrimental for older individuals. High Neuroticism was found to moderate the relationship between social activities and SWB, suggesting that decreases in social activities had a slightly negative effect on SWB for people high in Neuroticism.

During the early stages of the Covid-19 pandemic, the Swedish government did not implement the hard lockdowns and coercive measures found in many countries and instead relied on voluntary social distancing measures and work-from-home initiatives. Unlike its international counterparts in most countries, the rightwing populist party in Sweden early on took a critical approach toward the government's handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, calling for stricter government measures to curb virus transmission. Based on theories about strategic party positioning, and theories about political elite cues and framing effects, we use Swedish survey data from the early stages of the pandemic to show that the views of rightwing populist party supporters aligned with the rhetoric of the Swedish rightwing populist party in demanding more (rather than less) government intervention to curb the spread of SARS-COV-2. Our results suggest that they did so by drawing on core rightwing populist themes of anti-elitism and nationalism. Hence, our results speak to the role of elite cues and framing in public opinion formation during times of crisis, particularly among rightwing populists, who generally opposed stricter government measures to fight the Covid-19 pandemic.

Rising rightwing populism (RWP) potentially constitutes an obstacle to climate change mitigation, as European RWP parties and politicians often espouse climate change skepticism and oppose climate policies. Meanwhile, their party positions and issue stances have also become increasingly characterized by nationalism. Using European Social Survey data from 2016, we show that public attitudes consistent with nationalist ideology are clearly linked to voting for RWP parties and that people who hold these attitudes are more likely to be skeptical about climate change and to oppose policies that increase taxes on fossil fuels. With regard to policy attitudes, we find that nationalist ideology is more influential than traditional left-right political ideology, environmental values and political trust. The results also reveal substantial cross-national differences, as nationalist ideology is linked more closely to public views about climate change in Western European countries, where RWP parties with a nationalist rhetoric have had recent electoral successes.

Taxes on fossil fuels could be a useful policy tool for governments seeking to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. However, such taxes are politically challenging to introduce, as public opinion is usually hostile to them. Prior studies have found that attitudes toward carbon and other environmental taxes reflect not just people's beliefs and concerns about the problems these taxes address, but also their trust in their country's politicians and political system. Using multilevel models fitted to data collected in 2016 on 42,401 individuals in 23 European countries, we show for the first time that these two factors interact. Among Europeans who distrust their country's politicians, political parties, and parliament, or who live in countries with low levels of political trust, being aware and concerned about climate change is at most weakly associated with support for taxes on fossil fuels. Europeans with high political trust, on the other hand, tend to be much more supportive of fossil fuel taxes if they also believe in the reality and dangers of anthropogenic climate change. Cross-nationally, the nations whose populations are most supportive of higher taxes on fossil fuels are not those that are more aware and concerned about climate change; rather, they are those with the highest levels of political trust.