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How is the nature of populations governed by the movement decisions made by their members? This is the core question in this thesis. To answer this question, I first assume that s movement decisions are based on conditions in their local environment. Then I derive mathematical relationships that distil the character of individual movement events, and relate the sum of these events to the dynamical properties of the population. I find that the fate of populations depend delicately on the way resident individuals relocate in response to local conditions. This general conclusion is supported by results in the four papers constituting this thesis.

In the first paper we derive a deterministic approximation of a stochastic individual-based spatial predator-prey model. We show how general types of movement behaviors either stabilise or destabilise predator-prey dynamics. Based on experimental data on movement behaviors, we conclude that predator-prey dynamics are stabilised if the prey species respond stronger to predator presence than the predatory species respond to prey.

In the second paper we derive a new type of functional response that arise when there is a behavioral spatial “race” between predators and prey. Although fundamentally different from classical functional responses, the induced density-dependencies in reproduction rates are similar to those in Holling’s type II and DeAngelis-Beddington’s functional responses.

In the third paper we perform a novel systematic investigation of density-dependencies in population growth-rates induced by the spatial covariance in empirical predator-prey systems. We categorise three types of density dependencies: “lagged”, “direct” and “independent”, and find direct and especially lagged density-dependencies to be common. We find that the density-dependencies in most cases are destabilising, which is at odds with the wide-spread view that spatial heterogeneity stabilises consumer-resource dynamics. We also find dependencies of prey density to be more common than of predator density.

In the forth paper we consider the evolution of cooperation. We formulate a stochastic individual-based group-formation process and show that profit-dependent group disengagement is evolutionarily stable and allows the emergence of stable cooperative communities.