Neurocognitive processes underlying heuristic and normative probability judgmentsShow others and affiliations
2020 (English)In: Cognition, ISSN 0010-0277, E-ISSN 1873-7838, Vol. 196, p. 1-7, article id 104153Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]
Judging two events in combination (A&B) as more probable than one of the events (A) is known as a conjunction fallacy. According to dual-process explanations of human judgment and decision making, the fallacy is due to the application of a heuristic, associative cognitive process. Avoiding the fallacy has been suggested to require the recruitment of a separate process that can apply normative rules. We investigated these assumptions using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) during conjunction tasks. Judgments, whether correct or not, engaged a network of brain regions identical to that engaged during similarity judgments. Avoidance of the conjunction fallacy additionally, and uniquely, involved a fronto-parietal network previously linked to supervisory, analytic control processes. The results lend credibility to the idea that incorrect probability judgments are the result of a representativeness heuristic that requires additional neurocognitive resources to avoid.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
ELSEVIER , 2020. Vol. 196, p. 1-7, article id 104153
Keywords [en]
Decision making, Dual-system, Dual-process, fMRI, Representativeness
National Category
Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-169341DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2019.104153ISI: 000518704700021PubMedID: 31838247Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85076262700OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-169341DiVA, id: diva2:1423714
Projects
ujl2020-04-152020-04-152023-12-14Bibliographically approved