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Data reconstruction attack against principal component analysis
Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Department of Computing Science.
Umeå University, Faculty of Science and Technology, Department of Computing Science.ORCID iD: 0000-0002-0368-8037
2023 (English)In: Security and Privacy in Social Networks and Big Data: 9th International Symposium, SocialSec 2023, Canterbury, UK, August 14–16, 2023 / [ed] Budi Arief; Anna Monreale; Michael Sirivianos; Shujun Li, Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2023, p. 79-92Conference paper, Published paper (Refereed)
Abstract [en]

Attacking machine learning models is one of the many ways to measure the privacy of machine learning models. Therefore, studying the performance of attacks against machine learning techniques is essential to know whether somebody can share information about machine learning models, and if shared, how much can be shared? In this work, we investigate one of the widely used dimensionality reduction techniques Principal Component Analysis (PCA). We refer to a recent paper that shows how to attack PCA using a Membership Inference Attack (MIA). When using membership inference attacks against PCA, the adversary gets access to some of the principal components and wants to determine if a particular record was used to compute those principal components. We assume that the adversary knows the distribution of training data, which is a reasonable and useful assumption for a membership inference attack. With this assumption, we show that the adversary can make a data reconstruction attack, which is a more severe attack than the membership attack. For a protection mechanism, we propose that the data guardian first generate synthetic data and then compute the principal components. We also compare our proposed approach with Differentially Private Principal Component Analysis (DPPCA). The experimental findings show the degree to which the adversary successfully attempted to recover the users’ original data. We obtained comparable results with DPPCA. The number of principal components the attacker intercepted affects the attack’s outcome. Therefore, our work aims to answer how much information about machine learning models is safe to disclose while protecting users’ privacy.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2023. p. 79-92
Series
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, ISSN 03029743, E-ISSN 16113349 ; 14097
Keywords [en]
Data reconstruction attack, Generative Adversarial Networks, Membership Inference Attack, Principal Component Analysis, Privacy
National Category
Computer Sciences
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-214976DOI: 10.1007/978-981-99-5177-2_5Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85172275690ISBN: 9789819951765 (print)ISBN: 978-981-99-5177-2 (electronic)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-214976DiVA, id: diva2:1805147
Conference
9th International Symposium, SocialSec 2023, Canterbury, UK, August 14–16, 2023.
Available from: 2023-10-16 Created: 2023-10-16 Last updated: 2024-10-09Bibliographically approved
In thesis
1. Navigating data privacy and utility: a strategic perspective
Open this publication in new window or tab >>Navigating data privacy and utility: a strategic perspective
2024 (English)Doctoral thesis, comprehensive summary (Other academic)
Alternative title[sv]
Navigera i datasekretess och verktyg : ett strategiskt perspektiv
Abstract [en]

Privacy in machine learning should not merely be viewed as an afterthought; rather, it must serve as the foundation upon which machine learning systems are designed. In this thesis, along with the centralized machine learning, we also consider the distributed environments for training machine learning models, particularly federated learning. Federated learning lets multiple clients or organizations train a machine learning model in a collaborative manner without moving their data. Each client participating to the federation shares the model parameters learnt by training a machine learning model on its data. Even though the setup of federated learning keeps the data local, there is still a risk of sensitive information leaking through the model updates. For instance, attackers could potentially use the updates of the model parameters to figure out details about the data held by clients. So, while federated learning is designed to protect privacy, it still faces challenges in ensuring that the data remains secure throughout the training process. 

Originally, federated learning was introduced in the context of deep learning models. However, this thesis focuses on federated learning for decision trees. Decision Trees are intuitive, and interpretable models, making them popular in a wide range of applications, especially where explanability of the decisions made by the decision tree model is important. However, Decision Trees are vulnerable to inference attacks, particularly when the structure of the decision tree is exposed. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, a key contribution of this thesis is the development of novel federated learning algorithms that incorporate privacy-preserving techniques, such as $k$-anonymity and differential privacy, into the construction of decision trees. By doing so, we seek to ensure user privacy without significantly compromising the performance of the model. Machine learning models learn patterns from data, and during this process, they might leak sensitive information. Each step of the machine learning pipeline presents unique vulnerabilities, making it essential to assess and quantify the privacy risks involved. One focus of this thesis is the quantification of privacy by devising a data reconstruction attack tailored to Principal Component Analysis (PCA), a widely used dimensionality reduction technique. Furthermore, various protection mechanisms are evaluated in terms of their effectiveness in preserving privacy against such reconstruction attacks while maintaining the utility of the model. In addition to federated learning, this thesis also addresses the privacy concerns associated with synthetic datasets generated by models such as generative networks. Specifically, we perform an Attribute Inference Attack on synthetic datasets, and quantify privacy by calculating the Inference Accuracy—a metric that reflects the success of the attacker in estimating sensitive attributes of target individuals.

Overall, this thesis contributes to the development of privacy-preserving algorithms for decision trees in federated learning and introduces methods to quantify privacy in machine learning systems. Also, the findings of this thesis set a ground for further research at the intersection of privacy, and machine learning.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Umeå: Umeå University, 2024. p. 103
Series
UMINF, ISSN 0348-0542 ; 24.10
Keywords
Privacy, Data Reconstruction Attacks, k-anonymity, Differential Privacy, Federated Learning, Decision Trees, Principal Component Analysis
National Category
Computer Sciences Other Engineering and Technologies
Identifiers
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-230616 (URN)978-91-8070-481-6 (ISBN)978-91-8070-482-3 (ISBN)
Public defence
2024-11-04, BIO.A.206 Aula Anatomica, Biologihuset, 09:15 (English)
Opponent
Supervisors
Funder
Wallenberg AI, Autonomous Systems and Software Program (WASP)
Available from: 2024-10-14 Created: 2024-10-08 Last updated: 2024-10-24Bibliographically approved

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Kwatra, SaloniTorra, Vicenç

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