Epistemic injustice and conditioned experience: the case of intellectual disability
2016 (English)In: WAGADU volume15: Epistemic Injustice in Practice / [ed] Franziska Dübgen, Bloomington, Indiana, US: Xlibris LLC , 2016, p. 137-174Chapter in book (Refereed)
Abstract [en]
People with intellectual disabilities are commonly seen as "nonadult others" and as persons of limited credibility, and this view has implications in a number of areas. In this paper, the empirical findings from an interview study focused on lived experience are analyzed in relation to the intersections of intellectual disability and gender. In light of Fricker's (2007) work on epistemic injustice, and in recognition of Anderson's (2012) emphasis on the importance of transactional and structural injustice, a novel aspect of epistemic injustice is provided: as a consequence of conditioned lived space. The social identity of intellectual disability position persons thus identified to belong to a segregated and marginalized group. Although guided by the ambition to care for and protect this vulnerable group, structural transactions provided by the welfare system run the risk of simultaneously depriving individuals of both the experiences and the hermeneutical resources necessary to interpretatively frame and make sense of their limited situation and lack of possibilities – and thus from interacting epistemically in fruitful ways. A key structural feature of the epistemic injustice towards the group is shown to be a lived experience that to a large extent is conditioned by the constructions of disability and gender.
Abstract [de]
Epistemische Ungerechtigkeit und bedingte Erfahrung: Der Fall von geistiger Behinderung
Anhand einer Analyse der gelebten Erfahrungen von Menschen mit geistiger Behinderung erschließt dieser Artikel einen neuen Aspekt der epistemischen Ungerechtigkeit: Strukturell in das wohlfahrtsstaatliche System eingebettete Abläufe laufen Gefahr, die betroffenen Individuen sowohl ihrer Erfahrungen als auch der hermeneutischen Ressourcen zu berauben, die sie benötigen würden, um ihre bedingte Situation angemessen interpretieren zu können und um an einem epistemisch fruchtbaren Austausch teilzuhaben.
Abstract [fr]
Injustice épistémique et expérience conditionnée : Le cas du handicap mental
A partir d'une analyse de l'expérience d'un handicap mental, cet article met à jour un nouvel aspect d'injustice épistémique. La gestion structurelle assurée par la sécurité sociale risque de priver les individus des expériences et des ressources herméneutiques nécessaires pour interpréter et donner du sens à leur situation limitée, et de les empêcher de participer à des interactions épistémiques fructueuses.
Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
Bloomington, Indiana, US: Xlibris LLC , 2016. p. 137-174
Keywords [en]
epistemic injustice, conditioned experience, intellectual disability, welfare system, constructions of disability and gender
National Category
Social Work Philosophy
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-128138ISBN: 978-1-5245-5182-7 (print)ISBN: 978-1-5245-5183-4 (electronic)OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-128138DiVA, id: diva2:1049297
Funder
Forte, Swedish Research Council for Health, Working Life and Welfare, 2014-06872016-11-242016-11-242018-06-09Bibliographically approved