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Matching with partners and projects
Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet.
2019 (Engelska)Ingår i: Journal of Economic Theory, ISSN 0022-0531, E-ISSN 1095-7235, Vol. 184, artikel-id 104942Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat) Published
Abstract [en]

We propose a model where agents are matched in pairs in order to undertake a project. Agents have preferences over both the partner and the project they are assigned to. These preferences over partners and projects are separable and dichotomous. Each agent partitions the set of partners into friends and outsiders, and the set of projects into good and bad ones. Friendship is mutual and transitive. In addition, preferences over projects among friends are correlated (homophily). We define a suitable notion of the weak core and propose an algorithm, the minimum demand priority algorithm (MDPA) that generates an assignment in the weak core. In general, the strong core does not exist but the MDPA assignment satisfies a limited version of the strong core property when only friends can be members of the blocking coalition. The MDPA is also strategy-proof. Finally we show that our assumptions on preferences are indispensable. We show that the weak core may fail to exist if any of the assumptions of homophily, separability and dichotomous preferences are relaxed. 

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
Elsevier, 2019. Vol. 184, artikel-id 104942
Nyckelord [en]
Matching, Stability, Strategy-proofness, Two-sided matching, One-sided matching
Nationell ämneskategori
Nationalekonomi
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-166480DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2019.104942ISI: 000498285500012Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85072574332OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-166480DiVA, id: diva2:1382151
Tillgänglig från: 2020-01-02 Skapad: 2020-01-02 Senast uppdaterad: 2023-12-01Bibliografiskt granskad

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Yadav, Sonal

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Totalt: 212 träffar
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