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Local-global equivalence in voting models: A characterization and applications
Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India.
Economic Research Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, Kolkata, India.
Economics and Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India.
Umeå University, Faculty of Social Sciences, Umeå School of Business and Economics (USBE), Economics.
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2021 (English)In: Theoretical Economics, ISSN 1933-6837, E-ISSN 1555-7561, Vol. 16, no 4, p. 1195-1220Article in journal (Refereed) Published
Abstract [en]

The paper considers a voting model where each voter's type is her preference. The type graph for a voter is a graph whose vertices are the possible types of the voter. Two vertices are connected by an edge in the graph if the associated types are “neighbors.” A social choice function is locally strategy-proof if no type of a voter can gain by misrepresentation to a type that is a neighbor of her true type. A social choice function is strategy-proof if no type of a voter can gain by misrepresentation to an arbitrary type. Local-global equivalence (LGE) is satisfied if local strategy-proofness implies strategy-proofness. The paper identifies a condition on the graph that characterizes LGE. Our notion of “localness” is perfectly general. We use this feature of our model to identify notions of localness according to which various models of multidimensional voting satisfy LGE. Finally, we show that LGE for deterministic social choice functions does not imply LGE for random social choice functions.

Place, publisher, year, edition, pages
2021. Vol. 16, no 4, p. 1195-1220
Keywords [en]
D71, Local incentive constraints, mechanism design, strategic voting, strategy-proofness
National Category
Economics
Identifiers
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-189669DOI: 10.3982/TE4177ISI: 000755604700003Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85118835032OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-189669DiVA, id: diva2:1612690
Available from: 2021-11-19 Created: 2021-11-19 Last updated: 2023-09-05Bibliographically approved

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Yadav, Sonal

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Citation style
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Output format
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