This article focuses on ‘therefore’ constructions such as ‘The switch is on, and therefore the lights are on’. We submit that the contribution of ‘therefore’ is to express a dependence as part of the core content of these constructions, rather than being conveyed by conventional implicature [Grice, H. P. 1975. “Logic and Conversation.” In The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy, edited by M. Ezcurdia, and R. J. Stainton, 41–58. Broadview Press; Potts, C. 2005. The Logic of Conventional Implicatures. Oxford University Press] or a triggered presupposition [Pavese, C. 2017. “On the Meaning of ‘Therefore’.” Analysis 77 (1): 88–97. Pavese, C. 2021. “Lewis Carroll’s Regress and the Presuppositional Structure of Arguments.” Linguistics and Philosophy; Stokke, A. 2017. “II—Conventional Implicature, Presupposition, and Lying.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary 91 (1): 127–147]. We argue that the standard objections to this view can be answered by relying on the general projection hypothesis defended by Roberts et al. and Simons et al. [Roberts, C., M. Simons, J. Tonhauser, and D. I. Beaver. 2009. Presuppositions, Conventional Implicature, and Beyond: A Unified Account of Projection; Simons, M., J. Tonhauser, D. Beaver, and C. Roberts. 2010. “What Projects and Why.” Semantics and Linguistic Theory 20: 309–327], leaving our view on solid ground.