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Contractual requirements and bidding behavior in public procurement with entry
Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.
Umeå universitet, Samhällsvetenskapliga fakulteten, Handelshögskolan vid Umeå universitet, Nationalekonomi.ORCID-id: 0000-0001-9466-4876
2025 (Engelska)Ingår i: Journal of Public Economic Theory, ISSN 1097-3923, E-ISSN 1467-9779, Vol. 27, nr 1, artikel-id e70019Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat) Published
Abstract [en]

We combine theoretical and empirical analyses to investigate the impacts of contractual requirements on bidding behavior and competition in procurement auctions with endogenous entry. Our analysis demonstrates that contractual requirements affect expected payoffs, influencing the equilibrium number of bidders and their bids under zero-profit conditions. Specifically, in equilibrium, increased contractual requirements enhance competition by raising bidders' expected payoffs, while higher entry costs reduce competition. Overall, a rise in entry costs results in elevated equilibrium bids. Under certain conditions, an increase in contractual requirements raises equilibrium bids. Additionally, we emphasize the significance of enforceability in shaping bidding behavior and, thus, in policy implementation. Empirical evidence from public cleaning services procurement in Sweden supports the implications of our model.

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
John Wiley & Sons, 2025. Vol. 27, nr 1, artikel-id e70019
Nyckelord [en]
competition, contractual requirements, optimal bids, public procurement
Nationell ämneskategori
Nationalekonomi
Identifikatorer
URN: urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-236459DOI: 10.1111/jpet.70019ISI: 001424601900001Scopus ID: 2-s2.0-85219723135OAI: oai:DiVA.org:umu-236459DiVA, id: diva2:1945980
Forskningsfinansiär
KonkurrensverketTillgänglig från: 2025-03-20 Skapad: 2025-03-20 Senast uppdaterad: 2025-04-23Bibliografiskt granskad
Ingår i avhandling
1. Navigating public procurement
Öppna denna publikation i ny flik eller fönster >>Navigating public procurement
2025 (Engelska)Doktorsavhandling, sammanläggning (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
Alternativ titel[sv]
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Abstract [en]

Paper [I]: This paper studies the effect of Green Public Procurement (GPP) on competition, bids, and winning bids under two different regulation periods where the latter include more explicitly expressed GPP ambitions. Based on detailed data from Swedish internal cleaning service procurements, our results imply that environmental considerations might not influence the bids as required for GPP to be considered an effective environmental policy instrument. Over time, lower degree of competition and increased bids are found. This phenomenon can be attributed, at least in part, to regulatory influences, signifying an escalating complexity in the process of submitting bids.

Paper [II]: We combine theoretical and empirical analysis to investigate impacts of contractual requirements in procurement auctions with endogenous entry. Our analysis shows that contractual requirements impact expected payoffs, influencing the equilibrium number of bidders and their bids under zero-profit conditions. Specifically, we find that, in equilibrium, more contractual requirements increase competition by raising bidders’ expected payoffs, while increased entry costs reduce competition. Overall, a rise in contractual requirements and entry costs results in higher equilibrium bids. Additionally, we highlight the importance of enforce ability in shaping bidding behavior. Empirical evidence from public cleaning services procurement in Sweden corroborates the implications of our model.

Paper [III]: This paper investigates post-litigation impacts on bidder participation and composition within public procurement, utilizing Swedish data spanning from 2012 to 2018. The findings indicate an average decrease in bidder participation following a litigation process of approximately 8%, particularly in construction procurements, alongside a decline in the proportion of SME bidders and local firm participation. Furthermore, bidder participation, bidder composition, and procurement design significantly influence the probability of litigation.

Paper [IV]: This study examines the impact of local market concentration on the participation and success of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in Swedish municipal cleaning service procurement auctions. A 10 percentage point reduction in the joint market share of the four largest firms (CR4), while maintaining a constant Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), results in a 7.5% increase in SME participation and raises the likelihood of an SME winning by 2.4%. Furthermore, the 2014 revisions to the EU public procurement directives mitigated the adverse effects of market concentration. However, despite the increase in participation, there is no evidence that the success rates of SMEs improved following the implementation of the revised EU directives. 

Ort, förlag, år, upplaga, sidor
Umeå: Umeå University, 2025. s. 12
Serie
Umeå economic studies, ISSN 0348-1018 ; 1035
Nyckelord
Public Procurement, GPP, Regulation, Contractual Requirements, Endogenous Entry, Auction Theory, Litigation Processes, Bidder Participation, SMEs, Competitiveness, Regional Economics, Market Concentration, GMM, 2SLS, Probit, Poisson QMLE
Nationell ämneskategori
Nationalekonomi
Identifikatorer
urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-237793 (URN)978-91-8070-688-9 (ISBN)978-91-8070-689-6 (ISBN)
Disputation
2025-05-23, Umeå, 11:00 (Engelska)
Opponent
Handledare
Tillgänglig från: 2025-04-29 Skapad: 2025-04-23 Senast uppdaterad: 2025-04-28Bibliografiskt granskad

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