This chapter discusses what might be called the paradox of moral objectivity. On the one hand, powerful arguments suggest that objective moral facts would be metaphysically weird and that, consequently, there are no such things. But, on the other hand, moral philosophy as well as our everyday moral thought and discourse appears to be committed to objective moral facts. The right view of morality, then, might be one that is analogous to atheism. According to atheism, religious beliefs involve commitment to metaphysically weird and hence non-existent divine facts. And, according to what is known as the error theory about morality, moral beliefs involve commitment to metaphysically weird and hence non-existent moral facts. However, while the merits of atheism can be debated, the error theory about morality is just too absurd, since it implies that nothing is right or wrong. Surely it was wrong for Ted Bundy to go on a killing spree, for example. And, if so, the error theory is not the right view of morality. How, then, can the paradox be avoided? Towards the end of the chapter a solution is sketched.