Individuals with aphantasia report a lack of quasi-perceptual experience yet perform comparably to imaginers on perceptual tasks. Among existing accounts – Description, Introspection, Disconnection, and Absence – the latter two are considered the most plausible. Disconnection posits that aphantasics succeed by relying on (non-phenomenal) imagery, preserving its central representational role in cognition. In contrast, Absence claims that aphantasics lack imagistic representation altogether and, as a last resort, rely on alternative strategies.
We propose a middle ground: Ineffectivity. This account allows for the presence of (non-phenomenal) imagery but questions its effectivity. Imagery may be inaccessible (due to internal impairments, for example) or systematically bypassed in favor of alternative strategies. We argue that such strategies are not exceptional but banal, even among poor imaginers. This perspective offers a unified explanation for both “moderate” and “extreme” aphantasia. Unlike Absence, Ineffectivity accommodates preserved imagery mechanisms in some aphantasics. It also draws a clear distinction between aphantasia and blindsight, while Disconnection relies heavily on a parallel between the two.
We conclude with a noteworthy implication: Ineffectivity challenges the assumption that imagery plays a central and representational role in cognition, akin to that of perception. Instead, we suggest shifting the research focus from representational performance to how (lack of) phenomenology impacts engagement with mental content.