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  • 1.
    Björnsson, Gunnar
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Francén Olinder, Ragnar
    Internalists Beware – We Might all be Amoralists!2013Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 91, nr 1, s. 1-14Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Standard motivational internalism is the claim that by a priori or conceptual necessity, a psychological state is a moral opinion only if it is suitably related to moral motivation. Many philosophers, the authors of this paper included, have assumed that this claim is supported by intuitions to the effect that amoralists—people not suitably related to such motivation—lack moral opinions proper. In this paper we argue that this assumption is mistaken, seeming plausible only because defenders of standard internalism have failed to consider the possibility that our own actual moral practice as a whole is one where moral opinions fail to motivate in the relevant way. To show this, we present a cynical hypothesis according to which the tendency for people to act in accordance with their moral opinions ultimately stems from a desire to appear moral. This hypothesis is most likely false, but we argue, on both intuitive and methodological grounds, that it is conceptually possible that it correctly describes our actual moral opinions. If correct, this refutes standard motivational internalism. Further, we propose an explanation of why many have seemingly internalist intuitions. Such intuitions, we argue, stem from the fact that standard amoralist cases allow (or even suggest) that we apprehend the putative moral opinions of amoralists as radically different from how we understand actual paradigmatic moral opinions. Given this, it is reasonable to understand them as not being moral opinions proper. However, since these intuitions rest on substantial a posteriori assumptions about actual moral opinions, they provide no substantial a priori constraints on theories of moral judgment.

  • 2.
    Franzén, Nils
    Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden.
    Aesthetic evaluation and first-hand experience2018Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 96, nr 4, s. 669-682Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Evaluative aesthetic discourse communicates that the speaker has had first-hand experience of what is talked about. If you call a book bewitching, it will be assumed that you have read the book. If you say that a building is beautiful, it will be assumed that you have had some visual experience with it. According to an influential view, this is because knowledge is a norm for assertion, and aesthetic knowledge requires first-hand experience. This paper criticizes this view and argues for an alternative view, according to which aesthetic discourse expresses affective states of mind, analogously to how assertions express beliefs. It is because these affective states require first-hand experience that aesthetic discourse communicates that such acquaintance is at hand. The paper furthermore argues that the lack of an experience requirement for aesthetic belief ascriptions constitutes a problem for the kind of expressivist who claims that evaluative belief states are covert non-cognitive states.

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  • 3. Huvenes, Torfinn Thomesen
    Varieties of Disagreement and Predicates of Taste2012Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 90, nr 1, s. 167-181Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Predicates of taste, such as ‘fun’ and ‘tasty’, have received considerable attention in recent debates between contextualists and relativists, with considerations involving disagreement playing a central role. Considerations involving disagreement have been taken to present a problem for contextualist treatments of predicates of taste. My goal is to argue that considerations involving disagreement do not undermine contextualism. To the extent that relativism was supposed to be motivated by contextualists being unable to deal with disagreement, this motivation is lacking. The argument against contextualism rests on a too simple and narrow conception of disagreement that turns out to be problematic once we consider a wider range of cases. If we reject the assumptions about disagreement that the argument rests on, it no longer poses a threat to contextualism.

  • 4. Huvenes, Torfinn Thomesen
    et al.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Information centrism and the nature of contexts2016Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 94, nr 2, s. 301-314Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Information Centrism is the view that contexts consist of information that can be characterized in terms of the propositional attitudes of the conversational participants. Furthermore, it claims that this notion of context is the only one needed for linguistic theorizing about context-sensitive languages. We argue that Information Centrism is false, since it cannot account correctly for facts about truth and reference in certain cases involving indexicals and demonstratives. Consequently, contexts cannot be construed simply as collections of shared information.

  • 5.
    Nowak, Ethan
    et al.
    King’s College London.
    Michaelson, Eliot
    Who's your ideal listener?2020Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    It is increasingly common for philosophers to rely on the notion of an idealised listener when explaining how the semantic values of context-sensitive expressions are determined. Some have identified the semantic values of such expressions, as used on particular occasions, with whatever an appropriately idealised listener would take them to be. Others have argued that, for something to count as the semantic value, an appropriately idealised listener should be able to recover it. Our aim here is to explore the range of ways that such idealisation might be worked out, and then to argue that none of these results in a very plausible theory. We conclude by reflecting on what this negative result reveals about the nature of meaning and responsibility.

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  • 6.
    Peet, Andrew
    Leeds, UK.
    Referential intentions and communicative luck2017Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 95, nr 2, s. 379-384Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Brian Loar [1976] observed that communicative success with singular terms requires more than correct referent assignment. For communicative success to be achieved, the audience must assign the right referent in the right way. Loar, and others since, took this to motivate Fregean accounts of the semantics of singular terms. Ray Buchanan [2014] has recently responded, maintaining that, although Loar is correct to claim that communicative success with singular terms requires more than correct referent assignment, this is compatible with direct reference approaches, as long as one also endorses an independently motivated Gricean view of communicative intentions. This paper argues that Buchanan's Gricean view cannot account for the full range of Loar cases. In doing so, it aims to explicate the structure of Loar's cases and thus to clarify the conditions that a theory must meet in order to adequately meet his challenge.

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  • 7.
    Sandgren, Alexander
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Williamson, Timothy Luke
    Determinism, Counterfactuals, and Decision2021Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 99, nr 2, s. 286-302Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Rational agents face choices, even when taking seriously the possibility of determinism. Rational agents also follow the advice of Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Although many take these claims to be well-motivated, there is growing pressure to reject one of them, as CDT seems to go badly wrong in some deterministic cases. We argue that deterministic cases do not undermine a counterfactual model of rational deliberation, which is characteristic of CDT. Rather, they force us to distinguish between counterfactuals that are relevant and ones that are irrelevant for the purposes of deliberation. We incorporate this distinction into decision theory to develop ‘Selective Causal Decision Theory’, which delivers the correct recommendations in deterministic cases while respecting the key motivations behind CDT.

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  • 8.
    Stokke, Andreas
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Proposing, Pretending, and Propriety: A Response to Don Fallis2017Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828, Vol. 95, nr 1, s. 178-183Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    This note responds to criticism put forth by Don Fallis of an account of lying in terms of the Stalnakerian view of assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Fallis objects by presenting an example to show that one can lie even though one does not propose to make what one says common ground. It is argued here that this objection does not present a problem for the view of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. Responding to the objection brings out important features of this view of discourse and of assertion.

  • 9.
    Vaassen, Bram
    Umeå universitet.
    Mental causation for standard dualists2024Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy, ISSN 0004-8402, E-ISSN 1471-6828Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The standard objection to dualist theories of mind is that they seemingly cannot account for the obvious fact that mental phenomena cause our behaviour. On the plausible assumption that all our behaviour is physically necessitated by entirely physical phenomena, there appears to be no room for dualist mental causation. Some argue that dualists can address this problem by making minimal adjustments in their ontology. I argue that no such adjustments are required. Given recent developments in philosophy of causation, it is plausible that mental phenomena cause behaviour in standard dualist ontologies.

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