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  • 1.
    Coelho Mollo, Dimitri
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier. Cluster Science of Intelligence, Berlin, Germany.
    Intelligent Behaviour2024Ingår i: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 89, nr 2, s. 705-721Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The notion of intelligence is relevant to several fields of research, including cognitive and comparative psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and philosophy, among others. However, there is little agreement within and across these fields on how to characterise and explain intelligence. I put forward a behavioural, operational characterisation of intelligence that can play an integrative role in the sciences of intelligence, as well as preserve the distinctive explanatory value of the notion, setting it apart from the related concepts of cognition and rationality. Finally, I examine a popular hypothesis about the underpinnings of intelligence: the capacity to manipulate internal representations of the environment. I argue that the hypothesis needs refinement, and that so refined, it applies only to some forms of intelligence.

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  • 2.
    Huvenes, Torfinn Thomesen
    Univ St Andrews, Arche Philosoph Res Ctr, Fife, Scotland.
    Disagreement without error2014Ingår i: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 79, nr Suppl., s. 143-154Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    The idea that there can be cases of faultless disagreement, cases of disagreement in which neither party is making a mistake, is frequently discussed in connection with relativist views in philosophy of language. My goal is to argue that we can make sense of faultless disagreement without being committed to any form of relativism if we recognise that disagreement sometimes involves attitudes other than belief, such as desires or preferences. Furthermore, this way of making sense of faultless disagreement allows us to avoid some of the problems that have been raised in connection with relativist accounts of faultless disagreement.

  • 3.
    Loew, Christian
    Institute of Philosophy, University of Luxembourg.
    Boltzmannian Immortality2017Ingår i: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 82, s. 761-776Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Plausible assumptions from Cosmology and Statistical Mechanics entail that it is overwhelmingly likely that there will be exact duplicates of us in the distant future long after our deaths. Call such persons “Boltzmann duplicates,” after the great pioneer of Statistical Mechanics. In this paper, I argue that if survival of death is possible at all, then we almost surely will survive our deaths because there almost surely will be Boltzmann duplicates of us in the distant future that stand in appropriate relations to us to guarantee our survival.

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  • 4.
    Nowak, Ethan
    King’s College London, London, UK.
    Really complex demonstratives: а dilemma2020Ingår i: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    I have two aims for the present paper, one narrow and one broad. The narrow aim is to show that a class of data originally described by Lynsey Wolter (That’s that; the semantics and pragmatics of demonstrative noun phrases, PhD thesis, University of California at Santa Cruz, 2006) empirically undermine the leading treatments of complex demonstratives that have been described in the literature. The broader aim of the paper is to show that Wolter demonstratives, as I will call the constructions I focus on, are a threat not just to existing treatments, but to any possible theory that retains the uncontroversial assumptions that relative clauses always form a constituent with the nouns they modify, and that semantic composition proceeds sequentially and locally, with the inputs to interpretation having the structure syntax tells us they do.

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  • 5.
    Peet, Andrew
    University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway.
    Testimonial knowledge-how2019Ingår i: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 84, nr 4, s. 895-912Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    There is an emerging skepticism about the existence of testimonial knowledge-how (Hawley in Stud Hist Philos Sci Part A 41(4):387–404, 2010; Poston in Noûs 50(4):865–878, 2016; Carter and Pritchard in Philos Phenomenol Res 91(1):181–199, 2015a) (Hawley does not commit to the impossibility of testimonial knowledge-how. However, she questions whether apparent cases of testimonial knowledge-how will be genuinely testimonial). This is unsurprising since a number of influential approaches to knowledge-how struggle to accommodate testimonial knowledge-how. Nonetheless, this scepticism is misguided. This paper establishes that there are cases of easy testimonial knowledge-how. It is structured as follows: first, a case is presented in which an agent acquires knowledge-how simply by accepting a speaker’s testimony. Second, it is argued that this knowledge-how is genuinely testimonial. Next, Poston’s (2016) arguments against easy testimonial knowledge-how are considered and rejected. The implications of the argument differ for intellectualists and anti-intellectualists about knowledge-how. The intellectualist must reject widespread assumptions about the communicative preconditions for the acquisition of testimonial knowledge. The anti-intellectualist must find a way of accommodating the dependence of knowledge-how on speaker reliability. It is not clear how this can be done.

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  • 6.
    Sundström, Pär
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Are Sensory Concepts Learned by "Abstraction" from Experience?2019Ingår i: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 84, nr 5, s. 1159-1178Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    In recent years, many philosophers and scientists have argued or accepted that it is impossible to learn primitive sensory concepts like "blue" and "red". This paper defends a more qualified picture. I try to show that some received characterisations of "learning" are nonequivalent and point towards different learning-nonlearning distinctions. And, on some ways of specifying such a distinction, it might be correct that we do not and cannot "learn" a concept of blue. But on other ways of specifying such a distinction, we can and do sometimes "learn" a concept of blue from experiences of blue. The latter part of the argument connects with some traditional "abstractionist" views, and I defend the present claims in view of some widely circulated concerns about "abstracting" concepts from experience. I close with some reflections on how one might, in view of all this, think about "the learning-nonlearning distinction".

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  • 7.
    Vaassen, Bram
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier. 1630 Idésam, Umeå University.
    Dualism and Exclusion2021Ingår i: Erkenntnis, ISSN 0165-0106, E-ISSN 1572-8420, Vol. 86, nr 3, s. 543-552Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Many philosophers argue that exclusion arguments cannot exclude non-reductionist physicalist mental properties from being causes without excluding properties that are patently causal as well. List and Stoljar (Australas J Philos 95(1):96–108, 2017) recently argued that a similar response to exclusion arguments is also available to dualists, thereby challenging the predominant view that exclusion arguments undermine dualist theories of mind. In particular, List and Stoljar maintain that exclusion arguments against dualism require a premise that states that, if a property is metaphysically distinct from the sufficient cause of an effect, this property cannot be a cause of that effect. I argue that this premise is indeed likely to exclude patently causal properties, but that exclusion arguments against dualism do not require this premise. The relation that enables metaphysically distinct properties to cause the same effect in the relevant way turns out to be tighter than the relation typically posited between dualist conscious properties and their underlying physical properties. It is therefore still plausible that the latter causally exclude the former and that compelling exclusion arguments against dualism can be formulated by using a weaker exclusion premise. I conclude by proposing such a formulation.

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