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  • 1.
    Gheaus, Anca
    University of Sheffield.
    The feasibility constraint on the concept of justice2013Ingår i: The Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 63, nr 253, s. 445-464Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    There is a widespread belief that, conceptually, justice cannot require what we cannot achieve. This belief is sometimes used by defenders of so-called 'non-ideal theories of justice' to criticise so-called 'ideal theories of justice'. I refer to this claim as 'the feasibility constraint on the concept of justice' and argue against it. I point to its various implausible implications and contend that a willingness to apply the label 'unjust' to some regrettable situations that we cannot fix is going to enhance the action-guiding potential of a conception of justice, by providing an aspirational ideal. This is possible on the condition that, at all times, we cannot specify with certainty the limits of what is feasible for us collectively. The rejection of the feasibility constraint entails that there can be injustice without perpetrators; this is a theoretical price worth paying.

  • 2.
    Hansen, Nat
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    On an alleged truth/falsity asymmetry in context shifting experiments2012Ingår i: The Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 62, nr 248, s. 530-545Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Keith DeRose has argued that context shifting experiments should be designed in a specific way in order to accommodate what he calls a ‘truth/falsity asymmetry’. I explain and critique DeRose’s reasons for proposing this modification to contextualist methodology, drawing on recent experimental studies of DeRose’s bank cases as well as experimental findings about the verification of affirmative and negative statements. While DeRose’s arguments for his particular modification to contextualist methodology fail, the lesson of his proposal is that there is good reason to pay close attention to several subtle aspects of the design of context shifting experiments.

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    On an Alleged Truth/Falsity Asymmetry (preprint)
  • 3.
    Loew, Christian
    et al.
    Universität zu Köln, Germany.
    Jaag, Siegfried
    Universität Düsseldorf, Germany.
    Humean Laws and (Nested) Counterfactuals2019Ingår i: The Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 70, nr 278, s. 93-113Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Humean reductionism about laws of nature is the view that the laws reduce to the total distribution of non-modal or categorical properties in spacetime. A worry about Humean reductionism is that it cannot motivate the characteristic modal resilience of laws under counterfactual suppositions and that it thus generates wrong verdicts about certain nested counterfactuals. In this paper, we defend Humean reductionism by motivating an account of the modal resilience of Humean laws that gets nested counterfactuals right.

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  • 4.
    Nowak, Ethan
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Sociolinguistic variation, speech acts, and discursive injustice2023Ingår i: The Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 73, nr 4, s. 1024-1045Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    Despite its status at the heart of a closely related field, philosophers have so far mostly overlooked a phenomenon sociolinguists call 'social meaning'. My aim in this paper will be to show that by properly acknowledging the significance of social meanings, we can identify an important new set of forms that discursive injustice takes. I begin by surveying some data from variationist sociolinguistics that reveal how subtle differences in the way a particular content is expressed allow us to perform importantly different illocutionary actions, actions we use to do things like constructing a public persona and building a rapport with an audience. The social importance of these activities and the pervasiveness of our engagement in them means that the ethical stakes involved are high - substantial injustices may result if speakers from different social groups are differently empowered with regard to the illocutionary possibilities made available to them by variation.

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  • 5.
    Nowak, Ethan
    et al.
    Umeå universitet, Humanistiska fakulteten, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier.
    Michaelson, Eliot
    Department of Philosophy, King’s College London, London, UK.
    Meta-metasemantics, or the quest for the one true metasemantics2021Ingår i: The Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213, Vol. 72, nr 1, s. 135-154Artikel i tidskrift (Refereegranskat)
    Abstract [en]

    What determines the meaning of a context-sensitive expression in a context? It is standardly assumed that, for a given expression type, there will be a unitary answer to this question; most of the literature on the subject involves arguments designed to show that one particular metasemantic proposal is superior to a specific set of alternatives. The task of the present essay will be to explore whether this is a warranted assumption, or whether the quest for the one true metasemantics might be a Quixotic one. We argue that there are good reasons—much better than are commonly appreciated—for thinking the latter, but that there nevertheless remains significant scope for metasemantic theorizing. We conclude by outlining our preferred option, metasemantic pluralism.

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  • 6.
    Svensson, Frans
    Stockholm University.
    Review of Ingmar Persson, From Morality to the End of Reason2017Ingår i: The Philosophical Quarterly, ISSN 0031-8094, E-ISSN 1467-9213Artikel, recension (Övrigt vetenskapligt)
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